THUCYDIDES: CAPTURE OF SPHACTERIA; FROM "THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR", BOOK IV

Introduction. In this longish extract from Book IV of Thucydides' " The Peloponnesian War", Sabidius translates the account of the Athenians' unexpected triumph on the island of Sphacteria in 425 B.C. The details of this hard-fought skirmishing between the Athenians and the Spartans (Sabidius follows Thucydides in referring to the latter as Lacedaemonians) gives much of the flavour of what fighting in this war was like, and the text here has been extensively adapted for the use of Greek grammar exercises in school text-books.

Thucydides poses a considerable challenge to the translator because of the condensation of both his language and thought, and the fact that so many words are excluded as being either unnecessary or understood from the other words in either the sentence concerned or, indeed, in a previous sentence. Sometimes, a great deal has to be understood from compound verbs, in which there is more than one preposition in the prefix. For instance at the beginning of Chapter XI the word ' epikatabantes' means ' marching down (to the sea) to face (the enemy)'. In this case both ''the sea' and 'the enemy' have to be understood, and, if not included in the translation, the full force of the prefix cannot be brought out. Another example is the word 'enkatalambanein' in Chapter XIX, which means ' binding (his foe) down in (an agreement)'. Once again, both ' his foe' and ' an agreement' have to be understood to do justice to the meaning of the word. Thucydides makes extensive use of participial clauses, and particularly of the genitive absolute construction, which is often difficult to render in English, and main verbs are often hard to identify. For instance, in Chapter XXXIV, no main verb appears until line 11. Nevertheless, despite the considerable difficulties of turning the text of Thucydides into that of another language, - the above examples demonstrate just some of these - , Sabidius has, as far as possible, maintained his principle of following the actual sentence and phrase construction employed by the author. While this may perhaps lead at times to clumsy English, it is greatly to the advantage of those seeking to understand Thucydides' actual words and how the correct meaning is to be derived from them, surely the main purposes of textual analysis.

The text followed in the translation is that of C.E. Graves, M.A., first published in the 'Elementary Classics' series by Macmillan in 1879.

PART I: ATHENIAN SUCCESS AT PYLOS. SPARTA'S OFFER OF PEACE REFUSED.

1. Messina in Sicily secedes from Athens. Rhegium is attacked by the Locrians.

(With) the summer beginning, around the putting forth of (ears) of corn, ten ships of the Syracusans and an equal number of Locrian (ships) having sailed to Messina, they occupied (it), (the people) themselves having invited (them), and Messina revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans had arranged this chiefly seeing that the place afforded (lit. contained) an approach to Sicily, and fearing that the Athenians, starting from it, might some day attack them from a better base (lit. preparation), and the Locrians wishing, on account of their hatred of the Rhegians, to make war upon them from both land and sea (lit. from both sides). And the Locrians had at the same time invaded the (territory) of the Rhegians with all their forces, in order that they could not bring assistance to the Messenians, (some) Rhegian exiles joining in promoting the invasion together (with them), for Rhegium had for a long time been in a state of faction, and it was impossible at that particular moment to ward off the Locrians, wherefore they attacked (them) the more. Having ravaged (their lands), the Locrian land forces (lit. the Locrians on the foot path) withdrew, and their ships guarded Messina. And other (ships), being manned, were about to take up station at that very place in order to make war from there.

2. Invasion of Attica. An Athenian fleet sails for Corcyra and Sicily.

About the same time of the spring, before the corn was ripe (lit. at its peak), the Peloponnesians and their allies invaded Attica, and Agis, the son of Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, was in command, and, having taken up position, they ravaged the country. Meanwhile, the Athenians sent off to Sicily the forty ships, which they were getting ready, and the remaining generals Eurymedon and Sophocles; for the third of them, Pythagoras, had already arrived in Sicily. They instructed them that, at the same time as (they were) sailing by, to take care of those Corcyraeans in the city who were being raided by the exiles in the mountains; sixty ships of the Peloponnesians had sailed to that place to help those in the mountains, and, there being a great famine in the city, thinking that they would easily gain control of affairs (there). They told Demosthenes, being in a private position after his return from Acarnania, at his own request (lit. himself needing it) to make use, if he wished, of this fleet of theirs (on its way) round the Peloponnese.

3. Demosthenes, who had sailed with the fleet, proposes to occupy Pylos on the coast of Messenia.

When they came sailing off (the coast) of Laconia, and they heard that the ships of the Peloponnesians were already in Corcyra, Eurymedon and Sophocles were for pushing on to Corcyra, but Demosthenes urged them to put in first at Pylos and to do what was necessary (before) making their voyage. (The generals objecting), a storm, coming on by chance, drove them into Pylos. Demosthenes immediately thought it worthwhile to fortify the place, for he had joined the expedition for this purpose, and pointed out (the existence) of good store, both of timber and of wood, and that (the place) was strong by nature, and uninhabited, both itself and to a great extent of its district; for Pylos is about four hundred stades distant from Sparta, and is in (what) was once the Messenian country, and the Lacedaemonians call it Coryphasium. They said that there were many deserted headlands in the Peloponnese, if he wished (by) occupying (them) that the city should incur expenditure. But it seemed to him that this place was somewhat different more than (any) other, there being a harbour close by, and that the Messenians, belonging to it of old and speaking the same dialect as the Lacedaemonians, would be likely to do the greatest harm setting out from there, and would at the same time be trusty guardians of the place.

4. The fleet being detained at Pylos, the soldiers complete the fortifications.

As he did not persuade either the generals or the soldiers [later having communicated with company commanders also], he was detained in inactivity by the unnavigable weather, until a sudden urge came upon the soldiers, having (too much) leisure and forming into gangs (lit. taking their stand round (different points)), to complete the fortifications of the place. And, taking on the task, they worked at it, having no implements for shaping stone, picking out and carrying stones, and they put them together, each piece as it came, whatever it was; and mortar, if at any time it were necessary to use (it), they carried on their backs, through lack of hods, stooping down so that it would particularly stay on, and their hands entwining behind their backs (lit. backwards), in order that it might not fall off. And (so) in every way they were eager to anticipate the Lacedaemonians (by) completing the most assailable (parts) before they could attack (it); for most of the place was strong of itself to begin with and it was in no way necessary for there to be fortifications.

5. Demosthenes is left at Pylos.

But they (i.e the Lacedaemonians) chanced to to be keeping a certain festival and at the same time they treated it lightly (lit. in contempt), (in the belief) that, whenever they marched out, they would not be able to withstand them or that they would easily take (them) by force; and in some part too their army being still before Athens detained them. The Athenians, fortifying that part of the place (facing) towards the mainland and where it was most necessary in six days, leave Demosthenes behind with five ships as a garrison for it, and with the greater part of the ships pushed on with their voyage to Corcyra and Sicily.

6. The Peloponnesians withdraw from Athens.

The Peloponnesians who were (lit. being) in Attica, when they heard of the occupation of Pylos, went back homewards quickly, the Lacedaemonians and their king, Agis, thinking that the matter of Pylos (was) of concern to themselves. Having invaded early in the year, and the corn being still green, food was lacking for many (of them). Stormy weather, going greatly beyond the (then) settled season, distressed the army. So that from many causes it happened that they both departed rather quickly and that this invasion became a very short one; for they remained in Attica for (only) fifteen days.

7. The Athenians attempt to occupy Eion in Thrace.

About the same time, the Athenian general, Simonides, gathering together a few Athenians from the garrisons and a number of the allies from that (neighbourhood) took by treachery Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaeans, but being hostile. But immediately, the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans having come up, he was forced out and lost many soldiers.

8. The Spartans prepare to reduce Pylos. They occupy Sphacteria, at the entrance of the harbour.

The Peloponnesians having withdrawn from Attica, the Spartans, themselves, and the nearest of the Perioeci immediately set out for Pylos, and the approach of the other Lacedaemonians happened more slowly, (they) having just arrived (home) from other campaigns. And they sent round word also over the Peloponnese that they should march quickly to Pylos, and they sent for their sixty ships, which, having been dragged over the isthmus of the Leucadians, and having escaped the notice of the Attican ships in Zacynthus, arrived at Pylos. And the infantry army was already present. (With) the Peloponnesians still sailing towards (him), Demosthenes, anticipating (them), sent out secretly two ships to report to Eurymedon and the Athenians in the ships in Zacynthus that the place (was) in danger. On the one hand, the ships were sailing quickly in accordance with the orders of Demosthenes; on the other hand, the Lacedaemonians were preparing to assault the fortifications both by land and by sea, hoping to take easily a work hastily constructed and (with only) a few men being in (it). Expecting the arrival of the Attican ships from Zacynthus, they intended (lit. had it in mind), if after all they did not capture (it) beforehand, to block up the entrances to the harbour, in order that it would not be possible for the Athenians to lie at anchor against them. For the island called Sphacteria, stretching along and lying close to the harbour, makes a strong place and (there are) two narrow entrances, at one point a passage for two ships (abreast) (on the side) near to the fortifications of the Athenians and Pylos, at the other point, (on that side) near the rest of the mainland, eight or nine (ships); it was all wooded and pathless through (being) a wilderness, and in length (was) about fifteen stades pretty nearly. And so, they intended to block the inlets with their ships, pressed closely (together) and with their prows facing (the enemy); and, fearing this island, lest they might make war against themselves from it, they carried across to it (some) hoplites and stationed others along the mainland. For so, (they considered) both the island and the mainland, neither having a disembarkation point, would be hostile to the Athenians - for the (coast) of Pylos, itself, outside the inlet and towards the open sea, being without a harbour, would not have (any point) from where, setting out, they could bring help to their men (lit. the men of themselves) - they, themselves, without (any) sea-fight or risk, would, in all probability, take the place by siege, there being no food in (it) and it having been captured with little preparation. As this (plan) seemed good to them, they carried over the heavy infantry to the island, choosing (them) by lot from all the companies. A number had crossed over in turn beforehand, but the last ones and those who were caught were four hundred and twenty (in number) and the Helots attached to them. Epitadas, the son of Molobrus, was in command of them.

9. Demosthenes prepares to repel the attack.

Meanwhile, Demosthenes, seeing the Lacedaemonians about to attack (him) with ships and, at the same time, on foot, was also making preparations himself, and, having dragged up under the fortifications the triremes which were (remaining) to him from those which had been left, he secured (them) with a stockade, and he equipped the sailors in them with shields, of poor quality and many (of them) wicker; for it was not possible to procure arms in this deserted place, and even these they had taken from a piratical three-oared ship and a pinnace of the Messenians, which happened to be present. Of these Messenians, there happened to be about forty heavily-armed men, of whom he made use with the rest. He stationed the greater part both of those being armed and those being equipped upon the most fortified and strong points of the place towards the interior, telling (them) to repel the land force, if it were to attack; he, himself, having picked out from his whole (force) sixty hoplites and a few archers, went out outside the wall down to the sea, where he expected that they would most likely attempt to land, on ground although difficult and rocky facing towards the open sea, but their wall being weakest at this point, he considered that it would draw them on to be eager. For they, themselves, not ever expecting to be overcome by ships, had not been building a strong (wall), and the place might appear easily (accessible) to those having forced a landing. At this (point), therefore, going down to the very edge of the sea, he drew up his hoplites in order to stop (them), if it were possible, and he exhorted (them) to the following (effect).

10. Speech of Demosthenes to his men.

Soldiers, having taken part in this adventure, let no one among us in such a necessity desire to be thought a man of intelligence, calculating thoroughly all the danger surrounding us, rather than closing together with our opponents, thoughtlessly sanguine that he will come out successfully from this too. For whenever matters have reached a point of necessity like this, they least of all admit of calculation, (but) one takes upon oneself a quick danger. But I see most things too being in favour of us, if only we determine to stand fast and not utterly betray our stronger advantages, being dismayed by the number of them. For I think that the difficulty of the ground is in favour of ourselves, which, ourselves standing firm, becomes a support (to us). (For us) having retired, although (it) being hard, it will be easy to pass, no one barring (the way), and we shall have a more formidable enemy, a return back not being easily (open) to him, if he may be forced back by us; for they are easiest to repel (while) on board their ships, (after) landing already on equal terms. It is not necessary (for us) to be too much afraid in respect of their number; for it will fight in small divisions, although being many, because of the difficulty of coming to anchor, and it is not an army on land on like terms with superior force (lit. better), but (an army fighting) from ships for which it is necessary that many right conditions happen together in the sea (for success to occur). So I consider their difficulties counterbalances to our (small ) number. And, at the same time, I call upon you, being Athenians and knowing from practical experience about nautical landings against others, that if anyone, standing their ground, does not retire through fear of the surf and of the sternness of the sailing in of the ships, he cannot ever be forced back, and now stand firm yourselves also and, repulsing the enemy at the very water's edge, save both yourselves and the position.

12. The Lacedaemonians attack Pylos by land and sea.

Demosthenes advising such great things, the Athenians were more confident, and, marching down (to the water) to face (the enemy), they were drawn up at the edge of the sea. The Lacedaemonians, having set out, attacked the fortification with their army by land and, at the same time, with their ships, being forty-three (in number). Their admiral, Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan, was on board (lit. sailed along). He attacked just as Demosthenes was expecting. The Athenians were (now) defending (themselves) from both sides, from the land and from the sea; they apportioning the task in detachments of (lit. according to) a few ships, because it was not possible to approach the shore with more, and relieving (each other) in turn, they kept up their attacks, displaying every enthusiasm and cheering (each other on), if somehow, having pushed back (the defenders), they might capture the fortification. Brasidas appeared the most distinguished of all. For (being) a captain of a galley, and seeing, the position being difficult, that the captains and helmsmen, if at any point it did seem possible to land, hanging back and being careful of their ships lest they ground together, he shouted out (to them), saying that it was not like sparing planks to allow the enemy to have made a wall in their territory, but he ordered (them) to smash their ships, (thereby) forcing the entrance, and (appealing to) the allies in return for their great kindnesses to give their ships freely to the Lacedaemonians at the present moment, and, running (their ships) aground and landing in every (possible) way, to make themselves masters both of the men (defending) and of the place.

12. The Lacedaemonians are repulsed.

He urged on the others, and, compelling his own helmsman to run his ship aground, he advanced on to the gangway; and, trying to land, he was struck down by the Athenians, and, having been wounded in many places, he fainted, and, he falling into the bows, his shield slipped (off his arm) into the sea, and, it having been carried up on to the land, the Athenians, taking (it) up, later used (it) for the trophy, which they set up for (their success in repelling) this attack. The others were eager but were unable to land because of the difficulty of the ground, and with the Athenians standing firm and not withdrawing in any way. Fortune came round in respect of this, so that the Athenians were warding off from the land, and that Laconian (land) too, those attacking (them) by sea, and the Lacedaemonians were landing from ships and in their own (country now) being hostile, against the Athenians. For it formed at this time a great part of the glory of the former that they were chiefly mainlandsmen and most superior in respect of infantry, and of the Athenians that they were seafarers and most eminent with ships.

13. The Athenian fleet returns to Pylos.

Having made their attacks during that day and some of the next, they had desisted; and on the third they sent out some of their ships to Asine for timber for siege engines, expecting that though the wall over against the harbour had height, yet (as) landing (here) was most (practicable) they could take (it) by means of these engines. At this point, fifty ships of the Athenians from Zacynthus arrived; for some of the guard-ships from Naupactus and four Chian (vessels) had reinforced them. When they saw both the mainland and the island crowded with hoplites, and that their ships were in the harbour and not sailing out, not knowing by which means they might come to anchor, they sailed off for the time being to the island of Prote, which was not much distant, being uninhabited, and they took up their quarters (there), and on the next (day), having prepared to be led into a sea-battle, in case they should be willing to sail out against them in the open sea, but, if not, to sail in to the attack themselves. Neither were they led out against (them) nor did they happen to carry out what they intended, to block the entrances, but, staying quietly on the land, they manned their ships and were preparing, in the event of someone sailing in, to fight within the harbour, which was not (lit. not being) a small (one).

14. The Lacedaemonians are defeated, and their forces in Sphacteria cut off and blockaded.

Perceiving (this), the Athenians advanced against them by each inlet, and, falling on the main body (lit. the majority) of their ships (which were) already under way and in line (lit. with prows facing forwards), they put them to flight, and, pursuing (them hotly) as (far as they could) in the short (space available), they damaged many (vessels), and captured five (of them), crew and all (lit. with the men themselves). They rammed (lit. dashed into) the rest which had (lit. having) taken refuge on the shore. These were shattered, still getting their crews on board, before they could put to sea; taking some in tow, they dragged (them off) empty, their crews having setting out into flight. Seeing these things, the Lacedaemonians, sore distressed by the disaster, because in truth their men were being cut off on the island, came to their help, and, going into the sea with their armour, laying hold of the ships, they tried to drag (them) off; and in this (struggle) each man thought things were at a standstill (lit. had been stopped) at whatsoever action (lit. struggle) he himself also was not present. Great tumult occurred and a complete reversal (lit. an exchanging) of the method of both sides in respect of their ships; for, on the one hand, the Lacedaemonians through their excitement and dismay were engaged in a sea-fight in no other way, so to put it, than from land, and, on the other hand, the victorious Athenians, wishing, with their present fortune, to prosecute (matters) as far as possible, were fighting as foot-soldiers from ships. And so, having effected much toil and having wounded one another, they were separated, and the Lacedaemonians saved their empty ships except those having been captured first. Both sides returning to their camps, the former (i.e. the Athenians) set up a trophy, gave back the dead and took control of wreckage, and at once they sailed around the island and kept (it) under guard, its men having been cut off; the Peloponnesians on the mainland, having now come to their assistance in full force (lit. from all besides), stayed in their place watching (lit. over against) Pylos.

15. The Lacedaemonians determine to send envoys to Athens.

When the things that had happened at Pylos were reported at Sparta, it seemed good to them under circumstances of great disaster that the authorities should go down to the camp to deliberate on the spot seeing what it might be good (to do). And as they saw that it was impossible to help their men, and they did not wish to risk either that anything should befall them due to hunger or that they should be overpowered, constrained by numbers, it seemed good to them to make a truce as concerns Pylos with the generals of the Athenians, if they were willing, and to send ambassadors to Athens concerning a peace treaty, and to endeavour to get their men back as quickly as possible.

16. An armistice is concluded at Pylos.

The generals accepting the proposal, peace was made on the following terms: that the Lacedaemonians, having brought to Pylos the ships in which they had fought and all the (ships) in Laconia that were ships of war (lit. long ships), should hand (them) over to the Athenians, and should not take up arms against the fortification either by land or by sea; that the Athenians should allow the Lacedaemonians on the mainland to send out to their men on the island a fixed quantity of corn and (this already) kneaded, two Attic measures of barley, two little cups of wine, and (a piece of) meat for each man, and half of these for an attendant; that these (rations) should be sent in with the Athenians watching and no vessel should sail in secretly; that the Athenians should keep watch on the island no less (then before), provided only that (lit. inasmuch as) they do not land, and that they should not bear arms against the army of the Peloponnesians either by land or by sea. And that whatsoever of these provisions either of the parties shall transgress in whatsoever respect, the treaty shall be terminated. That it shall remain a treaty until the ambassadors of the Lacedaemonians shall have returned from Athens; that the Athenians should send them off in a trireme and bring (them) back again. That, (they) having returned, this treaty shall be terminated and the Athenians shall give back the ships in the same condition as they had received (them). The truce occurred on these (conditions), and the ships, being around sixty, (in number) were handed over, and the ambassadors were sent off. Having arrived at Athens, they spoke as follows.

17. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (i).

Athenians, the Lacedaemonians have sent us (here) to effect (such) an arrangement concerning our men on the island that whatsoever we may persuade (you) of is at the same time advantageous to you, and in relation to the disaster most likely to bring honour to us, as far as (is possible) in the present circumstances. We shall prolong our speech to a greater length not according to our wont, but it being our country's (custom) where a few words may suffice not to employ many, but (to employ) more (words) whenever it is a proper time to point out by the use of words something of importance to effect what is needed (lit. the necessary thing). And receive these (words) not in a hostile spirit and not thinking that (we think you are) ignorant (and in need of) being instructed, but as a reminder of good counsel to men who know (lit. knowing). For it is possible for you to make good use of your present good fortune, keeping what you control, and gaining honour and reputation besides, and not to suffer like those receiving something good surprisingly (usually do); for they always press forward in the hope of more on account of their unexpected good fortune in the present circumstances. But (those) to whom most changes have happened, for better or for worse, are justly bound to be most distrustful of prosperity; and, in truth, through experience this ought to apply to your city and to us especially.

18. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (ii).

And see (the truth of this), looking away at our present misfortunes, we who, having the biggest reputation among the Greeks, have come (here) to you, (though) having formerly thought ourselves to be more able to grant (that) for which, having now arrived, we are asking you. And, indeed, we have experienced this neither from lack of strength nor having been arrogant, greater (power) having been added (to us), but, (starting) from our regular resources, failing in our calculations, in which (matter) the same (chance) falls to us all alike. So (it is) not reasonable that you should think that, because of the present strength of your city and its acquisitions at the moment, what belongs to (lit. what is of) fortune will be always with you. They (are) prudent men who safely reckon their gains as doubtful - and these same men would offer more sense (than others) (in dealing) with misfortunes - and, as regards war, are convinced that it cannot abide with this man just as far as the limit (which) someone may wish to take it in hand, but (must go on) as its vicissitudes may lead them. Such men, stumbling the least (times) through not being puffed up, (by) being confident in immediate success, would come to terms, if they could, especially in a period of good fortune. This, O Athenians, it is well for you to do in relation to us now, lest, if after all, having not been persuaded (to come to terms), at some time afterwards you meet with failure, which is possible in many ways, you may be thought to have won even your present successes due to luck, it being possible (for you) to leave behind for the future an unshakeable reputation for strength and wisdom.

19. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (iii).

The Lacedaemonians are calling you to a treaty and an end of the war, offering peace and alliance and friendship in every way and on every occasion and for a neighbourly (understanding) to subsist between one another, and asking in return for the men on the island, and thinking (it) better for both parties not to take the utmost risks, whether, some means of escape occurring, they might escape by force, or, having been overwhelmed by the blockade, they might be still more subdued. We think that great enmities can really be best settled, not if someone, having proved victorious in most points of the war, (and) retaliating (by) binding (his foe) down with oaths by compulsion, shall make peace on terms (which are) not equal, but if, (though) it is in his power to do the same, having regard to what (is) equitable, (and) having also conquered him in generosity, he makes peace on moderate terms in comparison with what he expected. For his adversary, being already under an obligation, not to resist as (someone) having been constrained, but to show generosity in return, is more ready from a sense of shame to abide by the things which he agreed on. Men are more (likely) to act in this way towards their more (serious) enemies than towards those who have (lit. having) quarrelled (with them) over small things; they are naturally inclined to make concessions with gladness to those who have (lit. having) given way voluntarily, but to stand out against overweening arrogance, even against their (better) judgment.

20. Speech of the Lacedaemonian ambassadors at Athens (iv).

And for ourselves the (proposed) agreement is (now) desirable for both parties, if (it) ever (is), before something irremediable, happening in our midst, befalls us, in which (case) necessity holds an eternal hatred against you, in common and private, and you would be deprived of what we are now offering. (Matters) being still undecided, and your reputation and our friendship being at stake, (and) our disaster being settled on tolerable terms before anything dishonourable (occurs), let us be reconciled, and let us, ourselves, choose peace instead of war, and let us give to the other Greeks a respite from their sufferings; in this (matter) they will think that you are the more responsible. For they are at war, (being) unclear which of the two sides began (it); an end happening, for which you are now mainly responsible, they will ascribe their gratitude to you. And so, if you come to accept (our proposal), it is possible for you to become true friends to the Lacedaemonians, they having offered (it) to (you) gratifying rather then forcing (them). Consider the great advantages which are likely in this; for you and we saying the same things, you know that the rest of the Greek (people), being somewhat inferior, will honour (us) to the greatest extent.

21. Terms required by the Athenians.

And so the Lacedaemonians said so much, thinking that the Athenians had been desiring a peace treaty in an earlier time, but were prevented, themselves opposing (it), and, peace being given, would gladly accept (it) and would give back the men. They, having the men on the island, thought that the treaty would be ready for them at any time, whenever they wished to make (it) with them, and aimed at something more. Cleon, the (son) of Cleaenetus, a man who was (lit. being) a leader of the people at that time and most influential with the masses, urged them on especially; and he persuaded (them) to to reply (as follows), that it is necessary that those on the island, having first surrendered, should be brought to Athens; that (they) having come, (and) the Lacedaemonians having handed back Nisae and Pegae and Troezen and Achaea, which they had not taken in war but from the previous convention, the Athenians having agreed to these concessions, on the strength of (certain) misfortunes, being in somewhat greater need at that time, the men can be brought (back) and a treaty made for as long a time as may seem good to both parties.

22. The Lacedaemonian envoys return without effecting anything.

They did not say anything against this reply, but asked that commissioners might be chosen (to confer) with themselves, who, speaking and listening concerning each (point), might in quietness come to an agreement (as to) what they might persuade one another (to accept). Thereupon, Cleon fell upon (them) vehemently, saying that he knew from the beginning that they had nothing just in mind, and that this was clear enough now, inasmuch as they were not willing to speak to the people and are wishing to to be councillors with a few men; but, if they are intending anything honest, he urged (them) to speak to all. But the Lacedaemonians, seeing that, even if it seemed good to them to make concessions in their misfortune, it was not possible for them to speak in front of the people, lest they should be injuriously represented to their allies, having made proposals and having not succeeded, and that the Athenians would not grant what they had asked for on moderate terms, withdrew from Athens without achieving anything.

23. Hostilities renewed at Pylos. The Athenians retain the Lacedaemonian ships, and blockade Sphacteria.

They having arrived (back), the truce around Pylos was at once terminated, the Lacedaemonians demanded their ships back, just as had been agreed; but the Athenians, having (as) ground for complaint an attack on the fortification contrary to the truce and other things seemingly not worthy of mention, did not give (them) back, maintaining that it had been said that, if it were transgressed (in any way) whatsoever, the truce would be dissolved. The Lacedaemonians denied (these allegations), and, expostulating against the (detention) of their ships, (and) going back, they resumed the war. Hostilities went on (lit. things were fought) at Pylos by both sides with vigour, the Athenians sailing in two ships around the island in opposite directions all day - and at night as well, all (their ships) being anchored around (it) without exception except on the side facing the open sea whenever there was a wind. Twenty ships came to (join) them from Athens to guard (the island), so that there were now seventy altogether - and the Peloponnesians remaining encamped on the mainland, and making attacks on the fortification, looking for an opportunity, if one occurred, to save the men (on the island).

PART TWO. EVENTS IN SICILY. FINAL VICTORY OF THE ATHENIANS AT PYLOS.

24. Progress of the war in Sicily. The attack upon Rhegium is continued.

Meanwhile, the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily, having taken the rest of the fleet, which they were getting ready, to join those on guard duty in Messina, made war from Messina. The Locrians chiefly urged (them) on through hatred of the Rhegians, and they themselves too had invaded their territory with their full force. They (i.e. the Syracusans) wished to make trial of a sea-battle, seeing that the Athenians had (lit. there were to the Athenians) only a few ships present, and learning that the majority (of the ships) intended to have come were blockading the island (of Sphacteria). For, if they were to be victorious in this sea-battle, they hoped to subdue Rhegiam easily, (by) blockading (it) both by land (lit. on foot), and that thereby their position (lit. affairs) would become strong. For Rhegium, a promontory (on the coast) of Italy, lying very close to Messina in Sicily, it would not be possible for the Athenians to keep watch over and control the strait. The strait consists of (lit. is) the sea between Rhegium and Messina at the point where Sicily is the shortest distance from the mainland, and this (channel) is the Charybdis of legend (lit. having been so called), through which Odysseus is reputed to have sailed. And the sea, owing to the narrowness (of the channel) and with a strong current rushing into it from the vast open seas, both the Tyrrhenian and the Sicilian, was considered to be naturally dangerous (lit. difficult).

25(i). Actions in the straits of Messina.

In this narrow strait (lit. space between), the Syracusans and their allies were compelled to engage late in the day, concerning the passage of a boat (lit. a boat sailing across), putting out to sea with a few more than thirty ships against sixteen ships of the Athenians and eight Rhegian (ones). Having been defeated by the Athenians, they sailed back hurriedly, as each chanced to his own base, at both Messina and Rhegium, (and) losing one ship. And night fell upon the action. The Athenians and Rhegians, sailing up (and) seeing their ships empty, attacked, but they themselves lost one ship to a grappling iron which had been thrown on to (it) (lit. having been thrown on it), the men (saving themselves by) swimming away. After this, the Syracusans embarking on their ships and having them towed (lit. sailing with a rope) to Messina, (and) the Athenians, attacking again, lose another ship, the former getting their ships into the open sea and becoming the assailants. The Syracusans, having had not the less (of fortunes) in the coastal voyage and in the sea-battle which occurred (lit. having occurred) in such a way, brought (their ships) into the harbour at Messina.

25(ii). Attempts upon Naxos and Messina respectively.

The Athenians, Camarina having been reported as being betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and those with him, sailed thither, and meanwhile the Messenians, with their full forces, by land and with their ships at the same time, took the field against Naxos, which was (lit. being) their Chalcidian neighbour. On the first day, having made the Naxians keep within their walls, they laid waste the country, and on the next day, sailing around with their fleet by way of the river Acesines, they ravaged the land, and with their infantry made an inroad in the direction of the city. Meanwhile, the Sicels came down over the hills in large numbers to attack (lit. assisting against) the Messinians. And the Naxians, when they saw (them), having taken heart and encouraging themselves that the Leontinians and their other Greek allies were coming to their aid, making a sortie from the city, fell upon the Messinians, and, having routed (them), killed over a thousand (of them), and the survivors withdrew homewards with difficulty; for the barbarians, falling upon (them) on the roads, killed them in great numbers. The ships, having put into Messina, were afterwards separated, each to (her own) home (port). The Leontinians and their allies with the Athenians immediately took the field against Messina as having been weakened, and, attacking, the Athenians made their attempt against the harbour with their ships, and the infantry against the city. The Messinians and some of the Locrians with Demoteles, who had been left behind (as) guards after the disaster, suddenly attacking, rout much of the army of the Leontinians and killed many (of them). The Athenians, seeing (this) and disembarking from their ships, came up in support, and closely pursued the Messenians back again into the city, falling upon (them) in their confusion; and, having set up a trophy, they retired to Rhegium. After this, the Greeks in Sicily continued to make war upon each other by land without the Athenians.

26. The Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria still hold out, being furnished with supplies from the mainland in various ways.

On Pylos, the Athenians were still besieging the Lacedaemonians on the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in its position on the mainland. The blockade was laborious for the Athenians, from want of both food and water; for there was no spring except one in the citadel of Pylos itself, and this not large, but most, scraping away the shingle on the sea (shore), drank such water (as was) suitable (for them to drink). There was a narrowness (of room) for those encamped in the small (space), and, the ships not having a mooring-place, some crews took their food on the land, and others were anchored out at sea. The time elapsing contrary to reasonable expectation caused the greatest discouragement, (as they were besieging men) on a desert island being possessed of only brackish water, whom they thought they would overcome within a few days. The reason was the Lacedaemonians having given notice that anyone wishing to bring to the island ground corn and wine and cheese and, if (they could send it in) any other food such as might be useful in a siege, having rated (these provisions) at a high price, and promising freedom to any man among the Helots bringing (the food) in. Many, running the risk, brought (food) in, and particularly the Helots, putting off from the Peloponnese at any point they chanced, and sailing in while it was still night to the side of the island facing towards the sea. They looked out especially (for the chance) of being brought in by the wind; for (it was) easier to elude the blockade of the triremes, whenever the wind was from the sea; for it (then) became impossible to anchor around the (island), and the landing was made unsparingly by them; for they ran ashore their boats, having been deemed worthy of money, and the hoplites were on guard around the island's landing places. Those who (lit. such as) made the attempt in calm weather were captured. Divers also swam in from the harbour under water, dragging by a cord in skins poppy-seed mixed with honey and pounded linseed (lit. seed from flax); these escaping notice at first, look outs later happened; both sides skilfully employed every scheme, one to bring in provisions, the other lest these escape them.

27. State of feeling at Athens. Cleon attacks the Generals in office, especially Nicias.

In Athens, (the people) learning about the army, that it was suffering hardships, and that food was sailing in to the men on the island, were at a loss and had been fearing that winter might interrupt their blockade, seeing that the carrying of necessities around the Peloponnese would be impossible - (the troops being) in a desolate place and, at the same time, (themselves) not being able to send round enough (supplies) even in summer - and that the blockade of places without a harbour would not be practicable, but that either the men would escape the blockade, themselves giving (it) up, or that, watching out for bad weather, they would sail away in the boats, which were bringing them food. But of all things they chiefly feared that with regard to the Lacedaemonians, because they thought that they had a strong position they were no longer seeking to negotiate with them. And they began to repent not having accepted the treaty. And Cleon, realising their suspicion of him concerning the prevention of the agreement, said that those bringing the news were not telling the truth. Those having come recommending that, if they did not believe them, that they send some commissioners of inspection, he himself was chosen (as) a commissioner with Theagenes by the Athenians. Aware that he would he would be compelled either to tell the same things or, saying the opposite, he would be shown (to be) lying, he advised the Athenians, seeing that they were somewhat the more eager in mind (for men) to be sent off to fight, that it was necessary not to send commissioners of inspection nor, letting slip the opportunity, to delay, but, if it seemed to them that the things reported were true, to sail against the men. And he pointed at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, being a general, being hostile (to him), and reproaching (him), (he said) that it would be easy with preparation, if the generals were men, having sailed, to capture those on the island and, indeed, that he himself would have done this, if he had been in command.

28. Nicias offers to resign the command to Cleon, who is ultimately obliged to take it.

The Athenians having raised some clamour at Cleon because he was not sailing even now, if indeed it appeared (so) easy to him, and, at the same time, seeing that he was being reproached, told (him) that, as far as the generals were concerned (lit. inasmuch it was concerning them), taking whatever force he wished, he could try his hand. He, thinking at first that he was only giving (it) up in debate, was ready (to accept), but realising that he was disposed to give (it) up in reality, he began to retreat, and he said that the former (i.e. Nicias) was in command but not himself, (being) scared now and not supposing that he would venture to give (it) up to him. Nicias exhorted (him) once more and renounced the command at Pylos and made the Athenians witnesses (to this). But, such as the mob loves to do, the more Cleon shrunk from the expedition and tried to back out of what he had said, so much (the more) they encouraged Nicias to give up his command and called loudly upon the former to sail. And he said that, having this force in addition to those soldiers at Pylos, he would either bring (back) the Lacedaemonians alive or kill (them) on the spot. There fell among the Athenians a degree of laughter at his boastful speaking, and it occurred to sensible men (to be) equally glad, considering that they would gain from one or the other of the two blessings, either they would be rid of Cleon, which was what they rather expected, or, (if) disappointed in this expectation, they would have the Lacedaemonians in their hands.

29. Cleon, after choosing Demosthenes as his colleague, sails for Pylos.

Having made all the arrangements in the assembly and the Athenians having voted (the command of) the expedition to him, having chosen as his colleague Demosthenes, one of the generals at Pylos, he arranged the putting to sea with speed. He took Demosthenes to help him, learning that he was contemplating a descent on the island. For the soldiers, being distressed at the difficulty of the position, and besieged rather than besieging, were eager to risk all. And the island having been set on fire gave him confidence too. For previously he was afraid, it being wooded for the most part and trackless on account of its permanent wilderness, and he thought this would be to the advantage of the enemy. For, if he landed with a large force (lit. with a large force landing), falling on them from an unseen position, they might injure (them). For their weaknesses and preparation alike would not be visible to themselves through the forest, whereas all the weaknesses of their own force would be conspicuous, so that they could attack (them) unexpectedly wherever they chose; for the initiative to attack would be in their hands. If, on the other hand, he should force (them) to come to close quarters in the wooded area, he considered that a lesser (force) but (one) experienced in the country (would be) stronger than a larger (but) inexperienced (one). And (so), their force, (though) being numerous, would be cut to pieces unawares (lit. being cut to pieces, escaped notice) it being impossible to see (lit. a seeing not being possible) where there was a need to assist one another.

30. Demosthenes is prepared to land on the island.

These (reflections) occurred to him not least due to the Aetolian disaster, which had happened to a great (lit. some) extent because of the wood. One of the soldiers, compelled by the want of space to land on the extremities of the island, was preparing for breakfast with a guard (posted) in advance, and, setting fire to a small part of the wood unintentionally, and after this, a wind arising, much of it was consumed accidently (lit. being consumed, escaped notice). So, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were more numerous (than he had thought) - suspecting previously that he was sending in the corn for fewer men (than those actually) there - and that island was (now) easier to land on, he got ready for the attempt as something worthy on the part of the Athenians of making a serious (lit. greater) effort, and, sending for trooops from the neighbouring allies and preparing other things. At that moment, Cleon, having sent a messenger (saying) that he was coming and that he had the troops for which he had asked, arrives at Pylos. Having conferred together, they first send a herald to the camp on the mainland, proposing that, if they would, without risk (of battle) order the men on the island to surrender themselves and their arms to them, on condition that they should be kept under a moderate guard, until something concerning the main (lit. greater) war might be agreed.

31. Disposition of the Lacedaemonians.

These (proposals) not having been accepted, they delayed for one day, and on the next (day), having embarked all their hoplites on a few ships, they set out at night, and a little before dawn they landed on both sides of the island, from the open sea and from the harbour, the hoplites being about eight hundred (strong), and they advanced at a run against the first guard-post in the island. (The enemy) were disposed as follows: in this first guard-post, there were around thirty hoplites, and the majority of them and Epitadas, their archon, were holding the centre and the most level (part) and (the part) around the water, and a certain part, itself not large, guarded the extremity of the island facing towards Pylos, which was precipitous from the sea and barely assailable from the land; for there was a sort of fort there, rudely constructed of stones, which they thought might be useful to them if a retreat, unusually hard-pressed, were to overtake (them). Thus were they drawn up.

32. Arrangements made by Demosthenes and Cleon for the attack.

The Athenians immediately killed the first guards whom they ran up against, (who were) still in their beds trying to take up their weapons, and landing secretly (lit. they eluded notice in their landing), they (i.e. the enemy) thinking that their ships were sailing to their anchorage for the night as usual. At the same time as dawn was happening, the rest of the army landed, all the men of a little more than seventy ships, except the rowers, equipped as well as possible in each case, eight hundred archers and no less peltasts then these, the reinforcements from the Messenians, and all the other (troops) such as were holding their positions around Pylos, except the guards on the fortification. Demosthenes drawing (them) up, they were divided into (groups of) two hundred, sometimes more and at some points it was less, occupying the highest points, in order that the enemy had the greatest difficulty (lit. there was the greatest difficulty to the enemy), surrounding (him) on all sides, so that he had no place against which he might counter-attack, but might become encompassed by the number (of their assailants), if he attacked those in front, being shot at by those in his rear, and, if (he attacked) on the flanks, (being shot at) by those on the other (flank). Wherever they went, the enemy was always about to be at their back, lightly armed men and those most difficult (to cope with) with arrows and javelins and stones and slings, having effect from a distance, but whom it was not possible (for them) to attack; (in) fleeing, they were superior (in speed), and, (as) they went back, they pressed on (them again). With such a plan, Demosthenes contrived the landing from the first, and he made these dispositions in its execution;

33. Engagement on the island.

The men around Epitadas, what was in fact the main body of those on the island, when they saw that their first guard-post had been overwhelmed and that an army was coming to attack them, were drawn up and moved forwards against the hoplites of the Athenians, wishing to come to close quarters; for they had positioned themselves in front (of them), and the lightly armed troops (were) on their flanks and at their rear. So, they were not able to close with the hoplites nor to make use of their own specialised training; for the lightly armed troops, shooting (at them) from both flanks, held (them) up, and at, the same time, they (i.e. the Athenian hoplites) did not rush forward, but stayed still; they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians) pushed back the lightly armed troops, wherever, running at them, they came especially close; but they, turning about, fought back, the men being lightly equipped and easily outstripping (them) in their flight, and from difficulty of ground, being before a rough wasteland, in which the Lacedaemonians, having (heavy) armour, were not able to pursue (them).

34. The Lacedaemonians are hard pressed.

And so, they skirmished against one another for a little time. The Lacedaemonians no longer being able to rush out abruptly at the points where they were falling upon (them), the lightly armed troops, realising that they were now slower in defending (themselves), and having themselves derived the greatest confidence from their seeing that they appeared many times more numerous, and being more habituated to them no longer appearing equally formidable to themselves, because they had not suffered things worthy of their immediate expectations, as they had been cowed in mind when they first landed, (considering) that (they were going) up against the Lacedaemonians, (now) despising (them) and shouting, charged upon them in a mass and pelted (them) with stones and arrows and javelins, as each man had something to hand. The shouting happening at the same time as their onset, consternation fell upon men unused to such a kind of fighting, and a cloud of dust rose up from the recently burned wood, and it was difficult to see before one due to the arrows and stones pouring (on them) together from many men through the dust cloud. Thereupon, the struggle began to go hard for the Lacedaemonians; for their felt caps were not protecting (them) from the arrows and stones, and the spears were breaking off short in (their armour) as they were hit (lit. they being hit), and they could do nothing with themselves (i.e. they could not attack), being prevented from looking ahead in respect of seeing, and not hearing the orders between themselves due to the louder shouting of the enemy, and being surrounded by danger on every side, and not having (any) hope as to how it was necessary (for them), having defended (themselves), to escape.

35. They retreat to the extremity of the island.

But at last, many having already been wounded through moving to and fro on the same ground all the time, closing up, they fell back to the fort at the end of the island, which was not far distant and their guards (there). As they gave way, thereupon the lightly armed troops, full of confidence, pressed upon (them); as many of the Lacedaemonians as were caught retiring were killed, but the majority escaping to the fort were drawn up with the guards at this (point) in order to defend (it) at every place where it was assailable. And the Athenians, pursuing (them), could not surround them and hem them in (lit. did not have a way round and a surrounding of them) from the strength of the position, and, attacking from in front, they tried to storm (it). For a long time, and indeed for most of the day, both sides held out (though) suffering from the fighting and thirst and the sun, the one endeavouring to dislodge (the enemy) from the high ground, the other not to give in. But the Lacedaemonians were (now) defending (themselves) more easily than before, there being no surrounding of them on their flanks.

36. The Athenians occupy a position in their rear.

When it (i.e. the fighting) proved endless, the general of the Messinians coming to Cleon and Demosthenes, said they were wearying themselves to no purpose; but, if they were willing to give him some part of the archers and of the lightly armed troops, he would go round by way of their rear by a path which he himself would find, (and) he was resolved to force home the attack. Having received what he had asked for, setting out from where he could not be seen so that they could not observe (him), making his approach by the precipitous (cliffs) of the island, and (by a route) which the Lacedaemonians, trusting in the strength of the position, did not guard, and, going around with great difficulty, he escaped notice, and, suddenly appearing on the high ground at their rear, he astounded the one side by the unexpectedness (of the thing), and gave still more confidence to the other side, seeing what they were expecting. The Lacedaemonians, being shot at now from both sides, and being in the same dilemma, to compare a small (event) to a great one as that at Thermopylae - for they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae) were utterly destroyed, the Persians coming around (them) by the path, and they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians at Pylos) being already attacked on both sides, no longer held their ground, but, (as) a few fighting with many and due to the weakness of their bodies through want of corn, they fell back, and the Athenians were now masters of the approaches.

37. Summons to surrender.

Cleon and Demosthenes, realising that if they (i.e. the Lacedaemonians) were to retreat any (lit. ever so little) further they would be utterly destroyed by their army, stopped the fighting and held their men back, wishing to lead them back to Athens (lit. the Athenians) alive, (hoping that) they might surrender their weapons, if, somehow, hearing their proclamation, they might be shaken in their resolution and yield to (lit. to be less than) the present danger. And (so) they made proclamation (to know), if they would surrender their arms and themselves to the Athenians, on condition (lit. so that) that they (i.e. the Athenians) would decide what seemed good to them.

38. Surrender of the Lacedaemonians. Loss in the action.

Hearing (this), the majority (of them) lowered their shields and waved their hands, showing that they accepted what had been offered. After this, a cessation having occurred, Cleon and Demosthenes and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the part of them (i.e the Lacedaemonians) met for a parley, the first of the earlier of their leaders, Epitadas, having been killed, and Hippagretas, the (officer) chosen to succeed after him, lying as (if) dead among the bodies, (yet) still alive, (and) he himself having been chosen to succeed as commander in the third place according to the rule if anything should befall them (lit. if they should suffer anything). Styphon and those with him said that they wished to send a herald across to the Lacedaemonians on the mainland (to ask) what it was necessary for them to do. The Athenians, allowing none of them to pass over but themselves summoning heralds from the mainland, and consultations happening two or three times, the last man sailing across to them from the Lacedaemonians on the mainland reported that the Lacedaemonians order you yourselves to decide concerning yourselves, (while) doing nothing dishonourable. They, having discussed (the matter) among themselves, surrendered themselves and their arms. The following numbers were killed and captured alive on the island: altogether four hundred and twenty hoplites had crossed over; of these two hundred and ninety-two (lit. three hundred falling short of eight) were brought back alive, and the others had died. Of these, there were about a hundred and twenty Spartiates living. Not many of the Athenians were killed; for the fighting was not a pitched (business).

39. Duration of the blockade. Cleon fulfils his promise.

And the total time from when the men on the island were besieged, from the naval battle until the battle on the island, amounted to seventy-two days. Of these, for about twenty days, during which the ambassadors were talking about a treaty, they were furnished with provisions, and on the other (days) they were continually sustained by the things secretly sailed in. There was corn on the island and other victuals were captured on (it); for their commander, Epitadas, gave out less rations to each man than (was possible) having regard to his capacity. The Athenians and the Peloponnesians now both withdrew their forces from Pylos for home, and the promise of Cleon, although being reckless was fulfilled; for he led the men (back) within twenty days, just as he had undertaken (to do).

40. The general feeling throughout Greece.

This (event) occasioned more against the judgement (of the Greeks) than anything (else) concerning the war; for they expected that the Lacedaemonians would not surrender their weapons either through famine or any kind of force, but would die, bearing (them) and fighting as they could. (People) disbelieving that those surrendering were similar in essence to those among them who had fallen, and a certain man among the allies of the Athenians asking sometime later for the sake of annoyance one of the prisoners from the island, if those who had fallen were good men and true, it was answered to him that the spindle, meaning the arrow, would be worth a great deal, if it could distinguish the men of honour, making an indication that the man coming in the way of stones and arrows was (the one) killed.

41. The prisoners taken to Athens. Pylos garrisoned.

The men having been brought back, the Athenians resolved that they should be kept under guard in fetters until whatever time they might make peace, and that, if the Peloponnesians were to invade their land before this, having brought (them) out, they would put (them) to death. They established a garrison at Pylos, and the Messenians from Naupactus, sending their own fittest men as to their native country - for Pylos is in that country once belonging to Messenia - plundered Laconia and, being speakers of the same dialect, they did very much damage. The Lacedaemonians, being inexperienced in the time before of rapine and warfare of this kind, and (with) the Helots deserting, and fearing that (something) should be attempted (still) further against themselves among the (institutions) in the land, endured this not easily, but, although not wishing to be clear (about this) to the Athenians, they began to send envoys to them, and tried to recover Pylos and their men. But they were grasping at more, and, (although they) came often, they sent them away with nothing achieved. These (were) the affairs concerning Pylos.