PROCOPIUS: HIS THREE WORKS

Introduction.

Procopius of Caesarea, is the last great Greek historian to write in the classical tradition of Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius, and, although he wrote in the Sixth Century A.D., right at the end of the classical era, and on the cusp of the Dark Ages, he was one of the greatest of these historians. His reputation is mainly founded upon his "Histories of the Wars" of the reign of Justinian (527-565 A.D.) in eight books. Books I-VII, covering the years 527-550, were published in 550-1, and Book VIII, which brought the record up to 553, in 554. But he also wrote two other very different books - the "Anecdota" or "Secret History", probably dated to 551 and compiled simultaneously with Book VII of "The Wars", and the "On Buildings", probably dated to 554-5. The sharp differences between the nature of these books has puzzled historians of later centuries. Indeed, as Edward Gibbon noted in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", Procopius " successively composed the history, the panegyric, and the satire of his own times." The difference in the nature of these works makes Procopius unique among historians of antiquity, but has also made him the source of some suspicion among modern scholars. In this article Sabidius offers a translation of the introductions to all three of these works, and these opening passages are then analysed to see what they tell us about their underlying motivations and, in particular, Procopius' attitude to the Emperor Justinian.

1. De Bello Persico: Book I, Chapter I.

"Procopius of Caesarea has written the history of the wars which Justinian, the Emperor of the Romans, carried through against the barbarians of the east and of the west, so that what happened in each of them was somehow brought together in order that the long course of time, having subdued enormously important deeds through lack of a record, should not utterly abandon them to oblivion and make them altogether extinct, of which very things he, himself, thought that the memory would be something great and would be profitable to the greatest degree both to those now living and to those who will come in the future, if time should ever again thrust men into some similar constraint. For the display of a similar history can provide some service to those intending to go to war and those about to contend in some other way, disclosing how once the result of a similar struggle happened in the case of men of former times, and hinting, for those who plan as well as possible, at what kind of outcome present events will probably have. Furthermore, men (said) that it was known well to him that he was especially competent among all men to write the history of these things for no other reason than that it befell him, having been appointed as counsel to the general Belisarius to be present in some way at almost all the things that had been done. He considered that cleverness was appropriate to rhetoric, and inventiveness to poetry, but truth to writing history. Accordingly, he did not conceal those wretched deeds of his very intimate acquaintances, but, being precise, he wrote down every event in detail, whether it happened to have been done well or in some other way by them.

It will be evident that (there has been) no mightier (deed) than those which occurred in these wars, at least to those wishing to base their judgment on the truth. For in them more amazing things have been performed than in all (other wars), of which we know by report, that is unless anyone of those reading this (narrative) should give the prize of honour to the old time and not deem events (seen) by oneself worthy to be considered amazing, and so, just as, of course, some call the soldiers of today bowmen and to those of the most ancient times wish to apportion the names hand-to-hand fighters and shieldsmen and whatever such (names), and they think that this courage has by no means survived to the present time, holding an opinion about them at once careless and remote from experience. For a certain thought did not ever yet occur to them, that with regard to the bowmen of the time of Homer, to whom, having been so named, it happened that they were ridiculed by their craft, no horse was near at hand, no spear or shield defended (them), nor was there any other protection for the body, but they went into battle on foot, and there was a need for them to conceal themselves, choosing the shield of some comrade, or lying down behind a tombstone on some mound, from where they were able neither to save themselves when turning to flight nor to attack a fleeing enemy, nor indeed (could) they fight it out in the open, but they always seemed to be stealing something from those taking part in the engagement. But, apart from this, they used their skill so indifferently that, drawing the bowstring to their breast, thereupon they discharged a dart which would in all likelihood be both blunt and harmless to those receiving (it). Such seemed to be the kind of archery in the past.

And yet, the bowmen of the present go into battle, having put on a breastplate and fitted out with greaves up to the knee. Their arrows hang from their right sides, and from their other the sword. And there are (some) from whom a spear is suspended as well and at the shoulders a kind of small shield without a grip such as to cover around the face and the neck. They ride as well as possible and, with their horse running as quickly as possible, they are able to bend their bows with no difficulty to either side and to shoot at an enemy, both one pursuing and one fleeing. The bowstring is drawn by their forehead, about opposite the ears on the right, impelling the arrow with such force that it always kills whomever gets in its way, neither shield nor breast plate alike having the power to deflect its force in any way. There are (some) who, considering these things hardly at all, feel awe for, and are astonished at, the ancient time, and do not give much (credit) to (modern) contrivances. But none of these (considerations) will prevent the view that the greatest and most remarkable events have happened in these wars. As far as it happened to the Romans and the Medes making war, both what they suffered and what they accomplished, it will be told by starting at first almost from the beginning."

Analysis.

As might be expected of a historian setting himself to follow in the historiographical tradition of antiquity, Procopius' opening sentence imitates to some extent the initial sentences of both Herodotus and Thucydides. One of Herodotus' proclaimed purposes was "that human achievements may not become forgotten in time", and Thucydides states at once that the conflict about which he was writing was " a great war and more worth writing about than any of those which had taken place in the past". By specifically stating that he was determined to ensure that the events of Justinian's wars should be rescued from oblivion, and that he was recording the memory of great events, Procopius is specifically tying himself to the traditions of classical historiography as exemplified by Herodotus and Thucydides, and indeed such imitation was unavoidable for any writer following in this genre. The whole of this preface to " The Wars" is full of allusions to these writers and to other classical authors, notably Homer. In claiming that his histories will be useful to those intending to go to war, Procopius also follows Polybius, who offered tactical advice to generals.

Despite the many superficial resemblances between Procopius and his classical models, the underlying tone of his history is one of deep hostility to Justinian. Since this hostility could not be overt, his real views involve both coded criticism and an ironic stance towards both his classical models and his subject matter. There is a significant imbalance in the focus of Procopius' work. Whereas Herodotus consciously wrote about the deeds of Greeks and Persians alike, and Thucydides about both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, Procopius' primary focus is upon Justinian alone. Whereas some classical historians, notably Polybius and Procopius' immediate successor, Agathias, saw praise as a source of inspiration to future generations, the lack of praise in relation to Justinian in "The Wars" is positively deafening. In fact, he does on occasions even offer specific criticisms of Justinian. For instance in Book VIII.26.5. he refers to "the Emperor Justinian who had been very negligent in his conduct of the war before this." Furthermore, while he appears to be following Thucydides when he states in the preface that more "amazing things" have been performed in the wars about which he is writing than in all others, he totally fails to substantiate this claim and mentions none of the things which he might have mentioned in this context, such as the reconquest of territories, the great victories that occurred, the number of prisoners taken, including kings, and cities captured, all things about which Justinian boasted in the prologue to many of his laws. Instead, Procopius immediately undermines his claim of the amazing nature of his times by the statement that a reader might prefer to give the badge of honour to antiquity.

It is in this context that we must understand the bizarre contest of archers in Procopius' preface. On the face of it, Procopius appears to be seeking to demonstrate the superiority of the mounted archers of his own day to the hand-to-hand fighters of the Homeric age, and to defend the former from ridicule, as a way of justifying his theme of the greatness of the wars of his own time. In practice, however, he fails totally to make his case. To do this, Procopius either has to defend the profession of archery or argue that modern soldiers of the Sixth Century were the equals of the hand-to -hand fighters of the Homeric Age. He does neither. What he does do is to denigrate unfairly the archers of the Homeric era, and thus lower artificially the standard that modern soldiers must reach to justify his argument, and he then juxtaposes the weakness of Homeric bowmen to the armoured and mounted archers of his own day. This argument is not convincing because he needs to demonstrate that modern soldiers are superior not just to the most despised element of Homeric armies -that is, the archers or bowmen - but to the heroes such as Achilles or Ajax. But he totally fails to compare modern soldiers to the heroes of Homer, which is what he needs to do to convince the reader. Such heroes are markedly absent from Procopius' introduction. That Procopius is aware of the flaw in his argument is surely indicated by his repetition of the comment that some will continue to rate ancient times above the "contrivances" of the modern period. What is left, this preposterous contest of archers, could never have demonstrated the greatness of Justinian's wars. So what then is the purpose of this mockery? The target for this trivialisation of the claim of the greatness of these wars is not so much the classical tradition itself but the pretentious propaganda of the Emperor himself. When Procopius offers us poor arguments for the greatness of Justinian's wars we may suspect that he is drawing our attention to the weakness of that position, something which, however, he could not openly state. It was often only through pointed omissions that ancient authors could indicate their real views, and, as has been said, the lack of praise for Justinian in "The Wars" is devastating in its implications. At the same time this ridiculous and irrelevant contest of archers, and its sheer levity, served to deflate still further the Emperor's claims to glory.

2. Historia Arcana: Introduction: By the Historian.

"All the things which have happened to occur to the nation of the Romans in its wars right up to the present have been set out in detail by me as far as it has proved possible through arranging all the accounts of its activities in accordance with their proper times and places; but henceforth events will no longer be composed by me in the manner stated, since here will be set down everything such as has chanced to happen throughout the empire of the Romans. The reason (for this is) that it was not possible, the perpetrators being still alive, for these things to be recorded in a manner such as is necessary. For neither was it possible (for me) to elude the multitude of spies, nor, having been detected, not to perish in a miserable death. For I did not even have confidence in the most intimate of my kinsmen. But in the case of the many events described in my previous narrative I was compelled to conceal the causes (that led up to them). So now it will be necessary for me to disclose the things that have remained concealed before this and the causes of occurrences previously explained already. But for me, going towards another endeavour, something difficult and exceedingly hard to cope with, to stammer and correct myself concerning (the lives) lived by Justinian and Theodora, it particularly occurs to me to consider that the things about to be written by me in the present will appear neither credible nor probable to those coming after (us), and, especially when time, streaming greatly, will render the story somewhat ancient, I fear that I shall gain the reputation of a narrator of myths and shall be ranked among the trainers of tragic poets. At this point, however, I shall not shrink from the immensity of this task, having the confidence that my account is not without witnesses. For the men of the present day, being very knowledgeable witnesses of the events (in question) will be sufficient purveyors to future time of the truth concerning these (events). And yet something else often held me back for a long time when I was eager to (undertake) this narrative. For I considered that this (record) would be inexpedient for men coming in the future, since it would be most advantageous that the most wicked of deeds should be unknown to future times rather than that, coming to their attention, they should become worthy of imitation by tyrants. For the imitation of the evil deeds of their predecessors (is) always easy for the majority of those in power through lack of experience, and they always turn more easily and with little difficulty towards the faults of those of an earlier time. But afterwards this brought me to (writing) the history of these deeds, that assuredly it will be clear to the tyrants of the future that it was not unlikely that punishment would in all probability overtake them for their misdeeds, just as this happened to befall those people; and then that their actions and their characters will be on the record for the future, and from this they will perhaps transgress more hesitantly. For who of those men of later times would have learned of the licentious life of Semiramis or of the madness of Sardanapalus and Nero, if the records of these things had not been left behind by the writers of their times; otherwise this account will not be wholly without value to those who may so chance to suffer similar things at the hands of their rulers. For those suffering misfortunes are wont to be consoled by the (thought) that these evils have not fallen upon themselves alone. So, for these (reasons), I am going to tell first about the wretched deeds wrought by Belisarius; and afterwards I shall disclose all the wretched deeds committed by Justinian and Theodora."

Analysis.

Procopius' clear intention is that the Secret History should be taken together with "The Wars" to provide a true explanation of events, which he has been unable to give in the published document through fear of the Emperor Justinian. It seems to have been compiled in secret in the period following Belisarius' return from Italy in 549, when Procopius' view of his former employer had become extremely critical. The connection between "The Wars" and the "The Secret History" becomes immediately clear from his use of the word "mochthera", meaning "wretched" or "wicked deeds" in both introductory passages. This is clearly no coincidence. Perhaps the grievances which he had developed against Belisarius and his wife, Antonina, were the initial impetus for this secret compilation, and the first five chapters broadly comply with his intentions as stated in the preface to "The Secret History". From there onwards, however, the work broadens out into a general diatribe against both Justinian and Theodora, to whom Procopius attributes direct responsibility for all the ills of the Roman Empire. In Chapter XII Procopius calls them demons ("daimones") in human form, and later he calls Justinian the prince of demons ("archon ton daimonon"), capable of levitation and of walking around his palace without a head. Chapter IX is devoted to a vicious and pornographic attack on the immoral background of the Empress Theodora, whose death in 548 had only just preceded this piece of writing. The "Secret History" was probably not known until the Tenth Century in Byzantium - it is listed in the Tenth Century lexicon, the "Souda" - , and not until the Seventeenth Century in Western Europe, when its initial publication led to such dismay that for a long time many scholars sought to deny Procopius' authorship of it. This was partly because of a desire to shield Justinian, long seen as a Catholic lawgiver, and because it appeared to dent the image of Procopius as a rationalist historian in the Thucydidean tradition.

While due allowance for the requirements of the genres of "komodia" (satire) and "psogos" (invective) needs to be made, there is little doubt that the virulence of Procopius' attacks on Justinian and Theodora does reflect the extent of his disaffection with the regime. Procopius saw Justinian as responsible for undermining the position of both the traditional landowning aristocracy and the professional classes at Constantinople, whose influence had been superseded by lowly-born bureaucrats, while he was also intensely critical of Justinian's suppression of classical culture, which he viewed as potentially subversive, and his elevation of despotism into almost a legal principal. Although probably not a Christian himself, Procopius condemned Justinian's persecution of religious dissidents, and dismissed Christian theology as an insanely stupid attempt to investigate the nature of an unknowable entity (see "The Wars", Book V.3.6.) He also became increasingly disillusioned with the results of Justinian' s reconquests, which he claimed had destroyed both Italy and Africa, and he may have resented Justinian's increasingly ungracious treatment of his employer Belisarius. The suggestion that Procopius' hyperbolic abuse of Justinian and Theodora may not have been entirely serious should be disregarded. For men of the Seventh Century it was quite normal to ascribe disastrous events to the intervention of demons, and, despite the extremity of the abuse in the "Secret History", no one has succeeded in impugning the factual basis of its background content. An analysis of Chapters XIX-XXX shows that Procopius is attacking specific edicts issued by the Emperor. However, it must be accepted that after Chapter V Procopius is increasingly distracted from his avowed purpose of explaining the true causes of events in "The Wars", and indeed he fails completely to link Chapter XXX, the final chapter, back to the preface. Since he was not able to publish "The Secret History", as Justinian lived on to 565 and there is no record of Procopius after the completion of the "On Buildings" in 554-5, it is possible that he died without revising the work, and that, if he had, he might have addressed more coherently the aims set out in the preface. Nevertheless, "The Secret History" provides a devastating indictment of Justinian's regime, which complements dramatically the coded criticisms and the occasionally more overtly adverse comments in "The Wars".

3. De Aedificiis: Book I, Chapter I.

"Not wishing to make a display of my skill, nor being confident in the power of my speech, nor priding myself on my experience of countries, I have set out on the writing of this history; indeed I have not had anything through which I might bring such licence to it. But the thought has often occurred to me that history is wont to be a cause of so many and such great benefits to states, transmitting to posterity the memory of things that occurred of old, and resisting the making of affairs hidden by time exerting itself to the full, and inciting virtue among those reading it from time to time by the praise (it bestows), and continuously attacking vice and repelling its influence in this way. So, it is necessary for us to take care of this alone, that (all) the deeds of the past will be clearly set forth and by whomsoever among all men they were wrought. And this is not even a helpless (task) for a tongue which is lisping and stuttering. Apart from this, history shows that those who have been well treated by their rulers have become indulgent towards their benefactors, and that they have brought forth thank offerings in generous measure, (as) they, it may be so, have had joy for the moment of the beneficence of their rulers towards themselves, and will preserve their virtue immortal in the memory of those who will come in the future. For, on account of this, many of those coming after (them) will thrive emulating the honours of those preceding (them), and, having difficulty with censure, are quite likely to shun the basest of practices. And on account of what reason I have written this preface I shall disclose forthwith.

In our own time there has been born the Emperor Justinian, who taking over the state which was stirred up with disorder, has made it greater and much more illustrious, expelling hence those barbarians who had pressed upon it from of old, as has been shown by me writing in detail in my books concerning the wars. And indeed they say that Themistocles, the son of Neocles, once boastfully stated that he was not unable to make a small state large, but he is not unpractised in acquiring other states. Certainly he has already added many (states) to the empire of the Romans that were belonging to others in his own time, and he has created countless cities which did not previously exist. And finding belief about god slipping, before his time, into error and being forced to go in many (directions), having completely destroyed all the paths leading to these errors, he brought it about that it stood on the firmness of the foundation of a single faith. And, finding in respect of the laws, that they had become very numerous with no need, being obscure and obviously confused by going in opposite (directions) from each other, and, having purged them from their mass of verbal trickery, and, controlling very firmly their discrepancies towards each other, he preserved (them), and, dismissing of his own accord the charges against those plotting against (him), and, having made those wanting in life satiated with wealth and crushing the fortune dealing spitefully with them, he wedded the state to a prosperous life. But he strengthened the domain of the Romans that had lain everywhere exposed to the barbarians by a multitude of soldiers and, by constructing strongholds, be built a wall along its remotest parts. However, most of his other (achievements) have been described by me in my other writings, inasmuch as the benefits which have been created by him by building will be written up in this present (work). We know by report that the best king was the Persian Cyrus and that he was chiefly responsible for (establishing) the kingdom for the people of his race; but whether that Cyrus was such a man as he whose education was described by Xenophon the Athenian I am not able to be sure. For the quick cleverness of the man who somewhere had written these things having been refined by the power of his speech was sufficiently capable of becoming an embellishment of his deeds. But in the case of the king of our time, Justinian [whom one would rightly, I think, call a king by nature, since he is, in the words of Homer, as gentle as a father], if one should examine his reign with care, one will consider that the rule of Cyrus was a sort of child's play. Thus it will be proved that the state under him , just as has been lately said by me, has become more than doubled both in territory and in power generally. And the proof of the benevolence of the Emperor, that those devising mischievously the plot against him right up to his murder, not (only) that they are living to this (moment) of time and are holding their own possessions, although had clearly been found guilty but are even serving as generals of the Romans still and described in the rank of consuls. But now it is necessary for us to proceed, as I have said to the buildings of this emperor so that it may not come to pass in the future time that those seeing them disbelieve by their size that they happen to be indeed the works of one man. For already many works of men of former times not established on the written record have become incredible due to the surpassing (nature) of their merit. And in all probability the (buildings) in Byzantium beyond all (the rest) may be a foundation for my narrative. For the work beginning according to the old saying, it is necessary to set a face that shines from afar."

Analysis.

As the preface to the "On Buildings" clearly indicates, this final work of Procopius, with its unrestrained praise of the Emperor Justinian, sets it totally apart from the vitriolic abuse of him in "The Secret History" and the silence and coded criticisms in "The Wars". "On Buildings" is an example of the genre of "panegyric", which would have been familiar in the sycophantic atmosphere of the court of Justinian. The question obviously arises why Procopius should have written this laudatory work concerning Justinian when only a few years before he should have penned, albeit in secret, such devastatingly different views. While some have sought to argue that this may reflect a genuine change of heart on the part of Procopius in the mid-550s - such a view has been linked to the erroneous identification of Procopius of Caesarea with the Procopius who was Praefectus urbi in Constantinople in 562 -, the most likely explanation is that Procopius wrote this piece in order to demonstrate his loyalty, and to placate Justinian who may have doubted his reliability. This would hardly have been surprising, since Justinian can scarcely have failed to notice the absence of praise of him in "The Wars", which was very widely read by the intelligentsia of Byzantium on its publication in 550-1, and, while it is perhaps unlikely that Justinian would have personally understood the critical significance of the classical allusions in this work, there can be little doubt that a number of his courtiers would have been sufficiently well grounded in classical literature to have done so, and that, equally, some of them at least may have drawn Justinian's attention to their hostile implications. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Procopius may have felt it necessary to prove his loyalty and to safeguard the position of himself and his family by writing such a panegyric. It is even possible that he himself may have been involved in some way in the plots against Justinian which he mentions twice in the preface, and that he wrote "On Buildings" under instruction in expiation of his guilt. Another possibility is that Procopius wrote it in the hope of personal advancement. In that case, there may be some direct relevance in his comment in the preface about subjects being grateful to rulers who benefit them. At all events, it is most unlikely that Procopius' true sentiments towards Justinian will have changed, and, hence, while the "On Buildings" remains an invaluable source of information about the Sixth Century Later Roman Empire, one must doubt the sincerity of the views expressed in it by Procopius towards Justinian.

Futhermore, even the "On Buildings" contains a number of coded criticisms of Justinian via the esoteric technique of classical allusions. Best known perhaps is when he is describing the colossal bronze statue of Justinian, dressed like Achilles in the Augusteum in Constantinople. He writes: "One might say, in poetic speech, that here is that star of Autumn" (Book I, Chapter 2.10). Those of his readers who knew their "Iliad" would have recognised the reference to Achilles as the Autumn Star "which is brightest amongst the stars, and yet is wrought as a sign of evil and brings on the great fever for unfortunate mortals"( Homer's Iliad 22.26-31). Even the curious references to Themistocles and Cyrus in the preface probably betoken coded criticism. When he refers to "Themistocles, the son of Neocles" he is taking his readers back to Plutarch's "Life of Themistocles", in which Plutarch writes that his origins were lowly, his father Neocles undistinguished and his mother an alien. His boast quoted in the preface that he could make small states great is juxtaposed by Plutarch against the comment that he lacked cultural refinement and social skills. This reference to Themistocles in the preface therefore almost certainly involves a coded jibe against the humble social origins of Justinian and his uncle Justin I. The reference to "the rule of Cyrus as a sort of child' s play" in the preface links to a comment in "The Secret History" that Justinian's government made "the state seem like the game of 'King' played by children" (HA, XIV.14); both of these extracts involve an allusion to a passage in Herodotus, in which the young Cyrus and his playmates play a game in which they pretend that Cyrus is king. The purpose of this allusion is perhaps somewhat obscure but it certainly involves a belittling of Justinian's rule. In this context too, his reference to the power of speech facilitating an embellishment of Cyrus' deeds may also have significance, since this refers back to the reference to his own "power of speech" at the beginning of the preface. This is perhaps a subtle hint to the reader not to take too literally some of the praise been presented here. Finally, even the apparently innocuous reference in the preface to Justinian being, in Homer's words "as gentle as a father" has a sinister implication. The passage in Homer's "Odyssey" to which it alludes goes as follows: "First, I have lost my noble sire, who sometime was king among you here, and was as gentle as a father; and now there is an evil greater far, which surely shall soon make grievous havoc of my whole house and ruin all my livelihood"(Homer's Odyssey 2.47-49.)

Conclusion.

The translations of the introductions or prefaces to Procopius' three works do provide some insight into the separate motivations behind them. What cannot be doubted is the depth of hostility entertained towards Justinian and his wife Theodora, whom Procopius clearly hated even more. It has taken historians some time to perceive the full significance behind Procopius' failure to praise Justinian in "The Wars" and of the classical allusions with which his works are full. Perhaps there has been a desire to see the best in Justinian as "the Last of the Romans" and to cast his wife Theodora in something of a romantic light, as a reformed prostitute who saved Justinian's throne by her stirring speech during the Nika riots in 532. It has, perhaps, been painful for some to have to acknowledge that Theodora probably never made her courageous speech, often quoted as fact, and that this is mainly an invention by Procopius to condemn Justinian's rule as a tyranny. ( Her famous remark that the purple was a good winding sheet was a clear allusion to the earlier statement, by Dionysius of Syracuse, quoted by Diodorus Siculus among others, that "tyranny was a good burial shroud".) At the same time there has been a desire to portray Procopius as an objective and rational analyst of historical events in the true tradition of Thucydides, and certainly many histories of the Sixth Century and of Justinian's reign have involved little more than paraphrases of his work (viz. J.B. Bury's "History of the Later Roman Empire", 1923). For such historians, the existence of "The Secret History" has been most unwelcome, and some have tried to pass it off as the temporary aberration of a man who eventually made his peace with Justinian. Undoubtedly, it has damaged the reputation of both Justinian and Procopius. In the case of Justinian, it is difficult not to accept that the views of Procopius must have been shared by very many people of his social and intellectual milieu, and that Justinian's repressive attitude to traditional classical culture and the high levels of taxation imposed upon the wealthier classes to pay for his foreign wars must have made him intensely unpopular. Even the value of his codification of the laws was vitiated by the welter of laws which he issued himself, which served to renew the very confusion he had sought to address.

In the case of Procopius, himself, the extent of the recent criticism of him, based upon the vitriolic excesses of "the Secret History" and a lack of understanding of the techniques of ancient historiography amongst modern historians lacking a background in the classics themselves, has almost certainly been misplaced. Once the purposes behind his writings are fully understood, it is clear that Procopius remains a historical writer of the highest order. He must also have been a man of considerable courage, particularly in view of his comments in the preface to "The Secret History" about the ubiquity of spies and the penalty he might face for hostile comments. While one assumes that the "the Secret History" never saw the light of day during his lifetime, his deliberate withholding of praise of Justinian and his sophisticated use of classical allusions to provide coded criticisms of him, not only in "The Wars" but also, as has just been demonstrated, even in the "On Buildings", which he wrote ostensibly as a panegyric, must surely have involved him in considerable personal risk, a risk that must have been dramatically increased if he shared the text of "The Secret History" with anyone. It is possible that he died in about 555, and that the "On Buildings" was never completed. The lack of a section in it on Italy otherwise seems difficult to explain. At the same time, the work is very uneven, with Book IV (Parts 2 and 3) and Book V, being little more than lists of fortresses in the Balkans and monasteries in Asia, respectively. A more finished work would surely have developed these lists into something more substantial.

QUESTIONS EXPECTING THE ANSWER 'YES' OR 'NO'.

When, speaking English, we often ask questions which are looking for a simple, answer 'Yes' or 'No', and the manner in which we pose the question sometimes signals clearly to the respondent which answer we are expecting to receive, often indicating thereby the attitude or viewpoint of the questioner. Set out below is an analysis of the three types of such questions. Each example in English is translated into Latin and Greek. You will note that English has different forms of asking these questions, depending on the degree of emphasis the questioner wishes to inject. Readers with no previous knowledge of Latin, but who have heard references to 'Nonne' or 'Num' questions, will now be able to decipher what this distinction means.

(1) Simple question expecting either answer.

English: Do you wish to go home? OR Are you wishing to go home?

Latin: Visne ire domum?

Greek: ἆρ' ἐθελεις ἰέναι οἴκαδε;

(2) A question to which the expected answer is 'Yes'.

English: Don't you wish to go home? OR Surely you wish to go home? OR You do wish to go home, don't you?

Latin: Nonne vis ire domum?

Greek: ἆρ' οὐκ ἐθελεις ἰέναι οἴκαδε;

(3) A question to which the expected answer is 'No'.

English: Surely you don't wish to go home? OR You don't wish to go home, do you?

Latin: Num vis ire domum?

Greek: ἆρα μὴ ἐθελεις ἰέναι οἴκαδε;

N.B. The third type of the above questions does not always require an answer, since it is already felt to be 'No'.

P.S. 'Nonne' and 'Num' questions are sometimes called 'Negative Questions', and, indeed, when they are translated, most of them will contain the word 'Non' or another negative word. However, a 'Nonne' question, although it has a very negative look, can be translated without a negative, as the second example in the relevant section above indicates; on the other hand, if one's translation of a 'Num' question does not contain a negative, then an error will have been made, that is, if a literal translation is being attempted. A negative could, however, be avoided if the translator offered a free translation, such as "Surely you do wish to stay here?" Such free translations may of course then confuse the student reader, who, seeing 'Num' in the Latin text may then expect to find a negative in the English version. On the whole, therefore, it is probably better not to describe "Num" and "Nonne" questions as negative ones. Hence the title of this article!  

" SEEN THROUGH A GRILLE OF SQUARES " A POEM.

Seen through a grille of squares, the sky,

Is split up, intersected, neat,

Closely related, tree and cloud,

Rooftop and spire trick the eye

To think geometry complete,

To make the world an ordered crowd

Of lines and squares, intensify

Rationalism in defeat.

This is another way to shroud

An ill-conceived complexity

Beneath a simple form, replete

With all the errors of the proud,

Who hope, by thinking, to retain

A cosmos in their compassed brain.

SKULLPOEM

Behind the tegumental mask

Mastodons blurt in the muddy mind

Jocose congeries of trolls

Lurk in its veering groves

But after the terrible percussion of the clotting jetsam

The gracious triremes out of memory

Cleave the null striations,

Spurn the precocious fealty of wood.

THUCYDIDES: CAPTURE OF SPHACTERIA; FROM "THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR", BOOK IV

Introduction. In this longish extract from Book IV of Thucydides' " The Peloponnesian War", Sabidius translates the account of the Athenians' unexpected triumph on the island of Sphacteria in 425 B.C. The details of this hard-fought skirmishing between the Athenians and the Spartans (Sabidius follows Thucydides in referring to the latter as Lacedaemonians) gives much of the flavour of what fighting in this war was like, and the text here has been extensively adapted for the use of Greek grammar exercises in school text-books.

Thucydides poses a considerable challenge to the translator because of the condensation of both his language and thought, and the fact that so many words are excluded as being either unnecessary or understood from the other words in either the sentence concerned or, indeed, in a previous sentence. Sometimes, a great deal has to be understood from compound verbs, in which there is more than one preposition in the prefix. For instance at the beginning of Chapter XI the word ' epikatabantes' means ' marching down (to the sea) to face (the enemy)'. In this case both ''the sea' and 'the enemy' have to be understood, and, if not included in the translation, the full force of the prefix cannot be brought out. Another example is the word 'enkatalambanein' in Chapter XIX, which means ' binding (his foe) down in (an agreement)'. Once again, both ' his foe' and ' an agreement' have to be understood to do justice to the meaning of the word. Thucydides makes extensive use of participial clauses, and particularly of the genitive absolute construction, which is often difficult to render in English, and main verbs are often hard to identify. For instance, in Chapter XXXIV, no main verb appears until line 11. Nevertheless, despite the considerable difficulties of turning the text of Thucydides into that of another language, - the above examples demonstrate just some of these - , Sabidius has, as far as possible, maintained his principle of following the actual sentence and phrase construction employed by the author. While this may perhaps lead at times to clumsy English, it is greatly to the advantage of those seeking to understand Thucydides' actual words and how the correct meaning is to be derived from them, surely the main purposes of textual analysis.

The text followed in the translation is that of C.E. Graves, M.A., first published in the 'Elementary Classics' series by Macmillan in 1879.

PART I: ATHENIAN SUCCESS AT PYLOS. SPARTA'S OFFER OF PEACE REFUSED.

1. Messina in Sicily secedes from Athens. Rhegium is attacked by the Locrians.

(With) the summer beginning, around the putting forth of (ears) of corn, ten ships of the Syracusans and an equal number of Locrian (ships) having sailed to Messina, they occupied (it), (the people) themselves having invited (them), and Messina revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans had arranged this chiefly seeing that the place afforded (lit. contained) an approach to Sicily, and fearing that the Athenians, starting from it, might some day attack them from a better base (lit. preparation), and the Locrians wishing, on account of their hatred of the Rhegians, to make war upon them from both land and sea (lit. from both sides). And the Locrians had at the same time invaded the (territory) of the Rhegians with all their forces, in order that they could not bring assistance to the Messenians, (some) Rhegian exiles joining in promoting the invasion together (with them), for Rhegium had for a long time been in a state of faction, and it was impossible at that particular moment to ward off the Locrians, wherefore they attacked (them) the more. Having ravaged (their lands), the Locrian land forces (lit. the Locrians on the foot path) withdrew, and their ships guarded Messina. And other (ships), being manned, were about to take up station at that very place in order to make war from there.

2. Invasion of Attica. An Athenian fleet sails for Corcyra and Sicily.

About the same time of the spring, before the corn was ripe (lit. at its peak), the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, and Agis, the son of Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, was in command, and, having taken up position, they ravaged the country. Meanwhile, the Athenians sent off to Sicily the forty ships, which they were getting ready, and the remaining generals Eurymedon and Sophocles; for the third of them, Pythagoras, had already arrived in Sicily. They instructed them that, at the same time as (they were) sailing by, to take care of those Corcyraeans in the city who were being raided by the exiles in the mountains; sixty ships of the Peloponnesians had sailed to that place to help those in the mountains, and, there being a great famine in the city, thinking that they would easily gain control of affairs (there). They told Demosthenes, being in a private position after his return from Acarnania, at his own request (lit. himself needing it) to make use, if he wished, of this fleet of theirs (on its way) round the Peloponnese.

3. Demosthenes, who had sailed with the fleet, proposes to occupy Pylos on the coast of Messenia.

When they came sailing off (the coast) of Laconia, and they heard that the ships of the Peloponnesians were already in Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pushing on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes urged them to put in first at Pylos and to do what was necessary (before) making their voyage. (The generals objecting), a storm, coming on by chance, drove them into Pylos. Demosthenes immediately thought it worthwhile to fortify the place, for he had joined the expedition for this purpose, and pointed out (the existence) of good store, both of timber and of wood, and that (the place) was strong by nature, and uninhabited, both itself and to a great extent of its district; for Pylos is about four hundred stades distant from Sparta, and is in (what) was once the Messenian country, and the Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium. They said that there were many deserted headlands in the Peloponnese, if he wished (by) occupying (them) that the city should incur expenditure. But it seemed to him that this place was somewhat different more than (any) other, there being a harbour close by, and that the Messenians, belonging to it of old and speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, would be likely to do the greatest harm setting out from there, and would at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

4. The fleet being detained at Pylos, the soldiers complete the fortifications.

As he did not persuade either the generals or the soldiers [later having communicated with company commanders also], he was detained in inactivity by the unnavigable weather, until a sudden urge came upon the soldiers, having (too much) leisure and forming into gangs (lit. taking their stand round (different points)), to complete the fortifications of the place. And, taking on the task, they worked at it, having no implements for shaping stone, picking out and carrying stones, and they put them together, each piece as it came, whatever it was; and mortar, if at any time it were necessary to use (it), they carried on their backs, through lack of hods, stooping down so that it would particularly stay on, and their hands entwining behind their backs (lit. backwards), in order that it might not fall off. And (so) in every way they were eager to anticipate the Lacedaemonians (by) completing the most assailable (parts) before they could attack (it); for most of the place was strong of itself to begin with and it was in no way necessary for there to be fortifications.

5. Demosthenes is left at Pylos.

But they (i.e the Lacedaemonians) chanced to to be keeping a certain festival and at the same time they treated it lightly (lit. in contempt), (in the belief) that, whenever they marched out, they would not be able to withstand them or that they would easily take (them) by force; and in some part too their army being still before Athens detained them. The Athenians, fortifying that part of the place (facing) towards the mainland and where it was most necessary in six days, leave Demosthenes behind with five ships as a garrison for it, and with the greater part of the ships pushed on with their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

6. The Peloponnesians withdraw from Athens.

The Peloponnesians who were (lit. being) in Attica, when they heard of the occupation of Pylos, went back homewards quickly, the Lacedaemonians and their king, Agis, thinking that the matter of Pylos (was) of concern to themselves. Having invaded early in the year, and the corn being still green, food was lacking for many (of them). Stormy weather, going greatly beyond the (then) settled season, distressed the army. So that from many causes it happened that they both departed rather quickly and that this invasion became a very short one; for they remained in Attica for (only) fifteen days.

7. The Athenians attempt to occupy Eion in Thrace.

About the same time, the Athenian general, Simonides, gathering together a few Athenians from the garrisons and a number of the allies from that (neighbourhood) took by treachery Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaeans, but being hostile. But immediately, the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans having come up, he was forced out and lost many soldiers.

8. The Spartans prepare to reduce Pylos. They occupy Sphacteria, at the entrance of the harbour.

The Peloponnesians having withdrawn from Attica, the Spartans, themselves, and the nearest of the Perioeci immediately set out for Pylos, and the approach of the other Lacedaemonians happened more slowly, (they) having just arrived (home) from other campaigns. And they sent round word also over the Peloponnese that they should march quickly to Pylos, and they sent for their sixty ships, which, having been dragged over the isthmus of the Leucadians, and having escaped the notice of the Attican ships in Zacynthus, arrived at Pylos. And the infantry army was already present. (With) the Peloponnesians still sailing towards (him), Demosthenes, anticipating (them), sent out secretly two ships to report to Eurymedon and the Athenians in the ships in Zacynthus that the place (was) in danger. On the one hand, the ships were sailing quickly in accordance with the orders of Demosthenes; on the other hand, the Lacedaemonians were preparing to assault the fortifications both by land and by sea, hoping to take easily a work hastily constructed and (with only) a few men being in (it). Expecting the arrival of the Attican ships from Zacynthus, they intended (lit. had it in mind), if after all they did not capture (it) beforehand, to block up the entrances to the harbour, in order that it would not be possible for the Athenians to lie at anchor against them. For the island called Sphacteria, stretching along and lying close to the harbour, makes a strong place and (there are) two narrow entrances, at one point a passage for two ships (abreast) (on the side) near to the fortifications of the Athenians and Pylos, at the other point, (on that side) near the rest of the mainland, eight or nine (ships); it was all wooded and pathless through (being) a wilderness, and in length (was) about fifteen stades pretty nearly. And so, they intended to block the inlets with their ships, pressed closely (together) and with their prows facing (the enemy); and, fearing this island, lest they might make war against themselves from it, they carried across to it (some) hoplites and stationed others along the mainland. For so, (they considered) both the island and the mainland, neither having a disembarkation point, would be hostile to the Athenians - for the (coast) of Pylos, itself, outside the inlet and towards the open sea, being without a harbour, would not have (any point) from where, setting out, they could bring help to their men (lit. the men of themselves) - they, themselves, without (any) sea-fight or risk, would, in all probability, take the place by siege, there being no food in (it) and it having been captured with little preparation. As this (plan) seemed good to them, they carried over the heavy infantry to the island, choosing (them) by lot from all the companies. A number had crossed over in turn beforehand, but the last ones and those who were caught were four hundred and twenty (in number) and the Helots attached to them. Epitadas, the son of Molobrus, was in command of them.

9. Demosthenes prepares to repel the attack.

Meanwhile, Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack (him) with ships and, at the same time, on foot, was also making preparations himself, and, having dragged up under the fortifications the triremes which were (remaining) to him from those which had been left, he secured (them) with a stockade, and he equipped the sailors in them with shields, of poor quality and many (of them) wicker; for it was not possible to procure arms in this deserted place, and even these they had taken from a piratical three-oared ship and a pinnace of the Messenians, which happened to be present. Of these Messenians, there happened to be about forty heavily-armed men, of whom he made use with the rest. He stationed the greater part both of those being armed and those being equipped upon the most fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, telling (them) to repel the land force, if it were to attack; he, himself, having picked out from his whole (force) sixty hoplites and a few archers, went out outside the wall down to the sea, where he expected that they would most likely attempt to land, on ground although difficult and rocky facing towards the open sea, but their wall being weakest at this point, he considered that it would draw them on to be eager. For they, themselves, not ever expecting to be overcome by ships, had not been building a strong (wall), and the place might appear easily (accessible) to those having forced a landing. At this (point), therefore, going down to the very edge of the sea, he drew up his hoplites in order to stop (them), if it were possible, and he exhorted (them) to the following (effect).

10. Speech of Demosthenes to his men.

Soldiers, having taken part in this adventure, let no one among us in such a necessity desire to be thought a man of intelligence, calculating thoroughly all the danger surrounding us, rather than closing together with our opponents, thoughtlessly sanguine that he will come out successfully from this too. For whenever matters have reached a point of necessity like this, they least of all admit of calculation, (but) one takes upon oneself a quick danger. But I see most things too being in favour of us, if only we determine to stand fast and not utterly betray our stronger advantages, being dismayed by the number of them. For I think that the difficulty of the ground is in favour of ourselves, which, ourselves standing firm, becomes a support (to us). (For us) having retired, although (it) being hard, it will be easy to pass, no one barring (the way), and we shall have a more formidable enemy, a return back not being easily (open) to him, if he may be forced back by us; for they are easiest to repel (while) on board their ships, (after) landing already on equal terms. It is not necessary (for us) to be too much afraid in respect of their number; for it will fight in small divisions, although being many, because of the difficulty of coming to anchor, and it is not an army on land on like terms with superior force (lit. better), but (an army fighting) from ships for which it is necessary that many right conditions happen together in the sea (for success to occur). So I consider their difficulties counterbalances to our (small ) number. And, at the same time, I call upon you, being Athenians and knowing from practical experience about nautical landings against others, that if anyone, standing their ground, does not retire through fear of the surf and of the sternness of the sailing in of the ships, he cannot ever be forced back, and now stand firm yourselves also and, repulsing the enemy at the very water's edge, save both yourselves and the position.

12. The Lacedaemonians attack Pylos by land and sea.

Demosthenes advising such great things, the Athenians were more confident, and, marching down (to the water) to face (the enemy), they were drawn up at the edge of the sea. The Lacedaemonians, having set out, attacked the fortification with their army by land and, at the same time, with their ships, being forty-three (in number). Their admiral, Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, was on board (lit. sailed along). He attacked just as Demosthenes was expecting. The Athenians were (now) defending (themselves) from both sides, from the land and from the sea; they apportioning the task in detachments of (lit. according to) a few ships, because it was not possible to approach the shore with more, and relieving (each other) in turn, they kept up their attacks, displaying every enthusiasm and cheering (each other on), if somehow, having pushed back (the defenders), they might capture the fortification. Brasidas appeared the most distinguished of all. For (being) a captain of a galley, and seeing, the position being difficult, that the captains and helmsmen, if at any point it did seem possible to land, hanging back and being careful of their ships lest they ground together, he shouted out (to them), saying that it was not like sparing planks to allow the enemy to have made a wall in their territory, but he ordered (them) to smash their ships, (thereby) forcing the entrance, and (appealing to) the allies in return for their great kindnesses to give their ships freely to the Lacedaemonians at the present moment, and, running (their ships) aground and landing in every (possible) way, to make themselves masters both of the men (defending) and of the place.

12. The Lacedaemonians are repulsed.

He urged on the others, and, compelling his own helmsman to run his ship aground, he advanced on to the gangway; and, trying to land, he was struck down by the Athenians, and, having been wounded in many places, he fainted, and, he falling into the bows, his shield slipped (off his arm) into the sea, and, it having been carried up on to the land, the Athenians, taking (it) up, later used (it) for the trophy, which they set up for (their success in repelling) this attack. The others were eager but were unable to land because of the difficulty of the ground, and with the Athenians standing firm and not withdrawing in any way. Fortune came round in respect of this, so that the Athenians were warding off from the land, and that Laconian (land) too, those attacking (them) by sea, and the Lacedaemonians were landing from ships and in their own (country now) being hostile, against the Athenians. For it formed at this time a great part of the glory of the former that they were chiefly mainlandsmen and most superior in respect of infantry, and of the Athenians that they were seafarers and most eminent with ships.

13. The Athenian fleet returns to Pylos.

Having made their attacks during that day and some of the next, they had desisted; and on the third they sent out some of their ships to Asine for timber for siege engines, expecting that though the wall over against the harbour had height, yet (as) landing (here) was most (practicable) they could take (it) by means of these engines. At this point, fifty ships of the Athenians from Zacynthus arrived; for some of the guard-ships from Naupactus and four Chian (vessels) had reinforced them. When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with hoplites, and that their ships were in the harbour and not sailing out, not knowing by which means they might come to anchor, they sailed off for the time being to the island of Prote, which was not much distant, being uninhabited, and they took up their quarters (there), and on the next (day), having prepared to be led into a sea-battle, in case they should be willing to sail out against them in the open sea, but, if not, to sail in to the attack themselves. Neither were they led out against (them) nor did they happen to carry out what they intended, to block the entrances, but, staying quietly on the land, they manned their ships and were preparing, in the event of someone sailing in, to fight within the harbour, which was not (lit. not being) a small (one).

14. The Lacedaemonians are defeated, and their forces in Sphacteria cut off and blockaded.

Perceiving (this), the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and, falling on the main body (lit. the majority) of their ships (which were) already under way and in line (lit. with prows facing forwards), they put them to flight, and, pursuing (them hotly) as (far as they could) in the short (space available), they damaged many (vessels), and captured five (of them), crew and all (lit. with the men themselves). They rammed (lit. dashed into) the rest which had (lit. having) taken refuge on the shore. These were shattered, still getting their crews on board, before they could put to sea; taking some in tow, they dragged (them off) empty, their crews having setting out into flight. Seeing these things, the Lacedaemonians, sore distressed by the disaster, because in truth their men were being cut off on the island, came to their help, and, going into the sea with their armour, laying hold of the ships, they tried to drag (them) off; and in this (struggle) each man thought things were at a standstill (lit. had been stopped) at whatsoever action (lit. struggle) he himself also was not present. Great tumult occurred and a complete reversal (lit. an exchanging) of the method of both sides in respect of their ships; for, on the one hand, the Lacedaemonians through their excitement and dismay were engaged in a sea-fight in no other way, so to put it, than from land, and, on the other hand, the victorious Athenians, wishing, with their present fortune, to prosecute (matters) as far as possible, were fighting as foot-soldiers from ships. And so, having effected much toil and having wounded one another, they were separated, and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships except those having been captured first. Both sides returning to their camps, the former (i.e. the Athenians) set up a trophy, gave back the dead and took control of wreckage, and at once they sailed around the island and kept (it) under guard, its men having been cut off; the Peloponnesians on the mainland, having now come to their assistance in full force (lit. from all besides), stayed in their place watching (lit. over against) Pylos.

15. The Lacedaemonians determine to send envoys to Athens.

When the things that had happened at Pylos were reported at Sparta, it seemed good to them under circumstances of great disaster that the authorities should go down to the camp to deliberate on the spot seeing what it might be good (to do). And as they saw that it was impossible to help their men, and they did not wish to risk either that anything should befall them due to hunger or that they should be overpowered, constrained by numbers, it seemed good to them to make a truce as concerns Pylos with the generals of the Athenians, if they were willing, and to send ambassadors to Athens concerning a peace treaty, and to endeavour to get their men back as quickly as possible.

16. An armistice is concluded at Pylos.

The generals accepting the proposal, peace was made on the following terms: that the Lacedaemonians, having brought to Pylos the ships in which they had fought and all the (ships) in Laconia that were ships of war (lit. long ships), should hand (them) over to the Athenians, and should not take up arms against the fortification either by land or by sea; that the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send out to their men on the island a fixed quantity of corn and (this already) kneaded, two Attic measures of barley, two little cups of wine, and (a piece of) meat for each man, and half of these for an attendant; that these (rations) should be sent in with the Athenians watching and no vessel should sail in secretly; that the Athenians should keep watch on the island no less (then before), provided only that (lit. inasmuch as) they do not land, and that they should not bear arms against the army of the Peloponnesians either by land or by sea. And that whatsoever of these provisions either of the parties shall transgress in whatsoever respect, the treaty shall be terminated. That it shall remain a treaty until the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians shall have returned from Athens; that the Athenians should send them off in a trireme and bring (them) back again. That, (they) having returned, this treaty shall be terminated and the Athenians shall give back the ships in the same condition as they had received (them). The truce occurred on these (conditions), and the ships, being around sixty, (in number) were handed over, and the ambassadors were sent off. Having arrived at Athens, they spoke as follows.

17. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (i).

Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us (here) to effect (such) an arrangement concerning our men on the island that whatsoever we may persuade (you) of is at the same time advantageous to you, and in relation to the disaster most likely to bring honour to us, as far as (is possible) in the present circumstances. We shall prolong our speech to a greater length not according to our wont, but it being our country's (custom) where a few words may suffice not to employ many, but (to employ) more (words) whenever it is a proper time to point out by the use of words something of importance to effect what is needed (lit. the necessary thing). And receive these (words) not in a hostile spirit and not thinking that (we think you are) ignorant (and in need of) being instructed, but as a reminder of good counsel to men who know (lit. knowing). For it is possible for you to make good use of your present good fortune, keeping what you control, and gaining honour and reputation besides, and not to suffer like those receiving something good surprisingly (usually do); for they always press forward in the hope of more on account of their unexpected good fortune in the present circumstances. But (those) to whom most changes have happened, for better or for worse, are justly bound to be most distrustful of prosperity; and, in truth, through experience this ought to apply to your city and to us especially.

18. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (ii).

And see (the truth of this), looking away at our present misfortunes, we who, having the biggest reputation among the Greeks, have come (here) to you, (though) having formerly thought ourselves to be more able to grant (that) for which, having now arrived, we are asking you. And, indeed, we have experienced this neither from lack of strength nor having been arrogant, greater (power) having been added (to us), but, (starting) from our regular resources, failing in our calculations, in which (matter) the same (chance) falls to us all alike. So (it is) not reasonable that you should think that, because of the present strength of your city and its acquisitions at the moment, what belongs to (lit. what is of) fortune will be always with you. They (are) prudent men who safely reckon their gains as doubtful - and these same men would offer more sense (than others) (in dealing) with misfortunes - and, as regards war, are convinced that it cannot abide with this man just as far as the limit (which) someone may wish to take it in hand, but (must go on) as its vicissitudes may lead them. Such men, stumbling the least (times) through not being puffed up, (by) being confident in immediate success, would come to terms, if they could, especially in a period of good fortune. This, O Athenians, it is well for you to do in relation to us now, lest, if after all, having not been persuaded (to come to terms), at some time afterwards you meet with failure, which is possible in many ways, you may be thought to have won even your present successes due to luck, it being possible (for you) to leave behind for the future an unshakeable reputation for strength and wisdom.

19. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (iii).

The Lacedaemonians are calling you to a treaty and an end of the war, offering peace and alliance and friendship in every way and on every occasion and for a neighbourly (understanding) to subsist between one another, and asking in return for the men on the island, and thinking (it) better for both parties not to take the utmost risks, whether, some means of escape occurring, they might escape by force, or, having been overwhelmed by the blockade, they might be still more subdued. We think that great enmities can really be best settled, not if someone, having proved victorious in most points of the war, (and) retaliating (by) binding (his foe) down with oaths by compulsion, shall make peace on terms (which are) not equal, but if, (though) it is in his power to do the same, having regard to what (is) equitable, (and) having also conquered him in generosity, he makes peace on moderate terms in comparison with what he expected. For his adversary, being already under an obligation, not to resist as (someone) having been constrained, but to show generosity in return, is more ready from a sense of shame to abide by the things which he agreed on. Men are more (likely) to act in this way towards their more (serious) enemies than towards those who have (lit. having) quarrelled (with them) over small things; they are naturally inclined to make concessions with gladness to those who have (lit. having) given way voluntarily, but to stand out against overweening arrogance, even against their (better) judgment.

20. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (iv).

And for ourselves the (proposed) agreement is (now) desirable for both parties, if (it) ever (is), before something irremediable, happening in our midst, befalls us, in which (case) necessity holds an eternal hatred against you, in common and private, and you would be deprived of what we are now offering. (Matters) being still undecided, and your reputation and our friendship being at stake, (and) our disaster being settled on tolerable terms before anything dishonourable (occurs), let us be reconciled, and let us, ourselves, choose peace instead of war, and let us give to the other Greeks a respite from their sufferings; in this (matter) they will think that you are the more responsible. For they are at war, (being) unclear which of the two sides began (it); an end happening, for which you are now mainly responsible, they will ascribe their gratitude to you. And so, if you come to accept (our proposal), it is possible for you to become true friends to the Lacedaemonians, they having offered (it) to (you) gratifying rather then forcing (them). Consider the great advantages which are likely in this; for you and we saying the same things, you know that the rest of the Greek (people), being somewhat inferior, will honour (us) to the greatest extent.

21. Terms required by the Athenians.

And so the Lacedaemonians said so much, thinking that the Athenians had been desiring a peace treaty in an earlier time, but were prevented, themselves opposing (it), and, peace being given, would gladly accept (it) and would give back the men. They, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them at any time, whenever they wished to make (it) with them, and aimed at something more. Cleon, the (son) of Cleaenetus, a man who was (lit. being) a leader of the people at that time and most influential with the masses, urged them on especially; and he persuaded (them) to to reply (as follows), that it is necessary that those on the island, having first surrendered, should be brought to Athens; that (they) having come, (and) the Lacedaemonians having handed back Nisae and Pegae and Troezen and Achaea, which they had not taken in war but from the previous convention, the Athenians having agreed to these concessions, on the strength of (certain) misfortunes, being in somewhat greater need at that time, the men can be brought (back) and a treaty made for as long a time as may seem good to both parties.

22. The Lacedaemonian envoys return without effecting anything.

They did not say anything against this reply, but asked that commissioners might be chosen (to confer) with themselves, who, speaking and listening concerning each (point), might in quietness come to an agreement (as to) what they might persuade one another (to accept). Thereupon, Cleon fell upon (them) vehemently, saying that he knew from the beginning that they had nothing just in mind, and that this was clear enough now, inasmuch as they were not willing to speak to the people and are wishing to to be councillors with a few men; but, if they are intending anything honest, he urged (them) to speak to all. But the Lacedaemonians, seeing that, even if it seemed good to them to make concessions in their misfortune, it was not possible for them to speak in front of the people, lest they should be injuriously represented to their allies, having made proposals and having not succeeded, and that the Athenians would not grant what they had asked for on moderate terms, withdrew from Athens without achieving anything.

23. Hostilities renewed at Pylos. The Athenians retain the Lacedaemonian ships, and blockade Sphacteria.

They having arrived (back), the truce around Pylos was at once terminated, the Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, just as had been agreed; but the Athenians, having (as) ground for complaint an attack on the fortification contrary to the truce and other things seemingly not worthy of mention, did not give (them) back, maintaining that it had been said that, if it were transgressed (in any way) whatsoever, the truce would be dissolved. The Lacedaemonians denied (these allegations), and, expostulating against the (detention) of their ships, (and) going back, they resumed the war. Hostilities went on (lit. things were fought) at Pylos by both sides with vigour, the Athenians sailing in two ships around the island in opposite directions all day - and at night as well, all (their ships) being anchored around (it) without exception except on the side facing the open sea whenever there was a wind. Twenty ships came to (join) them from Athens to guard (the island), so that there were now seventy altogether - and the Peloponnesians remaining encamped on the mainland, and making attacks on the fortification, looking for an opportunity, if one occurred, to save the men (on the island).

PART TWO. EVENTS IN SICILY. FINAL VICTORY OF THE ATHENIANS AT PYLOS.

24. Progress of the war in Sicily. The attack upon Rhegium is continued.

Meanwhile, the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken the rest of the fleet, which they were getting ready, to join those on guard duty in Messina, made war from Messina. The Locrians chiefly urged (them) on through hatred of the Rhegians, and they themselves too had invaded their territory with their full force. They (i.e. the Syracusans) wished to make trial of a sea-battle, seeing that the Athenians had (lit. there were to the Athenians) only a few ships present, and learning that the majority (of the ships) intended to have come were blockading the island (of Sphacteria). For, if they were to be victorious in this sea-battle, they hoped to subdue Rhegiam easily, (by) blockading (it) both by land (lit. on foot), and that thereby their position (lit. affairs) would become strong. For Rhegium, a promontory (on the coast) of Italy, lying very close to Messina in Sicily, it would not be possible for the Athenians to keep watch over and control the strait. The strait consists of (lit. is) the sea between Rhegium and Messina at the point where Sicily is the shortest distance from the mainland, and this (channel) is the Charybdis of legend (lit. having been so called), through which Odysseus is reputed to have sailed. And the sea, owing to the narrowness (of the channel) and with a strong current rushing into it from the vast open seas, both the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, was considered to be naturally dangerous (lit. difficult).

25(i). Actions in the straits of Messina.

In this narrow strait (lit. space between), the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to engage late in the day, concerning the passage of a boat (lit. a boat sailing across), putting out to sea with a few more than thirty ships against sixteen ships of the Athenians and eight Rhegian (ones). Having been defeated by the Athenians, they sailed back hurriedly, as each chanced to his own base, at both Messina and Rhegium, (and) losing one ship. And night fell upon the action. The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up (and) seeing their ships empty, attacked, but they themselves lost one ship to a grappling iron which had been thrown on to (it) (lit. having been thrown on it), the men (saving themselves by) swimming away. After this, the Syracusans embarking on their ships and having them towed (lit. sailing with a rope) to Messina, (and) the Athenians, attacking again, lose another ship, the former getting their ships into the open sea and becoming the assailants. The Syracusans, having had not the less (of fortunes) in the coastal voyage and in the sea-battle which occurred (lit. having occurred) in such a way, brought (their ships) into the harbour at Messina.

25(ii). Attempts upon Naxos and Messina respectively.

The Athenians, Camarina having been reported as being betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and those with him, sailed thither, and meanwhile the Messenians, with their full forces, by land and with their ships at the same time, took the field against Naxos, which was (lit. being) their Chalcidian neighbour. On the first day, having made the Naxians keep within their walls, they laid waste the country, and on the next day, sailing around with their fleet by way of the river Acesines, they ravaged the land, and with their infantry made an inroad in the direction of the city. Meanwhile, the Sicels came down over the hills in large numbers to attack (lit. assisting against) the Messinians. And the Naxians, when they saw (them), having taken heart and encouraging themselves that the Leontinians and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid, making a sortie from the city, fell upon the Messinians, and, having routed (them), killed over a thousand (of them), and the survivors withdrew homewards with difficulty; for the barbarians, falling upon (them) on the roads, killed them in great numbers. The ships, having put into Messina, were afterwards separated, each to (her own) home (port). The Leontinians and their allies with the Athenians immediately took the field against Messina as having been weakened, and, attacking, the Athenians made their attempt against the harbour with their ships, and the infantry against the city. The Messinians and some of the Locrians with Demoteles, who had been left behind (as) guards after the disaster, suddenly attacking, rout much of the army of the Leontinians and killed many (of them). The Athenians, seeing (this) and disembarking from their ships, came up in support, and closely pursued the Messenians back again into the city, falling upon (them) in their confusion; and, having set up a trophy, they retired to Rhegium. After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war upon each other by land without the Athenians.

26. The Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria still hold out, being furnished with supplies from the mainland in various ways.

On Pylos, the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in its position on the mainland. The blockade was laborious for the Athenians, from want of both food and water; for there was no spring except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and this not large, but most, scraping away the shingle on the sea (shore), drank such water (as was) suitable (for them to drink). There was a narrowness (of room) for those encamped in the small (space), and, the ships not having a mooring-place, some crews took their food on the land, and others were anchored out at sea. The time elapsing contrary to reasonable expectation caused the greatest discouragement, (as they were besieging men) on a desert island being possessed of only brackish water, whom they thought they would overcome within a few days. The reason was the Lacedaemonians having given notice that anyone wishing to bring to the island ground corn and wine and cheese and, if (they could send it in) any other food such as might be useful in a siege, having rated (these provisions) at a high price, and promising freedom to any man among the Helots bringing (the food) in. Many, running the risk, brought (food) in, and particularly the Helots, putting off from the Peloponnese at any point they chanced, and sailing in while it was still night to the side of the island facing towards the sea. They looked out especially (for the chance) of being brought in by the wind; for (it was) easier to elude the blockade of the triremes, whenever the wind was from the sea; for it (then) became impossible to anchor around the (island), and the landing was made unsparingly by them; for they ran ashore their boats, having been deemed worthy of money, and the hoplites were on guard around the island's landing places. Those who (lit. such as) made the attempt in calm weather were captured. Divers also swam in from the harbour under water, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey and pounded linseed (lit. seed from flax); these escaping notice at first, look outs later happened; both sides skilfully employed every scheme, one to bring in provisions, the other lest these escape them.

27. State of feeling at Athens. Cleon attacks the Generals in office, especially Nicias.

In Athens, (the people) learning about the army, that it was suffering hardships, and that food was sailing in to the men on the island, were at a loss and had been fearing that winter might interrupt their blockade, seeing that the carrying of necessities around the Peloponnese would be impossible - (the troops being) in a desolate place and, at the same time, (themselves) not being able to send round enough (supplies) even in summer - and that the blockade of places without a harbour would not be practicable, but that either the men would escape the blockade, themselves giving (it) up, or that, watching out for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats, which were bringing them food. But of all things they chiefly feared that with regard to the Lacedaemonians, because they thought that they had a strong position they were no longer seeking to negotiate with them. And they began to repent not having accepted the treaty. And Cleon, realising their suspicion of him concerning the prevention of the agreement, said that those bringing the news were not telling the truth. Those having come recommending that, if they did not believe them, that they send some commissioners of inspection, he himself was chosen (as) a commissioner with Theagenes by the Athenians. Aware that he would he would be compelled either to tell the same things or, saying the opposite, he would be shown (to be) lying, he advised the Athenians, seeing that they were somewhat the more eager in mind (for men) to be sent off to fight, that it was necessary not to send commissioners of inspection nor, letting slip the opportunity, to delay, but, if it seemed to them that the things reported were true, to sail against the men. And he pointed at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, being a general, being hostile (to him), and reproaching (him), (he said) that it would be easy with preparation, if the generals were men, having sailed, to capture those on the island and, indeed, that he himself would have done this, if he had been in command.

28. Nicias offers to resign the command to Cleon, who is ultimately obliged to take it.

The Athenians having raised some clamour at Cleon because he was not sailing even now, if indeed it appeared (so) easy to him, and, at the same time, seeing that he was being reproached, told (him) that, as far as the generals were concerned (lit. inasmuch it was concerning them), taking whatever force he wished, he could try his hand. He, thinking at first that he was only giving (it) up in debate, was ready (to accept), but realising that he was disposed to give (it) up in reality, he began to retreat, and he said that the former (i.e. Nicias) was in command but not himself, (being) scared now and not supposing that he would venture to give (it) up to him. Nicias exhorted (him) once more and renounced the command at Pylos and made the Athenians witnesses (to this). But, such as the mob loves to do, the more Cleon shrunk from the expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, so much (the more) they encouraged Nicias to give up his command and called loudly upon the former to sail. And he said that, having this force in addition to those soldiers at Pylos, he would either bring (back) the Lacedaemonians alive or kill (them) on the spot. There fell among the Athenians a degree of laughter at his boastful speaking, and it occurred to sensible men (to be) equally glad, considering that they would gain from one or the other of the two blessings, either they would be rid of Cleon, which was what they rather expected, or, (if) disappointed in this expectation, they would have the Lacedaemonians in their hands.

29. Cleon, after choosing Demosthenes as his colleague, sails for Pylos.

Having made all the arrangements in the assembly and the Athenians having voted (the command of) the expedition to him, having chosen as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, he arranged the putting to sea with speed. He took Demosthenes to help him, learning that he was contemplating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed at the difficulty of the position, and besieged rather than besieging, were eager to risk all. And the island having been set on fire gave him confidence too. For previously he was afraid, it being wooded for the most part and trackless on account of its permanent wilderness, and he thought this would be to the advantage of the enemy. For, if he landed with a large force (lit. with a large force landing), falling on them from an unseen position, they might injure (them). For their weaknesses and preparation alike would not be visible to themselves through the forest, whereas all the weaknesses of their own force would be conspicuous, so that they could attack (them) unexpectedly wherever they chose; for the initiative to attack would be in their hands. If, on the other hand, he should force (them) to come to close quarters in the wooded area, he considered that a lesser (force) but (one) experienced in the country (would be) stronger than a larger (but) inexperienced (one). And (so), their force, (though) being numerous, would be cut to pieces unawares (lit. being cut to pieces, escaped notice) it being impossible to see (lit. a seeing not being possible) where there was a need to assist one another.

30. Demosthenes is prepared to land on the island.

These (reflections) occurred to him not least due to the Aetolian disaster, which had happened to a great (lit. some) extent because of the wood. One of the soldiers, compelled by the want of space to land on the extremities of the island, was preparing for breakfast with a guard (posted) in advance, and, setting fire to a small part of the wood unintentionally, and after this, a wind arising, much of it was consumed accidently (lit. being consumed, escaped notice). So, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous (than he had thought) - suspecting previously that he was sending in the corn for fewer men (than those actually) there - and that island was (now) easier to land on, he got ready for the attempt as something worthy on the part of the Athenians of making a serious (lit. greater) effort, and, sending for trooops from the neighbouring allies and preparing other things. At that moment, Cleon, having sent a messenger (saying) that he was coming and that he had the troops for which he had asked, arrives at Pylos. Having conferred together, they first send a herald to the camp on the mainland, proposing that, if they would, without risk (of battle) order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms to them, on condition that they should be kept under a moderate guard, until something concerning the main (lit. greater) war might be agreed.

31. Disposition of the Lacedaemonians.

These (proposals) not having been accepted, they delayed for one day, and on the next (day), having embarked all their hoplites on a few ships, they set out at night, and a little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbour, the hoplites being about eight hundred (strong), and they advanced at a run against the first guard-post in the island. (The enemy) were disposed as follows: in this first guard-post, there were around thirty hoplites, and the majority of them and Epitadas, their archon, were holding the centre and the most level (part) and (the part) around the water, and a certain part, itself not large, guarded the extremity of the island facing towards Pylos, which was precipitous from the sea and barely assailable from the land; for there was a sort of fort there, rudely constructed of stones, which they thought might be useful to them if a retreat, unusually hard-pressed, were to overtake (them). Thus were they drawn up.

32. Arrangements made by Demosthenes and Cleon for the attack.

The Athenians immediately killed the first guards whom they ran up against, (who were) still in their beds trying to take up their weapons, and landing secretly (lit. they eluded notice in their landing), they (i.e. the enemy) thinking that their ships were sailing to their anchorage for the night as usual. At the same time as dawn was happening, the rest of the army landed, all the men of a little more than seventy ships, except the rowers, equipped as well as possible in each case, eight hundred archers and no less peltasts then these, the reinforcements from the Messenians, and all the other (troops) such as were holding their positions around Pylos, except the guards on the fortification. Demosthenes drawing (them) up, they were divided into (groups of) two hundred, sometimes more and at some points it was less, occupying the highest points, in order that the enemy had the greatest difficulty (lit. there was the greatest difficulty to the enemy), surrounding (him) on all sides, so that he had no place against which he might counter-attack, but might become encompassed by the number (of their assailants), if he attacked those in front, being shot at by those in his rear, and, if (he attacked) on the flanks, (being shot at) by those on the other (flank). Wherever they went, the enemy was always about to be at their back, lightly armed men and those most difficult (to cope with) with arrows and javelins and stones and slings, having effect from a distance, but whom it was not possible (for them) to attack; (in) fleeing, they were superior (in speed), and, (as) they went back, they pressed on (them again). With such a plan, Demosthenes contrived the landing from the first, and he made these dispositions in its execution;

33. Engagement on the island.

The men around Epitadas, what was in fact the main body of those on the island, when they saw that their first guard-post had been overwhelmed and that an army was coming to attack them, were drawn up and moved forwards against the hoplites of the Athenians, wishing to come to close quarters; for they had positioned themselves in front (of them), and the lightly armed troops (were) on their flanks and at their rear. So, they were not able to close with the hoplites nor to make use of their own specialised training; for the lightly armed troops, shooting (at them) from both flanks, held (them) up, and at, the same time, they (i.e. the Athenian hoplites) did not rush forward, but stayed still; they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians) pushed back the lightly armed troops, wherever, running at them, they came especially close; but they, turning about, fought back, the men being lightly equipped and easily outstripping (them) in their flight, and from difficulty of ground, being before a rough wasteland, in which the Lacedaemonians, having (heavy) armour, were not able to pursue (them).

34. The Lacedaemonians are hard pressed.

And so, they skirmished against one another for a little time. The Lacedaemonians no longer being able to rush out abruptly at the points where they were falling upon (them), the lightly armed troops, realising that they were now slower in defending (themselves), and having themselves derived the greatest confidence from their seeing that they appeared many times more numerous, and being more habituated to them no longer appearing equally formidable to themselves, because they had not suffered things worthy of their immediate expectations, as they had been cowed in mind when they first landed, (considering) that (they were going) up against the Lacedaemonians, (now) despising (them) and shouting, charged upon them in a mass and pelted (them) with stones and arrows and javelins, as each man had something to hand. The shouting happening at the same time as their onset, consternation fell upon men unused to such a kind of fighting, and a cloud of dust rose up from the recently burned wood, and it was difficult to see before one due to the arrows and stones pouring (on them) together from many men through the dust cloud. Thereupon, the struggle began to go hard for the Lacedaemonians; for their felt caps were not protecting (them) from the arrows and stones, and the spears were breaking off short in (their armour) as they were hit (lit. they being hit), and they could do nothing with themselves (i.e. they could not attack), being prevented from looking ahead in respect of seeing, and not hearing the orders between themselves due to the louder shouting of the enemy, and being surrounded by danger on every side, and not having (any) hope as to how it was necessary (for them), having defended (themselves), to escape.

35. They retreat to the extremity of the island.

But at last, many having already been wounded through moving to and fro on the same ground all the time, closing up, they fell back to the fort at the end of the island, which was not far distant and their guards (there). As they gave way, thereupon the lightly armed troops, full of confidence, pressed upon (them); as many of the Lacedaemonians as were caught retiring were killed, but the majority escaping to the fort were drawn up with the guards at this (point) in order to defend (it) at every place where it was assailable. And the Athenians, pursuing (them), could not surround them and hem them in (lit. did not have a way round and a surrounding of them) from the strength of the position, and, attacking from in front, they tried to storm (it). For a long time, and indeed for most of the day, both sides held out (though) suffering from the fighting and thirst and the sun, the one endeavouring to dislodge (the enemy) from the high ground, the other not to give in. But the Lacedaemonians were (now) defending (themselves) more easily than before, there being no surrounding of them on their flanks.

36. The Athenians occupy a position in their rear.

When it (i.e. the fighting) proved endless, the general of the Messinians coming to Cleon and Demosthenes, said they were wearying themselves to no purpose; but, if they were willing to give him some part of the archers and of the lightly armed troops, he would go round by way of their rear by a path which he himself would find, (and) he was resolved to force home the attack. Having received what he had asked for, setting out from where he could not be seen so that they could not observe (him), making his approach by the precipitous (cliffs) of the island, and (by a route) which the Lacedaemonians, trusting in the strength of the position, did not guard, and, going around with great difficulty, he escaped notice, and, suddenly appearing on the high ground at their rear, he astounded the one side by the unexpectedness (of the thing), and gave still more confidence to the other side, seeing what they were expecting. The Lacedaemonians, being shot at now from both sides, and being in the same dilemma, to compare a small (event) to a great one as that at Thermopylae - for they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae) were utterly destroyed, the Persians coming around (them) by the path, and they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians at Pylos) being already attacked on both sides, no longer held their ground, but, (as) a few fighting with many and due to the weakness of their bodies through want of corn, they fell back, and the Athenians were now masters of the approaches.

37. Summons to surrender.

Cleon and Demosthenes, realising that if they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians) were to retreat any (lit. ever so little) further they would be utterly destroyed by their army, stopped the fighting and held their men back, wishing to lead them back to Athens (lit. the Athenians) alive, (hoping that) they might surrender their weapons, if, somehow, hearing their proclamation, they might be shaken in their resolution and yield to (lit. to be less than) the present danger. And (so) they made proclamation (to know), if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, on condition (lit. so that) that they (i.e. the Athenians) would decide what seemed good to them.

38. Surrender of the Lacedaemonians. Loss in the action.

Hearing (this), the majority (of them) lowered their shields and waved their hands, showing that they accepted what had been offered. After this, a cessation having occurred, Cleon and Demosthenes and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the part of them (i.e the Lacedaemonians) met for a parley, the first of the earlier of their leaders, Epitadas, having been killed, and Hippagretas, the (officer) chosen to succeed after him, lying as (if) dead among the bodies, (yet) still alive, (and) he himself having been chosen to succeed as commander in the third place according to the rule if anything should befall them (lit. if they should suffer anything). Styphon and those with him said that they wished to send a herald across to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland (to ask) what it was necessary for them to do. The Athenians, allowing none of them to pass over but themselves summoning heralds from the mainland, and consultations happening two or three times, the last man sailing across to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland reported that the Lacedaemonians order you yourselves to decide concerning yourselves, (while) doing nothing dishonourable. They, having discussed (the matter) among themselves, surrendered themselves and their arms. The following numbers were killed and captured alive on the island: altogether four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over; of these two hundred and ninety-two (lit. three hundred falling short of eight) were brought back alive, and the others had died. Of these, there were about a hundred and twenty Spartiates living. Not many of the Athenians were killed; for the fighting was not a pitched (business).

39. Duration of the blockade. Cleon fulfils his promise.

And the total time from when the men on the island were besieged, from the naval battle until the battle on the island, amounted to seventy-two days. Of these, for about twenty days, during which the ambassadors were talking about a treaty, they were furnished with provisions, and on the other (days) they were continually sustained by the things secretly sailed in. There was corn on the island and other victuals were captured on (it); for their commander, Epitadas, gave out less rations to each man than (was possible) having regard to his capacity. The Athenians and the Peloponnesians now both withdrew their forces from Pylos for home, and the promise of Cleon, although being reckless was fulfilled; for he led the men (back) within twenty days, just as he had undertaken (to do).

40. The general feeling throughout Greece.

This (event) occasioned more against the judgement (of the Greeks) than anything (else) concerning the war; for they expected that the Lacedaemonians would not surrender their weapons either through famine or any kind of force, but would die, bearing (them) and fighting as they could. (People) disbelieving that those surrendering were similar in essence to those among them who had fallen, and a certain man among the allies of the Athenians asking sometime later for the sake of annoyance one of the prisoners from the island, if those who had fallen were good men and true, it was answered to him that the spindle, meaning the arrow, would be worth a great deal, if it could distinguish the men of honour, making an indication that the man coming in the way of stones and arrows was (the one) killed.

41. The prisoners taken to Athens. Pylos garrisoned.

The men having been brought back, the Athenians resolved that they should be kept under guard in fetters until whatever time they might make peace, and that, if the Peloponnesians were to invade their land before this, having brought (them) out, they would put (them) to death. They established a garrison at Pylos, and the Messenians from Naupactus, sending their own fittest men as to their native country - for Pylos is in that country once belonging to Messenia - plundered Laconia and, being speakers of the same dialect, they did very much damage. The Lacedaemonians, being inexperienced in the time before of rapine and warfare of this kind, and (with) the Helots deserting, and fearing that (something) should be attempted (still) further against themselves among the (institutions) in the land, endured this not easily, but, although not wishing to be clear (about this) to the Athenians, they began to send envoys to them, and tried to recover Pylos and their men. But they were grasping at more, and, (although they) came often, they sent them away with nothing achieved. These (were) the affairs concerning Pylos.

" STONES " - A POEM.

The air is spun disjointed. Sounds and days,

The idling fingers of our lassive drift,

Endeavour to restate the discontent

Of minimal encounters - a grimace

A hand, a block of stone ... The years that went

to dogged balancing of each on each

(Triglyph and metope, tongue to slotted rift)

Scattered like armour on a blood-stained beach.

Lists were of course prepared, proportions found

And counterchecked - " So many thousand load

Of marble", " Such a curve, viewed from the ground,

Gives the effect of being straight" - amounts

Recalculated, notes transferred ... But still

Retracts in silence time's unfailing Once;

Before the cart-dust settled on the road,

The whirlwind breaks about the sacred hill.

Accept, examine, redetermine, hold -

Within the fractured pattern I can trace

Contorted shudders of reality.

Feel where the shadowed gridlines interlace,

Woven through dust-stained, water-melon streets,

Their sudden brief constraint; recall the old

Unvisioned fears ... The final memory

Shards into ashes and scatters all retreat.