"ON MORAL DUTIES":
BOOK III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS EXPEDIENT.
Translator's introduction:
a. Definition. The basic meaning of the word "officium" in Latin is a "service" or "duty," performed for someone else, and is a contraction of "opus facio," to do work. An extended meaning was "a sense of duty," from which, in the plural, we get the notion of "moral duties" or "moral obligations," which is the sense in which Cicero is using it in the title of his work, "De Officiis."
b. Date. Cicero wrote the "De Officiis" in September-November 44 B.C. Its writing coincided with his composition of the "Second Philippic," perhaps his most virulent attack on Mark Antony (see the translation on this blog dated 24 November 2012), which he sent to his friend Atticus on 25 October 44, and this perhaps accounts for the bitter incidental allusions to the tyrannical conduct of Caesar and Antony in "De Officiis".
c. Purpose. On his enforced retirement from both politics and his legal work in 46, Cicero set himself the task of acting as an "expositor" of Greek philosophy for his fellow Romans. He set himself this task, partly as a way of easing his fretting at his inability to contribute to the welfare of his countrymen, but also as a way of occupying himself during the long hours of sleeplessness which beset him during this time, a problem exacerbated by his prolonged grief at the death of his beloved daughter Tullia in February 45. "De Officiis," which is ostensibly addressed to his son Marcus, whom he had sent to Athens to study philosophy, is but one of an astonishingly prolific output of works which Cicero produced during the last four years of his life, i.e. 46-43. For Romans ethics was, perhaps, the only branch of philosophy which seemed of any significance, and Cicero seems to have considered "De Officiis" as his masterpiece.
d. Influences upon Cicero. In his philosophical works, Cicero made no pretensions towards originality. He saw himself very much as an "expositor", and a follower, of the Greeks. Although in terms of philosophy as a whole Cicero claimed to be a disciple of the New Academy, founded by Carneades of Cyrene (214-129) as a somewhat sceptical-leaning variety of Platonic thought, when it came to ethics Cicero was heavily influenced by the Stoics, that is the Middle Stoic school of Panaetius of Rhodes (185-109), whose disciple, Posidonius of Apamea (135-50), had been Cicero's tutor when he himself studied at Athens as a young man in 78. Cicero draws particularly upon Panaetius' work, "Περὶ Καθήκοντος" in books I and II of "De Officiis." This Greek phrase is usually translated "On the Fitting," but "On Moral Duties" would be another way to render it.
e. Structure of "De Officiis." The work is divided into three books: I. What is Right, or the Honourable; II. What is Expedient, or the Useful; III. The Conflict between What is Right and What is Expedient.
f. Structure of Book III. Book III, which is translated below, is structured into the following sections, the headings of which are shown below:
A. Introduction: contrasting approaches to leisure (1-6).
B. The conflict between the expedient and the honourable (7-13).
C. Perfect and Intermediate Moral Duties (13-18).
D. Establishing a formula, or criterion, for behaviour when the apparently expedient conflicts with the honourable (18-39).
E. The apparently expedient and the demands of justice (40-95).
F. The apparently expedient and fortitude (96-115).
G. The apparently expedient and the fourth virtue of self-control (116-120).
H. Postscript: parting exhortation to young Marcus (121).
g. Assessment of "De Officiis." In the introduction to his authoritative edition and translation of this work, Walter Miller (see Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, first published 1913) points out that Cicero follows Panaetius fairly closely in Books I and II, but that Book III, while it is more independent, is, in his view, of lesser quality. Of the work as a whole, Miller writes as follows: "It has its strengths and its weaknesses - its sane common sense and noble patriotism, its self-conceit and partisan politics; it has the master's brilliant style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical flourishes, and it fails often in logical order and power; it rings true in its moral tone, but it shows in what haste and distraction it was composed; for it was not written as a contribution to close scientific thinking; it was written as a means of occupation and diversion (see introduction p. xiv)."
h. Sabidius' reason for translating Book III. Although Miller may have some reason to consider Book III inferior in quality to the two earlier books, the fact that Panaetius failed to fulfil his undertaking to discuss the potential conflict between what is right and what is expedient compelled Cicero, if he wished to address this conflict, to branch out on his own, so to speak. Indeed, as Michael Grant in his introduction to his own translation of "De Officiis," Book III writes: "as Cicero himself states .... he is now writing independently and in accordance with his own experience and his own interpretation of what he has read." Grant goes on to make the following assessment of Cicero's efforts: "The result is a remarkable discussion of how a Roman citizen ought to meet the various problems of his life. Cicero, interpreting life as a complex of obligations to others as well as oneself, offers a splendid testimony to the beliefs in human cooperation which he so enthusiastically confirmed from his readings of the Stoics, and yet tempered with his own undogmatic good sense." (See "Cicero: Selected Works," translated by Michael Grant, Penguin Classics, 1960.) It is therefore because of the relative originality of Book III, and what its content tells one of Cicero's own greatness of spirit, that Sabidius has followed Michael Grant in prioritising its translation over the other two books.
h. The influence of "De Officiis" on future ages. This work was widely read and very highly regarded from the classical times, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance down to the Nineteenth Century. The Elder Pliny in his "Natural History," written in Vespasian's reign in the First Century A.D. says that "De Officiis" should not only be read daily, but committed to memory. Cicero's works in general and "De Officiis" in particular were hugely influential with the Early Church Fathers, Lactantius and Ambrose in particular, with Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Dante and Petrarch in the Middle Ages, and with most of the great thinkers of the Renaissance, including Colet, More and Linacre. Milton and Locke in the Seventeenth Century, and Montesquieu and Kant in the Eighteenth, were also its devotees. Also in the Eighteenth Century Frederick the Great of Prussia said of the work that it was "the best work on morals that has been or can be written," and in 1771 Voltaire wrote of it that "No one will ever write anything more wise, more true or more useful." Thereafter, interest in Cicero's work declined, partly due to the soaring enthusiasm in the Nineteenth Century for studying the history, literature and philosophy of fifth and fourth century Athens, as a result of which interest in Roman literature and, indeed, Greek literature of the Hellenistic era both declined markedly.
i. Sources. In making this translation Sabidius has relied upon the Latin text of this work contained in "Cicero: On Duties," translated by Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1913), and also available, inter alia, on the Perseus website. Apart from Miller's translation of "De Officiis" Book III, Sabidius has also availed himself of those of Michael Grant in "Cicero: Selected Works" (Penguin Classics, 1960), and of P.G. Walsh in "Cicero: On Obligations" (Oxford University Press, 2000).
A. INTRODUCTION: CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO LEISURE (1-6).
Chapter I. 1) (O) Marcus, my son (i.e. Marcus Tullius Cicero, the orator's only son, consul with Octavian in 30), Cato (i.e. Marcus Porcius Cato, the Censor or the Elder, consul 195) has written that that Publius Scipio (i.e. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, consul in 205 and 194, who defeated Hannibal at Zama in 202) who was the first to be called Africanus, (and) who was about equal to him in age, used to say that he was never less idle than when he was at his ease, and never less lonely than when he was alone. An impressive remark indeed, and worthy of (so) great and wise a man; it shows that even in his leisure (time) he was thinking about (public) business and that he was so used to communing with himself in his solitude that he was never idle, and that sometimes he had no need to converse with another. So, the two circumstances that cause torpor in others, leisure and solitude, used to stimulate him. I (only) wish that I could truthfully say the same (thing about myself); but if, I cannot match such excellence of mind by imitation, I do, at all events, approach (it) very closely in aspiration; for, now that I have been debarred from politics and from pleading at the bar by the force of treasonous arms (i.e. the intimidation of Mark Antony), I am pursuing (a life of) leisure, and, for that reason, I have left the city, and, (while) roaming around the countryside, I am often alone.
BOOK III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT IS EXPEDIENT.
Translator's introduction:
a. Definition. The basic meaning of the word "officium" in Latin is a "service" or "duty," performed for someone else, and is a contraction of "opus facio," to do work. An extended meaning was "a sense of duty," from which, in the plural, we get the notion of "moral duties" or "moral obligations," which is the sense in which Cicero is using it in the title of his work, "De Officiis."
b. Date. Cicero wrote the "De Officiis" in September-November 44 B.C. Its writing coincided with his composition of the "Second Philippic," perhaps his most virulent attack on Mark Antony (see the translation on this blog dated 24 November 2012), which he sent to his friend Atticus on 25 October 44, and this perhaps accounts for the bitter incidental allusions to the tyrannical conduct of Caesar and Antony in "De Officiis".
c. Purpose. On his enforced retirement from both politics and his legal work in 46, Cicero set himself the task of acting as an "expositor" of Greek philosophy for his fellow Romans. He set himself this task, partly as a way of easing his fretting at his inability to contribute to the welfare of his countrymen, but also as a way of occupying himself during the long hours of sleeplessness which beset him during this time, a problem exacerbated by his prolonged grief at the death of his beloved daughter Tullia in February 45. "De Officiis," which is ostensibly addressed to his son Marcus, whom he had sent to Athens to study philosophy, is but one of an astonishingly prolific output of works which Cicero produced during the last four years of his life, i.e. 46-43. For Romans ethics was, perhaps, the only branch of philosophy which seemed of any significance, and Cicero seems to have considered "De Officiis" as his masterpiece.
d. Influences upon Cicero. In his philosophical works, Cicero made no pretensions towards originality. He saw himself very much as an "expositor", and a follower, of the Greeks. Although in terms of philosophy as a whole Cicero claimed to be a disciple of the New Academy, founded by Carneades of Cyrene (214-129) as a somewhat sceptical-leaning variety of Platonic thought, when it came to ethics Cicero was heavily influenced by the Stoics, that is the Middle Stoic school of Panaetius of Rhodes (185-109), whose disciple, Posidonius of Apamea (135-50), had been Cicero's tutor when he himself studied at Athens as a young man in 78. Cicero draws particularly upon Panaetius' work, "Περὶ Καθήκοντος" in books I and II of "De Officiis." This Greek phrase is usually translated "On the Fitting," but "On Moral Duties" would be another way to render it.
e. Structure of "De Officiis." The work is divided into three books: I. What is Right, or the Honourable; II. What is Expedient, or the Useful; III. The Conflict between What is Right and What is Expedient.
f. Structure of Book III. Book III, which is translated below, is structured into the following sections, the headings of which are shown below:
A. Introduction: contrasting approaches to leisure (1-6).
B. The conflict between the expedient and the honourable (7-13).
C. Perfect and Intermediate Moral Duties (13-18).
D. Establishing a formula, or criterion, for behaviour when the apparently expedient conflicts with the honourable (18-39).
E. The apparently expedient and the demands of justice (40-95).
F. The apparently expedient and fortitude (96-115).
G. The apparently expedient and the fourth virtue of self-control (116-120).
H. Postscript: parting exhortation to young Marcus (121).
g. Assessment of "De Officiis." In the introduction to his authoritative edition and translation of this work, Walter Miller (see Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, first published 1913) points out that Cicero follows Panaetius fairly closely in Books I and II, but that Book III, while it is more independent, is, in his view, of lesser quality. Of the work as a whole, Miller writes as follows: "It has its strengths and its weaknesses - its sane common sense and noble patriotism, its self-conceit and partisan politics; it has the master's brilliant style, but it is full of repetitions and rhetorical flourishes, and it fails often in logical order and power; it rings true in its moral tone, but it shows in what haste and distraction it was composed; for it was not written as a contribution to close scientific thinking; it was written as a means of occupation and diversion (see introduction p. xiv)."
h. Sabidius' reason for translating Book III. Although Miller may have some reason to consider Book III inferior in quality to the two earlier books, the fact that Panaetius failed to fulfil his undertaking to discuss the potential conflict between what is right and what is expedient compelled Cicero, if he wished to address this conflict, to branch out on his own, so to speak. Indeed, as Michael Grant in his introduction to his own translation of "De Officiis," Book III writes: "as Cicero himself states .... he is now writing independently and in accordance with his own experience and his own interpretation of what he has read." Grant goes on to make the following assessment of Cicero's efforts: "The result is a remarkable discussion of how a Roman citizen ought to meet the various problems of his life. Cicero, interpreting life as a complex of obligations to others as well as oneself, offers a splendid testimony to the beliefs in human cooperation which he so enthusiastically confirmed from his readings of the Stoics, and yet tempered with his own undogmatic good sense." (See "Cicero: Selected Works," translated by Michael Grant, Penguin Classics, 1960.) It is therefore because of the relative originality of Book III, and what its content tells one of Cicero's own greatness of spirit, that Sabidius has followed Michael Grant in prioritising its translation over the other two books.
h. The influence of "De Officiis" on future ages. This work was widely read and very highly regarded from the classical times, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance down to the Nineteenth Century. The Elder Pliny in his "Natural History," written in Vespasian's reign in the First Century A.D. says that "De Officiis" should not only be read daily, but committed to memory. Cicero's works in general and "De Officiis" in particular were hugely influential with the Early Church Fathers, Lactantius and Ambrose in particular, with Peter Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Dante and Petrarch in the Middle Ages, and with most of the great thinkers of the Renaissance, including Colet, More and Linacre. Milton and Locke in the Seventeenth Century, and Montesquieu and Kant in the Eighteenth, were also its devotees. Also in the Eighteenth Century Frederick the Great of Prussia said of the work that it was "the best work on morals that has been or can be written," and in 1771 Voltaire wrote of it that "No one will ever write anything more wise, more true or more useful." Thereafter, interest in Cicero's work declined, partly due to the soaring enthusiasm in the Nineteenth Century for studying the history, literature and philosophy of fifth and fourth century Athens, as a result of which interest in Roman literature and, indeed, Greek literature of the Hellenistic era both declined markedly.
i. Sources. In making this translation Sabidius has relied upon the Latin text of this work contained in "Cicero: On Duties," translated by Walter Miller (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1913), and also available, inter alia, on the Perseus website. Apart from Miller's translation of "De Officiis" Book III, Sabidius has also availed himself of those of Michael Grant in "Cicero: Selected Works" (Penguin Classics, 1960), and of P.G. Walsh in "Cicero: On Obligations" (Oxford University Press, 2000).
A. INTRODUCTION: CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO LEISURE (1-6).
Chapter I. 1) (O) Marcus, my son (i.e. Marcus Tullius Cicero, the orator's only son, consul with Octavian in 30), Cato (i.e. Marcus Porcius Cato, the Censor or the Elder, consul 195) has written that that Publius Scipio (i.e. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus Major, consul in 205 and 194, who defeated Hannibal at Zama in 202) who was the first to be called Africanus, (and) who was about equal to him in age, used to say that he was never less idle than when he was at his ease, and never less lonely than when he was alone. An impressive remark indeed, and worthy of (so) great and wise a man; it shows that even in his leisure (time) he was thinking about (public) business and that he was so used to communing with himself in his solitude that he was never idle, and that sometimes he had no need to converse with another. So, the two circumstances that cause torpor in others, leisure and solitude, used to stimulate him. I (only) wish that I could truthfully say the same (thing about myself); but if, I cannot match such excellence of mind by imitation, I do, at all events, approach (it) very closely in aspiration; for, now that I have been debarred from politics and from pleading at the bar by the force of treasonous arms (i.e. the intimidation of Mark Antony), I am pursuing (a life of) leisure, and, for that reason, I have left the city, and, (while) roaming around the countryside, I am often alone.
2) But I should not compare this leisure (of mine) with the leisure of Africanus, nor this solitude (of mine) with his. For he, in order to secure some rest from his splendid services to the republic, now and then used to take a holiday for himself, and sometimes to withdraw from the assemblies and the throngs of men into solitude, as if into a haven (of rest), whereas my vacation has been fixed by the lack of public business, not by any desire for rest (on my part). For (now) that the Senate has been sidelined and the law-courts have come to an end, what is there that I can do either in the senate-house or in the forum (that is) worthy of my (efforts). 3) So, although I once lived amongst a huge multitude (of people) and in the public eye, I now shun the gaze of the miscreants with whom all (things) abound, and I hide away, as far as I can, and I am often alone. But, as I have thus learned from philosophers that, among evil (things) one ought to choose the least (evil) (n.b. this proverb comes from Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics"), but also to extract from these whatever good may lie in (them), for that reason too I am making the most of my repose, (though it is) not, in all honesty, such (a repose) as the man who once procured peace for the state ought (to have), but I am not allowing this solitude, which necessity, not my will, imposes on me, to find (me) idle.
4) And yet, in my judgment, Africanus earned the higher praise. For no records of his genius, committed in writing, no work of his leisure (time), no product of his solitude exists; from this it should be understood, from the activity of his mind and from his scrutiny of those matters which he was pursuing in his thoughts, that he was never at a loss or lonely; but I, who am not in possession of a great (enough) strength (of mind) to detach myself from my solitude by silent meditation, have turned all my efforts and attention to this task of writing. And so, I have written more in the short time since the downfall of the republic than (I did) in the many years when (it) was (still) standing.
Chapter II. 5) But, my (dear) Cicero, although the whole (field of) philosophy may be fruitful and productive, and no part of it uncultivated and barren, yet no topic within it is more fertile and richer than (the part which) concerns those moral duties from which the rules for leading a steady and honourable life are derived. And for this reason, although I trust that you are diligently attending to, and absorbing, (the lectures on) these (precepts) from my (friend) Cratippus (i.e. the Head of the school of Peripatetics and young Marcus' teacher), (who is) the foremost amongst the philosophers of our day, still I think (it) useful that your ears should resound with such voices from every side, and that they, if this could happen, should hear nothing else. 6) All (those) who intend to embark upon an honourable career must undertake this (process), and I do not know whether (there is) anyone (to whom this applies) more than you; for you will have to withstand the considerable expectation that you will emulate my industry, my great (course) of political offices, (and) perhaps something of my reputation. Besides, you have incurred a heavy burden (of responsibility) on account of both Athens and Cratippus; since you have gone to them, for the purchase, as it were, of the liberal arts, it would be very discreditable (for you) to return empty-handed, (thus) disgracing both the reputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, you should strive, as much as you can, by mental effort and by hard work - if (in your case) learning is a labour and not a pleasure; do your very best to succeed, and do not act (in such a way) that, when all (your needs) have been (so) freely supplied by me, you are perceived to have failed on your own account.
Chapter II. 5) But, my (dear) Cicero, although the whole (field of) philosophy may be fruitful and productive, and no part of it uncultivated and barren, yet no topic within it is more fertile and richer than (the part which) concerns those moral duties from which the rules for leading a steady and honourable life are derived. And for this reason, although I trust that you are diligently attending to, and absorbing, (the lectures on) these (precepts) from my (friend) Cratippus (i.e. the Head of the school of Peripatetics and young Marcus' teacher), (who is) the foremost amongst the philosophers of our day, still I think (it) useful that your ears should resound with such voices from every side, and that they, if this could happen, should hear nothing else. 6) All (those) who intend to embark upon an honourable career must undertake this (process), and I do not know whether (there is) anyone (to whom this applies) more than you; for you will have to withstand the considerable expectation that you will emulate my industry, my great (course) of political offices, (and) perhaps something of my reputation. Besides, you have incurred a heavy burden (of responsibility) on account of both Athens and Cratippus; since you have gone to them, for the purchase, as it were, of the liberal arts, it would be very discreditable (for you) to return empty-handed, (thus) disgracing both the reputation of the city and of your master. Therefore, you should strive, as much as you can, by mental effort and by hard work - if (in your case) learning is a labour and not a pleasure; do your very best to succeed, and do not act (in such a way) that, when all (your needs) have been (so) freely supplied by me, you are perceived to have failed on your own account.
But enough of this! For I have frequently written to you at length for the sake of encouragement; now, let us go back to the remaining section of the work in front of (us).
B. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EXPEDIENT AND THE HONOURABLE (7-13).
7) So, Panaetius (i.e. the most famous Stoic philosopher of the Middle Stoa and Cicero's teacher), who has, unquestionably, given (us) the most thorough discussion of moral duties, - and I have followed him in the main, (while) applying some modifications - , after he laid down three topics in relation to moral duties, on which men are accustomed to deliberate and reflect - the first, when they are uncertain whether something, about which there is discussion, is right or wrong, the second, (whether) it is expedient or inexpedient, (and) the third, if something, which has the appearance of moral rectitude clashes with something which appears (to be) expedient, how one ought to make a distinction between these (things) - , he expounded the first two topics in three books, and he stated in writing that he would discuss the third topic in due course, but he did not fulfil what he had promised. 8) (And) I wonder (all) the more at this, because it is recorded by his pupil Posidonius (i.e. another celebrated philosopher of the Middle Stoa) that Panaetius was (still) alive thirty years after he had published these books. (And) I am surprised that this subject has been (but) briefly touched upon by Posidonius in certain notebooks (of his), (and) especially since he states that there is no topic in the whole of philosophy as important (as this).
9) I certainly do not agree with those who say that this subject was not overlooked by Panaetius, but that it was deliberately omitted (by him), and that it had not needed to be discussed at all, because expediency can never conflict with honesty. With regard to this (assertion), one (point) may cause some doubt, (that is) whether that topic, which is third in Panaetius' classification, ought to have been included, or omitted entirely, (but) the other (point), that it was to have been undertaken by Panaetius, but (was then) abandoned, cannot be open to doubt. For (if) someone has completed two sections of a threefold division, it is necessary that the third section should remain for him (to do); besides, he promises at the end of the third book that he will discuss this section in due course. 10) Posidonius acts (as) a trusty witness on this same (matter), and he also writes in one of his letters that Publius Rutilius Rufus (i.e. consul 105), who had been a pupil of Panaetius, used to say that not one painter had been found who could complete that part of the Venus of Cos which Apelles (i.e. a celebrated Fourth Century artist, born in Colophon) had left unfinished - for the beauty of her face removed any hope of representing the rest of her body - , so no one would venture to complete what Panaetius had omitted, and had not completed, because of the surpassing excellence of those (topics) which he had completed
Chapter III. 11) Therefore, with regard to Panaetius' intentions, there cannot be any doubt; but, whether he was right to have added this third aspect to the enquiry into moral obligation or not, there can perhaps be some discussion about this. For, whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics believe, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, that which is morally good is so much the highest good that everything (else which is) gathered together on the other side (of the scales) would scarcely have the appearance of the slightest weight, it is not to be doubted that expediency can never contend with moral rectitude. And so we have heard that Socrates had cursed those who had first torn asunder those (concepts) made inseparable by natural conjecture. To this, indeed, the Stoics are in agreement, as they consider that, whatever is morally right, it is expedient also, and that nothing (is) expedient which (is) not morally right.
12) But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is only worth cultivating because it is productive of advantage, like those who measure the desirability of something on the basis of pleasure or the absence of pain, he might argue that expediency is sometimes in conflict with integrity; but, since he is the sort of man who judges what is morally right (as) the only good, and that (those things) which conflict with it (have) only the appearance of expediency, and that life cannot be made any better by their presence, or any worse by their absence, it does not seem that he should have raised a debate of this kind, in which what seems expedient is compared with what is morally right. 13) But actually, what is called by the Stoics the highest good, (that is) to live in accordance with nature, has, I believe, this meaning: (that we are) always to live in conformity with virtue, and to choose all those (things) which are in harmony with nature, so long as such (things) are not incompatible with virtue. Since this is so, some (people) think that (it was) not right for this comparison (i.e. between what is right and what is expedient) to (have been) introduced, and that no instruction at all should have been offered on this subject.
C. PERFECT AND INTERMEDIATE MORAL DUTIES (13-18).
It is true, furthermore, that what is properly and truly called moral goodness is the possession of the wise alone; but among those in whom no perfect wisdom exists, that perfect moral goodness itself cannot indeed exist at all, (but only) the semblance of moral goodness. 14) For these duties, which we are discussing in these books, the Stoics call 'intermediate'; they are common (property) and are widely available; and many (people) attain to the knowledge of them through the strength of their intellect and the advancement of their learning. But that duty, which those same (philosophers) call right, is also perfect and absolute, and, as the same (philosophers) say, satisfies all the numbers (i.e. they fulfil all the requirements of natural perfection - an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that certain numbers stand for specific kinds of perfection), and cannot be the responsibility of anyone except the sage. 15) Yet, when some (action) is performed, in which 'intermediate' duties are evident, that is regarded (as) fully perfect, on account of the fact that the common crowd does not generally understand how far it falls short of perfection; but, in so far as they do understand, they think that nothing has been overlooked; this same (thing) occurs with regard to poems and paintings, and several others (areas of artistic accomplishment), such that those lacking experience are delighted with, and praise, things which are not worthy of praise, for (what is), I believe, this reason, that there is something of excellence in these (works) that captivates the uneducated, since they are not really able to judge what is the (point) of weakness in one or another of these things; and so, when they have been instructed by experts, they readily abandon their opinion.
Chapter IV. So, (the performance of) the particular duties, which I am discussing in these books, they (i.e. the Stoics) say that these involve a sort of second-grade moral goodness, (which is) not only peculiar to sages, but (is) shared with the whole human race. 16) And so, all (men), in whom there is a natural disposition to virtue are stirred by such (duties). When the two Decii (i.e. Publius Decius Mus, consul 340 and his son, Publius Decius Mus, consul 295, who both sacrificed their lives in victorious battles, the former fighting the Latins at Suessa Aurunca, and the latter fighting the Samnites at Sentinum) or the two Scipios (i.e. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, consul 222, and his younger brother Publius Cornelius Scipio, consul 218, were both killed in Spain in 211 fighting the Carthaginians) are commemorated (as) 'brave men', or when Fabricius (i.e. Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, consul in 282 and again in 278), or Aristides (i.e. an Athenian statesman at the beginning of the Fifth Century), is called 'the Just', an exemplar, whether of courage in the case of the former, or of justice, in the case of the latter, is in no way being invoked, as though in the case of a 'sage'; for none of them (was) a sage, in the sense that we would wish (the word) 'sage' to be understood; nor were Marcus Cato (vide section 1) and Gaius Laelius (i.e. Gaius Laelius Sapiens consul 140), men who were regarded and named (as) 'wise', actually sages, nor indeed (were) the famous Seven (i.e. the seven sages of Greece, including Thales and Solon, who lived in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries), but, from their frequent (performance) of 'intermediate' duties, they bore a certain resemblance and likeness to sages.
17) Therefore, it is not right that what is true morality should be matched with the incompatibility of expediency, nor should what we commonly call morality, (the thing) that is practised by those who wish themselves to be regarded as good men, ever be weighed against financial profits, and we should observe and maintain that moral goodness which falls within (the scope of) our understanding, as (carefully) as the sages have to (observe) that moral goodness which is properly and truly (so) called; for otherwise whatever progress has been made towards moral goodness cannot be maintained.
Now these (remarks) relate to those who, through due observance of their moral obligations, are considered (to be) good (men).
18) Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by financial profit and personal advantage, and are not prepared for such (outcomes) to be outweighed by (considerations of) moral rectitude, are accustomed in their deliberations to compare moral goodness with what they think (is) expedient; (but) good men are not accustomed (to do that). And so, I believe that Panaetius, when he stated that men were accustomed, in (making) this comparison, to hesitate, he meant (exactly) what he said, simply that "this was their custom," not also that "it was their duty." Furthermore, it is absolutely disgraceful, not only to rate what appears expedient more highly than what is morally right, but also (even) to compare them against one another.
D. ESTABLISHING A FORMULA, OR CRITERION, FOR BEHAVIOUR WHEN THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT CONFLICTS WITH THE HONOURABLE (18-39).
So, what is it that sometimes tends to cause doubt, and seems to require consideration? (It is,) I believe, whenever (an occasion for) doubt arises as to what kind of (action) it is that is under consideration. 19) For on occasion it often happens that (something) which usually tends to be considered (as) morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong; by way of example, let some (case) be proposed that has a wider application: what greater crime can there be than to kill not only a man, but a man (who is) also a close friend? But, if a man kills a tyrant, albeit (he is) an intimate friend, he has not implicated himself in a crime, has he? At any rate, it does not seem (so) to the Roman people, who believe such (an act to be) the most splendid of all glorious deeds. So, has expediency prevailed over moral rectitude? By no means, (for) moral rectitude has accompanied expediency.
So, some general rule needs to be laid down, so that we can decide, without any (possibility of) error, whenever something which we call expedient seems to clash with something which we perceive (to be) morally right; if we follow this (rule) in comparing courses of action, we shall never depart from (the path of) duty. 20) This rule, however, will be perfectly in harmony with the system and doctrine of the Stoics; indeed, in these books I am following their system for this reason: although (things) that are morally right are given preference to (things) which seem expedient, yet these (issues) are to be discussed in a more illuminating fashion by those who consider whatever is morally right (as) identical to (what is) expedient, and nothing expedient which (is) not morally right, than by those who (believe) something morally right (that is) not expedient, and (something) expedient (that is) not morally right. But my Academy gives me the considerable freedom to let it be within my rights to defend any (theory) which suggests (itself to me as) most credible. But I return to my rule.
Chapter V. 21) So then, to take something from someone else and for a man to maximise his own benefit by another man's loss is more contrary to nature than (is) death, or poverty, or pain, or anything else that can befall either his person or his external possessions. For, in the first place, it undermines the intercourse and fellowship of human beings. For, if we should be so disposed that each (of us), in accordance with our own financial advantage, should rob or injure a neighbour, that fellowship of the human race, which is especially in accord with nature, must, of necessity, be disrupted. 22) Just as, if each of our limbs had such a notion that it thought it could become fit and well if it could transfer to itself the strength of the neighbouring limb, the whole body would inevitably become weakened and die, so, if each one of us should seize for himself the property of others and take away whatever he could for his own benefit, the society of men and our community must inevitably be overthrown. For it is granted, without any resistance from nature, that each one of us may prefer to secure for himself, rather than for someone else, what is required for the conduct of life, (but) nature does not allow this, that we should increase our means, our wealth and our resources from the spoils of others.
23) In truth, this (principle), that one must not harm another for the sake of one's own interests, is established in the same way not only by nature, that is by the law of nations, but also by the laws of the (different) peoples, in which the public interest is maintained in individual states; for this is what the laws are looking (to achieve), this is their intent, that the unifying bonds between citizens should be maintained; those who break them, they punish by means of death, exile, imprisonment, (or) a fine.
Moreover, the system of nature itself, which is the law of gods and men, makes this (principle) much more effective; whoever wishes to comply with it - and all, who wish to live in accord with nature, will comply (with it) - will never be guilty of coveting the property of another and of obtaining what he has taken from his neighbour. 24) Furthermore, loftiness and greatness of spirit, and, courtesy, justice (and) generosity likewise, are much more in accord with nature than self-indulgence, (mere) living, and riches; but it is, indeed, (the mark) of a noble and lofty spirit to despise such (things) and to consider (them) as nothing in comparison with the common good. However, to steal from one's neighbour for personal gain is more contrary to nature than death, pain and other (things) of the same kind.
25) And again, it is more in accord with nature to undergo the greatest toils and tribulations for the sake of saving or aiding every nation, if it can be done, (thus) emulating the famous Hercules, whom popular report, recalling his benefits (to mankind), has stationed amidst the assembly of the gods, than to live in solitude, not only without any troubles, but also abounding in the greatest pleasures (and) every resource, so that you may also surpass (all others) in beauty and strength.
Therefore, all those with the best and most noble character much prefer the former life (i.e. the life of service) to the latter (one) (i.e. the life of pleasure). From this it follows that man, (if he is) obedient to nature, cannot harm his (fellow-)man.
26) And then, (he) who wrongs another in order to gain some advantage for himself, either must suppose that he is doing nothing contrary to nature, or he believes that death, poverty, pain, and also the loss of children, relatives (and) friends are more to be avoided than doing someone an injustice. If he thinks that nothing contrary to nature is being done when he wrong his (fellow-)man, why should you argue with him, since he is stripping a man of absolutely everything that is human? But if he believes that this should indeed be avoided, but that the other (things), (namely) death, poverty (and) pain are much worse, he is mistaken in his belief that any damage to his person or to his property (is) more serious than any impairment to his soul.
Chapter VI. Accordingly, this one (principle) ought to be adhered to by all, that what is useful to the individual should be identical (to what is useful) to everyone else and to the community as a whole; if someone appropriates this (thing of use) to himself, (then) the whole human fellowship will be destroyed.
27) And furthermore, if nature ordains that a man shall wish to promote the interests of a (fellow-)man, whoever he may be, for this reason only, because he is a (fellow-)man, it is necessarily in accordance with the same nature that the interests of all men are common. If this is true, we are all constrained by one and the same law of nature, and, if this is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now, the first (premise is) true; therefore, the conclusion (is) true. 28) For that is indeed an absurd (position) that some (people) say that they will not rob a parent or a brother for their own gain, but that their relationship to the rest of their (fellow-)citizens is (quite) another (thing), Such (people) claim that there is no law, no social tie, which they share with their (fellow-)citizens for the sake of a common interest, and this attitude demolishes the whole of civil society.
But (those) who say that regard should be had for (the rights of) citizens, but not of foreigners, would divide the shared brotherhood of the human race; when this has been removed, kindness, generosity, goodness and justice are utterly obliterated; (those) who do dispose of these virtues must also be considered (as being) wickedly opposed to the immortal gods. For they overturn the fellowship between human beings, (which has been) established by them, and the closest bond of this fellowship is the belief that it is more repugnant to nature for a man to rob his neighbour for his own financial benefit than (for him) to endure all (possible) loss, whether to his property, or to his person ... or even to his very soul, so long as such (losses) do not involve injustice; for this one virtue is the mistress and queen of all the virtues.
29) (But) perhaps someone might say: "Well then, might not a wise man, if he were consumed with hunger, take food from another man (who was) no use at anything at all?" Certainly not, for my life is not more valuable to me than that frame of mind that (says) that I should not wrong anyone for the sake of my own advantage. Or again, if a good man were able to rob that cruel and monstrous tyrant Phalaris (i.e. the cruel Sixth Century tyrant of Acragas) of his clothing, lest he himself might die of cold, surely he should do (so)?
30) These (cases) are very easy to decide. For if, for the sake of your own advantage, you were to take anything from a man (who was) completely useless in every respect, you would be acting in an inhuman manner and contrary to the law of nature; but if, on the other hand, you are the sort of person, who, if you should remain alive, could render a great service to the state and to human society, if, for that reason, you were to take something from another, it would not be (something) worthy of censure. But if, on the other hand, the case is not of this kind, each person has to bear his own misfortune rather than take away another's advantages. So, sickness or want or anything of that sort is not more repugnant to nature than stealing and coveting (the property) of someone else, but disregard of the common interest is contrary to nature; for it is unjust. 31) So, the law of nature itself, which preserves and maintains the interests of human beings, will surely determine that the things (which are) necessary for living should be transferred from an idle and worthless man to a man (who is) wise, and good and brave, since if he were to die, it would greatly detract from the common good; only let that (man) act in such a way that he does not consider, due to self-regard and self-love, such (a transfer of possessions as) a pretext for wrong-doing. So, he will always fulfil his moral duty (by) taking account of the interests of mankind, and of that human fellowship, which I (so) often call to mind.
32) For, with regard to Phalaris, a decision is very easy. For we do not have any fellowship with tyrants, but rather there is the widest cleavage (between us and them), nor is it opposed to nature to rob, if you can, a man whom it is morally right to kill, and, indeed, the whole of that pestilential and impious race (i.e. tyrants) should be exterminated from human society. Furthermore, just as certain limbs are amputated, if they themselves have begun to lack blood and life, so to speak, and (thus) to harm other parts of the body, so that savagery and monstrosity of the beast in human form must be separated, as it were, from the shared body of humanity.
All questions of this kind are those in which our moral duty is to be found in accordance with the circumstances.
Chapter VII. 33) So, I believe that Panaetius would have pursued subjects of this sort, if some accident or (other) work had not frustrated his intention. With regard to these very issues, there are more than enough recommendations in his previous books, from which one can learn what should be avoided on account of shamefulness, and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not shameful at all.
But, as I am now putting the capstone, as it were, upon this work (which while) unfinished (is) yet nearly completed, just as geometers make a practice of not demonstrating every (proposition) but ask that certain (axioms) may be assumed by them (as true), so that they may, the more easily, explain what they wish (to put across), so I ask you, my (dear) Cicero, to allow me, if you can, (to claim) that nothing is worth seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if this is not permitted by Cratippus (i.e. as a Peripatetic, Cratippus believed that there were natural goods, such as honour and health, which were worth seeking for their own sake), you will surely grant this at least, that what is morally right is the thing most worthy to be sought for its own sake. Either one (of these alternatives) is sufficient for my (purpose), and at one time the former, and at another time the latter, seems (to me) the more probable, and, besides (these) no other (proposition is) credible.
34) Now, in the first place, I must defend Panaetius, for he stated not that expedient (things) could, on occasion, be in conflict (with the things that are) morally right - for to him that would have been impious - but (only) those (things) that appeared (to be) expedient. Indeed, he often bears witness to the fact that nothing (is) expedient which is not, at the same time, morally right, (and) that nothing is morally right which is not, at the same time, expedient, and he says that no greater pestilence has ever assailed human life than the doctrine of those who have set these (things) apart. Therefore he included (in his works) that conflict which appeared to be present, (but) which was not (real), not in order that we should ever give the expedient preference to the morally right, but so that we could accurately distinguish between them, if they should ever happen to coincide. So, I shall discharge this topic (which was passed) over, without any props to support (me), but fighting my own battles, as the saying goes. For nothing has been written on this subject since (the time of) Panaetius which meets with my approval, at least with regard to the (works) which have come into my hands.
Chapter VIII. 35) So then, when some of expediency is brought to your attention, you are inevitably influenced (by it); but if, when you direct your mind (to it), you observe something immoral attached to that thing which has presented the appearance of expediency, then you should not abandon (the search) for expediency, but you do need to understand that there cannot be any expediency present when it is (accompanied) by something immoral. But if there is nothing so opposed to nature as the immoral - for nature demands rectitude, harmony and consistency, and abhors their opposites - and (if) nothing (is) so much in accord with nature as expediency, (then) surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in the same object.
And again, if we are born for moral rectitude, and (if) that is either the only (thing) worth seeking, as Zeno (i.e. the founder of Stoicism) thought, or, at least, (it is) to be regarded (as) infinitely heavier in weight, as seems good to Aristotle (i.e. the founder of the Peripatetics), it necessarily follows that what is morally right is either the only, or the highest, good; now that which (is) good (is) certainly expedient; so, whatever (is) morally right (is) expedient.
36) Thus (it is) the error of men, (who are) not morally upright, that, when they seize upon something which seems expedient, to detach it at once from what is morally right. Hence (assassin's) daggers, hence the poisoned (cup), hence forged wills owe their origin, hence (too) the thefts, the embezzlement (of public funds), the pillaging and the plundering of allies and citizens, (and,) finally there emerges the lust for excessive wealth, for intolerable power, (and) finally for making oneself a king, even in states (that are) free, and nothing more atrocious or more repulsive than this can be imagined. For with a false perspective they see the material rewards, (but) they do not see the penalty - I am not speaking of (the punishment) of the laws, which they often escape (anyway) - but (the knowledge) of their own moral degradation, which is the bitterest possible (one).
37) For this reason, then, let this sort of questioner be expelled from our midst - for the whole lot (of them) are wicked and ungodly - , (that is, those) who (stop to) consider whether they should pursue the course which they know to be morally upright, or knowingly to defile themselves by a crime; for in their very hesitation there is (an element) of guilt, even if they do not (in the end) proceed to the deed. Therefore, those (courses of action) should not be considered at all, when even their consideration is morally wrong.
Furthermore, we must also banish from our deliberations any expectation or intention of concealing (things) and of keeping (them) secret. For, if we have only made some progress in philosophy, we ought to be convinced enough that (even) if we could keep all gods and men in the dark (about our actions), we must still do nothing that (smacks) of greed, or of injustice, or of lust, or of lack of self-control.
Chapter IX. 38) To illustrate this (truth), the celebrated Gyges is introduced by Plato (as the man) who, when a (fissure in) the earth had opened up, descended into that chasm and came upon a bronze horse, in whose side there was a door; when he had opened this, he saw a body of a dead man of an enormous size, and (with) a gold ring on his finger; when he had removed it, he wore (it) himself, and then took himself off to an assembly of shepherds - for he was a shepherd of the king. Then, when he turned the bezel of this ring inwards towards the palm (of his hand), he was seen by no one, but saw everything himself; when he turned the ring back to its (proper) position, he became visible once more. And so, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the ring, he indulged in sexual intercourse with the queen, and, with her as a helper, he murdered his master the king, (and) removed (all those) whom he thought were standing in his way, and no one could detect him in these crimes. Thus, thanks to the ring, he suddenly rose to be the king of Lydia.
Now then, if a wise (man) were to get hold of this very ring, he would not suppose that he had any more right to do wrong than if he did not have (it); for good (deeds), not secret (intrigues), are sought by good men.
39) And yet on this point certain philosophers - they are hardly at all vicious, but not very perceptive - declare the tale related by Plato (to be) fictitious and fabricated; as if he were actually maintaining that it had happened or could have happened! (But) the force of this ring and what it exemplifies is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect (the truth), when you were to do something for the sake of riches, power, sovereignty (or) sexual gratification, if it would always be unknown to the gods and men, would you do (it)? They say that it could not happen. Indeed, it is not possible at all; but I ask that, if what they say is not possible were possible, what then would they do? They press (their argument) just like yokels; for they deny that it is possible, and they persist in (making) this point; (but) they do not see what this word (i.e. 'if') means. For, when I ask what would they do if they could escape detection, I am not asking whether they can escape detection, but I am applying torments, as it were, so that, if they replied that, with the guarantee of impunity, they would do what was in their interests, they would be confessing that they are criminally-minded, (and) if they say that (they would) not (do so), they would be conceding that all (acts that are) inherently immoral should be avoided by them.
But now let me return to my theme.
E. THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT AND THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE (40-95).
Chapter X. 40) Many cases often arise to perplex our minds with the appearance of expediency; one ought not to contemplate whether integrity should be forsaken because of the size of the benefit - for that, indeed, would be despicable - , but whether that thing which appears (to be) expedient can happen without dishonour. When Brutus (i.e. Lucius Junius Brutus) annulled the consular power of his colleague Collatinus (i.e. Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, consul with Brutus in 509), it could be thought that he was doing something unjust; for he had been Brutus' partner and associate in their plans to expel the kings. But, when the leading men (in the state) had taken the decision that Superbus' (i.e. Lucius Tarquinius Superbus or 'The Proud', the seventh and last king of Rome 535-510) kindred and the (very) name of the Tarquins, and every reminder of the kingship, be removed, (then) what was expedient, (namely) to consult the interests of the fatherland, was so (evidently) morally right that it should have seemed right to Collatinus himself as well. And so, expediency won the day, because of that moral rectitude, without which expediency could not even have existed.
Chapter III. 11) Therefore, with regard to Panaetius' intentions, there cannot be any doubt; but, whether he was right to have added this third aspect to the enquiry into moral obligation or not, there can perhaps be some discussion about this. For, whether moral goodness is the only good, as the Stoics believe, or whether, as your Peripatetics think, that which is morally good is so much the highest good that everything (else which is) gathered together on the other side (of the scales) would scarcely have the appearance of the slightest weight, it is not to be doubted that expediency can never contend with moral rectitude. And so we have heard that Socrates had cursed those who had first torn asunder those (concepts) made inseparable by natural conjecture. To this, indeed, the Stoics are in agreement, as they consider that, whatever is morally right, it is expedient also, and that nothing (is) expedient which (is) not morally right.
12) But if Panaetius were the sort of man to say that virtue is only worth cultivating because it is productive of advantage, like those who measure the desirability of something on the basis of pleasure or the absence of pain, he might argue that expediency is sometimes in conflict with integrity; but, since he is the sort of man who judges what is morally right (as) the only good, and that (those things) which conflict with it (have) only the appearance of expediency, and that life cannot be made any better by their presence, or any worse by their absence, it does not seem that he should have raised a debate of this kind, in which what seems expedient is compared with what is morally right. 13) But actually, what is called by the Stoics the highest good, (that is) to live in accordance with nature, has, I believe, this meaning: (that we are) always to live in conformity with virtue, and to choose all those (things) which are in harmony with nature, so long as such (things) are not incompatible with virtue. Since this is so, some (people) think that (it was) not right for this comparison (i.e. between what is right and what is expedient) to (have been) introduced, and that no instruction at all should have been offered on this subject.
C. PERFECT AND INTERMEDIATE MORAL DUTIES (13-18).
It is true, furthermore, that what is properly and truly called moral goodness is the possession of the wise alone; but among those in whom no perfect wisdom exists, that perfect moral goodness itself cannot indeed exist at all, (but only) the semblance of moral goodness. 14) For these duties, which we are discussing in these books, the Stoics call 'intermediate'; they are common (property) and are widely available; and many (people) attain to the knowledge of them through the strength of their intellect and the advancement of their learning. But that duty, which those same (philosophers) call right, is also perfect and absolute, and, as the same (philosophers) say, satisfies all the numbers (i.e. they fulfil all the requirements of natural perfection - an allusion to the Pythagorean doctrine that certain numbers stand for specific kinds of perfection), and cannot be the responsibility of anyone except the sage. 15) Yet, when some (action) is performed, in which 'intermediate' duties are evident, that is regarded (as) fully perfect, on account of the fact that the common crowd does not generally understand how far it falls short of perfection; but, in so far as they do understand, they think that nothing has been overlooked; this same (thing) occurs with regard to poems and paintings, and several others (areas of artistic accomplishment), such that those lacking experience are delighted with, and praise, things which are not worthy of praise, for (what is), I believe, this reason, that there is something of excellence in these (works) that captivates the uneducated, since they are not really able to judge what is the (point) of weakness in one or another of these things; and so, when they have been instructed by experts, they readily abandon their opinion.
Chapter IV. So, (the performance of) the particular duties, which I am discussing in these books, they (i.e. the Stoics) say that these involve a sort of second-grade moral goodness, (which is) not only peculiar to sages, but (is) shared with the whole human race. 16) And so, all (men), in whom there is a natural disposition to virtue are stirred by such (duties). When the two Decii (i.e. Publius Decius Mus, consul 340 and his son, Publius Decius Mus, consul 295, who both sacrificed their lives in victorious battles, the former fighting the Latins at Suessa Aurunca, and the latter fighting the Samnites at Sentinum) or the two Scipios (i.e. Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus, consul 222, and his younger brother Publius Cornelius Scipio, consul 218, were both killed in Spain in 211 fighting the Carthaginians) are commemorated (as) 'brave men', or when Fabricius (i.e. Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, consul in 282 and again in 278), or Aristides (i.e. an Athenian statesman at the beginning of the Fifth Century), is called 'the Just', an exemplar, whether of courage in the case of the former, or of justice, in the case of the latter, is in no way being invoked, as though in the case of a 'sage'; for none of them (was) a sage, in the sense that we would wish (the word) 'sage' to be understood; nor were Marcus Cato (vide section 1) and Gaius Laelius (i.e. Gaius Laelius Sapiens consul 140), men who were regarded and named (as) 'wise', actually sages, nor indeed (were) the famous Seven (i.e. the seven sages of Greece, including Thales and Solon, who lived in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries), but, from their frequent (performance) of 'intermediate' duties, they bore a certain resemblance and likeness to sages.
17) Therefore, it is not right that what is true morality should be matched with the incompatibility of expediency, nor should what we commonly call morality, (the thing) that is practised by those who wish themselves to be regarded as good men, ever be weighed against financial profits, and we should observe and maintain that moral goodness which falls within (the scope of) our understanding, as (carefully) as the sages have to (observe) that moral goodness which is properly and truly (so) called; for otherwise whatever progress has been made towards moral goodness cannot be maintained.
Now these (remarks) relate to those who, through due observance of their moral obligations, are considered (to be) good (men).
18) Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by financial profit and personal advantage, and are not prepared for such (outcomes) to be outweighed by (considerations of) moral rectitude, are accustomed in their deliberations to compare moral goodness with what they think (is) expedient; (but) good men are not accustomed (to do that). And so, I believe that Panaetius, when he stated that men were accustomed, in (making) this comparison, to hesitate, he meant (exactly) what he said, simply that "this was their custom," not also that "it was their duty." Furthermore, it is absolutely disgraceful, not only to rate what appears expedient more highly than what is morally right, but also (even) to compare them against one another.
D. ESTABLISHING A FORMULA, OR CRITERION, FOR BEHAVIOUR WHEN THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT CONFLICTS WITH THE HONOURABLE (18-39).
So, what is it that sometimes tends to cause doubt, and seems to require consideration? (It is,) I believe, whenever (an occasion for) doubt arises as to what kind of (action) it is that is under consideration. 19) For on occasion it often happens that (something) which usually tends to be considered (as) morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong; by way of example, let some (case) be proposed that has a wider application: what greater crime can there be than to kill not only a man, but a man (who is) also a close friend? But, if a man kills a tyrant, albeit (he is) an intimate friend, he has not implicated himself in a crime, has he? At any rate, it does not seem (so) to the Roman people, who believe such (an act to be) the most splendid of all glorious deeds. So, has expediency prevailed over moral rectitude? By no means, (for) moral rectitude has accompanied expediency.
So, some general rule needs to be laid down, so that we can decide, without any (possibility of) error, whenever something which we call expedient seems to clash with something which we perceive (to be) morally right; if we follow this (rule) in comparing courses of action, we shall never depart from (the path of) duty. 20) This rule, however, will be perfectly in harmony with the system and doctrine of the Stoics; indeed, in these books I am following their system for this reason: although (things) that are morally right are given preference to (things) which seem expedient, yet these (issues) are to be discussed in a more illuminating fashion by those who consider whatever is morally right (as) identical to (what is) expedient, and nothing expedient which (is) not morally right, than by those who (believe) something morally right (that is) not expedient, and (something) expedient (that is) not morally right. But my Academy gives me the considerable freedom to let it be within my rights to defend any (theory) which suggests (itself to me as) most credible. But I return to my rule.
Chapter V. 21) So then, to take something from someone else and for a man to maximise his own benefit by another man's loss is more contrary to nature than (is) death, or poverty, or pain, or anything else that can befall either his person or his external possessions. For, in the first place, it undermines the intercourse and fellowship of human beings. For, if we should be so disposed that each (of us), in accordance with our own financial advantage, should rob or injure a neighbour, that fellowship of the human race, which is especially in accord with nature, must, of necessity, be disrupted. 22) Just as, if each of our limbs had such a notion that it thought it could become fit and well if it could transfer to itself the strength of the neighbouring limb, the whole body would inevitably become weakened and die, so, if each one of us should seize for himself the property of others and take away whatever he could for his own benefit, the society of men and our community must inevitably be overthrown. For it is granted, without any resistance from nature, that each one of us may prefer to secure for himself, rather than for someone else, what is required for the conduct of life, (but) nature does not allow this, that we should increase our means, our wealth and our resources from the spoils of others.
23) In truth, this (principle), that one must not harm another for the sake of one's own interests, is established in the same way not only by nature, that is by the law of nations, but also by the laws of the (different) peoples, in which the public interest is maintained in individual states; for this is what the laws are looking (to achieve), this is their intent, that the unifying bonds between citizens should be maintained; those who break them, they punish by means of death, exile, imprisonment, (or) a fine.
Moreover, the system of nature itself, which is the law of gods and men, makes this (principle) much more effective; whoever wishes to comply with it - and all, who wish to live in accord with nature, will comply (with it) - will never be guilty of coveting the property of another and of obtaining what he has taken from his neighbour. 24) Furthermore, loftiness and greatness of spirit, and, courtesy, justice (and) generosity likewise, are much more in accord with nature than self-indulgence, (mere) living, and riches; but it is, indeed, (the mark) of a noble and lofty spirit to despise such (things) and to consider (them) as nothing in comparison with the common good. However, to steal from one's neighbour for personal gain is more contrary to nature than death, pain and other (things) of the same kind.
25) And again, it is more in accord with nature to undergo the greatest toils and tribulations for the sake of saving or aiding every nation, if it can be done, (thus) emulating the famous Hercules, whom popular report, recalling his benefits (to mankind), has stationed amidst the assembly of the gods, than to live in solitude, not only without any troubles, but also abounding in the greatest pleasures (and) every resource, so that you may also surpass (all others) in beauty and strength.
Therefore, all those with the best and most noble character much prefer the former life (i.e. the life of service) to the latter (one) (i.e. the life of pleasure). From this it follows that man, (if he is) obedient to nature, cannot harm his (fellow-)man.
26) And then, (he) who wrongs another in order to gain some advantage for himself, either must suppose that he is doing nothing contrary to nature, or he believes that death, poverty, pain, and also the loss of children, relatives (and) friends are more to be avoided than doing someone an injustice. If he thinks that nothing contrary to nature is being done when he wrong his (fellow-)man, why should you argue with him, since he is stripping a man of absolutely everything that is human? But if he believes that this should indeed be avoided, but that the other (things), (namely) death, poverty (and) pain are much worse, he is mistaken in his belief that any damage to his person or to his property (is) more serious than any impairment to his soul.
Chapter VI. Accordingly, this one (principle) ought to be adhered to by all, that what is useful to the individual should be identical (to what is useful) to everyone else and to the community as a whole; if someone appropriates this (thing of use) to himself, (then) the whole human fellowship will be destroyed.
27) And furthermore, if nature ordains that a man shall wish to promote the interests of a (fellow-)man, whoever he may be, for this reason only, because he is a (fellow-)man, it is necessarily in accordance with the same nature that the interests of all men are common. If this is true, we are all constrained by one and the same law of nature, and, if this is true, we are certainly forbidden by nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now, the first (premise is) true; therefore, the conclusion (is) true. 28) For that is indeed an absurd (position) that some (people) say that they will not rob a parent or a brother for their own gain, but that their relationship to the rest of their (fellow-)citizens is (quite) another (thing), Such (people) claim that there is no law, no social tie, which they share with their (fellow-)citizens for the sake of a common interest, and this attitude demolishes the whole of civil society.
But (those) who say that regard should be had for (the rights of) citizens, but not of foreigners, would divide the shared brotherhood of the human race; when this has been removed, kindness, generosity, goodness and justice are utterly obliterated; (those) who do dispose of these virtues must also be considered (as being) wickedly opposed to the immortal gods. For they overturn the fellowship between human beings, (which has been) established by them, and the closest bond of this fellowship is the belief that it is more repugnant to nature for a man to rob his neighbour for his own financial benefit than (for him) to endure all (possible) loss, whether to his property, or to his person ... or even to his very soul, so long as such (losses) do not involve injustice; for this one virtue is the mistress and queen of all the virtues.
29) (But) perhaps someone might say: "Well then, might not a wise man, if he were consumed with hunger, take food from another man (who was) no use at anything at all?" Certainly not, for my life is not more valuable to me than that frame of mind that (says) that I should not wrong anyone for the sake of my own advantage. Or again, if a good man were able to rob that cruel and monstrous tyrant Phalaris (i.e. the cruel Sixth Century tyrant of Acragas) of his clothing, lest he himself might die of cold, surely he should do (so)?
30) These (cases) are very easy to decide. For if, for the sake of your own advantage, you were to take anything from a man (who was) completely useless in every respect, you would be acting in an inhuman manner and contrary to the law of nature; but if, on the other hand, you are the sort of person, who, if you should remain alive, could render a great service to the state and to human society, if, for that reason, you were to take something from another, it would not be (something) worthy of censure. But if, on the other hand, the case is not of this kind, each person has to bear his own misfortune rather than take away another's advantages. So, sickness or want or anything of that sort is not more repugnant to nature than stealing and coveting (the property) of someone else, but disregard of the common interest is contrary to nature; for it is unjust. 31) So, the law of nature itself, which preserves and maintains the interests of human beings, will surely determine that the things (which are) necessary for living should be transferred from an idle and worthless man to a man (who is) wise, and good and brave, since if he were to die, it would greatly detract from the common good; only let that (man) act in such a way that he does not consider, due to self-regard and self-love, such (a transfer of possessions as) a pretext for wrong-doing. So, he will always fulfil his moral duty (by) taking account of the interests of mankind, and of that human fellowship, which I (so) often call to mind.
32) For, with regard to Phalaris, a decision is very easy. For we do not have any fellowship with tyrants, but rather there is the widest cleavage (between us and them), nor is it opposed to nature to rob, if you can, a man whom it is morally right to kill, and, indeed, the whole of that pestilential and impious race (i.e. tyrants) should be exterminated from human society. Furthermore, just as certain limbs are amputated, if they themselves have begun to lack blood and life, so to speak, and (thus) to harm other parts of the body, so that savagery and monstrosity of the beast in human form must be separated, as it were, from the shared body of humanity.
All questions of this kind are those in which our moral duty is to be found in accordance with the circumstances.
Chapter VII. 33) So, I believe that Panaetius would have pursued subjects of this sort, if some accident or (other) work had not frustrated his intention. With regard to these very issues, there are more than enough recommendations in his previous books, from which one can learn what should be avoided on account of shamefulness, and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not shameful at all.
But, as I am now putting the capstone, as it were, upon this work (which while) unfinished (is) yet nearly completed, just as geometers make a practice of not demonstrating every (proposition) but ask that certain (axioms) may be assumed by them (as true), so that they may, the more easily, explain what they wish (to put across), so I ask you, my (dear) Cicero, to allow me, if you can, (to claim) that nothing is worth seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if this is not permitted by Cratippus (i.e. as a Peripatetic, Cratippus believed that there were natural goods, such as honour and health, which were worth seeking for their own sake), you will surely grant this at least, that what is morally right is the thing most worthy to be sought for its own sake. Either one (of these alternatives) is sufficient for my (purpose), and at one time the former, and at another time the latter, seems (to me) the more probable, and, besides (these) no other (proposition is) credible.
34) Now, in the first place, I must defend Panaetius, for he stated not that expedient (things) could, on occasion, be in conflict (with the things that are) morally right - for to him that would have been impious - but (only) those (things) that appeared (to be) expedient. Indeed, he often bears witness to the fact that nothing (is) expedient which is not, at the same time, morally right, (and) that nothing is morally right which is not, at the same time, expedient, and he says that no greater pestilence has ever assailed human life than the doctrine of those who have set these (things) apart. Therefore he included (in his works) that conflict which appeared to be present, (but) which was not (real), not in order that we should ever give the expedient preference to the morally right, but so that we could accurately distinguish between them, if they should ever happen to coincide. So, I shall discharge this topic (which was passed) over, without any props to support (me), but fighting my own battles, as the saying goes. For nothing has been written on this subject since (the time of) Panaetius which meets with my approval, at least with regard to the (works) which have come into my hands.
Chapter VIII. 35) So then, when some of expediency is brought to your attention, you are inevitably influenced (by it); but if, when you direct your mind (to it), you observe something immoral attached to that thing which has presented the appearance of expediency, then you should not abandon (the search) for expediency, but you do need to understand that there cannot be any expediency present when it is (accompanied) by something immoral. But if there is nothing so opposed to nature as the immoral - for nature demands rectitude, harmony and consistency, and abhors their opposites - and (if) nothing (is) so much in accord with nature as expediency, (then) surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in the same object.
And again, if we are born for moral rectitude, and (if) that is either the only (thing) worth seeking, as Zeno (i.e. the founder of Stoicism) thought, or, at least, (it is) to be regarded (as) infinitely heavier in weight, as seems good to Aristotle (i.e. the founder of the Peripatetics), it necessarily follows that what is morally right is either the only, or the highest, good; now that which (is) good (is) certainly expedient; so, whatever (is) morally right (is) expedient.
36) Thus (it is) the error of men, (who are) not morally upright, that, when they seize upon something which seems expedient, to detach it at once from what is morally right. Hence (assassin's) daggers, hence the poisoned (cup), hence forged wills owe their origin, hence (too) the thefts, the embezzlement (of public funds), the pillaging and the plundering of allies and citizens, (and,) finally there emerges the lust for excessive wealth, for intolerable power, (and) finally for making oneself a king, even in states (that are) free, and nothing more atrocious or more repulsive than this can be imagined. For with a false perspective they see the material rewards, (but) they do not see the penalty - I am not speaking of (the punishment) of the laws, which they often escape (anyway) - but (the knowledge) of their own moral degradation, which is the bitterest possible (one).
37) For this reason, then, let this sort of questioner be expelled from our midst - for the whole lot (of them) are wicked and ungodly - , (that is, those) who (stop to) consider whether they should pursue the course which they know to be morally upright, or knowingly to defile themselves by a crime; for in their very hesitation there is (an element) of guilt, even if they do not (in the end) proceed to the deed. Therefore, those (courses of action) should not be considered at all, when even their consideration is morally wrong.
Furthermore, we must also banish from our deliberations any expectation or intention of concealing (things) and of keeping (them) secret. For, if we have only made some progress in philosophy, we ought to be convinced enough that (even) if we could keep all gods and men in the dark (about our actions), we must still do nothing that (smacks) of greed, or of injustice, or of lust, or of lack of self-control.
Chapter IX. 38) To illustrate this (truth), the celebrated Gyges is introduced by Plato (as the man) who, when a (fissure in) the earth had opened up, descended into that chasm and came upon a bronze horse, in whose side there was a door; when he had opened this, he saw a body of a dead man of an enormous size, and (with) a gold ring on his finger; when he had removed it, he wore (it) himself, and then took himself off to an assembly of shepherds - for he was a shepherd of the king. Then, when he turned the bezel of this ring inwards towards the palm (of his hand), he was seen by no one, but saw everything himself; when he turned the ring back to its (proper) position, he became visible once more. And so, taking advantage of the opportunity provided by the ring, he indulged in sexual intercourse with the queen, and, with her as a helper, he murdered his master the king, (and) removed (all those) whom he thought were standing in his way, and no one could detect him in these crimes. Thus, thanks to the ring, he suddenly rose to be the king of Lydia.
Now then, if a wise (man) were to get hold of this very ring, he would not suppose that he had any more right to do wrong than if he did not have (it); for good (deeds), not secret (intrigues), are sought by good men.
39) And yet on this point certain philosophers - they are hardly at all vicious, but not very perceptive - declare the tale related by Plato (to be) fictitious and fabricated; as if he were actually maintaining that it had happened or could have happened! (But) the force of this ring and what it exemplifies is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect (the truth), when you were to do something for the sake of riches, power, sovereignty (or) sexual gratification, if it would always be unknown to the gods and men, would you do (it)? They say that it could not happen. Indeed, it is not possible at all; but I ask that, if what they say is not possible were possible, what then would they do? They press (their argument) just like yokels; for they deny that it is possible, and they persist in (making) this point; (but) they do not see what this word (i.e. 'if') means. For, when I ask what would they do if they could escape detection, I am not asking whether they can escape detection, but I am applying torments, as it were, so that, if they replied that, with the guarantee of impunity, they would do what was in their interests, they would be confessing that they are criminally-minded, (and) if they say that (they would) not (do so), they would be conceding that all (acts that are) inherently immoral should be avoided by them.
But now let me return to my theme.
E. THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT AND THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE (40-95).
Chapter X. 40) Many cases often arise to perplex our minds with the appearance of expediency; one ought not to contemplate whether integrity should be forsaken because of the size of the benefit - for that, indeed, would be despicable - , but whether that thing which appears (to be) expedient can happen without dishonour. When Brutus (i.e. Lucius Junius Brutus) annulled the consular power of his colleague Collatinus (i.e. Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus, consul with Brutus in 509), it could be thought that he was doing something unjust; for he had been Brutus' partner and associate in their plans to expel the kings. But, when the leading men (in the state) had taken the decision that Superbus' (i.e. Lucius Tarquinius Superbus or 'The Proud', the seventh and last king of Rome 535-510) kindred and the (very) name of the Tarquins, and every reminder of the kingship, be removed, (then) what was expedient, (namely) to consult the interests of the fatherland, was so (evidently) morally right that it should have seemed right to Collatinus himself as well. And so, expediency won the day, because of that moral rectitude, without which expediency could not even have existed.
But this was not so in the case of the king who founded the city (i.e. Romulus); 41) for the appearance of expediency motivated him; when he thought that (it would be) more advantageous (for him) to rule alone than with another, he murdered his brother (i.e. Remus). By (doing) this, he abandoned both family affection and human feelings, so that he could secure something which seemed expedient, but was not, and yet he offered (as a pretext for his deed) the reason of the wall, (thus giving) an appearance of moral rectitude, (which was) neither credible nor appropriate. So, he committed a sin, (though) I say (it) with all due respect to Quirinus (i.e. the name given by the Romans to Romulus after he was deified) or Romulus.
42) And yet we are not obliged to overlook our own interests and to surrender (things) when we need those (things) ourselves, but each one of us should manage his own interests in such a way that they may be met without injury to anyone else. Chrysippus (i.e. a Third Century Stoic philosopher) (puts it) very well, when he says, "(He) who traverses the running track, should strive and exert himself as much as he can in order to win, (but) he ought never to trip up, or push down with his hand, a man with whom he is competing; so in life it is not wrong (for a man) to seek (to acquire) for himself something which relates to his own advantage, but he has no right to snatch (it) from another."
43) Moral obligations are most confused, however, in (the case of) friendships, when both failing to give what you can with integrity, and giving what is not right, are contrary to one's moral duty. But in all such cases, there is a succinct and straightforward rule. For those (things) which seem (to be) advantageous, (namely) public offices, riches, sensual pleasures and other (things) of a like kind, ought never to be put before friendship. But the good man will never act contrary to the public welfare, or in breach of his oath or pledged word, for the sake of a friend, not even if he sits (as) the judge in the case of the friend himself, for he sets aside his role (as) a friend, when he assumes (that) of a judge. The only concessions he makes to friendship are to prefer his friend's case to be a true (one), (and,) in so far as the laws permit, to set a (convenient) time for the pleading of his suit. 44) Indeed, when he comes to pronounce the verdict under oath, he should remember he is summoning God (as) a witness, that is, as I understand (it), his own conscience, and God, himself, has bestowed nothing upon man more divine than this. And so, we have inherited from our ancestors a fine custom of appealing to the judge, if only we can keep to it, "To do what he can with integrity of faith." This (form of) request is in keeping with what I said a moment ago could be conceded to a friend by an honest judge; for if everything our friends wanted had to be done, such (relationships) would have to be regarded not (as) friendships but (as) conspiracies. 45) But I am speaking (here) of ordinary friendships; for among men whose wisdom is perfect, no such thing can occur.
They say that the Pythagoreans Damon and Phintias had such affection for one another that, when the tyrant Dionysius (i.e. whether this is Dionysius the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse 405-367 or Dionysius the Younger, tyrant 367-356 and 346-343 is uncertain) had fixed a day for the execution of one of them, and the one who had been condemned to death had requested that a few days (should be allowed) him for the purpose of his family being committed to the care (of friends), the other one stood surety for his appearance, (on the understanding) that, if he did not return, he, himself, would be put to death. When he returned on the day (appointed), the tyrant, in admiration of their loyalty, begged that they should enrol him (as) the third (partner) in their friendship.
46) So, when we are comparing what seems expedient in (the realm of) friendship with what is morally right, let the appearance of expediency be disregarded, (and) let moral rectitude prevail; but, when, with regard to friendship, (things) which are not morally right are requested, let religious scruple and good faith take precedence over friendship. So, that choice between our moral obligations, into which I am inquiring, will be facilitated.
Chapter XI. But, through the appearance of expediency, wrong is very often committed in public affairs, as in our own destruction of Corinth (n.b. by Lucius Mummius in 146); Even harsher (were) the Athenians, who decreed that that, in the case of the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their fleet, their thumbs should be cut off (n.b. this is alleged to have happened in 430 at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, but whether it actually occurred is uncertain). This (action) seemed to be expedient; for Aegina was too great a threat on account of its nearness to the Piraeus (i.e. the port of Athens). But nothing which (is) cruel (can be) expedient; for cruelty is abhorrent to our human nature, (the dictates of) which we ought to follow. 47) (They) also (do) wrong who prevent foreigners from enjoying (residence) in our cities, and expel them; this includes Pennus in our fathers' time (n.b. the tribune Marcus Junius Pennus passed a law in 126 expelling foreigners from Rome) and Papius in recent years (n.b. Gaius Papius, tribune in 65 passed a similar law). Now it is not right for (someone) who is not a citizen to be permitted to have the rights of a citizen; our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola (i.e. Lucius Licinius Crassus and Quintus Mucius Scaevola, consuls in 95) proposed such a law; but to disbar foreigners from enjoying (the facilities) of our city is utterly inhumane.
There (are) splendid (occasions) when the appearance of public benefit is scorned on account of moral rectitude. (The history of) our country is full of examples (of this), not only on many occasions, but especially during the second Punic war; when she had received (the news of) the disaster at Cannae, she displayed a loftier spirit than (she) ever (did) during moments of success; (there was) no sign of fear at all, absolutely no mention of peace (terms). So great is the impact of moral rightness that it suppresses the illusion of expediency.
48) When the Athenians were totally unable to stem the tide of the Persians' invasion (i.e. in 480) and decided, after abandoning their city and depositing their wives and children at Troezen, to take to their ships and defend the freedom of Greece with their fleet, they stoned to death a certain Cyrsilus, who had urged (them) to stay in the city and admit Xerxes. And yet he thought he was pursuing (the path of) expediency, but it was not (expedient) at all, as it clashed with moral rectitude. 49) After the victory in their war with the Persians (i.e. after the Battle of Plataea in 479), Themistocles announced in the assembly (i.e. in Athens) that he had a plan to safeguard the state, but that there was no need for it to be known about; he asked that the people should nominate someone with whom he could discuss (it); Aristides (vide section 16) was nominated; he (told) him, that the Spartan fleet, which had been beached at Gytheum, could be secretly set on fire, and by means of this (deed) the power of the Spartans would be broken. When Aristides had heard this (proposal), he came into the assembly amid great expectation, and said that the plan which Aristides had outlined was a very expedient (one), but not morally right. And so, the Athenians reckoned that what was not morally right was not expedient either, and, at the suggestion of Aristides, they rejected that whole proposal without even hearing (what it was). They (behaved) better than we (do), for we have pirates who are immune (from paying taxes) (i.e. the Cilician pirates settled at Soli by Pompey in 67) (and) allies (who pay) tribute (i.e. the city of Massilia and King Deiotarus of Galatia, who had fought for Pompey against Caesar in the Civil War 49-44)
Chapter XII. So let it be established (as a principle) that what is morally wrong is never expedient, not even at the time when you acquire something which you think is expedient; for to think something which is morally wrong (to be) expedient, is disastrous (in) itself. 50) But, as I have said above (i.e. see section 40), cases often arise when expediency may appear to conflict with honesty, so that we must investigate whether the conflict is total or whether it can be reconciled with honesty. The following are problems of this kind: if, by way of an example, an honest man has conveyed a large quantity of grain from Alexandria to Rhodes during (a time of) dearth and famine among the Rhodians, and (when) grain (is) at a very high price, (and) if, at the same time, he knows that several merchants have set sail from Alexandria, and he has seen their ships, laden with corn, on course making for Rhodes, should he tell this to the Rhodians, or should he (keep) silent and sell his own (cargo) at the highest possible price. I am assuming that he is a wise and decent man; the question I am asking concerns the thinking and reasoning of a man who would not keep the Rhodians in the dark, if he judged that this (was) dishonest, but might be in doubt (as to) whether it was dishonest (or) not.
51) In cases of this kind, Diogenes of Babylon, a great and profound Stoic, is accustomed to think one (thing), (and) his pupil Antipater, a most learned man, another. According to Antipater, everything (should be) disclosed, so that the buyer should be aware of absolutely everything which the seller knows, (whereas,) according to Diogenes, it is the duty of the seller to declare any defects (in his goods), in so far as it is laid down by the civil law (of the land), (and) otherwise to conduct (his business) without deception, and, since he is the seller, to sell at the best possible price he can get.
"I have shipped my (stock)," Diogenes' merchant may say, "I have offered it for sale, (and) I am selling (it at a price) no higher than anyone else, perhaps even at a lower (price), when the supply (is) more plentiful. Who is suffering any injury?"
52) On the other side, there arises Antipater's way of thinking: "What are you saying? You should consult the interests of your (fellow-)men and promote human fellowship, and you were born under this law and you inherit these natural principles, which you ought to follow and obey, such that your interests shall be those of the community, and, conversely, that the interests of the community shall be yours (as well); (so) will you (really) conceal from your (fellow-)men what benefits and abundance are coming their way?"
Diogenes will perhaps reply as follows: "It is one (thing) to conceal, (it is quite) another (thing) to keep silent; at this moment I am not concealing from you, (even) if I am failing to tell you, what is the nature of the gods, or what is the summit of good (things), knowledge of which would be of more value to you than the low price of wheat; but, at the same time, I am under no obligation to tell (you) what it is in your interest to hear."
53) "Yes, but you are obliged (to do so)," the other (i.e. Antipater) will say, "if only you remember the (bonds of) fellowship forged together by nature between man and man."
"I do remember (them)," he (i.e. Diogenes) will reply, "but surely that fellowship (of yours) is not of such a kind that there may not be anything personal belonging to each person? But, if that it is the case, (then) we should not sell anything at all, but give (it all away)."
Chapter XIII. In this whole discussion, you notice that it is not said (by anyone): "Although this is morally wrong, yet, as it is my interest, I will do (it)," but, rather (on one side), that it is in my interest, without being morally wrong, and, on the other side, that this act must not be done because it is morally wrong.
54) Suppose that a decent man is selling his house on account of certain defects, of which he, himself, is aware, but (of which) everyone else is ignorant; suppose it is insanitary and (yet) it is considered healthy; suppose it is not known that snakes are to be seen in every bedroom, and that is timbered with rotten wood and is on the verge of collapse, but no one knows this except the owner; if the vendor did not tell the purchasers about these (defects), and sold the house for far more than he thought he would sell (it for), I ask whether he has conducted this (sale) in an unjust or despicable manner.
55) "He certainly (did)," says Antipater, "for what is the failure to show the (right) path to (a traveller) who has lost his way, (an offence) which in Athens is penalised by public execrations, if it is not of the same order as this, (namely,) to allow a buyer to rush (into a purchase) and (thus) mistakenly to incur a very great loss? (Indeed,) it is even worse than the failure to point out the (right) path; for it is deliberately to lead another (man) astray."
Diogenes (says) in reply: "Did he, who did not even recommend (purchase), force you to buy? He put up for sale (something) which he did not like, (whereas) you bought (something) which you did like. But if (those) who advertise for sale 'a fine and well built house', are not considered to be swindlers, even when it is neither fine nor soundly built, much less should those who did not even praise the house (be considered swindlers). For when there is (freedom to exercise) his judgment on the part of the buyer, what deceit can there be on the part of the vendor? But if not everything (that is) stated has to be made good, do you (really) think that what is not stated has to be made good? What indeed would be more ridiculous than for a vendor to recount (all) the faults in that article which he is selling? And what (would be) so absurd as for an auctioneer to announce at the owner's bidding: 'I am selling an insanitary house'?"
56) In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases, honesty is defended on one side, (while,) on the other (side), with regard to expediency, it is so stated that it is not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do (it). This is that conflict which often seems to arise between (those things that are) expedient and (those that are) morally right. I must adjudicate between these (two cases); for I did not outline (them only) to raise the question, but to offer a solution.
57) So, it seems (to me) that the corn-dealer ought not to have concealed (the facts) from the Rhodians, nor (should) the house-seller (have concealed its defects) from his buyers. For it is not concealment (if) you keep quiet about something, but (it is concealment) when you try, for the sake of your own profit, to hide something that you know (about) from those, in whose interests it is to know it. And who does not see what is the nature of this kind of concealment, and of the man responsible for it? (He is) certainly not an open, or straightforward, or decent, or just, or honest man, (but) rather (one who is) shifty, devious, sly, deceitful, malicious, crafty, wily, (and) artful. Surely it is inexpedient to submit (oneself) to so many of these terms of reproach, and many others (too)?
Chapter XIV. 58) But if (those) who keep silent (are) worthy of censure, what should we think of those who (actually) practise falsehood in their speech? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, (who was) not devoid of wit and quite well read, when he had gone to Syracuse, as he himself used to say, for the sake of a holiday, not business, kept saying that he would like to buy some small estate, where he could invite friends, and where (he could) amuse himself without any interruptions. When this was spread abroad, a certain Pythius, who was running a banking-house in Syracuse, (said) that he had such an estate, not indeed for sale, but that Canius could make use of it, if he wished, as if it were his own, and, at the same time, he invited the man to dinner at the estate on then next day. Then, when he had accepted, Pythius, who as a banker was popular with all classes, called some fishermen to (join) him, and asked them to do their fishing the next day in front of his little estate, and told (them) what he wanted them to do. Canius came to dinner at the (appointed) time; a banquet (was) sumptuously prepared by Pythius, (and) a (whole) crowd of boats (was) before their eyes; each (fisherman) brought with him what he had caught, and their fishes were deposited at Pythius' feet.
59) Then Canius says, "What, pray, does this mean, Pythius? All these fishes, all these boats?"
And he replies, "What (is) strange (about it)? Syracuse gets all its fish from this place, (and) its gets its fresh water from here (too); these (people) cannot do without this residence (of mine)."
Inflamed with greed, Canius entreated Pythius to sell (it to him). Eager and very rich, the man bought (it) for as much as Pythius wanted, and he bought the furniture (as well); he sets down the items (in his account book) and completes the transaction. The next day Canius invites his friends, (and) he arrives early himself; he does not even see a thole-pin (i.e. a peg for oars, similar to a rowlock), (and) he asks his nearest neighbour whether there was some fishermen's holiday, because he could see none of them at all.
"None that I know of," says he, "but none are in the habit of fishing here; and so I was surprised at what happened yesterday."
60) Canius was furious; but what could he do (about it)? For my colleague and friend Gaius Aquilius (i.e. Gaius Aquilius Gallus, a renowned jurist and praetor with Cicero in 66) had not yet published his provisions for pleading in relation to criminal fraud; when asked what out of the (material) in those very (provisions) constituted criminal fraud, he replied: "When one should pretend one (thing, but) enact another." This (was) indeed a very excellent (definition), as (one might have expected) from a man (so) skilled at making definitions. So, Pythius, and all those (others) who do one (thing while) pretending another, (are) dishonest, wicked and malevolent. Therefore, no act of theirs can (ever) be expedient, since it is tainted with so many flaws.
Chapter XV. 61) But, if Aquilius' definition is correct, pretence and dissimulation should be done away with. So then, an honest man will neither pretend nor conceal anything, in order that he may buy or sell on better (terms). Furthermore, your criminal fraud had also been penalised by the statutes, as, in the case of trusteeships, by the Twelve Tables (i.e. Rome's first code of laws, dated 451-450, which made provision for wills), the defrauding of minors by the Plaetorian law (i.e. a law, dated 192, designed to protect minors), and in judgments unsupported by statute, in which it is added, "in accordance with good faith." Moreover, in all other cases, these phrases are especially noteworthy; in (a case of) arbitration of a wife's property, "(what is) fairer (is) better"; (and) in (a suit over) a trust (fund), "honest dealing as between honest (people)". What then? Can there be any scope for fraud in a (case) which (features) "the better (and) the fairer"? Can anything fraudulent or malicious be done when "honest dealing between honest (parties)" is stipulated? But, as Aquilius says, criminal fraud rests on pretence. So, all falsehood must be kept out of business contracts; a seller will not engage a bogus bidder, nor the buyer (one) who may bid against himself; and, if it comes to naming a price, each (party) will state (it) no more than once. 62) Indeed, when Quintus, the son of Publius, Scaevola had asked that (the price of) a farm, which he was buying, should be disclosed to him once (and for all) and the vendor had done this accordingly, he said that he valued (it) more highly; (and) he added a hundred thousand (sesterces to the price). There is no one who can deny that he was an honest man, but they do say that it was not (the act of) a wise (man), just as (it would not have been) if he had sold (it) for a lesser price than he could have (obtained for it). Here, then, is that pernicious (idea) that (the world) considers some (men) upright (and) others (worldly-)wise. From it (comes) Ennius' (remark), "A wise (man) is wise in vain if he cannot benefit himself." This is true indeed, if (only) what was (the meaning of) "benefit" could be agreed between me and Ennius.
63) Now, I observe that Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in those books which he writes to Quintus Tubero (i.e. Quintus Aelius Tubero, praetor in 123, and a distinguished jurist) on "Moral Obligation" that "it is (the mark) of a wise (man) to take account of his family's affairs (while) doing nothing contrary to our customs, laws and traditions. For we want to be rich not only for ourselves, but (also) for our children, our relatives, our friends, and, above all, for the common good. For the resources and prosperity of individuals are the wealth of the state." He cannot approve, in any way, of Scaevola's action, concerning which I spoke a short time ago; and indeed he says that absolutely the only (thing) he will not do for the sake of his own advantage (is something) which (the law) does not permit. No great praise or gratitude should be bestowed upon such a (man).
64) But, if both pretence and concealment constitute criminal fraud, there are very few transactions, in which that criminal fraud is not involved, and, if an honest man is the sort who helps everyone he can, and harms no one, we shall certainly not easily encounter such an honest man.
Therefore, it is never expedient to do wrong, because it is always immoral, and it is always expedient for a man to be honest, because it is always morally right.
Chapter XVI. 65) And then, in so far as the law on (the sale of) real estate (is concerned), it is stipulated in our civil code that any defects in those (properties) being sold, which are known to the vendor, should be declared. For, although it was (considered) sufficient in the Twelve Tables for those (faults) which had been specified by word of mouth to be made good, (and) that any (defect) which had been denied should be subjected to a double penalty, a (further) penalty has also been established by our jurisconsults for a failure to declare (them); for they have determined that any defect which exists in (a piece of) real estate, if the vendor is aware of it, must be made good, unless it has been specifically declared. 66) For instance, when the augurs (had planned) that an augury should be observed from from the citadel, and had instructed Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, who owned a house on the Caelian Hill, that those (parts of his house) which obstructed the auspices (i.e. the flight of birds), because of their height should be demolished, he advertised this block for sale, and Publius Calpurnius Lanarius bought (it). That same (notice) was (then) served upon him by the augurs. And so, when Calpurnius had carried out the demolition works and had learned that Claudius had (only) put the house up for sale after he had been ordered by the augurs to undertake the demolition work, he took him before the arbiter (i.e. the equity court) (to determine) "what indemnity he should make and deliver to him on account of good faith." The verdict was pronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of that Cato of ours (i.e. Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis , or the Younger, i.e. praetor 52, and who committed suicide at Utica after the battle of Thapsus in 46) - for, as other (men get their names) from their fathers, so he who begot such a luminary must be identified by reference to his son - ; so, he (as the presiding) judge pronounced as follows: "Since he had known about that (order) and had not declared (it), he was bound to make good the purchaser's loss."
67) So he established that it was integral to good faith that any defect of which the vendor had been aware should be made known to the buyer. If he has judged this correctly, neither that corn-dealer of ours nor that seller of the insanitary house (were) right to keep silent. But (all cases of) reticence of this kind cannot be recounted in the civil code, but (those) which can (be) are scrupulously dealt with. Our kinsman Marcus Marius Gratidianus (i.e. praetor 85 and 84) had sold to Gaius Sergius Orata (i.e. praetor 97) the house which he himself had bought from the same (man) a few years before. It was subject to a legal encumbrance, but Marius had not declared this in the terms of sale. Crassus (see section 47 above) (spoke for) Orata, Antonius (i.e. Marcus Antonius Orator, consul 99) defended Gratidianus. Crassus stressed (the letter of) the law, (namely that) "The vendor was bound to make good that defect which he had not declared, (even though he was) aware (of it); Antonius (pleaded) equity, since that defect had not been unknown to Sergius, who had sold that house (to him), (so) no declaration had been needed, nor had he been deceived, as he could remember to what legal liability the (property) which he had bought was (subject).
68) What is the purpose of these (illustrations)? So you may understand this, that sharp (practices) were not acceptable to our forebears.
Chapter XVII. But the laws dispose of sharp (practices) in one way, (and) philosophers (do so) in another, the laws in so far as they can restrain (them) by force, (and) philosophers by reason and good taste. Now reason requires this, that nothing (should be done which is) underhand, pretended or deceitful. So, is it not underhand to set snares, even if you do not intend to rouse (your prey) or to drive (them into them)? For these very wild creatures often fall into (traps), (even) without anyone pursuing (them). Could you, in the same way, advertise a house for sale, put up a notice, sell your house on account of its flaws, (and then) allow someone to run into (it), unawares?
69) Although I see that, owing to the degeneracy of our social habits, this is considered neither morally wrong by custom nor is it banned by statute or by the civil code, yet it is forbidden by the law of nature. For there is a (bond of) fellowship - although it has often been stated, yet it must be repeated again and again - and this has a very wide application indeed, between all (men) of every (race), an inner (link) between those who are of the same race, (and an even) closer (connection) between those who (are) of the same state. And so our forefathers wished there to be one law for the nations and another, civil, law; the civil (law ought) not necessarily (to be) the same as (the law) of nations, but (the law) of nations ought to be the same as the civil (law). But we possess no substantial and distinct image of true law or genuine justice, (and) we make do with a (mere) shadow and imitations (of them). If only we could even come away with these! For they are drawn from the best examples of nature and truth. 70) For how important (are) these words: "That I may not be deceived or defrauded through you and your pledge of good faith!" How golden (are) these (words): "There ought to be honest dealing and no deception as between honest (people)!" But, who are "honest (people)," and what is "honest dealing," is a big question.
Indeed, Quintus Scaevola, the chief priest (vide sections 47 and 62), used to say that there was a great force in all those judgments, to which were appended (the words) "in accordance with good faith," and he believed that the expression had a very wide application, and that it was employed in wardships, partnerships, trusts, commissions, the buying and selling of properties, in hiring and letting, (that is, in all the activities) on which the social structure of our (daily) lives depends; on these (issues), there was (the need) for a most competent judge to determine what each individual should pay to the other (party) in recompense, especially when there were counter-claims in very many (cases).
71) So, sharp (practices) must be done away with, and (also) that trickery which wishes that it should itself be seen (as) prudence, but is far removed and at a great distance from it. For prudence is located in the choice between good and bad (things), (whereas,) if all (things) which are morally wrong are bad, trickery prefers bad (things) to good (ones).
But (it is) not only in (the case of) property transactions that the civil law, (which is) derived from nature, punishes trickery and deception, but also, in (the case) of the sale of slaves, every (form of) deception (on the part) of the vendor is barred. For (a vendor) who should know about (a slave's) health, (his record) of escape, and of his thefts, should provide (this information). (The position) of heirs is a different case.
72) From this we come to realise that, since the source of the law is nature, it is in accord with nature that no one should act in such a way that he should profit from another's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found than the pretence of wisdom in relation to ill-will; from this those countless (occasions) arise, when expediency seems to conflict with honesty. For how few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if impunity and the unawareness of everyone (are) assured?
Chapter XVIII. 73) If you agree, let us put (this) to the test, and (do so,) at least, in those instances in which the common herd of people does not think that (anyone) is wronged. For in this situation there is no need to discuss cut-throats, poisoners, forgers, thieves, (and) embezzlers (of public funds), who should be repressed, not by the words and arguments of philosophers, but by chains and a prison(-cell), but let us consider the (things), which those who are regarded (as) honest (men) do.
Certain (men) brought from Greece to Rome the forged will of that wealthy man, Lucius Minucius Basilus. In order to get (it) approved the more easily, they enrolled (as) heirs together with themselves Marcus Crassus (i.e. Marcus Licinius Crassus Dives, consul in 70 and 55 and a member of the First Triumvirate with Caesar and Pompey) and Quintus Hortensius (i.e. consul in 69 and a famous barrister), the most influential men of that day; although they suspected that it was a forgery, they did not repudiate the trifling proceeds of another's crime. What (shall we say) then? Is it good enough not to appear to have committed an offence? I, at any rate, do not think so, although I loved one (of them while he was) living (i.e. Hortensius), and I do not hate the other (now that he is) dead (i.e. Crassus, killed at Carrhae, fighting the Parthians, in 53); 74) But, when Basilus had desired that his sister's son Marcus Satrius should bear his name and had made him his heir - I speak of the (man who is) the patron of the Picene and Sabine territory (i.e. Lucius Minucius Basilus Satrianus, praetor in 45); O (what) a shameful stigma that name is upon these times of ours! (i.e. Cicero considers it shameful that regions enjoying the status of Roman citizenship should require a patron to protect their interests at Rome, and also that their patron, who was appointed in the summer of 44, should be a henchman of Mark Antony, which Satrianus by that time was) - and it was not right that these leading (citizens) of the state should obtain his estate, and that nothing should go to Satrius except his name. Furthermore, if he who does not ward off and repel injustice, when he can, acts unjustly, as I have argued in the first book (i.e. De Officiis I), in what way is the man to be regarded who not only does not repel injustice, but even encourages (it)? Indeed, for my part even genuine legacies do not seem morally right, if they are sought after by cunning (words of) flattery, (and) by attentions which are not sincere but hypocritical.
And yet, in such cases one (course) tends sometimes to be expedient, (and) another (one) morally right. (75) (But this is) misleading; for our standard is the same for expediency as for moral rectitude. (The man) who does not appreciate this (is the sort of man) to whom no deception, no crime will be alien. For, if he so reasons: "That is indeed the right (course), but this is the expedient (one)," he will, in his mistaken (judgment), venture to separate those things, (which are) joined together by nature, and that is the source of every (kind of) dishonesty, wrong-doing and wickedness.
Chapter XIX. And so, if an honest man has such power that, if he were to snap his fingers, he could insert his name into rich men's wills, he would not employ such a power, even if he could be sure that no one would ever suspect anything at all. But, if you were to grant this power to Marcus Crassus, so that, by the (mere) click of his fingers, he could be enrolled (as) an heir, (when), as a matter of truth, he was not an heir, believe me, he would dance (a jig) in the forum. But the just man, and the one whom we feel to be a good man, will not take anything from anyone in order to transfer it to himself. He who is surprised at this should confess that he does not know what a good man is. 76) But, indeed, if anyone should wish to unfold the notion (of a good man which lies) wrapped up in his own mind, he should at once make it clear to himself that a good man is (one) who helps whomever he can, (and) harms no one, unless (he has been) provoked by injustice. What (shall we say) then? Would he not be doing harm who, as if by some kind of magic charm, acts so as to dislodge genuine heirs and succeed in their place himself. "Well then," someone may say, "is he not to do what is of advantage (to himself), (and) what is expedient?" Indeed not; he should realise that nothing that is unjust is either expedient or advantageous; (he) who does not learn this (lesson) cannot be a good man.
77) (When I was) a boy, I heard from my father that the ex-consul Gaius Fimbria (i.e. consul in 104) had been the judge in the case of Marcus Lutatius Pinthia, a highly honourable Roman knight, when he had laid down a wager to be forfeited "(if he did) not (prove in court) that he was a good man." (I heard that) Fimbria had, thereupon, told him that he would never adjudicate such a case, lest he might either rob a worthy man of his reputation if he ruled against (him), or be seen to have decided that someone was a good man, when such a title depended on (the performance of) countless duties and praiseworthy acts.
So, to this (type) of good man, which not only Socrates, (but) also Fimbria had known, nothing can appear to be expedient that is not morally right. Therefore, such a man will in no way venture to do, nor will he even consider (doing), anything which he would not dare to make public. Is it not a shame that philosophers should have any doubts about such (things), which country folks have no doubts about at all? (Indeed it is) from them that that proverb, which is already worn with age, originated. For when they praise someone's trustworthiness and goodness, they say that he is honest enough (to be someone) with whom you can (play at) flashing (your fingers) in the dark (i.e. the game "How many fingers have I up?"). What force does this proverb have, if not this, that nothing is expedient which is not proper, even if you can obtain it without rebuke?
78) Do you see that in (the light of) this proverb, no pardon can be granted either to the celebrated Gyges (i.e. the shepherd who dethroned and replaced the king of Lydia in the first half of the Seventh Century, vide section 38) or to the man whom I supposed a short (time) ago could sweep up everyone's legacies by snapping his fingers? For, just as what is morally wrong, although it may be concealed, cannot, however, in any way become morally right, so what is not morally right cannot be made expedient, since nature opposes and fights against (it).
Chapter XX. 79) But, it will be objected, when the rewards are very great, there is an excuse for sinning.
When Gaius Marius (i.e. consul I 107 and then in the years 104-100 successively, and finally, for the seventh time, in 87) had been kept away from any hope of the consulship for a long time, and had already been overlooked for the consulship for seven years after his praetorship, and it did not seem that he would ever be a candidate for the consulship, he accused before the (whole) Roman people that eminent man and citizen Quintus Metellus (i.e. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, consul 109), whose legate he was, (and) although he had been dispatched by him as his commander, of prolonging that (particular) war; (he promised) that, if they made him consul, he would deliver Jugurtha (i.e. the King of Numidia, at war with Rome 109-105) either alive or dead, into the hands of the Roman people. And so, he was indeed elected consul, but he departed from his good faith and justice and, by means of a false charge, he brought into (public) disfavour an outstanding and highly respected citizen, whose legate (he was) and by whom he had been sent (to Rome on a mission).
80) Not even our kinsman Gratidianus performed a good man's duty during the time when he was praetor, and the tribunes of the people had summoned the college of praetors to a meeting, in order that a common agreement on the value of the currency could be reached; for, at that time, its value was fluctuating so much that no one could tell what he was worth. Working together, they drafted an edict, as well as a penalty and a judicial procedure, and they agreed that they would all mount the rostrum together in the afternoon (to make the announcement). Then, while the others (went their way), (some) in one (direction and some) in another, Marius (i.e. Gratidianus) (went) straight from the counsel benches to the rostra, and alone announced the (decision) which had been jointly drafted. And that action, should you ask, brought him great honour; (there were) statues (of him) on every street, (and) before them incense (and) wax candles (were burning). Why (should I say) more? No one was ever dearer to the masses.
81) There are such cases, which sometimes perplex us in our deliberations, when the (occasion) in which justice is violated does not seem so serious, but (when) the (consequences) which arise from it (seem) very significant, just as to Marius (i.e. Gratidianus) it did not seem so wrong, (but) very much to his advantage, to preempt the popular favour away from his colleagues and the tribunes of the people, (and) by this action to be elected consul, which was his goal at that time. But there is one rule for all (situations) which I desire to be very familiar to you, (namely) that what seems expedient should not be morally wrong, or, if it is morally wrong, it should not seem to be expedient. What then (follows from this)? Can we judge either the famous Marius or that kinsman of ours (to be) a good man? Open up (your mind) and examine your view (of the matter), so as to see what is the nature and (what is) the notion of the good man within that idea (of yours). Does it accord with the (character of) a good man to tell lies for the sake of his own profit, to forestall (others) and to deceive (them)? Certainly not in any way!
82) So, is there anything of such value, or any advantage so worth winning, that (to gain it) you would lose the illustrious name of a good man? What is there that this expediency, as it is called, can bring (you which is) as great as (what it can) take (from you), if it robs you of the name of a good man, and takes away (from you) your sense of honour and justice? For what difference does it make, whether someone changes from a man into a beast, or whether, in the shape of a man, he exhibits the monstrous behaviour of a beast?
Chapter XXI. What (then)? Are not (those) who disregard everything (that is) upright and honest, if only they may attain power, acting in the same way as the man (i.e. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, consul 70, 55 and 52) who sought to have (as) his father-in-law the man, by whose audacity he might gain power himself? To him it seemed advantageous to have supreme power on the basis of another (man's) unpopularity; (and) he failed to see how unjust to his country and how dishonourable this was. But the father-in-law himself (i.e. Gaius Julius Caesar, consul 59, 48, 46-44, and dictator 49-44) used to have constantly on his lips those Greek verses from "The Phoenician Women," (i.e. a tragedy of Euripides) which I shall reproduce as well as I can, (though) awkwardly perhaps, but still (well enough) that the message can be understood:
"For if the Right can (ever) be violated, it should be violated for the sake of a throne; in all other things may you practise piety."
Eteocles, or rather Euripides, (deserved) to die, for making an exception of the most wicked (crime) of all! 83) So, why do we gather these petty (charges) - (forged) legacies, (and) fraudulent buying (and) selling? Behold, you (have the man) who yearned to be the king of the Roman people and master of every race (i.e. Caesar), and he achieved it! If anyone says such a desire is morally right, he is a madman; for he is justifying the extinction of laws and liberty, and he thinks their foul and detestable suppression a glorious (thing). But (in the case of the man) who admits that it is not morally right to be king in a state that was (once) free, and which ought to be (so now), and yet (claims) that it is advantageous for the man who can do it, with what rebuke, or, rather, with what taunt should I try to tear him way from so great a delusion? For, (O ye) immortal gods, can that most foul and most hideous murder of our native land be of advantage to anyone, even though the man who has involved himself in it may be given the title "Father" by the citizens (he has) oppressed (n.b. Caesar was proclaimed "Pater Patriae," after the battle of Munda in 45)? Expediency, therefore, must be aligned with moral rectitude, and, indeed, in such a way that these two (concepts) may seem to differ from one another in word, but sound (as) one in reality.
84) On the basis of popular opinion, I do not know what greater benefit there could be than to be a king, (but) when I begin to bring my reasoning back to the truth, (then) I find that, on the contrary, (there is) nothing more useless to the man who has attained that (position) unjustly. For can such torments, anxieties, and fears, both by day and by night, (and) a life so fraught with snares and hazards be of benefit to anyone?
"Kingship has many foes and untrustworthy (followers), but few well-wishers," says Accius (i.e. in a fragment from his play "Atreus"). But to what (sort of) kingship (was he referring)? (Why,) that (which was) handed down by Tantalus and Pelops and held by right. But how many foes do you think that king (had), who, with the army of the Roman people, had oppressed the Roman people themselves, and had compelled a state (that was) not only free, but also the ruler of the world, to become his slave (i.e. Caesar)?
85) What blemishes do you think he had on his conscience, what scars on his heart? Yet, whose life can be of benefit to himself, when the condition of his life is that the man who takes it (from him) (i.e. he has Marcus Junius Brutus in mind here) will be (held) in the greatest gratitude and esteem? But, if these (things) which seem so especially (advantageous) are not advantageous, because they are full of shame and moral turpitude, we ought to be quite convinced that nothing is expedient which is not morally right.
Chapter XXII. 86) And yet, such a (judgment call) was indeed made on many other occasions, but also by Gaius Fabricius (vide section 16) during his second consulship and by our senate during the war with Pyrrhus (i.e. The King of Epirus who invaded Italy in 280-275 in support of Tarentum and the other cities of Magna Graecia). For when King Pyrrhus had declared war on the Roman people without provocation, and when there was a struggle for power with that chivalrous and powerful king, a deserter came from him into Fabricius' camp, and promised that, if he were to offer him a reward, he would return to Pyrrhus' camp as secretly as he had come, and kill him with poison. Fabricius took care that this man was returned to Pyrrhus' camp, and this action of his was commended by the senate. And yet, if we are looking for an example of expediency and a (popular) conjecture (of what it is), this one deserter could have brought that great war and that formidable adversary of our empire to an end, but it would have been a severe disgrace and a scandal to have overcome, not by valour, but by a crime, the man with whom (we were engaged in) a contest for glory.
87) Which course, then, (was) more expedient to Fabricius, who was as highly regarded in this city of ours as Aristides (vide sections 16 and 49) (was) in Athens, or to our senate, who never divorced expediency from worthiness - to contend with the enemy with arms or with poison? If power is to be sought for the sake of glory, crime, in which there can be no glory, should be excluded; if power, itself, is to be sought by every possible means, it cannot be expedient (to be linked) with shame.
So, that well-known proposal of Lucius, son of Quintus, Philippus (i.e. Lucius Marcius Philippus, consul 91), that certain states, which, in accordance with a decree of the senate, Lucius Sulla (i.e. Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix, consul 88 and dictator 82-79) had exempted (from taxation) after (a sum of) money had been received (from them), should become tax-payers again, and (that) we should not return to them the money which they had paid for their exemption. (And) the senate approved the (measure). Shame upon our government! For pirates' sense of honour is better than our senate's. But (it will be said) our revenues (were) increased, so (it was) expedient. How long will (any of our citizens) have the effrontery to say that something which is not morally right is expedient? 88) Furthermore, can hatred and infamy be expedient for any government, which should be sustained by its good reputation and the goodwill of its allies?
(On this) I often disagreed even with my good friend Cato (vide section 66); it seemed to me that he defended the treasury and our revenues too rigorously, (and) that he refused all (requests) from the tax collectors and many (requests) from our allies, whereas we ought to be generous towards the latter, and deal with the former in the way that we used to treat our tenants, and all the more (so) because such harmony between the social classes was essential to the welfare of the republic. Curio (i.e. Gaius Scribonius Curio, consul 76) , too, (was) wrong, when he stated that the cause of the Transpadanes (i.e. the inhabitants of Cisalpine Gaul or Italy north of the River Po.) was just, but always added: "(But) let expediency prevail!" He ought rather to have claimed that it was not just because it was not expedient for the republic, than to have admitted that it was just, while stating that it was not expedient.
Chapter XXIII. 89) The sixth book of Hecaton's "Moral Duties," (n.b. Hecaton was a Stoic and a pupil of Panaetius) is full of such questions (as these): "Is it (the mark) of a good man not to feed his retinue of slaves when the price of corn (is) very high?"
He gives the arguments on both sides (of the question), but yet in the end he aligns our moral duty, as he conceives (it), with expediency rather than with our humanity.
(Then) he asks: if a loss had to be effected at sea, should (a man) make the sacrifice of an expensive horse or (that) of a cheap young slave. In this case, regard for his household property leads him in one direction, (feelings of) humanity in the other.
"If a foolish (man) has laid hold of a plank during a shipwreck, should a wise (man) wrest (it) away from (him), if he can?"
He (i.e. Hecaton) says no, because it would be unjust.
"Well then? Shall the owner of the ship seize (it) from (him), (because) it belongs to him?"
"Not at all, no more than he should be willing to throw a passenger from the ship into the deep (ocean), because (the ship) was his. For until they reach the (place) for which the ship was chartered, the ship does not belong to the owner, but to the passengers."
90) "Well then? If there were one plank, (and) two shipwrecked (man), both wise, should both of them seize (it to save) themselves, or should one give way to the other?"
"Of course, one should give way, but to the one whose life is of more importance, either for his own sake or (for that) of his state."
"(But) what if these (considerations are) of equal (weight) in both (cases)?
"(Then,) there will be no contest, but one will give way to the other as if (the matter) were to be decided by lot or by a game of chance."
"Well again? Suppose a father were robbing shrines or digging underground passages into the treasury, should his son inform the magistrates of it?"
"(No,) that would indeed be an impious act; rather, he should even defend his father, should he be indicted."
"So, does not (loyalty to) one's country take precedence over all (other) obligations?"
"Yes, indeed, but to have citizens (who are) dutiful to their parents is of benefit to one's country."
"(But) what (about this)? If the father tries to introduce a tyranny or to betray his country, shall the son stay silent?"
"Indeed not; he will implore his father not to do it. If that achieves nothing, he will take him to task, he will even threaten (him), and, in the end, if things are pointing towards the destruction of his country, he will put the safety of his country before his father's safety."
91) He also asks (this question): if a wise (man) should inadvertently accept some counterfeit coins instead of genuine (ones), should he, when he becomes aware of it, pass them off as genuine, if he owes someone (something)? Diogenes says ("yes"), Antipater says no, (and) I agree rather with him.
Should (a man,) who knowingly offers wine (which is) going off for sale, tell (his customers about it)? Diogenes thinks it is unnecessary, (whereas) Antipater considers that (it is required) of an honest man (to do so). Such (issues) are just like the (points of) law disputed among the Stoics. "When selling a slave, should his faults be declared - not (only) those, which if you do not declare (them), the slave which you have purchased would be returned (to you), but (also) that he is a liar, a gambler, a thief (or) a drunkard?" One (i.e. Antipater) thinks that such faults should be declared, the other (i.e. Diogenes) thinks not.
92) "If a man thinks he is selling brass, when he is (actually) selling gold, should an honest man inform him that it is gold, or should he buy for one denarius (something) which is (worth) a hundred denarii?"
It is now clear both what my views are, and what are the (grounds of) dispute between those philosophers whom I have mentioned.
Chapter XXIV. Must agreements and promises always be kept, "which", as the praetors are accustomed (to say in their edicts), "have been made neither through force nor by criminal fraud"?
If a man should give someone a remedy for dropsy, and should stipulate that, if he should be restored to health by this remedy, he would never make use of it afterwards, (and,) if he is cured by that remedy, but some years later he falls (victim) to the same disease, and does not obtain the permission of the man, with whom he had made the agreement that he may be permitted to use it again, what should he do? Since the man is being inhumane in refusing to give his permission, and no harm at all would be done to him (if he did so), (the sick man) should take care of his life and health.
93) Well, again? Suppose some wise (man) has been asked by the man who is making him his heir, since a million sesterces is being left to him in his will, to dance publicly in the forum in (broad) daylight, before he should enter into his inheritance, and he has promised that he will do it, because otherwise he would not enrol him (as) his heir, should he do what he has promised? I do wish he had made no such promise, and I think that would have been in keeping with his dignity; (but) since he has made the promise, if he does consider (it) degrading to dance in the forum, it would be more honourable (for him) to break his promise, (even) if he were to take nothing from the inheritance, than if he were to take (the inheritance and to keep his promise), unless, perhaps, he were to transfer the money to the state (to meet) some grave emergency, as it would not (then) be morally wrong even to dance in the forum, since it would be in his country's interests (for him to do so.)
Chapter XXV. 94) Nor do those promises even need to be kept which are not expedient to the very people to whom you have promised them. To return to (the realm of) fables, Sol (i.e. the Sun) told his son Phaëthon that he would do whatever he wanted; he wanted to be taken up in his father's chariot; taken up he was. And yet, before he finished his journey, he was consumed by a bolt of lightning. How much better it would have been if, in this (instance), his father's promise had not been kept! (And) what of the promise which Theseus exacted from Neptune? When Neptune gave him three wishes, he wished for the death of his son Hippolytus, since he had become the object of suspicion to his father concerning (his relationship with) his stepmother (i.e. Phaedra); when this wish was obtained, Theseus was overwhelmed with grief. 95) (And) what (about) that (situation) when Agamemnon (i.e. the High-King of Mycenae and leader of the Greek forces at Troy) had vowed to Diana the most beautiful (creature) which had been born in his kingdom in that year, (and) he sacrificed Iphigenia (i.e. his daughter), because nothing more beautiful had indeed been born in that year but her? He should have broken his promise rather than have committed so frightful a crime.
So, promises sometimes do not need to be kept, nor do objects held in trust always need to be returned. If someone left his sword with you (when he was) in his right mind, (and) he asks for (it) back (when he has gone) mad, it would be a sin to give (it ) back, and it would be your moral duty not to return (it). And again, if a man who left money with you were to make war upon your native-land, would you return (what he had) deposited? I do not believe (you would); for you would (then) be acting against the state, which ought to be (the thing) most dear (to you). Thus, many (actions) which appear to be morally right prove not to be morally right in moments of crisis: to honour a promise, to stand by agreements, to return sums of money held in trust, cease to be morally right if their utility (is) altered.
But now I think enough (has been) said about those (actions,) which seem to be expedient under the guise of prudence, (yet are really) contrary to justice.
F. THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT AND FORTITUDE (96-115).
96) But, since in Book One we derived our moral obligations from the four sources of moral rectitude (i.e. the four cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance), let us (now) concentrate upon the same (four sources), when we demonstrate how hostile to virtue are those (sources of conduct) which seem to be expedient, but are not. We have already discussed wisdom, which ill-will seeks to imitate, and likewise justice, which is always expedient. Two dimensions of moral rectitude are left, of which one is to be seen in the greatness and preeminence of an outstanding spirit, the other in the shaping and regulation (of it) by self-control and restraint.
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Chapter XXVI. 97) Ulysses thought (it) a useful (ploy), as the tragic poets have recorded it at any rate - for in Homer, our foremost authority, there is no such suspicion in relation to Ulysses - , but the tragedies charge him with trying to avoid military service by feigning madness. The plan (was) not morally right, but, as someone might perhaps say, (it was) expedient to keep his throne and to live at ease in Ithaca with his parents (i.e. Laertes and Anticleia), his wife (i.e. Penelope) and son (i.e. Telemachus). Do you think that any distinction (to be won) in (facing) daily toils and dangers (can be) compared with such an untroubled existence?
No, I think that such (a life is) to be despised and rejected, since, (if) it is not morally right, it is not expedient either. 98) For what do you think would have said of Ulysses, if he had persisted in that pretence (of madness)? For, although he achieved very great things in the war, yet he was to hear these (taunts) from Ajax: "He was the first (among us) to swear this oath, as you all know, (yet) he alone broke his word; he persisted in pretending he was mad in order to avoid the draft. And, if the shrewd wisdom of Palamedes had not seen through his ill-willed effrontery, he would have permanently betrayed the authority of the sacred pledge." (n.b. this extract comes from the "Iudicium Armorum", i.e. "The Test of Arms", of Pacuvius or Accius, now lost.)
99) In truth, it would have been better for him to have done battle, not only with the enemy, but also with the waves, something which he did, than to desert Greece (when she was) united in waging war upon the barbarians (i.e. the Trojans).
But let us disregard both fables and foreign (lands); let us turn to a real event concerning our own (country). Marcus Atilius Regulus (i.e. consul 267 and 256), when, in his second consulship, he had been taken captive (n.b. actually he was taken prisoner in 255 when he was a proconsul), by means of an ambush, by the Spartan general Xanthippus, (who was) under the command of Hannibal's father Hamilcar (n.b. actually it was a different Hamilcar, and not Hannibal's father, whose military career began in 247) was sent to the senate, having sworn to return to Carthage himself, if certain noble prisoners of war were not restored to the Carthaginians. When he came to Rome, he discerned the specious (course) of expediency, but he considered it false, as the outcome reveals. The (course) was as follows: to remain in his country, to be at his home with his wife and children, (and, while) regarding the disaster which he had suffered in battle as common to the fortunes of war, to maintain the standing of his consular rank. Who says that these (things) were not advantageous? Do you think that anyone (would)? (Yet) greatness of spirit and courage deny (it). Chapter XVII. 100) You cannot ask for more reliable authorities (than these), can you? For it is (in the nature) of these particular virtues to stand in fear of nothing, to despise all human (vicissitudes), (and) to reckon nothing which can befall a man (as) intolerable. So what, then, did he do? He came into the senate, (and) he set out his instructions, but he declined to give a vote (on the matter in question), (saying) that he was not a senator so long as he was bound by the oath (he had) sworn to his enemies. And he said this also - "O foolish man," someone will say, "to oppose his own interests!" - that it was not expedient for the prisoners to be returned; for they were young men and good leaders, (whereas) he (was) now worn out by old age. When his authority prevailed (in the senate), the prisoners were retained, (and) he himself returned to Carthage; neither his love of country nor of his kin held him back. Nor, indeed, was he unaware at the time that he was going to a most cruel enemy and to refined tortures, but he believed that the oath (he had) sworn needed to be kept. And so, (even) then, when he was being put to death by lack of sleep, he was in a better position than if he had remained at home, (as) an aged prisoner of war and a forsworn ex-consul.
101) "But (he acted) foolishly," (you will say), "who not only failed to advocate that the prisoners be sent back, but even argued against (it)."
(But) how (was he) foolish? (Was that the case,) even if he served the interests of the state? Indeed, can something which is inexpedient for the state (ever) be of benefit to any (individual) citizen?
Chapter XXVIII. Men undermine what are the (very) foundations of nature, when they divorce expediency from (what is) honourable. For we all seek (what is) expedient, and we are drawn towards it, and we cannot act in any other way. For what man is there who would turn his back upon (the things which are) expedient? Or, rather, who (is there) who does not pursue them with the utmost eagerness? But, because we cannot find these things anywhere but in (what is) praiseworthy, seemly or honourable, we therefore regard these (qualities as) our primary and highest (goals), (and) we consider the title of expediency (as applying) not so much to (what is) magnificent as to what is necessary.
102) "So what (point) is there," someone will say, "in swearing an oath? It is not that we fear the wrath of Jupiter, is it? Indeed, it is the common (view) of all philosophers, not only of those who say that god has no troubles himself and imparts none to others (i.e. the Epicureans), but also of those who hold the view that god is always doing something and exerting himself (i.e. the Stoics), that god is never angry and never harms (anyone). But what more harm could an angry Jupiter have (done to him) than the harm that Regulus brought upon himself? So, there was no religious scruple that could undermine such expediency.
"Or (was he afraid) that he would act basely? In the first place, (as the proverb says:) 'Of evils, (choose) the least' (vide section 3). So, did that moral wrong really cause so great an evil as that terrible torture? Secondly, there is also that extract from Accius (i.e. in his play, "Atreus"): [Thyestes] 'Did you break your faith?' [Atreus] 'I did not pledge it (then), nor do I pledge (it now) to any faithless (man).' Although this is said by an impious king, yet it is admirably spoken."
103) These (critics) also add that, just as we maintain that some things seem expedient that are not, so they maintain that some things seem morally right that are not. So, this very (action of his, namely) returning to be tortured for the sake of keeping his oath, seems to be morally right; but it proves not (to be) morally right, because what has been enacted by an enemy's force ought not to be binding."
They add that, whatever is highly expedient, it may also prove to be morally right, even if it did not seem (so) beforehand.
These (are) in essence (the arguments raised) against (the conduct of) Regulus. But let me consider the first of them.
Chapter XXIX. 104) "He should not have feared that Jupiter would harm (him) in his anger, for he is not wont to be angry or to harm (anyone)."
Indeed, this argument is no more effective against Regulus' (oath) than against oath-taking in general. But in swearing an oath, one ought to understand, not what fear (it may induce in case of violation), but what impact may arise (from it); for an oath is a religious affirmation; moreover, what you have promised with assurance, as if god was your witness, must be kept. For (the issue) no longer concerns the wrath of the gods, which is non-existent, but (the obligations of) justice and good faith. For, (as) Ennius (so) splendidly (says): "O kindly Good Faith with wings attached, and oath sworn (in the name) of Jupiter!" (n.b. this extract is lost, but probably comes from Ennius' play "Medea" or his "Thyestes"). So, the man who violates his sworn oath violates that Good Faith which our ancestors determined should be (placed) on the Capitol "next to Jupiter Best (and) Greatest" (i.e. this is believed to have been ordered by Atilius Caiatinus, censor in 247), as is attested in a speech of Cato (i.e. presumably Cato the Elder).
105) But, in fact, not even an angry Jupiter could have done more harm to Regulus than the harm that Regulus did to himself.
(That is true,) of course, if there were no (other) evil but pain. But philosophers of the highest authority assure (us) that it is not only not the greatest evil, but not even an evil (at all). Indeed, I do not know (whether) Regulus (is) no mean witness or a very weighty (one), but, pray, do not disparage (him). For what more competent (witness) could we seek than that leader of the Roman people, who suffered torture on a voluntary basis for the sake of fulfilling his moral duty?
For (critics) say this: "Of evils, (choose) the least" (vide sections 3 and 102), that is, to (choose what is) morally wrong rather than (what is) ruinous, or is there anything more evil than moral wrong? What if there is something repulsive in deformity of the body, how monstrous should the depravity and foulness of a corrupted soul appear! 106) Therefore, (those philosophers) who discuss these (problems) with more rigour venture to say that what is morally wrong (is) the only wrong, but even those (philosophers) who (discuss them) less stringently do not hesitate to call (it) the greatest evil.
As for that (quotation): "I did not pledge (it then), nor do I pledge (it now), to any faithless man" (vide section 102), (it was used) by the poet correctly for this reason, because, when he was dealing with Atreus, he had to adhere to his character. But, if they are going to adopt for their own (use) the (argument) that a pledge, which may be given to a faithless (person), is no (pledge), let them see to it that no pretext for perjury is being sought.
107) Furthermore, we even have a law regulating warfare, and fidelity to an oath sworn to an enemy must often have to be kept. For an (oath) that is so sworn with the intention that it should be discharged must be kept; what (is sworn) otherwise, if it should not be performed, there is no perjury. For example, if you do not deliver the ransom agreed with pirates in return for your life, there would be no deception, not even if you should fail to do it, after having sworn (to do so); for a pirate is not listed in the ranks of (lawful) enemies, but (is) the common foe of all (people), with him, there ought not to be any pledged word or any mutually binding oath. 108) For swearing a false (oath) is not perjury, but not to perform something which you have sworn to do in accordance with your conscience, as it is expressed in words on our customary phrase, is perjury. For as Euripides aptly (puts it), "I have sworn with my tongue; my mind I bear (as yet) unsworn" (i.e. in his "Hippolytus).
But Regulus had no right to have undermined the terms and covenants of war (made with) an enemy. For the war was being waged with (the sort of) proper and legitimate enemy, against whom we employ the whole of our fetial law (n.b. the college of 20 fetial priests or 'fetiales' were responsible for rituals concerning the declaration of war and making treaties) and the many laws (which we) share (with other nations). If this were not so, the senate would never have delivered up illustrious men in chains to the enemy.
Chapter XXX. 109) And, indeed, when Titus Veturius (i.e. Titus Veturius Calvinus, consul in 334 and 321) and Spurius Postumius (i.e. Spurius Postumius Albinus Caudinus, consul in 334 and 321) were consuls for the second time, because they had fought unsuccessfully at Caudium (i.e. the battle of the Caudine Forks, between Capua and Beneventum, in 321), and, after our legions had been sent beneath the yoke, they had made peace with the Samnites, they were handed over to them; for they had made (peace) without the instructions of the people and the senate. And Tiberius Numicius (and) Quintus Maelius, who were then tribunes of the people (n.b. they were probably military tribunes, not tribunes of the plebs, who were not permitted to leave Rome during their time in office) were delivered up at the same time, because the peace had been concluded with their authority; (this was done) so that the peace with the Samnites could be repudiated, and the advocate and instigator of this handover was the very Postumius who was being delivered up.
The same thing (happened) many years later (in the case of) Gaius Mancinus (i.e. Gaius Hostilius Mancinus, consul 137), who supported a bill, which Lucius Furius (i.e. Lucius Furius Philus, consul 136) and Sextus Atilius (i.e. Sextus Atilius Serranus, consul 136) had introduced, in accordance with a decree of the senate, that he should be delivered up to the Numantines (i.e. Numantia was a town in Nearer Spain, with which the Romans were at war), with whom he had made a treaty without the authority of the senate; after it (i.e. the bill) was passed, he was handed over to the enemy. He was more honourable than Quintus Pompeius (i.e. Quintus Pompeius Rufus, consul 141), at whose entreaty, when he was in the same situation, such a bill was not passed (n.b. as proconsul in Spain in 139 he made a treaty with the Numantines which the senate also disowned) In the latter case, what appeared (to be) expediency was stronger than honourable conduct, (whereas) in the earlier (cases) the false mirage of expediency was overcome by the power of moral rectitude.
110) "But," (they argued,) "(something) which had been enacted by force ought not to have been (considered) binding."- As if, indeed, force could (ever) be brought to bear upon a brave man!
"Why, then, did he make that journey to the senate, especially as he was intending to argue against (the release) of the prisoners?"
(Now) you are criticising what is the noblest (thing) about his (conduct). For he did not rely upon his own judgment, but took up the case so that the decision should be the senate's; (yet,) if he had not been the instigator of the (proposal), the prisoners would certainly have been returned to the Carthaginians; in that case, Regulus would have stayed in his native land unharmed (n.b. assuming that Regulus' return to prison in Carthage did occur, one might be less certain than Cicero that the senate would actually have agreed to restore the prisoners). (But,) because he thought this (was) not expedient for his country, he therefore believed that (it was) morally right for him both to declare his (opinion) and to suffer (for it).
For, when they say that what is particularly expedient becomes morally right, it does not become (morally right), but, rather, (it is) morally right. For nothing is expedient which (is) not at the same time morally right, nor (is it) morally right because (it is) expedient, but (it is) expedient because (it is) morally right.
And, therefore, from the many wonderful examples (in our history), one could not easily cite (anything which is) either more praiseworthy or more outstanding than this example (of his).
Chapter XXXI. 111) But out of all this (catalogue) of praise (in the case) of Regulus, the one thing (particularly) worthy of our admiration is that he proposed that the prisoners of war be retained. For (the fact) that he returned may seem remarkable to us now, but in those times he could not have done otherwise; that merit, therefore belongs not to the man, but to the times. For our ancestors were of the opinion that no bond was more effective for the maintenance of good faith than the swearing of an oath. This is shown by the laws in the Twelve Tables, by the sacred laws (i.e. laws which if contravened rendered lives and property forfeit), by the treaties, in which good faith is binding even in the case of the enemy, and by the investigations of the censors and the penalties (imposed by them), for they rendered no judgments more rigorously on any matter than on cases relating to oaths.
112) Marcus Pomponius, a tribune of the people (i.e. in 363), impeached Lucius, son of Aulus, Manlius (i.e. Lucius Manlius Capitolinus Imperiosus, dictator 363), after he had been dictator, because he had added a few days to his tenure of the dictatorship; he also charged (him) because he had banished his son Titus, who was, afterwards, named Torquatus (i.e. Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, consul 347, 344, 340) from (all contact with) people, and had ordered (him) to live in the country. When his son, (who was) a young man, heard of this trouble his father was experiencing, it is said that he hastened to Rome, and arrived at Pomponius' house at first light. When his arrival was announced to him, as he thought that he, in his anger, would be bringing him some (evidence to use) against his father, he arose from his bed and, (all) witnesses having been asked to leave (the room), he bid the young man join him. But when he entered, he at once drew his sword and swore that he would kill him immediately, unless he were to swear an oath that he would absolve his father. Forced by the terror of this (situation), Pomponius swore (the oath); he reported the (incident) to the people, and told (them) why it was necessary to drop the suit, (and why) he had acquitted Manlius. So great was the power of an oath in those days! And, moreover, that (lad) was the Titus, who, at the Anio, pulled the torque (i.e. collar) from the neck of the Gaul, whom he had killed, after he had been challenged by him (to single combat), and (thus) won his surname; in his third consulship, the Latins (were) routed and put to flight at the Veseris (i.e. a river close to Mount Vesuvius in 340); he was an exceptionally great man, and (one) who, (while) very generous to his father, (was) also bitterly harsh to his son (i.e. he had had his son executed for disobeying orders earlier in 340).
Chapter XXXII. 113) But, just as Regulus is worthy of praise for keeping his oath, so those (men,) whom Hannibal sent to the senate after the battle of Cannae under oath to return to the camp which the Carthaginians had occupied, if they did not reach an agreement about the prisoners being ransomed, (are) deserfving of censure. All (the authorities) are not of one view about these (facts); for Polybius, an especially good authority, states that, of the ten noblemen who had then been sent, nine returned, when an agreement was not made by the senate; (but) one of the ten, who, a little (while) after he had left the camp, had gone back (there) on the pretext that he had forgotten something, (then) remained behind at Rome; for he claimed, wrongly, that by his return to the (enemy) camp he had been released from his oath; for deceit aggravates perjury, it does not nullify (it). So, cunning, perversely masquerading (as) prudence, was (mere) folly. And so, the senate decreed that the sly old schemer should be escorted back to Hannibal in chains.
114) But the most significant (part of the story is) this: the eight thousand men Hannibal was holding (were) not (men) whom he had taken in battle, or who had fled from (it) in fear of death, but (men) who had been left behind in the camp by the consuls Paulus (i.e. Lucius Aemilius Paulus, consul 219 and 216) and Varro (i.e. Gaius Terentius Varro, consul 216). The senate voted not to redeem them, even though this could have been achieved by quite a small (sum of) money, in order that (the maxim) "Conquer or die," could be instilled in (the hearts of) our soldiers. Indeed, the same (man) (i.e. Polybius) writes that, when he heard this news, Hannibal's morale was broken, because the senate and people of Rome had (displayed) such surpassing courage at a time of disaster. So, things which appear expedient are outweighed when placed in the balance against honourable conduct.
115) However, Gaius Acilius (i.e. Gaius Acilius Glabrio, tribune of the people in 197), who wrote his history in Greek, says that there were several (men) who returned to the camp with the same deceitful trick (in mind) so as to be released from their oath, and they were branded by the censors with every (possible) mark of ignominy.
Now let this be the conclusion of this topic. For it is (perfectly) clear that such (acts) as are done with a cowardly, submissive, abject and broken spirit, such as the action of Regulus would have been, if, with regard to the prisoners of war, he had supported (a measure,) which seemed to be in his own interests, (but) which (was) not (in the interests) of the state, or (if) he had decided to remain at home, are not expedient, because they are disgraceful, foul and morally wrong.
G. THE APPARENTLY EXPEDIENT AND THE FOURTH VIRTUE OF SELF-CONTROL (116-120).
Chapter XXXIII. 116) Our fourth division is left, (the one) which comprises propriety, moderation, temperate behaviour, self-restraint and self-control.
So, can anything be expedient, which is contrary to this chorus of such virtues? And yet, the Cyrenaics, (who come) from (the school of) Aristippus, and those philosophers (who are) named Annicerii, reckoned all good (to lie) in pleasure, and considered virtue to be praiseworthy for this reason (only), because it is productive of pleasure. (Now) that these schools are obsolete, Epicurus, a supporter and advocate of the same doctrine, is flourishing. Against such (foes), we must fight it out, "on foot and on horseback," as the saying goes, if our intention is to defend and maintain moral rectitude.
117) For, if not only expediency, but all happiness in life, depends upon a sound physical constitution, and the expectation of such a constitution being maintained, as Metrodorus (i.e. a philosopher from Lampsacus, who was Epicurus' closest disciple and friend) has written, (then) that expediency, and, in fact, the highest (form of expediency), will undoubtedly clash with moral rectitude. For, in the first place, what place will be offered to wisdom (in that system)? To search for pleasures in all directions? What wretched servitude for a virtue to be pandering to sensual pleasure! And what function (will be assigned) to wisdom? To make a sensible choice between sensual pleasures? Granted that nothing may be more pleasurable than this, what more degrading (duty) can (possibly) be envisaged?
And then, should anyone argue that pain (is) the greatest evil, what place in that (doctrine) has fortitude, which is (but) indifference to pain and toil? For, although Epicurus speaks, as he does speak, bravely enough of pain, we must, nevertheless, examine not what he says, but what it is reasonable for a man to say, who has defined good as pleasure (and) evil as pain.
And (again), if I should listen to him, he says a great deal in many places about self-restraint and self-control, but the (flow of) water dries up, as they say; for can (the man) who commends self-control (really be) the man who supposes that the highest good (is to be found) in pleasure? For self-control is the adversary of the passions, but the passions are the eager adherents of pleasure.
118) And yet, with regard to these three (categories of) virtue (i.e. wisdom, fortitude and self-control) they equivocate in whatever way they can, (and) not without subtlety; they present wisdom (as) the knowledge which supplies pleasures and banishes pains; they also clear the way for fortitude in some sense, when they propound (it as) a rational means of disregarding death and enduring pain. They even usher in self-control, (though) not easily it is true, but still in whatever way they can; for they say that the summit of pleasure is determined by the removal of pain. Justice (i.e. the remaining cardinal virtue) totters or, rather, it falls flat, and (so do) all those virtues, which are discernible in communal life and in the fellowship of the human race. For neither goodness, nor generosity, nor kindness can exist, no more than friendship (can), if those (qualities) are not sought for their own sake, but are directed towards sensual pleasure or personal advantage.
119) For, just as I have shown that (anything) which was opposed to moral rectitude was not expediency, so I maintain that all sensual pleasure is opposed to moral rectitude. (And so) I consider that Calliphon and Dinomachus (i.e. two Epicurean philosophers) (are) all the more to be condemned (in that) they imagined that they could resolve the dispute; if they were to have coupled sensual pleasure with moral rectitude, like (mating) an animal with a human being. (But) moral rectitude does not accept such a union, it rejects (it), it repels (it). (For) the supreme good and (the supreme) evil, which ought to be (something) simple, cannot, in fact, be mixed and blended from different (qualities). But (I have discussed) this - for the subject is a (large) one - more fully elsewhere; now (let us turn) to the matter (before us).
120) We have, then, fully discussed earlier how a question is to be decided, if something which seems (to be) expediency clashes with moral rectitude. But if, on the other hand, pleasure is also said to have the appearance of expediency, there can be no possible union between it and moral rectitude. For, so that I may concede something to pleasure, it may, perhaps, provide some spice (to one's life), (but) certainly nothing of benefit.
H. POSTSCRIPT: PARTING EXHORTATION TO YOUNG MARCUS (121).
So, farewell, my (dear) Cicero, and tell yourself that you are indeed very dear to me, but you will be much dearer (still), if you delight in such counsel and instructions.
