CICERO: "LAELIUS: DE AMICITIA" (ON FRIENDSHIP).

CICERO: "LAELIUS: DE AMICITIA" (ON FRIENDSHIP).

Introduction:

Cicero composed the "De Amicitia" in 44 B.C. probably in the autumn of that year following the composition and publication of his "De Senectute" (see Sabidius' translation on this blog dated July 16th 2021) and "De Divinatione" earlier in that year. The dialogue that Cicero is recounting in this remarkable piece of work is reputed to have occurred in 129 B.C., a few days after the apparent murder of Scipio Africanus the Younger, the bosom friend of Laelius the Wise, the principal interlocutor in this work. Cicero claims that this discourse which he is reporting was passed down to him in 88 B.C., when he was a youth, by his elderly confidant Quintus Mucius Scaevola, Laelius' son-in-law and one of the other two minor interlocutors in the dialogue (the other was Gaius Fannius Strabo, another son-in-law of Laelius).  Although he lived to some extent in the shadow of his great friend Scipio, Laelius was himself a most distinguished man. When appointed praetor in 145 B.C. he campaigned successfully against Viriathus, the Lusitanian rebel, and he became consul in 140 B.C. He was a famous orator and writer of Latin, and his title "Sapiens" - 'the Wise', stemmed from his great knowledge and philosophical understanding. He had been a pupil of the Stoic philosophers Diogenes and Panaetius. This work, "Laelius: De Amicitia", was tremendously popular, not only with Romans of succeeding generations, but also in medieval times, and it greatly influenced both Boethius and Dante. As Michael Grant spells out in the brief introductory comments to his own Penguin translation of this work, "Cicero was striking a blow for a more idealistic approach" to the Roman concept of friendship than "the practical tit-for-tat upon which their whole political life was based" (see "Cicero: On the Good Life", Penguin, 1971). 

Sources. As in the case of the "De Senectute", Sabidius has relied upon the text, and to a great extent too, upon the translation of William Armistead Falconer, Harvard University Press, 1923, available on the Perseus website. Other translations available to him have been that of E.S. Shuckburgh on the Project Gutenberg website, dated about 1900, and that of Michael Grant (see just above). 

Dedication. In the case of the "De Amicitia", as in the case of the "De Senectute", Cicero dedicated his writing to his close friend and associate Titus Pomponius Atticus. In relation to his translation of the "De Amicitia", Sabidius was delighted to meet the request of his coadjutor Andrew Panton, that this should be dedicated to Andrew's longstanding friend, Richard Essam, M.A. (Oxon). Richard has enjoyed a long and successful career as a schoolmaster, which he completed a few years ago teaching Latin and Ancient Greek at Millfield School in Somerset. It was in fact Richard Essam who recommended to Andrew that Sabidius add "De Amicitia" to his corpus of translations, both on account of the quality of the prose it contains but also because of its thoughtful content; and, as Andrew is happy to assert, Richard is exactly the sort of friend who is portrayed in chapter 65 below as "straightforward, and sociable, and sympathetic," and as "someone who is influenced by the same things as oneself."    

(1) 1. Quintus Mucius (Scaevola), the augur, (i.e. consul in 117 B.C.) used to recount from his memory, and in a charming manner, many (stories) about his father-in-law, Gaius Laelius (i.e. consul in 140 B.C.), and, in every conversation (about him) he did not hesitate to call him 'Sapiens' (i.e. 'the Wise'); now, as soon as I had assumed the manly toga, I had been introduced to Scaevola in such a way that, in so far as I could (manage it) and he would permit (it), I should never depart from the old man's side; and so I committed to memory many of the statements wisely made by him, (and) also many of his brief and sensible comments, and I sought to become more learned through his wisdom. When he died (i.e. in 88 B.C.), I attached myself to Scaevola the priest (i.e. Quintus Mucius Scaevola, consul in 95 B.C. and Pontifex Maximus from 90 B.C.), whom I venture to call the single most distinguished (man) of our community, both in his ability and in his uprightness (of character). But of this (I shall speak) on other (occasions); now I return to the augur. 

(2) Although many (things) often (come back to me), I particularly remember him sitting on a semi-circular bench at his home, as he was accustomed (to do), when both I and quite a few of his intimate friends were with (him), (and) he fell upon this topic (i.e. friendship), which happened at that time to be on many (people's) lips. For you will certainly remember, Atticus (i.e. Titus Pomponius Atticus, Cicero's closest friend and confidant, to whom this book was dedicated), and all the more so, because you were much in the company of Publius Sulpicius (Rufus), how great was the surprise and dismay of the people, when he, as tribune of the plebs (i.e. in 88 B.C., having renounced his patrician status), separated himself in deadly hatred from Quintus Pompeius (Rufus), who was then consul, with whom he had (previously) been on the most intimate and affectionate terms.  

(3) And so at the time when Scaevola happened to mention this very (fact), he proceeded to expound to us a discussion on the subject of friendship which Laelius had had with himself and with another son-in-law, Gaius Fannius (Strabo), son of Marcus (i.e. tribune of the plebs in 142 B.C.), a few days after the death of Africanus (i.e. Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, the Younger, consul in 147 and 134 B.C., who was murdered in 129 B.C.). I have committed to memory the (main) points of that discussion, which I have set out in this book in my own way; for I have brought on (to the stage), as it were, the speakers themselves, lest (the words) "said I" and "said he" should be interposed too often, and in order that the discourse should appear to have been carried out, as if by (them) in person, in our presence.  

(4) For, while you were frequently pleading with me to write something on friendship, the subject seemed to me (to be) worthy both of everyone's attention and of our intimate friendship; and so, not (being) unwilling to benefit the multitude, I have acted as you have asked. But, as, in the case of my "Cato the Elder", which was written for you on the subject "of Old Age", I presented Cato (i.e. Marcus Porcius Cato Maior [the Elder], consul 195 B.C.; died 149 B.C.) (when he was) an old man (as) the principal speaker, because no other person seemed more suited to talk about that time of life than he who had been an old man for such a long time, and had prospered in his old age beyond all other (men), so, since we had learned from our forefathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio had been especially memorable, the character of Laelius seemed appropriate to me to expound the very views on friendship, which Scaevola remembered had been put forward by him. Moreover, this kind of discourse, based (as it is) on the authority of men of ancient times, and especially those (who were) renowned, seems to acquire in some way a greater dignity; and so, when I am reading my own (work), I am sometimes so affected that I think it is Cato speaking, not myself.     

(5) But, as (I) then (wrote as one) old man to (another) old man on the subject of old age, so in this book I have written (as) a most affectionate (friend) to a friend on the subject of friendship. Then, it was Cato speaking, and in those days almost no one was older than him, (and) no one (was) wiser; now, Laelius will be speaking about friendship, (he who was) both wise - for thus was he regarded - and excelling in the glory of friendship. I wish you would avert your mind from me for a little while, (and) may you think that Gaius Laelius is speaking himself; the conversation is begun by them, (then) Laelius replies, and his entire discourse is about friendship, and as you read it you will recognise yourself.    

(6) 2. FANNIUS: Those (words) of yours, Laelius, are (true); for there never was any better or more distinguished man than Africanus. But you should be aware that the eyes of all (men) are (now) fixed only upon you; (people) call you, and think (you are), wise. The (word) was attributed in this way to Marcus Cato, (and) we know that in our fathers' time Lucius Acilius (n.b. the exact identity of this man is unknown).was called "the Wise"; but they were both called this for a somewhat different reason: Acilius because he was thought to be skilled in civil law, (and) Cato because he had experience of (so) many different interests; in his case (there were) many instances, both in the senate and in the forum, of his shrewdness of foresight, or his firmness of action, or his sharpness of response, (and,) as a result, in his old age he received (the title) of "the Wise" as a sort of surname.    

(7) But you are (considered) wise in a somewhat different sense, not only on account of your natural (ability) and character, but also on account of your devotion to study and your learning, and not as the masses but as the learned are accustomed to call (a man) wise, and in this sense we understand  - for (those) who investigate such (matters) more carefully do not consider those who are called "The Seven" (to be) among the category of wise (men) - that no one in the whole of Greece (can be called wise, except) one (man) at Athens (i.e. Socrates), and he, to be sure, had also been declared extremely wise by the oracle of Apollo (i.e. the Delphic Oracle); in your case, (people) think that your wisdom consists in this: that you consider all your (main possessions) to be placed within you, and you think that the fortunes of human life (to be) of less account than virtue. And so, they ask of me, and of Scaevola here too, I believe, how you are bearing the death of Africanus, and all the more (so), because on the latest Nones (i.e. the 5th or the 7th day of the month), when we had come to the gardens of Decimus Brutus (i.e. Decimus Junius Brutus Callaicus, consul 138 B.C.) for the sake of practising our augural duties, as usual, you were not present, although you have been accustomed to appear on that day and (discharge) that duty with the greatest diligence. 

(8) SCAEVOLA: It is true, Gaius Laelius, that many (people) are asking (such questions), just as has been said by Fannius, but I state in reply what I have observed, (namely) that you are bearing with composure the pain which you have sustained through the death (of one who was) both a very great man and a very dear (friend), nor could the (reality) of your human nature have been unmoved (by it), nor was it; but, as to your not being present at the meeting of our college on the Nones, I reply that the reason (for this) was sickness, not melancholy. 

LAELIUS: Indeed, (you spoke) correctly, Scaevola, and truthfully; for I should not have been kept away by any personal inconvenience from that duty which I have always performed, when I was well, nor do I think that through some misfortune of mine such a thing could happen to a man of steadfast character, so that some interruption of his duty should occur.  

(9) Now (when) you say, Fannius, that such great (merit) is attributed to me, (a merit) such as I neither acknowledge nor claim, you are acting in a kindly manner, but you seem to me not to be judging Cato highly enough; for either no one was wise, (something) which indeed I am inclined to believe, or, if anyone (was, it was) he. In order that I may omit all other (things, consider) how he bore his son's death! I had remembered (the case of) Paullus (i.e. Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, consul 182 and 168 B.C.), (and) I had experienced (that of) Galus (i.e. Gaius Sulpicius Galus, consul 166 B.C.), but their (sons had died) in childhood, but Cato's (son was) a man in the prime of life and with an assured reputation (i.e. Marcus Porcius Cato Licinianus, died 152 B.C. when praetor designatus).   

(10) For this reason, take care not to give precedence over Cato even to that very (man) (i.e. Socrates) whom, as you say, Apollo declared to be the wisest (of men); for (it is) the deeds of the former and the words of the latter (that) are praised. 

But, as for me, as I am now speaking with both of you, I beg you to believe that the situation is this: 

3. If I were to say that I am unmoved by the loss of Scipio, wise (men) might consider how correctly I am acting; but I should certainly be speaking falsely. For I am (indeed) moved, as I have been deprived of a friend such as I believe no one (else) ever will be, and, as I can confirm, no one (else) certainly has (ever) been (before); but I am not in want of a remedy, and I console myself greatly with the comforting thought that I am free from that delusion, by which most men are tormented on the death of their friends. I believe that no ill has befallen Scipio, (and) it has befallen me, if it is befallen anyone; but to be gravely distressed by one's own misfortunes is (the mark of a man) who loves not his friend but himself.    

(11) But in his case who would deny that his (life) had gone wonderfully well? For, unless he chose to desire immortality, (something) which he thought about very little, what did he not obtain which it was proper for a man to wish for? The very high expectations of the citizens, which they had had of him when he was still a boy, he exceeded at once in his youth through his incredible merit, (and, although) he never sought the consulship, he was twice elected consul, on the first occasion before his time, and on the second occasion at the right for him but almost too late for the commonwealth, and, by overthrowing the two cities that were most hostile to our empire (i.e. Carthage in 146 B.C. and Numantia in 133 B.C.), he not only put an end to wars in the present, but also in the future. Why should I speak of his good-natured character, of his devotion to his mother (i.e. Papiria, whom his father Paullus had divorced), of his generosity to his sisters (i.e. the Aemiliae), of his kindness to his (relatives) (i.e. including his elder brother, Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, consul 145 B.C.), (and) of his integrity towards all (men)? And how dear he was to the state was demonstrated by the grief at his funeral. So how could the addition of a few (more) years have helped him? For, although old age may not be a burden, as I remember Cato argued (in a discussion) with me and with Scipio in the year before he died, yet it does take away from that vigour which Scipio had kept even then.    

(12) Therefore, his life was really so good that nothing could be added (to it) either by good fortune or fame, and the suddenness (of his death) took away any consciousness of dying; as to what (was) the nature of his death, it is difficult to speak; you know what people suspect (i.e. that he had been murdered by friends of the Gracchi, because he had been opposing Carbo and the work of the Land Commission); yet this I may say in truth, that, with regard to Publius Scipio, that of the many days, which he saw in (the course of) his life as being the most celebrated and the most joyous, the most brilliant was that (last) day, the day before the one on which he departed from this life, when, the senate having been dismissed, he was escorted to his home towards evening by the conscript fathers, the people of Rome, the allies and the Latins, so that from so lofty a station of (human) grandeur he seems to have passed to the gods above rather than to the (shades) beneath.    

(13) 4. For I do not agree with those who have recently begun to put forward the (view) that our souls perish together with our bodies, and that everything is destroyed by death. The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, whether (it is that) of our ancestors who bestowed religious rites on the dead, which they surely would not have done if they had thought that nothing concerned them (any more), or (it is that) of those (i.e. the Pythagoreans) who lived in this land and, by their principles and precepts, brought culture to Great Greece (i.e. Southern Italy), or (it is that) of him who was declared by the oracle of Apollo (to be) the wisest (of men) (i.e. Socrates), (he) who, (in this case, did) not (argue) now on this side and then on the other, as (he did) in most (debates), but always the same, that the souls of men are divine, and that, when they have departed from the body, a return to heaven is open to them, and that (it would happen) most promptly to the man (who was) most decent and most just.     

(14) This same (view) seemed right to Scipio, who must indeed have had a presentiment, only a few days before his death, when Philus (i.e. Lucius Furius Philus, consul 136 B.C.) and Manilius (i.e. Manius Manilius, consul 149 B.C.) and several others were present, and you too, Scaevola, had come with me, (when) he spoke for three days on (the state of) the republic; and almost (all of) the conclusion of his argument was concerned with the immortality of souls, (something) which he said he had heard from Africanus (i.e. Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus the Elder, consul 205 and 194 B.C.) by means of a vision in his sleep. If it is the case that the soul of every excellent (man) should rise up most easily in death from what may be called the custody and fetters of the body, of whom can we think as having an easier journey to the gods than Scipio? Therefore, I fear that it would be more (a sign) of envy than of friendship to grieve at such a fate as his. But, if the truth (is) rather that the death of souls and of bodies occurs at the same time, and no sensation at all remains, (then it follows that), as there is nothing good in death, so there is certainly nothing evil; for, once sensation has been lost, the situation is the same as if one had never been born, and yet (the fact) that he was born is a source of joy to us, and this state of ours will rejoice (at it) as long as it shall exist. 

(15) So, it has indeed gone very well for him, as I have said before, (but) not so well with me, and, as I had entered (this world) before (he did), so it would have been fairer if I had departed from this life before (him). But yet I find such enjoyment in the recollection of our friendship, that I seem to have spent a happy life, because I have lived (it) with Scipio, with whom I shared concerns about public and private business, and with whom I shared a home and common military service, and that thing, wherein lies the whole essence of friendship, complete agreement in our tastes, pursuits and opinions. And so, that reputation of mine for wisdom, which Fannius has just now mentioned, does not delight me, especially as (it is) false, as much as I hope that the memory of our friendship will be ever-enduring, and this (thought) is (all) the more pleasing to me, because through all periods of time scarcely three or four pairs of friends are on record (i.e. Theseus & Pirithous; Achilles & Patroclus; Orestes & Pylades; and Damon & Phintias); and among this category I venture to hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.   

FANNIUS: Of course, that must be so, Laelius. But, since you have made mention of (the word) friendship, and we are at our leisure, you would be doing me a very great kindness, and Scaevola too, I expect, if (you would do) as you are accustomed (to do) when (people) ask questions of you on other subjects, (and) so  discuss (with us) what you think about friendship, what you consider (is) its nature, (and) what rules you would give (it).  

 SCAEVOLA: It certainly would be pleasing to me; and in fact Fannius has anticipated (me), since I was seeking to make this very (request) of you. So you would be doing both of us a very great favour. 

(17) 5. LAELIUS: I should certainly have no objections, if I felt confidence in myself; for the subject is a noble (one), and we are, as Fannius has said, at our leisure. But who am I? Or what skill do I have?That is a job for philosophers, and one for Greeks, that of arguing on any subject, even if it may be put to them suddenly. This is a difficult task, and one that requires no little practice. Therefore, (for a discussion of everything) that can be said on the subject of friendship, I advise you to seek (it) from those who profess these (skills); I can only urge you to put friendship before all (other) human issues; for there is nothing (that is) so well suited to our nature, or so appropriate to our fortunes, whether favourable or adverse.

(18) But this I do feel first of all, that friendship cannot exist unless (it occurs) among good (men); nor do I cut it to the quick (i.e. go into the matter too deeply), like those who discuss these (things) more accurately, (and) perhaps correctly, but with too little (consideration) of the common benefit; for they (i.e. the Greek philosophers) say that no one is a good man unless (he is) wise. This may be so, to be sure, but they understand wisdom (to be) something such as no mortal man has yet attained, but we should look at these (things) as they are in the experience of everyday life, not (as) things that are imagined or longed for. I could never say that Gaius Fabricius (Luscinus) (i.e. consul 282 and 278 B.C.), Manius Curius (Dentatus) (i.e. consul 290, 275 and 274 B.C.), (and) Tiberius Coruncanius (i.e. consul 280 B.C. and the first plebeian Pontifex Maximus 254 B.C.), whom our ancestors considered wise, were wise in accordance with that standard of theirs. So, let them keep the name of wisdom to themselves, invidious and unintelligible (as it is); (but) let them grant that they were good men. They will not do it though; they will say that this cannot be granted except in the case of a wise (man).  

(19) Therefore, let us proceed, dull-witted (as we are), as the saying goes, Minerva (i.e. the goddess of wisdom). (Those) who behave in such a way (and) live in such a way as to give proof of their loyalty, integrity, (sense of) fairness, and generosity, and in whom there is no greed, lust or audacity, but they do have great strength of character, like the ones whom I have just mentioned, let us consider such men as good, just as they were thought (to be), and thus they also deserve to be called (good), because they follow nature, in as far as men can, (as) the best guide to good living. 

For thus I think it is clear to me that we were created in such a way that there was a certain (sense of) fellowship between (us) all, but (this tie became) greater as each of us came closest (to another). And so fellow-citizens (are considered) better than foreigners, (and) neighbours (better) than strangers; for with them nature herself has engendered friendship; but it does not have enough strength. For friendship exceeds (any other) relationship in this (respect), in that goodwill can be removed from a relationship, while from friendship it cannot be; for if goodwill is removed, the name of friendship is gone, (whereas if you remove it from a relationship, the name) of relationship remains.  

(20) Yet, how great (is) the strength of friendship can best be understood from the (fact) that from the infinite ties of the human race, which nature herself has brought together, this bond is so restricted and confined to (so) narrow (a sphere), that all affection is shared either between two (persons) or between (just) a few. 

6. For friendship is nothing other than a (complete) accord about all things, divine and human, (joined) with goodwill and affection; (and) indeed I do not know of anything at all better than this (which) has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, some good health, some power, some public honours, (and) many even (prefer) sensual pleasures. The last of these (is the preference) of the beasts, it is true, but the previous (ones are) fleeting and uncertain, dependent not so much upon our judgment as upon the fickleness of fortune. Now (there are those) who place the highest good in virtue, (and) their (view is) a noble (one) indeed, but this virtue of theirs both begets and comprises friendship, nor without virtue can there be friendship in any way. 

(21) Now, let us explain (the word) 'virtue' according to the usage of our (everyday) life and speech, and let us not define it in a lofty (style) of words, as certain learned (men may do), and let us count, among those who are regarded as good, (men such as) Paullus, Cato, Galus, Scipio, (and) Philus; the ordinary standards of life are satisfied by them; but let us forget those who are not found anywhere at all (i.e. the ideally perfect men of the Stoics). 

(22) Therefore, among men such as these friendship offers benefits that are so great that I am scarcely able to  describe (them). First of all, how can life be 'the life worth living', as Ennius says (it is), if it does not depend on the mutual goodwill of a friend? What (is) sweeter than to have (someone) with whom you may venture to discuss everything in such a way as (you would) with yourself? How could your enjoyment during prosperous times be so great, if you did not have (someone) who delighted in these (things) as much as you? Adversity would indeed be hard to bear without someone who would have to bear such (things) with even more hardship than you. In short, (all) other things which tend (to be) useful are in each and every case directed almost (entirely) towards particular things: riches, so you can spend (them); power, so you can be cherished; public offices, so you can be praised; sensual pleasures, so you can experience delight; good health, so you can be free from pain and engage (fully) in bodily functions; friendship comprises very many things; wherever you turn yourself, it is there by your side, it is never out of place, it is never untimely, never irksome; and so we do not make use of fire and water, as they say (i.e. proverbially speaking, fire and water are the prime necessities of life), on more occasions than (we do) friendship. I am not now speaking of ordinary or commonplace (friendship), which itself still brings delights and benefits, but of the true and faultless (kind), such as was the case of those few who are famous. For friendship makes prosperous (circumstances) even brighter and adverse (ones) less heavy (by) sharing and participating in (them). 

(23) 7. Since friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, it undoubtedly also surpasses these (things) in every way, in that it projects the bright light of good hope into the future, and it does not allow our spirits to be weakened or to fail. For (he,) who looks upon a true friend, looks upon some sort of image of himself. Therefore, though they are absent, they are there; and, though they are in need, they are in abundance; and, though they are weak, they are strong; and - (this is something) which it is harder to say - , though they are dead, they are alive; so great (is) the esteem, the memory, and the longing on the part of their friends that attends them. From this, the death of the former (i.e. the departed) seems fortunate, (and) the life of the latter (i.e. the survivors) (seems) praiseworthy. But, if you were to remove the bond of goodwill from our natural circumstances, no house nor any city could stand, nor would the cultivation of the land even continue. If that (statement) is not clear, how great is the power of friendship and concord can be understood from (the results) of quarrels and disagreements. For what house is so steadfast, what state is so strong, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by animosities and dissensions? From this it can be judged how great is the goodness in friendship.   

(24) At any rate, they say that a certain learned man from Agrigentum (i.e. Empedocles) foretold in Greek verses that, in relation to natural matters and the whole of the universe, those (things) which were to remain constant bring about friendship, whereas those (things) which were in a state of flux spread discord. And, indeed, all men both understand this (statement) and attest (to it) from their own experience. And so, if, when some service in incurring or participating in the risks of a friend has come to light, is there anyone who does not spread the news (of it) abroad with the loudest praise?  What loud cheers recently (filled) the whole theatre during the new play of my guest and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, with the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes, Pylades declared himself to be Orestes, so that he might be slain instead of him, but Orestes kept on asserting that he was Orestes, as was in fact the case. Getting to their feet, they applauded in response to this fictional incident; what do we think they would have done in real (life)? Nature herself easily showed her own power, since men were judging, in relation to someone else, that something had been well done which they could not do themselves. 

Thus far, I think I have been able to say what I feel about friendship; if there are things (to be said) in addition - and I believe there are many (things) - inquire, if it should seem right (to you), from those who examine these (things in detail). 

(25) FANNIUS: But we (would) rather (inquire) of you; and yet I have often sought (answers) from such (men), and, indeed, I have listened to them not unwillingly; but the thread of your discourse (is) of a different (texture). 

SCAEVOLA: Now, you would stress this (point) even more, Fannius, if you had been present in Scipio's pleasure-gardens recently, when there was a discussion about (the state of) the republic. What a splendid patron of justice he was when opposed to that elaborate speech of Philus! 

FANNIUS: It was easy indeed for the most just man to stand up for justice. 

SCAEVOLA: Well then, (would it) not (be) easy (to speak of) friendship for the man who has gained the highest glory on account of his having preserved it with the utmost fidelity, constancy and (sense of) justice? 

(26) 8. LAELIUS: Now indeed it is force that you are using; for what difference does it make by what means you force me? (for) forcing (me) you certainly are. For it is hard, nor is it even fair, to withstand the representations of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good cause. So, if I very often think about friendship a lot, it is customary for me to think that consideration should be given to this (question), whether friendship is being sought as a result of weakness and want, so that, by the giving and receiving of favours, one may obtain from another, and in turn repay, what one could not (get) by oneself, or whether it should have another cause, peculiar to friendship to be sure, but older, and more beautiful, and emanating rather from nature herself. For love, from which (the word) 'friendship' is derived, is the chief (agent) in the union of mutual affection. For material benefits, it is true, are courted by the appearance of friendship, and honoured to suit the occasion; yet, with regard to friendship, nothing is false, nothing (is)  pretended, and, whatever there is, it is true and genuine. 

(27) Therefore, friendship seems to me to spring from nature rather than from need, and more from an inclination of the soul, (joined) with a certain feeling of love, than from any calculation of how much material benefit this feeling was likely to bring. Yet what sort of (thing) this is can be understood even in the case of certain wild creatures, which, up to a certain age, so love those born to them, and are so loved by them, that their feelings are readily apparent. (But) this is much more obvious in man, firstly from the affection which exists between children and their parents, which cannot be destroyed, except by some outrageous crime; and secondly, when some similar feeling of love arises, if we have come upon someone with whose habits and character we correspond, because in him we seem to see, as it were, a kind of lamp of uprightness and virtue. 

(28) For there is nothing more lovable than virtue, nothing that more attracts (us) to loving (someone), since in fact, on account of their virtue and integrity we even love in some way those whom we have never seen. Is there anyone who does not dwell upon the memory of Gaius Fabricius, (and) Manius Curius, whom he never saw, with some kindly affection? On the other hand, is there anyone, who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus (i.e. the seventh and last king of Rome, 534-510 B.C.), and Spurius Cassius (Vecellinus) (i.e. consul 502, 493, 486 B.C. and executed in 485 B.C. for seeking to make himself king), (and) Spurius Maelius (i.e. executed in 439 B.C. also for seeking to make himself king)? With two generals we fought it out for power in Italy, Pyrrhus and Hannibal; for the former, on account of his probity, we entertain no very hostile feelings, (whereas) this state has always hated the latter on account of his cruelty.     

(29) 9. But, if the force of probity is so great that we love it, whether (it is) in those whom we have never seen, or, (something) which is more (remarkable), even in an enemy, what a wonder it is, if men's souls are stirred, when they think they see the virtue and goodness of those with whom they can be joined together in service. And yet, love is strengthened by the receipt of a kindly service, and by the evidence of concern, and a closer familiarity, and when things are added to that first impulse of the soul to love, there springs up a certain marvellous greatness of goodwill. If they think that it stems from (a sense of) weakness, so that each of us may have (someone) through whom he may obtain what he lacks, they undoubtedly bequeath to friendship a humble and far from noble origin, so to speak, and they would (make) her the daughter of poverty and want. If this were so, (then) a man might consider that, just as his own resources were very small, so he was well suited to friendship; but (the truth) is very different. 

(30) (To the extent) that a man relies mainly on himself, and that he is so greatly fortified by his virtue and wisdom, that he needs no one else, and he considers that all his (possessions) are placed within himself, so he especially excels in seeking out and cherishing friendship. For what (reason)? (Did) Africanus (have) any need of me? None at all, by Hercules! And I assuredly (had) no (need) of him; but I (did have) a certain admiration for his virtue, (and) he in turn loved me, perhaps because of the quite strong opinion he had of my character; (and) our close association increased our mutual affection. But, although many great material advantages did ensue, still the reasons for our love did not stem from the expectation of these. 

(31) For just as we are generous and liberal, not so as to extract gratitude - for we do not trade in kindness, but are disposed to generosity by nature - , so we believe that friendship should be sought after, not because we are induced by the hope of a fee, but because its whole reward is in the love itself. 

(32) From these (views), (those) who, after the manner of cattle, ascribe everything to pleasure, totally dissent, nor (is that) surprising; for they can regard nothing (as) lofty, nothing (as) noble and divine, who have abased their every thought to something so lowly and so mean. Therefore, let us now remove these (men) from our conversation, but let us ourselves believe that the feeling of love and the affection of goodwill arise from nature, when the indication of probity has been given. (Those) who have desired it may attach themselves (to it) and move closer (to it), so that in the service of him, whom they have begun to love, they may enjoy his character and be his equal partners in affection, and be more inclined to do (him) a good service than to demand repayment, and that there should be this noble rivalry between them. Thus, the greatest benefits will be obtained from friendship, and its origin, (being derived) from nature rather than from weakness, will be more dignified and consistent with the truth. For, if material advantage glues together friendships, the same (thing), being utterly changed, would dissolve (them); but, since nature cannot be changed, so genuine friendships are eternal. 

So now you know the origin of friendship, unless, perhaps, you wish (to add) something to these (remarks).  

FANNIUS: Please, do go on, Laelius;  for I am responding, as is my right, on behalf of him who is junior to me in age.  

(33) SCAEVOLA: Indeed, you (speak) well. Therefore, let us listen. 

10. LAELIUS: Then, listen, you very best of gentlemen, to those (things) which were very frequently said between Scipio and me on the subject of friendship. And yet he indeed used to say that nothing was harder than for a friendship to continue right up to the very last day of one's life. For it often happened that (a friendship) was not mutually expedient, or that their political views were not the same; it was often said too that the characters of the men were changed, sometimes by adverse circumstances, and sometimes by the increasing burdens of old age. And then he used to take an example of these points from an analogy of early life, in that the most ardent attachments of boyhood were often laid aside together with the boyhood toga.

(34) But even if they have (managed to) prolong (a friendship) to the time of manhood, yet it is sometimes destroyed by rivalry, either in relation to a contract of marriage or some other opportunity, which both of them could not attain at the same time. But, even if they should continue in friendship for longer, yet it is often destroyed, should they clash in the struggle for office; for, (while) in the case of most (men) there is no greater bane to friendships than the desire for money, in the case of the most worthy (men) (it is) the strife for honour and glory, and from this (cause) the greatest enmities have arisen between the closest of friends. 

(35) Very serious disagreements, and generally justifiable (ones), also arise, when something should be demanded from friends which was not right, as (for example) to be agents of vice or abettors in (inflicting) a wrong; but, when they should refuse, although they may have done it for honourable reasons, yet it may be claimed by those whom they were unwilling to indulge that the duty of friendship has been disregarded. But those who venture to demand anything you like from a friend, by that very demand profess that they will do all (things) for the sake of a friend. By their long-standing complaint not only are social intimacies usually destroyed, but never-ending enmities are also produced. So many (dangers) of this kind, he would say, hover like (evil) fates over friendships that it seems to him that (it is a sign) not only of wisdom but also of good fortune to escape (them) all. 

(36) 11. Therefore, let us first consider this, if you please, how far should love go in friendship? Now, if Coriolanus (i.e. Gnaeus Marcius Coriolanus, who led a Volscian army against the city of Rome in 491 B.C.) had friends, surely they should not have borne arms against their country together with Coriolanus? In the case of Vecillinus, (or) in the case of Maelius, surely their friends should not have assisted (them) to gain the throne? 

(37) Now we saw Tiberius (Sempronius) Gracchus (i.e. tribune of the plebs 133 B.C.) utterly deserted by Quintus (Aelius) Tubero (i.e. nephew of Scipio Africanus the Younger, and a Stoic philosopher, and also tribune of the plebs in 133 B.C.) and the friends of his own age, when he began to disrupt the republic. And yet, when Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a guest-friend of your family, Scaevola, had come to me to plead for leniency, because I was present to advise the consuls, (Publius Popillius) Laenas and (Publius) Rupilius (i.e. the two consuls in 132 B.C.), he offered this (as) a reason that I might pardon him, (the fact) that he had thought so highly of Tiberius Gracchus that he thought he should do whatever he wanted. Then I (asked): "Even if he should have wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" "He would never have wanted that of course," he said; "but if he had wanted (it), I should have obeyed." You see what a wicked remark (that was)! And by god, he did just what he said (he would do), or even more; for he did not comply with the temerity of Tiberius Gracchus, but he directed (it), nor did he offer himself as a companion of his fury, but as its leader. And so, terrified by the special commission (set up to look) into this madness, he fled to Asia (i.e. in 132 B.C.), and joined himself to our enemies (i.e. Aristonicus, the pretender to the throne of Pergamon under the name of Eumenes III), and he paid a heavy and just price (for his crimes) against the republic (i.e. he committed suicide in 130 B.C. on the downfall of Aristonicus). Therefore, it is no excuse for sinning, if you have sinned for the sake of a friend; for, since his belief in your virtue had been the source of your friendship, it is difficult for that friendship to continue, if you have forsaken your virtue.  

(38) But, if we should decide that (it is) right either to grant our friends whatever they wish, or to get from them whatever we wish, if we are (endowed) with perfect wisdom, (then) no harm would result, but I am speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we see, or of whom we have kept a record, (and) of whom everyday life is aware. Our examples should be taken from this category, and chiefly, I grant you, from those who come nearest to wisdom. 

(39) We see that (Quintus) Aemilius Papus was a close friend of (Gaius Fabricius) Luscinus - so we have learned from our forefathers - , that they were twice consuls together (i.e. in 282 and 278 B.C.) and colleagues in the censorship (i.e. in 275 B.C.); then it is stated on the record that Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius were most closely associated with them and with each other. So, we certainly cannot suspect anyone of these (men) of soliciting anything from a friend which was contrary to his (good) faith, contrary to his sworn oath, and against (the interests of) the republic. For what indeed is the point of saying, in the case of such men that he would not have secured his (request), (even) if he had asked for (it), seeing that they were the purest of men, and (to them) it would have been equally wrong both to have asked for such a thing and to have met the request? But Gaius (Papirius) Carbo (i.e. consul 120 B.C.) (and) Gaius (Porcius) Cato (i.e. consul 118 B.C.) were followers of Tiberius Gracchus, and his brother Gaius (Sempronius Gracchus) (i.e. tribune of the plebs in 123 and 122 B.C.), then less (keen) to be sure, (is) now most enthusiastically so.  

(40) 12. So, let this rule be set up with regard to friendship. that we should neither ask for dishonourable things, nor do (them) if asked. For it is a shameful excuse, and a totally dishonourable (one), both with regard to sins in general and (those) contrary to (the interests of) the state, if anyone should plead that he had acted for the sake of a friend. For, Fannius and Scaevola, we are now placed in such a position that we should keep a sharp look-out for the future troubles of the republic. Our (political) practice has already departed somewhat from the track and course of our ancestors.   

(41) Tiberius Gracchus tried to occupy the throne, or he did in fact reign for a few months. (Now,) the Roman people had never heard of, or experienced, anything like that (before), (had they)? What his friends and relatives who followed him, even after his death, have done to Publius Scipio (i.e. Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, consul 138 B.C. and Pontifex Maximus from 141 B.C., who led the attack on Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C., in which the latter was killed,  and the purge of his supporters that followed; in order to avoid his prosecution, he was sent by the senate on a mission to Pergamon where he died in 132 B.C.) I cannot speak of without tears. For, because of the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus, we have put up with Carbo (i.e. he was tribune of the plebs in 131 B.C., when he sponsored a law extending the secret ballot to the enactment and repeal of laws) in whatever way we could; but what I should expect with regard to the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus, I am not inclined to predict. From there the business creeps on; once it has begun, it slips downhill to disaster. You see how much mischief has already been caused before by the Gabinian law (i.e. the Lex Gabinia of 139 B.C., sponsored by the tribune Aulus Gabinius which introduced the secret ballot in elections to office), and two years later by the Cassian law (i.e. the Lex Cassia of 137 B.C., sponsored by the tribune Lucius Cassius Ravilla, which extended the use of secret ballots to juries in criminal trials). I now seem to see the people estranged from the senate, and the weightiest matters (of state) being determined by the judgment of the mob. For more (people) will learn how such things can be done, than how they may be resisted. 

(42) To what end (do I say) these (things)? (It is) because without associates no one attempts any such thing. Therefore, it must be enjoined upon good men (i.e 'optimates' or members of the aristocratic party) that, if by some chance they should fall unawares into friendships of this kind, they should not think themselves so bound in obligation that they cannot separate themselves from friends who are sinning in some important public matter; for wicked (men), on the other hand, a penalty must be enacted, nor assuredly (will it be) lighter for those who have been following another than for those who have themselves been leaders in treason. Who was more renowned in Greece than Themistocles, who more powerful? (But,) when he (as) their general had saved Greece from servitude in the war with Persia, and had been banished into exile on account of his unpopularity, he would not submit to the injustice of an ungrateful country, as he was required to do, (and) he did the same thing as Coriolanus had done among our (people) twenty years previously (i.e. he joined the Persians in 470 B.C.). No one was found to assist these (men) against their country; so each of them took his own life. 

(43) So, such an alliance of wicked (men) not only should not be protected by the plea of friendship, but rather it should be punished by every form of suffering, so that no one should think (it) permissible to follow even a friend when he is waging war against his country; and yet, as things are beginning to go, (this is something) which is likely to happen at some unknown time in the future. As for me, I am no less concerned about what (the state of) the republic will be after my death than about what is (its state) today. 

(44) 13. So, let this be decreed as the first rule of friendship, that we should ask from our friends (only) honourable (things), (and) that we should (only) do (things) for our friends for an honourable reason, nor should we even wait (to do them) until we are asked; let zeal be ever present, (and) let hesitation be absent; indeed, let us venture to give advice in a frank manner. In friendship, let the influence of those who give good advice mainly prevail, and let it be employed in advising not only clearly, but even sternly, when the occasion should require (it), and let it be followed once it has been sought. 

(45) For in the case of certain (men), whom I hear are regarded as sages in Greece, some views which I believe to be wonderful are held (by them) - but there is nothing which these (men) do not pursue with their subtle arguments; some (of these men teach) that too much (intimacy in) friendships should be avoided, lest it should be necessary for one (man) to endure the anxieties of several; each one of us has enough business of his own, and some to spare, (and) it is annoying to be too much involved in (the affairs of) others; that it is best to hold the reins of friendship as lightly as possible, and that we may draw (them) or slacken (them) at will; for (they say) that (a feeling of) security is essential for living happily, and this the soul cannot enjoy, if one (man) is, as it were, in travail on behalf of many. 

(46) Now. I am told that other (men) (i.e. the Epicureans and their precursor Aristippus of Cyrene) say in an even more heartless fashion - I touched briefly on this point a little earlier - that friendships should be sought after for the sake of the help and support (they bring), not out of goodwill and affection; this would mean that whoever should have the least strength and the least energy would strive most greatly for friendships as a result; from this it should happen that little women would seek the protection of friendships more than men, and the poor (more) than the rich, and the unfortunate (more) than those who are considered blessed. 

(47) O (what) a splendid philosophy! For they seem to be taking the sun out of the universe, (when) they remove friendship from life, and we have (received) nothing better, nothing more delightful from the immortal gods than that. For what is that (sense of) security of theirs? In appearance it is indeed an alluring (thing), but in reality on many occasions it should be rejected. For it is not appropriate not to undertake any honourable business or duty, or to set it aside once it has been undertaken, lest you should become anxious. But, if you flee from care, virtue must also be shunned, (something) which inevitably causes some concern when it rejects and despises things (that are) contrary to itself; so kindness (rejects) ill-will, temperance lust, (and) bravery cowardice; and so you can see that (it is) the just (who) are most pained at things (that are) unjust, the brave at (things that are) unwarlike, and the self-restrained at (things that are) licentious. So, it is characteristic of the well-ordered mind both to rejoice at good deeds and to feel pain at (things that are) contrary (to them). 

(48) Therefore, if pain of mind befalls a wise (man), which it certainly does, unless we suppose that (all) human feeling has been rooted out of his mind, what is the reason why we should remove friendship entirely from our life, in order that we should not receive any worries on account of it? For, when emotion is removed from the mind, what is the difference, I do nor say between a man and a beast, but between a man and a block of wood, or a stone, or anything of such a kind? For those (men) (i.e. the Stoics) should not be listened to, who would have it that virtue is something hard like iron; as with many (things in life), but especially with regard to friendship, it is in fact something yielding and pliable, so that it expands, as it were, with a friend's prosperity, and shrinks (in sympathy) with his difficulties. For this reason, that anguish (of mind) which is (so) often felt on a friend's account is not so great as to banish friendship from life, any more than that the virtues should be dispensed with because they involve some cares and worries. 

14. But, since (virtue) would knit friendship together, as I have said before, if some mark of virtue should shine forth from it, to which a similar spirit should join and attach itself, (then) when that happens, love must spring forth.   

(49) For (is there) anything so absurd as to be delighted by many empty (things), such as public office, fame, stately buildings, (and) dress and adornment of the body, (and) to take no delight at all in an animate (being) being endowed with virtue, (and) in one who was capable of loving, or, as I may so put it, of loving in return? For there is nothing more pleasurable than the return of goodwill and the interchange of zealous services.   

(50) But what if I also add something which may fairly be added, that there is nothing that so draws and attracts anything to itself as likeness (does) to friendship? It will surely be accepted as true that good (men) love and attach (other) good (men) to themselves, as if (they were) joined together by family relationship and nature. For there is nothing more eager and more greedy than nature for (things that are) similar to itself. Therefore, for this very (reason), Fannius and Scaevola, it should be evident, in my opinion, that between good (men) (there is), as if (it were) a necessity, a kindly feeling for (other) good (men), which has been constituted by nature as the fountain of friendship. But this same goodness also applies to the majority of men. For this is not an unfeeling virtue or a selfish and exclusive (one), but she is even accustomed to protect whole nations and to plan the best measures for their (welfare); (this is something) which she certainly would not do, if she shrank from the affection of the common people.    

(51) And, in fact, it also seems to me that (those) who form friendships for the sake of material advantage (i.e. the Epicureans or Cyrenaics) remove the most attractive link from (the chain of) friendship. For (it is) not so much the material gain procured through a friend, as (it is) the very love of a friend that delights, and then that which is advanced by a friend (only) becomes pleasurable, if it is advanced with zeal; and, it is so far from (the truth) that friendships are cherished on account of need, that those who (are endowed) with wealth and resources, and especially with virtue, in which lies (a man's) best means of support, are least in need of another's (help, and) are most generous and most given to acts of kindness. And yet I am not inclined to think that there is no a need for friends ever to be lacking anything at all. For how (else) would my zeal have shown itself, if Scipio had never been in need of my advice or my assistance, either at home or abroad? So, friendship does not follow material advantage, bur material advantage (follows) friendship.  

(52) 15. So, these men, wallowing in pleasures (as they do), ought not to be listened to, whenever they argue about friendship, which they have no understanding of, either in theory or in practice. For who is there, in the name of the gods and of men! who would wish to be surrounded by every kind of wealth and to live amid an abundance of everything, on condition that he should love nobody, and that he himself should be loved by no one? For such is the life of tyrants, in which there can undoubtedly be no loyalty, no affection, no assurance of continuing goodwill, (and where) all (things) always arouse suspicion and anxiety, (and there is) no place for friendship. 

(53) For who loves either the (man) whom he fears or the (man) by whom he believes himself to be feared? Yet (tyrants) are courted, but only for a time. But, if by chance they have fallen (from power), as generally happens, then it is perceived how in need of friends they were. It is said that Tarquin said this at the time when he was going into exile, that he had (only) learned which of his friends had been faithful (and) which unfaithful, when he could no longer pay either of them back.    

(54) And yet, such was his pride and ill-nature, that I wonder if he could have had anyone (as) a friend. And now, just as I have said that his character could not procure (him) any true friends, so the wealth of many very powerful (men) excludes (them from) faithful friendships. For not only is Fortune blind herself, but she usually even makes blind those whom she has embraced; and so they are carried away by wanton pride and obstinacy, nor can anything be more insufferable than a well-off fool. And indeed for this (reason) we may see that those who were previously obliging in their behaviour are (so) changed by rule, by power, (and) by prosperous circumstances, that old friendships are scorned by them, and they indulge themselves in new (ones). 

(55) But what (is) more foolish, when (men) can have a multitude of facilities, resources, and possessions, than to procure the other (things) that money provides - horses, slaves, splendid raiment, (and) costly plates, (and) not procure friends, (which,) if I may say so, (are) life's best and fairest utensil? And in fact, while they are procuring these other (things), they do not know for whom they are procuring (them), nor for whose sake they toil - for whichever of these (things it is), it is (the possession) of a (man) who has prevailed through his strength - and in the case of each man his tenure of friendships remains settled and sure, so that, even if those (things) which are, as it were, the gifts of Fortune, do continue, yet a life, uncultivated and uninhabited by friends, could not be a pleasant (one). But so much (then) for these (things).  

(56) 16. Now, there is a need to determine, with regard to friendship, what are the limits and the boundary lines, as it were, of affection. On these, I observe that three views are brought forward, none of which I approve: the first, that we should be disposed towards a friend in the same way as we are (disposed) towards ourselves; the second, that our goodwill in relation to our friends should correspond equally and in all respects with their goodwill towards us; (and) the third, that, whatever (value) a man attaches to himself, the same (value) should be attached (towards him) by his friends. 

(57) I do not agree at all with any of these three views. For the first of these, that the way in which a man feels towards himself, so he should feel towards a friend, is untrue. For how many (things) we do for our friends that we should never do for ourselves! We beg and entreat an unworthy (man), (and) then inveigh against another too sharply, and criticise (him) too loudly, (but these things) which would scarcely be considered acceptable in relation to our own affairs become most respectable with regard (to those) of our friends; and there are many circumstances, in which good men forgo, and allow (themselves) to be deprived of their own advantages, so that their friends may enjoy them rather than themselves.  

(58) The second view is (one) which limits friendship to an equal (exchange of) services and attitudes. It is surely to subject friendship to too slight and feeble a reckoning that there should be an equal measure of debtors and creditors. It seems to me that true friendship is richer and more affluent (than that), and it should not be (so) strictly on guard lest it should pay out more than it has received; for there should be no fear that something may be lost, or that something may flow down on to the ground, or that something more (than is) due should be required of friendship. 

(59) But that third boundary line (is) the worst (one), (namely) that whatever (value) a man attaches to himself, the same (value) should be attached (to him) by his friends. For in the case of certain (men) either the spirit is often too dejected, or the hope of bettering their fortune (is) too faint. Therefore, it is not (the mark) of a friend to have the same view of a man as he has of himself, but rather to bring it about that he should raise his friend's drooping spirit and that he should induce in (him) a more optimistic frame of mind. So, some other boundary line of true friendship must be fixed, when I have first stated (a view) which Scipio used to condemn in the strongest terms. He used to say that no utterance could be more inimical to friendship than (that) of the man who had said that we should so love (people) as if at some time we were going to hate (them);  nor, indeed, could he be induced to believe, as used to be thought, that it had been stated by Bias (i.e. Bias of Priene, a man famous for the justice of his verdicts), who had been regarded as one of the Seven Sages; (but he thought) it was the opinion of some vile, or scheming (man), or (one) who related everything to his own power. For how on earth could anyone be a friend when he is going to think that he could be his enemy? Now it will also be necessary (for him) to desire and pray that his friend should sin as often as possible, and thereby give him the more handles to seize hold of; then again, he will have to feel distress, pain, (and) envy at the good deeds and good fortune of his friends. 

(60) Therefore, this maxim, whomsoever it comes from, has the power to destroy friendship; it should rather be understood beforehand that we should exercise such care in forming friendships that we should never begin to love anyone whom we might some day come to hate. Now, Scipio thought that, even if we had been unfortunate in our choice, we should endure it rather than planning an opportunity for hostile behaviour.  

(61) 17. So these (are) the limits (which) I think ought to be observed, (namely) that, when the characters of friends are faultless, then there should be a complete harmony of opinions and inclinations about everything between them without any exception, so that, even if it happens by chance that some not entirely proper wishes of one's friends are in need of our assistance, (and that) in relation to these their lives and reputations are at stake, there must be some deflection from the (straight) path, so long as no extreme disgrace should follow; for there is a limit to the indulgence which can be given to friendship. Nor indeed should one's reputation be neglected, nor ought one to consider the goodwill of one's fellow-citizens a poor weapon in managing one's affairs; how shameful it is to acquire (it) by charming words and flattery; virtue, which esteem accompanies, ought by no means to be disregarded.  

(62) But - for I frequently return to Scipio, whose every conversation was on the subject of friendship -  he used to complain that men were more careful in relation to everything else (other than friendship); everyone could tell how many goats and sheep he had, (but) could not say how many friends he had, and that (men) certainly took care in acquiring the former, (but) were indifferent with regard to the choice of their friends, and had no certain signs and marks, by which they might judge those who were suitable for friendships. So, (those who are) firm, and steady, and constant ought to be chosen, (but) there is a great dearth (of men) of this kind. And it is very difficult to come to a decision without a trial, but the trial must be in relation to friendship itself. So, friendship precedes such a judgment and removes the opportunity for a trial. 

(63) Therefore, it is (a sign) of wisdom so to check the onrush of benevolence in its course, that we so manage friendship by putting the inclinations of our friends to the test in some way, as though we were testing horses. Some (men) often show in small money (transactions) how fickle they are, while others, when a trivial (sum) could not move (them), are found out in the case of a big (one). But, if any shall be found who think (it is) base to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not put public offices, magistracies, military commands (and) power before the requirements of friendship, so that, when the latter (things) are placed before (them) on one side, (and) the claims of friendship on the other, they do not much prefer the former? For (human) nature is (too) weak to despise power; and, even if (men) have attained it by disregarding friendship, they think (this) will be forgotten, because friendship was not disregarded without a very good reason.   

(64) And so, true friendships are very difficult to find among those who are engaged in offices and public business; for where can we find a man who puts the advancement of a friend above his own? Why, to say nothing of that, how painful (and) how hard does involvement in the disasters (of another) seem to most (men)? Nor is it easy to find (any) who would descend to such (depths for a friend). And yet Ennius (is) right (to say): "In a doubtful situation a sure friend is found" (i.e. A friend in need is a friend indeed). Yet, these two (things) expose most men (to charges) of fickleness and weakness: they either think little of (a friend) when they are in prosperous circumstances, or they desert (him when he is) in difficulties. So, whoever, in either situation, has shown himself staunch, immovable, (and) firm in friendship, we ought to consider him to belong to a very rare class of men, and an almost divine (one). 

(65) 18. Now, the foundation of that reliability and constancy that we look for in friendship is loyalty; for nothing is steadfast that is disloyal. Besides, it is right (for someone) to be chosen (who is) straightforward, and sociable, and sympathetic, that is someone who is influenced by the same things (as you), all of which apply to loyalty; for (a man's) nature cannot be trustworthy (when it is) complex and tortuous, nor indeed can (someone), who is not influenced by the same (things as you), and (who is not) in accord (with you) by nature, be either loyal or reliable. To this should be added that (a friend) should not take pleasure either in bringing criminal charges against (you) or believe (them when they have been) brought (by others), and all of these things apply to that constancy which I mentioned sometime before. So that truth which I stated at the beginning is established, that friendship cannot exist except among good (men). 

For it is (the mark) of a good man, whom I may call wise at the same time, to maintain these two (rules): first, let there not be any deception or pretence; for it is more honest even to have hated than to conceal one's (true) opinion behind a false facade; next, he should not only reject any charges brought against (his friend) by another; but let him not even be suspicious, always thinking that some damage has been done by his friend. 

(66) To this should be added that there ought (to be) some pleasantness in his conversation and manners, (and this is) by no means a minor spice to friendship, Now, a solemn and a serious (manner) with regard to everything does have a certain gravity about it, but friendship ought to be more indulgent, and more relaxed, and more agreeable, and more inclined to every sort of kindness and affability. 

(67) 19. Now, at this point a certain question of some little difficulty arises, should new friends, who are worthy of friendship, ever be preferred to old (ones), as we generally prefer young horses to poor old (ones). This doubt (is) unworthy of a human being! For there ought not to be any surfeits of friendships, as (there are) in other things; as in the case of wine, which requires age, the oldest one ought to be the sweetest; and that saying is a true (one), that many pecks of salt must be eaten together in order that the duty of friendship may be fulfilled.  

(68) But those new (friendships) should not in fact be rejected if they offer the hope that fruit should appear, as in the case of genuine blades of corn, but an old (friendship) must be kept in place; for the force of age and habit is very great. But, in the case of that horse, of which I have just made mention, if nothing should prevent (it), there is no one who would not rather use one to which he has become accustomed, rather than (one which is) untried and new. But not (only) in the case of a living creature, but also in relation to things that are inanimate, habit is strong, since we delight in those places (that are) even mountainous and overgrown, in which we have lived for quite a long time.

(69) But it is of the utmost importance in friendship that a superior should be in an equal (position) to an inferior. For often a certain pre-eminence does exist, as was the case with Scipio in our set, as I so call (it). He never put himself before Philus (i.e. Lucius Furius Philus, consul 136 B.C.), or Rupilius (i.e. Publius Rupilius, consul 132 B.C.) or Mummius (i.e. Lucius Mummius Achaicus, consul 146 B.C. when he suppressed the Achaean League and destroyed Corinth), or (any other) friends of a lower rank, and his brother, Quintus Maximus (i.e. Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, consul 145 B.C.) a distinguished man undoubtedly, but by no means his equal, he treated as his superior, because he preceded (him) in age, and he wished that all his (friends) could be enhanced (in dignity) through him. 

(70) This (course) should be adopted and imitated by everyone, so that, if they are endowed with any pre-eminence in virtue, intellect and (good) fortune, they may impart these to their (kin) and share (them) with their relatives, so that, if they were born to humble parents, (and,) if they have relatives weak both in mind and in fortune, they may increase the possessions of the former, and be the means of honour and dignity in the case of the latter. As in myths, (those) who have been in slavery for some time due to ignorance of their origin and family, when they are discovered and found (to be) the sons of gods or kings, yet they retain an affection for the shepherds, whom they considered to be their parents for many years. (And) surely this (feeling) ought to be much stronger in the case of real and undoubted parents. For the fruit of virtue and genius and of every (kind of) excellence is then developed to its greatest (extent) when it is conferred upon the one who is closest (to us). 

(71) 20. As, therefore, those, who are by necessity the superiors in any friendship and relationship, ought to put themselves on an equal footing with their inferiors, so their inferiors (ought) not to feel any distress that they are surpassed by them in intellect, fortune, or rank. Several of these are constantly uttering some complaints or even reproaches, and all the more (so), if they think that they have done (something) which they can call an act of duty and friendship, and involving themselves in some hard work. (It is) certainly a very disagreeable class of men who keep offering reproaches in relation to these services (of theirs); he, on whose behalf they were performed, ought to be mindful (of them), (but he) who undertook (them) should not mention (them).   

(72) As, therefore, those who are superior ought to lower themselves in friendship, so should they lift up their inferiors in some way. For there are some who render friendships difficult, when they think they have been slighted; this does not usually happen, except in the case of those who think they deserve to have been slighted; they ought to be relieved of this opinion not only by words but by action. 

(73) Now, in the first place, you must assign to  each (friend) as much (assistance) as you, yourself, can bring, and, secondly, as much as he, whom you love and are helping, (can) bear. For however much you excel, you cannot lead all your (friends) to the highest honours, as Scipio could when he made Publius Rupilius consul, (although) he could not (do so) in the case of his brother Lucius (Rupilius). But, even if you could bestow whatever you wish on another, you must still consider whether he can cope with (it). 

(74) As a general rule, friendships should be formed when (men) have grown strong and mature both in mind and in age, nor, if in their early years they were fond of hunting and ball games, should they regard as indispensable (intimates) those whom they loved at that time because they were endowed with the same interests.   For on that basis, our nurses and the slaves that took us to school will claim the largest (share) of our goodwill through the right of long-standing (acquaintance); they should certainly not be neglected, but valued in a different sort of way. (For) otherwise (i.e. when we are mature in mind and age), friendships cannot remain secure. For disparities of character are accompanied by disparities of taste, and (it is) the difference in these things (that) severs friendships, nor can good (men) not be friends with bad (men), or bad (men) with good (ones), for any other reason, but that the distance between them in character and tastes is as great as it possibly can be.

(75) It can also properly be laid down with regard to friendship that a certain immoderate (kind of) goodwill, which often does occur, should not hinder the important interests of one's friends. For, to return to legends in my case, Neoptolemus (i.e. the son of Achilles, also known as Pyrrhus) could never have captured Troy, if he were to have listened to Lycomedes (i.e. king of Scyros, and the father of Deidamia, Neoptolemus' mother), by whom he had been reared, who was seeking to prevent his journey with many tears. And important issues often arise, that make it necessary for friends to part; and he, who would hinder these (issues from being faced), because he cannot easily bear his regret (at his friend's departure), is both weak and effeminate, and, for this very reason, far from reasonable in his friendship.  

(76) And so, on every occasion, it is necessary (for you) to consider (carefully) both what you are going to demand from a friend, and what you shall allow to be obtained from you (by him). 

21. There is also a certain (kind of) disaster in the break-up of friendships (which is) sometimes inevitable; for our discussion will now sink from the intimacies of wise (men) to the ordinary (sort of) friendships. Often, the vices of friends burst out, sometimes on to the friends themselves, and sometimes on to strangers, but their infamy flows on to their friends. Therefore, such friendships should be loosened by a slackening of familiarity, and, as I have heard Cato say, they should be unravelled rather than torn apart, unless some unbearable wrongdoing has blazed forth in full measure, so that it would be neither proper nor decent, nor could it possibly happen, that a withdrawal and separation (of friendship) should not be effected at once.  

(77) But if, on the other hand, as usually happens, a certain change of disposition or of tastes should occur, or a difference in political views should have intervened - for I am talking now, as I said a little earlier, not of the friendships of wise (men) but of the ordinary (kind) - , care must be taken lest friendships should not only appear to have been set aside, but also enmities to have been aroused. For there is nothing more shameful than to wage war with one, with whom you have lived on intimate terms. Scipio had withdrawn himself from friendship with Quintus Pompeius (i.e. consul in 141 B.C.) on my account (i.e. he won election to the consulship by a trick, that is, he pretended not to be standing and therefore put Laelius off his guard), as you know; and on account of a disagreement, which was in relation to politics, he was estranged from my colleague Metellus (i.e. Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, consul 143 B.C., who resented the part played by Scipio in getting him passed over for the command in the campaign against the Achaean League in 146 B.C., which went to the consul Lucius Mummius Achaicus); in both cases, he acted with dignity and with moderation, and with no bitter resentment of mind.   

(78) Therefore, in the first place, there is a need to ensure that no discord should arise between friends; but, if some such discord does occur, that our friendships should appear to have been put out, rather than suppressed (i.e to have died a natural rather than a violent death). Indeed, care must be taken, lest friendships should even turn themselves into serious enmities; (for) from these, quarrels, curses and insults are born. Yet, if these were endurable, they should be borne, and such respect should be paid to an old friendship, that he may be at fault who committed the offence, rather than he who suffered (it). 

To be sure, there is (but) one precaution and one safeguard (to be taken) against all these vices and inconveniences, (and) that (is) not to give your affection too quickly, and not to bestow (it) on the unworthy.  

(79) Now, they are worthy of friendship, who have within themselves the reason why they are loved. A rare class (indeed)! And actually all distinguished (things are) rare, nor (is) anything more difficult than to find (something) which is, in all respects, a perfect (specimen) of its kind. But most (men) do not recognise anything in human affairs (as) good, unless it should be something profitable, and, like their cattle, they value those friends most highly from whom they hope that they will extract the greatest profit.  

(80) So they are without that loveliest and most natural (kind of) friendship, (which is) sought after for itself and on account of itself, nor do they have an example of their own of the power of friendship and what is the nature and the extent (of it). For everyone loves himself, not in order to exact some reward from himself for his self-love, but because each (man) is dear to himself on account of himself; unless this same (feeling) should be transferred to friendship, a true friend would never be found: for he it is who is, as it were, a second self.   

(81) But, if it is evident in animals, (whether) of the air, of the sea, (or) of the land, (whether) tame (or) wild, firstly that they love themselves - for this (feeling) is born alike in every living creature - , (and) secondly that they require and look for animals of their own kind, to which they may attach themselves. and this they do with longing and with something resembling human love, how much greater must this be by nature in the case of man, who both loves himself and looks for another, whose soul he may so mingle with his own that he almost makes one out of two!

(82) 22. But most men, perversely, not to say shamelessly, want to have a friend such as they cannot be themselves, and they do not bestow on their friends the things that they themselves require from them. But the proper (thing) is first of all to be a good man yourself, (and) then to seek another like you. (It is) among such men (that) this stability of friendship, of which we have been talking for sometime, can be secured, (and,) when men (are) united by goodwill, they will, first of all, subdue those desires, to which other (men) are slaves, then they will delight in fair dealing and rectitude, and one will undertake everything on behalf of the other; and one will never demand anything from the other, unless (it is) honourable and proper, and they will not only cherish and love, but also revere, each other. For (he) who takes away reverence from it, takes away friendship's greatest ornament.    

(83) Therefore, a dangerous mistake is (made) by those who think that the freedom (to commit) every kind of licentious and sinful (act) is accessible in friendship; friendship was given (to us) by nature (as) the handmaid of the virtues, not (as) the companion of the vices, in order that, since virtue cannot attain in isolation those (aims) which are the highest, she may attain (them) in union and in fellowship with another. If (there is) such a partnership between them, whether it (now) exists, has existed, or will exist in the future, their company should be regarded as the best and the most blessed (on the road) to nature's highest good.  

(84) This is, I say, the partnership, in which abide all (things) that men think are worth pursuing, (namely) honour, fame, peace of mind and serenity, so that, when these (things) are present, life is happy, and, without them, it cannot be.   

Since this is our best and our highest (aim), if we wish to obtain it, we must give our attention to virtue, without which we can attain neither friendship nor any other thing worthy of pursuit; but (those) who neglect it, (and yet) think they have friends, realise at last that they are in error, when some grave misfortune compels (them) to put their (friends) to the test.

(85) Therefore, for it needs to be said quite often, you should love (someone) after you have appraised (him), not appraise (someone) after you have fallen in love with (him). But not only are we punished for our negligence in many matters, but we are also especially punished for our selection and cultivation of friends; for we take decisions in the wrong order, and we do things (which have already) been done, (something) which we are forbidden (to do) by the ancient proverb. For, having been involved in one way or another in a lengthy familiarity, or even in (the performance of) duties, we suddenly break our friendships asunder in mid-course after some offence has arisen. 

(86) 23. Such great negligence in a matter of the greatest importance is greatly to be deplored. For friendship is the one thing in human experience, on the value of which all (men) agree with one voice. And yet, virtue itself is regarded with contempt by many, and is said to be just self-promotion and display; many despise riches, and a meagre sustenance and (style of) dress pleases them, content, (as they are,) with little; (and) yet how many (people) regard public honours, for which some are on fire with desire, with such contempt, that they think nothing is more empty, (and) nothing more futile! And likewise (in the case of) other (things), which seem worthy of admiration to some, there are very many who think (they are) of no value at all; (but,) in the case of friendship, all to a single (man) think the same (thing), both those who have involved themselves in politics, and those who are devoted to the acquisition of knowledge and learning, and those who manage their own business at their leisure, (and,) finally, those who have wholly given themselves up to sensual pleasures, (they all believe) that without friendship there is no life at all, if only they wish to some extent to live the life of a free man.   

(87) For friendship creeps into the lives of all (of us), nor does it suffer any mode of life being lived without it.  

But, even if anyone is of a nature so harsh and savage that he should shun and loathe the company of men, such as we are told was the case with a certain Timon at Athens (i.e. a semi-legendary misanthrope who seems to have lived in the middle of the fifth century B.C.), yet he cannot bear not to look for someone, in whose presence he can spew forth the venom of his bitterness. Now, this (view) would be best judged, if such a thing as this could happen, that some god should carry us away from this throng of men and put (us) in solitude somewhere, and, (while) supplying (us) with a plentiful abundance of everything for which our nature yearns, take from us entirely the ability to gaze upon our fellow-men. Who could be so hard as to endure such a life, and (who is there) from whom solitude would not take away the enjoyment of every pleasure?   

(88) Therefore, that (saying) is true, which used to be said, I think, by Archytas of Tarentum (i.e. a Pythagorean visited by Plato, who was a mathematician and the founder of the science of mechanics), (and which) I have heard our elders repeat, after they had heard (it said) by other old men: "If a man could have ascended into the heavens and clearly seen the beauty of the universe and the stars, that wonderful sight would have been unattractive to him; (but) it would have been most delightful, if he had someone, to whom he could have described (it)." So, nature loves nothing solitary, and always strives for some kind of prop; and this is also most pleasing in the case of a very close friend.   

24. But, although this same Nature declares by so many indications what she wishes, seeks, and desires, yet we grow deaf in some way, and do not hear the (things) which we are warned about by Her, and many causes of suspicion and offence are given, which it is (the mark) of a wise (man) sometimes to make light of, sometimes to endure; one such (cause of) offence must be faced, in order that the value and loyalty (implicit) in friendship may be retained: for friends are often in need of advice and a scolding, and these should be received in a friendly manner, when they are delivered in (a spirit of) goodwill. 

(89) But what my friend says in his 'Woman of Andros' is somehow true: "Compliance earns (us) friends, plain-speaking hatred (viz. Terence: 'Andria' 41)." That truth, which is the poison of friendship, (can be) troublesome, if in fact hatred is born from it, but much more troublesome (is that) compliance, which (by) indulging a friend in his sins allows (him) to be carried away headlong; but the greatest fault (lies) in him, who both rejects the truth and is driven by compliance into doing wrong. 

Therefore, in this whole matter reason and care need to be employed, firstly, so that advice should be free from harshness, (and,) secondly, so that criticism (should be free) from insult; but, with regard to compliance, let affability be present, (but) let flattery, the handmaid of the vices, be far removed, as it is unworthy not only of a friend, but even of a free-born (man); for (life) is lived in one way with a tyrant, (and) in another with a friend.  

(90) But the welfare of a man whose ears are so closed to the truth, that he cannot hear the truth from a friend, should be despaired of. For that (saying) of Cato's, as with so many (of them), is a shrewd (one): "Some (men) are better served by their bitter enemies than by those who seem dear (to them); the former often tell (them) the truth, the latter never (do)." And indeed it (is) absurd that those who are admonished do not feel that annoyance which they ought to feel, (but) they do feel it when they ought to be free (of it); for they are not distressed that they have sinned, but they say they are annoyed at being rebuked, whereas, on the contrary, they ought to grieve at the offence (and) to rejoice at its correction. 

(91) 25. So, as it is characteristic of true friendship both to give and to take advice, and, on the one hand, to offer (it) freely, (but) not harshly, (and,) on the other hand, to receive (it) patiently and without resentment, so it should be considered that there is no greater bane to friendship than fawning, allurement and flattery; for, although it has many names, it should be branded (as) the vice of fickle and deceitful men, who say everything with regard to (giving) pleasure, and nothing with regard to (telling) the truth. 

(92) Now, deceit is both wicked in all circumstances - for it takes away our ability to discern the truth and pollutes it - , and it is especially repugnant to friendship; for it destroys sincerity, without which the name of friendship can have no meaning. For, since the essence of friendship is in its (power) is to make one mind, so to speak, out of many, how can that happen, if not even in a single (man) will there always be one and the same mind too, but (one that is) fickle, changeable and complex?

(93) For what can be so pliable (and) so inconsistent as the mind of a man which is transformed to (suit) not only the feelings and wishes of another, but even his expression and the nod (of his head)?    

"He says 'no', I say 'no'; he says 'yes', I say 'yes'; in short, I have bade myself agree (with him) in everything (viz. Terence: 'Eunuchus' 250)", 

as says that same (friend of mine) Terence, but (now) he (speaks) in the character of Gnatho, which sort of friend it is (the sign) of complete frivolity to turn to.

(94) However, (there are) many like Gnatho, though they are superior (to him) in position, fortune and reputation, and their flattery is troublesome, when the weight of their influence is added to their fickleness. 

(95) But, by care being applied, a fawning friend can be separated and distinguished from a true (one), just as everything (that is) counterfeit and imitated (can be separated and distinguished) from (things that are) genuine and real. A public assembly that is composed of the most inexperienced (of men) can, nevertheless, usually judge what is the difference between a demagogue, who is a flattering and shallow citizen, and (one who is) reliable, and strict and dignified. 

(96) What flattering (words) Gaius Papirius (Carbo) recently sought to pour into the ears of the public assembly, when he was trying to carry a law concerning the re-election of the people's tribunes! I spoke against (it); but I will say nothing about myself, but I will speak with more pleasure of Scipio. (O you) immortal gods, how great was the weight, how great (was) the majesty in his speech! You would easily have said that he was the leader of the Roman people, not (just) their comrade. But you were both present and the speech is available (in print). And so, this law of the people was repudiated by the votes of the people (n.b. this vote occurred in 130 B.C.; although the attempt to have tribunes of the people re-re-elected then failed, it was successful on a subsequent occasion after 129 B.C., the date of this dialogue). 

And in fact, to refer to myself, you remember when Quintus (Fabius) Maximus (Aemilianus), the brother of Scipio, and Lucius (Hostilius) Mancinus were consuls (i.e. in 145 B.C.), how popular the (proposed) law about (membership of) priestly offices, proposed by Gaius Licinius Crassus (i.e. a tribune of the people) seemed (to be)! For the (right of) co-optation to the priestly colleges (i.e. existing members of the colleges voting for new ones) was to be transferred to the patronage of the people; and by the way, he was the first to establish the practice of turning to face the forum when addressing the people. Nevertheless, through my speech in defence (of it), reverence for the immortal gods prevailed over his plausible speech. And this (vote) took place, when I was praetor, and five years before I was made consul (i.e. in 140 B.C.); thus that cause was maintained more through its own merit than through the influence of one holding very high (office).

(97) 26. But if on the stage, that is at a public meeting, at which there is the amplest opportunity for fictitious and false statements (to be made), the truth nevertheless prevails, if only it is laid open and made clear, how (much) should this be the case with regard to friendship, which depends on total truthfulness. In this, unless, as the saying goes, you behold and show your breast, you can have no trust, no certainty, not even (the pleasure) of loving or of being loved, since you cannot be aware of what happens with sincerity. And yet, that flattery (which I have mentioned), however ruinous it may be, can harm no one, except the one who receives it and is delighted by it. So it happens that he opens his ears most widely to flatterers (is he) who flatters himself and delights in himself most greatly. 

(98) Virtue is utterly in love with herself; for she knows herself best, and understands how lovable she is. But I am not now speaking of virtue, but of a reputation for virtue. For many (men) wish not so much to be endowed with virtue herself, as to be seen (to be so endowed). Flattery does delight them, (and,) when a fictitious discourse is adopted by the (flatterers) with their consent, they think that vain language is a testimony to their own merits. It is not, therefore, a (proper) friendship, when one (party) does not wish to hear the truth, (and) the other is prepared to indulge in lies. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies have seemed (so) humorous to us, if there were no braggart soldiers. "In truth, did Thais give me great thanks? (viz. Terence: 'Eunuchus' 3.1.1)" It was sufficient to reply "great"; (but the parasite) said "enormous (viz. 'Eunuchus' 3.1.2)". The flatterer always magnifies the (thing) which he (who) is knowingly being talked about wishes to be large. 

(99) Therefore, although that sort of winsome flattery has power over those who themselves encourage and invite it, yet even stronger and steadier (men) should be warned to be on their guard, lest they be taken in by such crafty flattery. For no one, unless he is utterly stupid, fails to detect an open flatterer; (but) we must exercise diligent care, lest some crafty and secretive man worms his way into our confidence; for he is not easily recognised, since he often exercises flattery even by opposing, and he flatters (by) pretending that he disagrees, and then at last he gives in and allows himself to be overcome. But (is there) anything more shameful than to be duped? (So,) we should be all the more on our guard that such a thing should not happen (to us).

"So that today, of all the foolish old men who play comic parts on the stage, you have messed about with, and ridiculed, me the most vigorously! (viz. lines from the 'Epiclerus' of Caecilius Statius of Mediolanum)."

(100) For even in stage-plays the silliest person plays the parts of unforeseeing and credulous old men. 

But in some unaccountable way my discourse has drifted away from the friendships of blameless men, that is, (men) of wisdom - of such wisdom, I mean, as it seems can fall to (the lot of) man - to friendships of the trivial kind. Therefore, let me return to that first (topic), and now at last even bring that to a conclusion.

27. Virtue, Gaius Fannius, and you, Quintus Mucius, virtue, I say, brings about friendships and preserves (them). In her, there is harmony of interests, in her (there is) steadiness, in her (there is) consistency; and, when she has raised her head and has shown her own light, and has gazed at and recognised the same in another, she moves towards it and receives in turn that (light) that is in the other; from it (i.e. from the light) there springs up the flame both of love and of friendship; for both (words) are derived from 'to love' (i.e. 'amor' and 'amicitia' from 'amare'), but 'to love' is nothing other than to esteem the very (man) whom you love without any benefit or advantage being sought; but that very (thing) springs up from friendship, even if you did not look for it. 

(101) Due to this feeling of goodwill, I as a young man became attached to those old men, Lucius (Aemilius) Paullus (Macedonicus), Marcus (Porcius) Cato, Gaius (Sulpicius) Galus, Publius (Cornelius Scipio) Nasica (Corculum) (i.e. consul 162 B.C.), (and) Tiberius (Sempronius) Gracchus, the father-in-law of my (dear) Scipio. That (feeling) is even stronger among those of the same age, as between Scipio, Lucius Furius (Philus), Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius (i.e. the brother of Lucius Mummius Achaicus) and myself. But, in turn, (as) an old man I find pleasure in the affection of young men, as in the case of yourselves, and as in the case of Quintus (Aelius) Tubero; I also delight in being on friendly terms with the very young Publius Rutilius (Rufus) (i.e. consul 105 B.C.) and Aulus Verginius (i.e. later a well-known lawyer). And, since the law of our life and nature has been established that one generation springs up from another, it is indeed desirable that you can arrive, so to speak, at the finishing line with men of your own age, (that is) with the same (men) with whom, as it were, you set out from the starting point (in the race of life).  

(102) But, inasmuch as human affairs are fragile and fleeting, we should continually be on the look out for people to love and by whom we should be loved; for, if affection and benevolence are taken away, all joy is taken from our lives. To me, indeed, although he was suddenly snatched away, Scipio still lives and always will live; for I loved the virtue of that man, and this is not dead; nor did it live before the eyes of myself alone, who always had it in my sight, but it will also be bright and conspicuous to posterity. No one will ever undertake the important (things of life) who does not think that he must keep before (him) the memory and the image of that man.  

(103) For my part, of all the blessings which fortune or nature has assigned me, I have nothing which I can compare with Scipio's friendship. In it I found agreement in public affairs, in it advice on private business, and in it too relaxation full of delight. I never offended him, not even in the slightest matter, so far as I am aware, nor did I (ever) hear anything from him which I would wish (had) not (been said); we had one home and the same livelihood, and this we shared, and (we were) together, not only on military campaigns, but also in our foreign travels and holidays in the countryside.  

(104) For what should I say of our constant zeal for knowledge and for learning something? In these (activities), withdrawn from the eyes of the people, we spent all our leisure time. If my recollection and memory of these things had died together with him, I could not endure in any way the loss of a man so very close and dear to me. But those (experiences) are not dead, but rather they are being nourished and augmented by my reflections and memory, and, (even) if I were (to be) utterly deprived of them, yet my age would itself afford me great relief. For I cannot now be in this (state of) bereavement for much longer. For all (trials that are) brief ought to be tolerable, even if they are severe.   

I have said (all the things) about friendship that I have to say. But I exhort you so to esteem virtue, without which there can be no (such thing as) friendship, that, it (i.e. virtue) being excepted, you will think (there is) nothing more excellent than friendship.