Introduction.
Sabidius has already translated the seven books of the "De Bello Gallico" (The Gallic War) actually attributed to Caesar (Book VIII is thought to have been written by Aulus Hirtius), and these translations can be accessed by readers via Sabidius' site map. He has now translated the third book of the "De Bello Civili" (The Civil War), which is the last of the three books under this title actually written by Caesar, since it is clear that the following three books, entitled the Alexandrian, African and Spanish Wars respectively, were written by others.
Book III of the "De Bello Civili" is easily the longest of Caesar's books and consists of 112 chapters. The content of the Book covers the progress of the War in 48 B.C. Caesar follows Pompey across the Adriatic into Greece, although he experiences some difficulties in the transport from Italy of a large part of his army. After a tense struggle, in which Caesar attempts to blockade Pompey's army around the coastal city of Dyrrhacium, he suffers a significant setback, and is obliged to withdraw his forces deeper inland. Pompey pursues him to Thessaly, and is eventually lured into meeting Caesar in a pitched battle at Pharsalus, where he suffers a disastrous defeat. After fleeing to Egypt, Pompey is murdered on his arrival there. Caesar has followed him, however, and the book ends somewhat abruptly, while Caesar with a small expeditionary force is being besieged in his quarters which are centred around the royal palace at Alexandria. The fact that the book does not end at a natural break point, such as the death of Pompey or Caesar's return to Italy in 47, suggests that the book, and indeed the work as a whole, was never finished, and some have thought that its completion was interrupted by his assassination on the Ides of March 44. Indeed, there is no clear evidence that any of the three books written by Caesar were published in his lifetime, and all that can safely be said is that they were composed during the Civil War itself, with the intention of seeking to win over neutral opinion or those of his antagonists who were not too violently opposed to him. Thus much attention is given by him in Book III to presenting his cause and his actions in the best possible light: for instance, he emphasises the efforts he made to reach an accommodation with Pompey, the many instances of his renowned 'clementia', when he showed mercy to captured opponents, and the readiness of so many Greek towns to open their gates to him, sometimes contrary to the wishes of their Pompeian garrisons. On the other hand he draws attention to many examples of his opponents' unsatisfactory or unreasonable behaviour. Prominent examples of this are Bibulus' cruelty in killing the crews of captured ships (Chapter 8); Libo's insincerity in the negotiations about a truce (Chapter 17); Labienus' sabotaging of peace talks between the soldiers of the two armies (Chapter 19); Scipio's maltreatment of the inhabitants of Pergamum and the province of Asia as a whole (Chapters 31-32); and Labienus' insulting treatment of Caesarian captives after the setback at Dyrrachium (Chapter 71). Above all, however, is the devastating way in which Caesar exposes the self-seeking and petty-minded behaviour of his senior senatorial opponents immediately prior to the battle of Pharsalus (Chapters 82-83).
From a historical viewpoint, the focal point of Book III is the battle of Pharsalus (see Chapters 85-99), not only the greatest battle of the Civil War of 49-45, but perhaps the most famous battle ever fought between Romans themselves. Indeed in the following century the poet Lucan was to produce his famous work, "Pharsalia", in hexameter verse on this very subject. Caesar's victory was achieved very much against the odds, because he was heavily outnumbered by the army of Pompey, who had 45,000 legionary infantry and 7,000 cavalry in the field against his 22,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. Caesar gives careful attention to the drawing up of the battle-lines of both sides, and who was in charge of which sections of the respective fronts. Pompey expected that his preponderance in cavalry would allow him to win the day. His plan was to gather most of his horsemen on his left flank, and, after they had driven Caesar's inferior cavalry forces from the field, to then roll up the exposed right flank of Caesar's battle-line, and thus circumvent the rest of his army. However, Caesar had correctly anticipated Pompey's battle plan, and, in order to forestall it, he withdrew six cohorts from the third line of his infantry drawn up, as they were, in the customary 'triplex acies', in order to form a fourth line, which, posted at an oblique angle a little behind his right wing, and masked by the usual dust-clouds created by the formation of thousands of men, was invisible to the enemy. Pompey's cavalry advanced as expected, quickly pushing back Caesar's cavalry, but, poorly led and in a state of disorder, they were suddenly confronted by Caesar's fourth line, who, using their javelins ('pila') as spears, thrust them into the faces of Pompey's cavalrymen so effectively that they rapidly withdrew from the field in a state of panic. In effect, Caesar had 'trumped' Pompey's 'ace', since the fourth line, having slaughtered Pompey's archers and slingers, who had been left defenceless by their cavalry's precipitate withdrawal, then turned on Pompey's left flank, just at the moment when Caesar ordered his third line, inactive until that point, to advance to the support of his first two lines that had successfully managed to hold their own against Pompey's greater numbers of legionaries. The result was a massacre, an estimated 15,000 Pompeians being killed and 24,000 taken prisoner. A disconsolate Pompey was later reported to have said, with regard to the collapse of his cavalry, that he felt betrayed by them, since the rout had been caused by the very people to whom he had looked to deliver victory; but the real lesson of this battle was that Pompey's army, despite its significantly greater numbers, was no match for Caesar's better trained and more experienced soldiers, with their greater sense of morale, arising surely from their justified belief in the genius of their leader.
Sabidius has already written at some length about Caesar's language in the separate introductions to each of the seven books of the "De Bello Gallico" (see the Site Map to this blog). Once again the Ablative Absolute device is used to a significant extent in Book III of the "De Bello Civili", and in the translation below these are translated literally, and underlined as well. Caesar makes more widespread use of these than most other Latin authors, and this does create some difficulties for the reader. For instance Chapter 103 begins with six of these Ablative Absolute phrases in succession, before the main action of the paragraph can begin. Another device is his use of Indirect Discourse (or Reported Speech). On some occasions there are long passages with no main verbs specified - for instance, in Chapter 10 following the words, "The gist of these proposals was as follows", there are nineteen lines without a main verb specified. (I say 'specified' since verbs of 'thinking' or 'telling' have to be understood). In the translation below, because Sabidius has put the English translations of Latin main verbs into italics, a long piece of Indirect Discourse becomes quickly evident, because no words have been placed in italics for many lines, or, where they do exist, they have been inserted into the narrative in brackets. Indirect Discourse also creates difficulties with regard to the correct tense into which the successive infinitives, or subjunctives, should be translated, and this can become more difficult when Caesar uses the Historic Present, as he frequently does, for vividness or emphasis. In fact each translator has to find his own salvation in these instances, and no general rule can easily be applied. With regard to the Historic Present, as a whole, Sabidius has chosen to translate it into a past tense, for, as he has said elsewhere, its prolonged use can become both confusing and repetitive. In general, however, he follows his usual practice of offering as literal a translation as possible within the context of providing a rendering in English which is readily understandable to the reader. Wherever possible, however, any departure from the literal sense of the Latin words is accompanied by an alternative version in brackets. (This practice is particularly common in the case of gerundives and impersonal verbs.) The purpose of Sabidius' translations remains to facilitate the ready understanding of the meaning of the Latin words and the original into allegedly more agreeable everyday English can distort the author's intended meaning with only a very marginal benefit being offered in terms of the accessibility of the English.
Caesar's constant recourse to the use of the Ablative Absolute and Indirect Discourse can readily be explained by the nature of his writing. He classifies both the "De Bello Gallico" and the "De Bello Civili" as "Commentarii", (i.e. reports or notes), upon which a more polished work of historical writing might later be based. Ablative Ablatives allow a large amount of information to be processed with a minimum of words, and represent encapsulated statements of fact which serve as background to what is being said in the rest of the sentence or paragraph. Indirect Discourse, as used by him is a form of 'barebones reporterage', or compressed statement, in which much information, normally important to the structure of the sentence, such as person, and the distinction between the subject and object, is stripped away, because it is obvious. Such linguistic usage was highly suitable to a military context, in which despatches to the Senate and People of Rome from the front, or communiques to subordinates, might be composed, when compressed, yet factual language would be seen as a suitable example of Roman pragmatism and practicality. While this accounts for what is otherwise particular to Caesar's style, what is so interesting is that the quality of his writing was such that it created a genre in itself. Indeed, ancient sources describe him as a leader or proponent of the puristic style of Latin writing, called the Attic style, as opposed to the more highly wrought or aphoristic style, of which Cicero was seen as the most significant exemplar. Nevertheless, Cicero, who in the tradition of classical literature would normally have seen a polished style as an essential quality of historical writing, was to say of Caesar's "Commentarii" in his "Brutus", written in 46, that, "They are like nude figures, upright and beautiful, stripped of all ornament of style as if they had removed a garment. His aim was to provide source material for others who might wish to write history, and perhaps he has gratified the insensitive, who may wish to use their curling-tongs on his work; but men of good sense he has deterred from writing." What he meant, and goes on to make clear, was that Caesar's writing was so elegant in its lucidity and simplicity that only the unwise would seek to improve on it. It is important to stress the quality of Caesar's Latin, because, although he is the first author to whom young students of Latin have traditionally been introduced, his Latin can actually be quite difficult to translate. Terseness and compression are qualities that are hallmarks of the Latin language as a whole, and in Caesar's case the impersonal military concision which one associates with his Ablative Absolutes are especially good examples of these qualities; but, as the poet Horace in his "Ars Poetica" was later to say: "Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio (I labour to be brief, and I become obscure)". There are perhaps moments when this is true of Caesar's prose as well, since he frequently omits words which he considers can be understood from an earlier sentence or are obvious from the context as a whole, but for the most part the clarity and brevity of his style is admirable.
Book III of "The Civil War" is an outstanding example of Caesar's prose, being terse and restrained without ever becoming monotonous or repetitive. Sabidius hopes that anyone who reads this translation below will want to read it in the original Latin as well. structure of the Latin sentences. It is Sabidius' belief that colloquial or free translations of the Latin original into allegedly more agreeable everyday English can distort the author's intended meaning with only a very marginal benefit being offered in terms of the accessibility of the English.
Caesar's constant recourse to the use of the Ablative Absolute and Indirect Discourse can readily be explained by the nature of his writing. He classifies both the "De Bello Gallico" and the "De Bello Civili" as "Commentarii", (i.e. reports or notes), upon which a more polished work of historical writing might later be based. Ablative Ablatives allow a large amount of information to be processed with a minimum of words, and represent encapsulated statements of fact which serve as background to what is being said in the rest of the sentence or paragraph. Indirect Discourse, as used by him is a form of 'barebones reporterage', or compressed statement, in which much information, normally important to the structure of the sentence, such as person, and the distinction between the subject and object, is stripped away, because it is obvious. Such linguistic usage was highly suitable to a military context, in which despatches to the Senate and People of Rome from the front, or communiques to subordinates, might be composed, when compressed, yet factual language would be seen as a suitable example of Roman pragmatism and practicality. While this accounts for what is otherwise particular to Caesar's style, what is so interesting is that the quality of his writing was such that it created a genre in itself. Indeed, ancient sources describe him as a leader or proponent of the puristic style of Latin writing, called the Attic style, as opposed to the more highly wrought or aphoristic style, of which Cicero was seen as the most significant exemplar. Nevertheless, Cicero, who in the tradition of classical literature would normally have seen a polished style as an essential quality of historical writing, was to say of Caesar's "Commentarii" in his "Brutus", written in 46, that, "They are like nude figures, upright and beautiful, stripped of all ornament of style as if they had removed a garment. His aim was to provide source material for others who might wish to write history, and perhaps he has gratified the insensitive, who may wish to use their curling-tongs on his work; but men of good sense he has deterred from writing." What he meant, and goes on to make clear, was that Caesar's writing was so elegant in its lucidity and simplicity that only the unwise would seek to improve on it. It is important to stress the quality of Caesar's Latin, because, although he is the first author to whom young students of Latin have traditionally been introduced, his Latin can actually be quite difficult to translate. Terseness and compression are qualities that are hallmarks of the Latin language as a whole, and in Caesar's case the impersonal military concision which one associates with his Ablative Absolutes are especially good examples of these qualities; but, as the poet Horace in his "Ars Poetica" was later to say: "Brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio (I labour to be brief, and I become obscure)". There are perhaps moments when this is true of Caesar's prose as well, since he frequently omits words which he considers can be understood from an earlier sentence or are obvious from the context as a whole, but for the most part the clarity and brevity of his style is admirable.
Book III of "The Civil War" is an outstanding example of Caesar's prose, being terse and restrained without ever becoming monotonous or repetitive. Sabidius hopes that anyone who reads this translation below will want to read it in the original Latin as well.
Book III of "The Civil War" is an outstanding example of Caesar's prose, being terse and restrained without ever becoming monotonous or repetitive. Sabidius hopes that anyone who reads this translation below will want to read it in the original Latin as well.
The Latin text used is that of Renatus du Pontet, published at Oxford by the Clarendon Press, 1901, as made available by the www.perseus.tufts.edu website.
I. Caesar in Italy - Pompey's preparations (Chapters 1-6).
Chapter 1. With (Gaius Julius) Caesar (as) dictator holding the elections, Julius Caesar and Publius Servilius (Vatia Isauricus) were appointed consuls; for this was the year in which he could (lit. it was permitted to him to) become consul. These matters having been completed, as credit was rather tight throughout (lit. in the whole of) Italy, and money owed was not being paid, he decided that arbitrators should be chosen; (that) estimates of the property and possessions (of debtors) should be made at the value which each of these things had been (worth) before the war, and such (payments) should be handed over to the creditors. In fact, he thought this was the most suitable (way) for the fear of the cancellation of debts (lit. new tablets, i.e. rubbing out all account books and starting from scratch), which is generally accustomed to accompany wars and civil conflicts, to be removed or lessened, and for the credit of debtors to be protected. Also, with praetors and tribunes of the plebs putting bills to the people, he restored to their former state certain people (who had been) condemned for corruption under a law of Pompey's (i.e. of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus) during that period in which Pompey had had a garrison of legions in the city - these cases had been carried through in a single day with some jurymen hearing (them) (and) others passing sentence - (because) he valued (these men) who had offered themselves to him at the beginning of the civil war, in case he wished to make use of their services in the war, just as if he had (actually) used (them), since they had given him the opportunity (to do so). For he had determined that they ought to be restored by a decision of the people rather than that it should be seen that (they had been) restored by his benevolence, so that he should not appear either ungrateful in returning thanks (lit. thanks being returned) or presumptuous in forestalling the generosity of the people (lit. the generosity of the people being forestalled).
Chapter 2. He allotted eleven days to these matters, and the Latin holidays and all the elections being carried out, and (then) abdicated (lit. detached himself from) the dictatorship and set out from the city and reached Brundisium. Thither he had ordered twelve legions (and) all the cavalry to muster (lit. go). But he found only (enough) ships to enable, at a pinch, fifteen thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horsemen to be transported. This one thing, (namely) a shortage of ships, hindered Caesar from bringing the war to a speedy conclusion (lit. was lacking to Caesar for the purpose of speed in the war being brought to an end). Besides, these very forces were embarked in smaller numbers than this, because many had been lost in so many wars in Gaul, and the long march from Spain had reduced (them by) a great number, and an unhealthy autumn in Apulia and around Brundisium (after they had come) from the most wholesome regions of Gaul and Spain had affected the whole army with sickness.
Chapter 3. Pompey, having obtained the space of a year to prepare his forces (lit. for the purpose of his forces being prepared), because he had been free from war and unharassed by an enemy, had gathered together a great fleet from Asia and the Cycladic islands, from Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia (and) Egypt, had seen to it that a great (fleet) was built in all those places, had exacted a large (sum of) money (which he had) levied from Asia, Syria, and all the kings, dynasts and tetrarchs and from the free peoples of Achaea, (and) had compelled the (tax-farming) companies of those provinces of which he was in control himself to pay him a large (amount) of money.
Chapter 4. He had raised nine legions of Roman citizens: five, which he had brought across from Italy; one of veterans from Cilicia, which (he had) made up from two and called 'the twin'; one of veteran soldiers from Crete and Macedonia, who, having been discharged by their previous commanders, had settled in these provinces; (and) two from Asia, whom (Lucius Cornelius) Lentulus (Crus) had caused to be enrolled. In addition, he had distributed a large number (of men) from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaea and Epirus among the legions under the name of reinforcements; with these he had mixed the men of (Gaius) Antonius. Beside these, he was awaiting two legions from Syria with (Quintus Caecilius Metellus Pius) Scipio (Nasica). He had archers, three thousand in number, from Crete (and) Lacedaemon, from Pontus and Syria and other states, two cohorts of slingers of six hundred men (each) and seven thousand cavalrymen. Of these, Deiotarus had brought six hundred Galatians, (and) Ariobarzanes five hundred from Cappadocia. Cotys had supplied about the same number from Thrace and had sent his son Sadala (with them); two hundred were from Macedonia, of whom Rhascypolis, (a man) of great valour, was in command; five hundred of the men of Gabinius from Alexandria, Gauls and Germans, whom Aulus Gabinius had left there as a garrison at the court of King Ptolemy, (Gnaeus) Pompeius, the son, had brought over with his fleet; eight hundred he had collected from the number of his own slaves and his own herdsmen; three hundred Tarcandarius Castor and Domnilaus had supplied from Gallograecia (i.e. Galatia) - of these the first had come in person (lit. at the same time) and the second had sent his son -; two hundred - among these a majority (were) mounted archers - had been sent by Antiochus of Commagene, upon whom Pompey bestowed a large reward. To this he had added Dardani and Bessi, some mercenaries and others recruited by order or voluntarily, (and) likewise men from Macedonia and from Thessaly and from other tribes and states, and so he made up that number which we have mentioned above (i.e. the seven thousand cavalrymen).
Chapter 5. He had procured a very large quantity of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene and other regions. He had decided to winter in Dyrrachium, Apollonia and the other coastal towns, in order to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea, and for this reason he had stationed his fleet all along the sea coast. Pompeius the son was in command of the Egyptian ships, Decimus Laelius and Gaius (Valerius) Triarius the Asiatic (ones), Gaius Cassius (Longinus) the Syrian, Gaius (Claudius) Marcellus with Gaius Coponius the Rhodian, (and) (Lucius) Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius the Liburnian and Achaean fleet. But Marcus (Calpurnius) Bibulus, having been put in charge of all maritime affairs, was managing everything; the supreme command was centred in him.
Chapter 6. When he (i.e. Caesar) came to Brundisium, addressing his soldiers, (he told them) that, since they had almost reached (lit. it had almost come to) the end of their toils and dangers, they might leave their slaves and baggage behind (them) in Italy with an easy mind, and that they should climb aboard the ships lightly kitted, so that a greater number of soldiers could be embarked, and that they should put all their trust in (lit. entrust everything to) victory and his generosity, (and,) with everyone exclaiming that he should order as he wished (and) that they would readily (lit. with an easy mind) do whatever he had commanded, he set sail (lit. loosened [the sails of] his ships) on the fourth of January. The next day he reached land. Obtaining a quiet anchorage at Acroceraunia (lit. the Ceraunian rocks) amidst some hazardous locations, and mistrusting every harbour because he thought it would be held by his adversaries, he disembarked his troops at that place which is called Palaeste with all his ships entirely (lit. to a single [ship]) undamaged.
II. Negotiations in Epirus (Chapters 7-19).
Chapter 7. (Quintus) Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus were at Oricum with the eighteen Asiatic ships, of which they were in command by order of Decimus Laelius, (and) Marcus Bibulus (was) at Corcyra with a hundred and ten ships. But the former, lacking confidence, did (not) venture out of harbour, although Caesar had brought only twelve ships, of which four were decked, and Bibulus, his ships unprepared and their oarsmen dispersed, did not come up early enough, because Caesar was sighted off the coast before any report at all of his approach could be brought to those regions.
Chapter 8. His troops having been disembarked, the ships were sent back to Brundisium by Caesar on the same night, so that the other legions and the cavalry could be carried across. His legate (Quintus) Fufius Calenus was in charge of this task, (with orders) to apply despatch in transporting the legions (lit. in the legions being transported). But his ships, having left the land too late and not making use of the nocturnal breeze, came to grief during the return (journey). For Bibulus, having been informed (lit. made more sure) of Caesar's approach, (and,) hoping that he could come upon some part of our ships (while they were) loaded, met (them when they were) empty, and, having got about thirty, he vented his fury at his own negligence and his disappointment upon them, and set fire to (them) all, and killed the sailors and captains in the same fire, hoping that the remaining (men) would be deterred by the extent of the punishment. This business having been completed, he occupied with his fleet the anchorages from Sason to the harbour of Oricum and all the shore-lines everywhere (lit. far and wide), and, the guard-posts having been carefully arranged, he himself sleeping out aboard ship in the most severe winter (weather) and not shirking any labour or duty, nor awaiting any reinforcements, if (only) he could come to grips with Caesar.
Chapter 9. On the departure of the Liburnian (ships) from Illyricum, Marcus Octavius, with those ships which he had, arrived at Salona. There, the Dalmatians and the other barbarian (peoples) having been stirred up, he turned Issa aside from its alliance with Caesar. The town (i.e. Salona), however, was protected both by the nature of its position and by its hill. But the Roman people fortified themselves, wooden towers having been quickly built, and, as they were incapable of resisting on account of their small number, (and) having been weakened by numerous wounds, they resorted to extreme (measures) of assistance, and freed all their adult slaves and made (ropes for) their catapults from the shorn hair of all their women. Their (determined) view having been learned of, Octavius surrounded the town with five separate camps and began to press them by a siege and by attacks at one (and the same) time. They, having been prepared to endure everything, were struggling in particular from their lack of corn. Deputies having been sent to Caesar, they sought help from him on this matter; they sustained their other difficulties by themselves as (best) they could. A long period (of time) having elapsed, since the length of time of the siege had made Octavius' men somewhat careless, (and) getting an opportunity from their departure at the time of midday, their women and children having been stationed on the wall, lest any (part) of their daily routine might be missed, they themselves, a band (of men) having been formed with those whom they had very recently freed (from slavery), broke into the nearest of Octavius' camps. This having been stormed, they attacked a second in the same assault, then a third and a fourth and next the remaining (one), and drove them out of every camp, and, a great number having been slain, they compelled the rest and Octavius himself to take refuge in their ships. This was the outcome of the siege. Winter was now approaching, and, with such great losses having been received, Octavius, the siege of the town having been despaired of, withdrew (lit. betook himself) to Pompey at Dyrrachium.
Chapter 10. We have mentioned that Lucius Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had twice come into Caesar's power, once at Corfinium, (and) again in Spain. By virtue of his kindnesses (to him), Caesar considered him a suitable (person) to send to Gnaeus Pompey with proposals, and he understood that he had influence with Gnaeus Pompey. The gist of these proposals was as follows: that both of them should make an end of their obstinacy and lay down (lit. depart from) their arms and not tempt fortune any further. That both of them had suffered enough serious misfortunes to enable (these) to serve as a lesson and (as) warnings (to them) to fear other calamities: he (i.e. Pompey), having been expelled from Italy, (had suffered) from Sicily and Sardinia and the two Spains having been lost, together with a hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens; he himself (i.e. Caesar) (had suffered a great setback) through the death of (Gaius Scribonius) Curio and the loss of his African army, and from the surrender of (Gaius) Antonius and his soldiers at Curicta (i.e. Corcyra Nigra). Therefore, let them spare themselves and the republic, since from their own misfortunes they already had proof enough of how great the power of fortune can be (lit. how greatly fortune can prevail) in war. This was the one (and only) time for discussions about peace, while each was confident and they both seemed equal; but, if fortune should give only a little (advantage) to one, he who thought (himself) superior would not observe the terms of peace, nor would (he) who was sure he would possess everything be content with an equal share. That, since they had not been able to agree the terms of peace previously, (these) should be sought from the Senate and from the people in Rome. That it ought to concern the Senate and to be pleasing to themselves, if each of them were at once to swear an oath at a public meeting that he would dismiss his army in the next three day period. That, the arms and support, upon which they now relied, having been laid aside, both of them must (lit. should of necessity) be content with the decision of the people and the Senate. So that these things could the more easily appear worthy of Pompey's support (lit. be approved by Pompey), (he said) that he would dismiss all his land forces everywhere.
Chapter 11. Vibullius, having been put ashore at Corcyra, thought it was nonetheless necessary to inform Pompey (lit. make Pompey more sure) of Caesar's sudden approach, so that he could adopt a plan with regard to it, before he began to discuss the proposals (lit. it was begun concerning the proposals being discussed), and, for this reason, his journey having been continued without a break by night and by day, and the pack-horses having been changed at every town for the sake of speed, he hastened to Pompey, to report that Caesar was coming towards (him). At that time Pompey was in Candavia and was making his way from Macedonia to winter-quarters at Apollonia and Dyrrachium. But, alarmed at the new situation, he began to make for Apollonia by forced marches, lest Caesar should occupy the states on the sea shore. But he (i.e. Caesar), his soldiers having been disembarked, set out for Oricum on the same day. When he arrived there, Lucius (Manlius) Torquatus, who was in command of the town on Pompey's order, and had a garrison of Parthini there, attempting, the gates having been shut, to defend the town, when he ordered the Greeks to climb up on to the wall and take up arms, but they said that they would not fight against the authority of the Roman people, and even tried to admit Caesar of their own accord, all assistance having been despaired of, opened the gates and surrendered himself and the town to Caesar, and was preserved unharmed by him.
Chapter 12. Oricum having been occupied, Caesar set out for Apollonia without any delay having elapsed. His approach having been heard about, Lucius Staberius, who was in command there, began to bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it and to demand hostages from the inhabitants of Apollonia. But they refused to give (any) or to shut the gates against the consul or to take upon themselves a judgment contrary to what the whole of Italy and the Roman people had judged. Their will having been learned of, Staberius fled secretly from Apollonia. They (i.e. the inhabitants) sent envoys to Caesar and admitted (him) into the town. The inhabitants of Byllis, (and) of Amantia, and the other neighbouring states, and the whole of Epirus followed them, and, envoys having been sent to Caesar, they promised to do what he required (of them).
Chapter 13. But Pompey, these things, which had been done at Oricum and at Apollonia, having been ascertained, being afraid for Dyrrachium, hastened thither by daytime and nocturnal marches. At the same time, Caesar was said to be approaching; and so great a panic fell upon his army, because in his haste (lit. hurrying) he had joined night together with day and had not interrupted his journey, that almost every man from Epirus and the neighbouring regions deserted their standards, (and) several (of them) threw down their weapons, and their march seemed like a flight. But, when Pompey halted near Dyrrachium and instructed that a camp should be marked out, with the army being panic-stricken even then, (Titus Atius) Labienus stepped forward first and swore that he would not desert him and would undergo the same fate (as he), whatever fortune should allot to him. The other legates swore this same (oath); the military tribunes and centurions followed (them), and the whole army swore likewise. The road to Dyrrachium having already been occupied, Caesar made an end to his haste and pitched camp by the river Apsus in the territories of the people of Apollonia, so that the states (that had) deserved well (of him) might be protected by a guard, and there he resolved to await the arrival of his other legions from Italy, and to winter in tents (lit. under skins). Pompey did this as well, and, his camp having been pitched on the other side of the river Apsus, he brought all his troops and auxiliaries together there.
Chapter 14. The legions and the cavalry having been put into ships at Brundisium, Calenus, as he had been instructed by Caesar, in as far as he had the amount of ships (required), set sail (lit. loosened [the sails of] his ships) and, having proceeded a short distance from port, he received a despatch from Caesar, in which he was informed (lit. made more sure) that all the harbours and (the whole) coast-line were occupied by their adversaries' fleet. This having been ascertained, he withdrew (lit. betook himself) into the harbour and recalled all his ships. One of these, which went onwards (lit. persisted), and did not comply with Calenus' order, because it was without soldiers and was being run for a private purpose, was carried to Oricum and stormed by Bibulus; he wreaked his vengeance on slaves and freemen, even youths, and slew them all (lit. to a single man). So, the safety of the whole army depended on (lit. was in accord with) a short (space of) time and a great chance.
Chapter 15. Bibulus, as has been stated above, was with his fleet off Oricum, and, as he was debarring Caesar from the sea and the harbours, so he was debarred himself from all the land of these regions. For, with garrisons having been stationed, the whole coast-line was being held by Caesar, and no opportunity was arising of fetching wood or water, or of mooring his ships near land. His situation was one of (lit. was in) great difficulty, and they were being overwhelmed by the most severe shortages of essential supplies, to such an extent that he was obliged to bring in wood and water, just like their other provisions, in transport ships from Corcyra, and it even happened on one occasion, (when they were) experiencing rather violent storms, that they were forced to catch the nocturnal dew from the skins with which their ships had been covered. However, they bore these difficulties patiently and calmly (lit. with a calm mind), and they did not think that they should should expose the shores (lit. that the shores [were] needing to be exposed) or abandon the harbours (lit. the harbours [were] needing to be abandoned by them). But, when they were in the difficulties which I have described and Libo had joined (lit. had united himself with) Bibulus, they both spoke with the legates Manius Acilius (Glabrio) and (Lucius) Statius Murcus, one of whom was in command of the town wall (and) the other of the garrisons on land: (they said) that they wished to speak with Caesar, if such an opportunity were granted to them. To this they added a few (words) to back this up (lit. for the sake of the matter being confirmed), that they thought it right that there should be a discussion (lit. that it should be discussed) about a settlement. In the meantime, they asked that there should be a truce, and (this) they obtained from them. For what they were proposing seemed important, and they knew that Caesar desired it in the highest degree, and it was imagined that some progress had been made (lit. something had been progressed) from Vibullius' proposals.
Chapter 16. Having set out with a single legion with the purpose of the more distant states being secured and (the issue of) the corn supply, which he was managing within tight constraints, being settled, he was at that time at Buthrotum, a town opposite to Corcyra. There, having been informed (lit. made more sure) by a dispatch from Acilius and Murcus of the requests of Libo and Bibulus, he left his legion; he himself returned to Oricum. When he arrived there, they were summoned to a conference. Libo appeared and apologised for Bibulus, because he was (a man) of very hot-temper, and besides had a private feud with Caesar conceived from their aedileship and praetorship; (he said) that for that reason he had avoided the conference, lest matters of the highest expectation and the greatest importance should be hindered by his irascibility. That it was and always had been the greatest desire of Pompey that there should be a settlement (lit. it should be settled) and a laying down of arms (lit. it should be departed from arms), but they did not have any power in that matter on account of the fact that they had promised Pompey the supreme (command) of the war and all (other) matters through a decision of the (war) council. But, Caesar's demands having been ascertained, (he said) that they would send (them) to Pompey and would carry on the rest (of the negotiations) through them with themselves suggesting (it). In the meantime, let the truce be maintained until a messenger could return (lit. it could be returned) from him, and let neither side harm the other. To this he added a few (words) concerning their cause and concerning their forces and auxiliaries.
Chapter 17. To these comments Caesar did not then think that he should make a response (lit. that it was proper for it to be replied to [by him]) nor do we now think that (there is) a sufficient reason that it should be placed on the record. (But) Caesar required that he should be allowed (lit. it should be permitted to him) to send envoys to Pompey without any risk (to them), and that they (i.e. Libo and Bibulus) should (either) guarantee that this would be (the case) or that they should bring (the envoys, who had been) received by them, to him. That, as it pertained to the truce, the operation of the war had been so divided that they could impede with their fleet his ships and his reinforcements, just as he could bar them from (fresh) water and land. If they wanted this (constraint) to be removed from them, they should relax their blockade of the seas; (but, he said) that, if they kept their (blockade) up, he would retain his one also. But nevertheless there could be a discussion (lit. it could be discussed) even if they did not remove these (blockades), and this situation would not be a hindrance to that. Libo neither received Caesar's envoys nor guaranteed their safe conduct (lit. took responsibility for their danger), but referred the whole matter to Pompey; he pressed this one (point) about a truce, and he urged (it) most vehemently. When Caesar realised that he had organised this entire discussion to escape from his immediate danger and privation (lit. for the sake of his immediate danger and privation being avoided), and that he was not bringing any hope or terms of peace, he returned (lit. betook himself) to his other plans for the war.
Chapter 18. Bibulus, having been kept away from land for several days and having been seized with a serious illness from the cold and fatigue, as he could not have (it) seen to and he was not willing to abandon the commission (which he had) undertaken, could not withstand the virulence of his disease. On his death (lit. With him having died), the supreme command reverted to no one, but each (admiral) managed his own fleet separately at his own discretion. Vibullius, the alarm, which Caesar's sudden arrival had aroused, having been allayed, as soon as it was over, Libo and Lucius Lucceius and (Gnaeus Pompeius) Theophanes, with whom Pompey was accustomed to consult over the most important matters, having been summoned, began to discuss Caesar's proposals. Pompey interrupted him as he was entering upon his speech, and forbade (him) from saying any more. "What need do I have (lit. What need is there to me) of a life or of a state, which I shall appear to have (only) by the generosity of Caesar? An opinion of this sort cannot possibly be removed, when I shall be thought to have been brought back to Italy, from which I set out (voluntarily)." The war having been concluded, Caesar learned of these things having happened from those who were present at the conversation. Nevertheless, he still tried by other methods to discuss peace by means of conferences.
Chapter 19. Between the two camps, (that) of Pompey and (that) of Caesar, there was only a single river, the Apsus, and the soldiers had frequent conversations among themselves, and, by the agreements of those speaking, no weapon was thrown during that time. He (i.e. Caesar) sent his legate Publius Vatinius to the very bank of the river to do such things as most pertained to peace, and to shout out frequently in a loud voice, (asking) whether citizens were allowed (lit. it was permitted to citizens) to send two envoys to (other) citizens (to talk) about peace, (something) which even the fugitives from the Pyrenaean mountains (i.e. the remnants of the army of Quintus Sertorius) and the pirates had been allowed (to do) (lit. [something] which it had even been permitted to the fugitives from the Pyrenaean mountains and the pirates [to do]), especially when they were doing this in order that citizens might not decide the issue with (other) citizens by arms. He said many things in a humble voice, as was fitting in relation to his own safety and (that) of everyone, and (he was) heard in silence by soldiers of both (armies). There was a reply (lit. It was replied) from the other side that Aulus (Terentius) Varro undertook that he would come to a conference on the next day and would see together (with them) how (lit. according to what means) envoys could come in safety and set forth what they wished; and a fixed time was appointed for this meeting. When there was a meeting there on the next day, a large number of men from both sides assembled, and there was a great expectation of this event and all minds appeared to be intent upon peace. Titus Labienus came forward from the crowd, and the talk of peace having been superseded, began to converse and to argue with Vatinius. Suddenly (a shower of) missiles, (which had been) let loose from all directions, interrupted (them) in the midst of their conversation; he (i.e. Vatinius) escaped these (missiles), having been protected by the arms of his soldiers; however, several men were wounded, among these the centurions Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius and Lucius Tiburtius, and some soldiers. Then Labienus (exclaimed): "Now then, stop talking about peace; for, without Caesar's head having been delivered to us, there can be no peace."
III. Trouble in Italy (Chapters 20-22).
Chapter 20. During the same period (in Rome), the praetor Marcus Caelius Rufus, the cause of debtors having been taken up (by him), placed his official chair near the platform of Gaius Trebonius, the urban praetor, and promised, that, if anyone should appeal (to him) with regard to the evaluation (of property) and the (system of) payments, as Caesar had determined (when) present (in Rome), he would be of assistance. But it transpired, due to the fairness of judgment and the humanity of Trebonius, who thought that, in these (difficult) times, justice should (lit. was needing to) be administered in a merciful and moderate manner, that (people) could not be found, by whom the initiation of an appeal could be produced. For to plead poverty and to complain either of one's own calamity or (of that) of the times, and to assert the difficulties of auctioning (one's property) is perhaps (the mark) of a moderate spirit; but to retain one's possessions (completely) intact, (in the case of those) who confess themselves to be in debt, what sought of mentality, what sort of impudence is that? So, no one was found to ask for that. Moreover, Caelius was discovered (to be) more exacting than those for whose advantage (the matter) pertained. And, starting from this beginning, lest he should appear to have embarked upon (so) shameful a cause in vain, he promulgated a law to the effect that money owed should be paid after a period of six years without any interest.
Chapter 21. When the consul Servilius and the other magistrates opposed (this) and he achieved less than his expectation, in order to arouse the passions of the people (lit. for the purpose of the passions of the people being aroused), the former law having been abandoned, he promulgated two (others), one by which he remitted a year's rent on dwellings to tenants, the other on cancellation of debts, and, an assault by the mob having been made on Gaius Trebonius, and several (persons) having been wounded, it drove him from his platform. The consul Servilius reported to the Senate on these proceedings, and the Senate voted that Caelius should (lit. was needing to) be removed from public affairs. In accordance with this decree, the consul barred him from the Senate, and, (when he was) attempting to harangue (the people), escorted (him) down from the rostrum. Smarting from this disgrace and from his resentment, he pretended publicly that he would go off to (join) Caesar; (but,) messengers having been secretly sent to (Titus Annius) Milo, who, (Publius) Clodius (Pulcher) having been murdered, had been condemned on that account, because he (still) had the remnants of a troop of gladiators from the great games (which he had) given, joined (forces) with him, and sent him to the district around Thurii to incite the herdsmen (lit. for the purpose of the herdsmen being incited). He, himself, when he came to Casilinum, and his military standards and weapons were seized at one (and the same) time, and having been shut out of Capua, his household having been seen at Naples, (and) his plans to arrange the betrayal of the town having been revealed, and fearing danger because the community had taken up arms and considered that he must (lit. was needing to) be treated in the position of a (public) enemy, dropped his plan and diverted himself from that path.
Chapter 22. In the meantime, Milo, letters having been sent around to the towns (saying) that he was doing those things which he was doing on the instructions, and with the authority, of Pompey, (and that) these commissions had been conveyed to him through Vibullius, was trying to win over (those) whom he considered to be struggling due to debt. When he could achieve nothing with these (people), some convicts having been freed, he began to assault Cosa in the territory of Thurii. There, when (he attacked the town which was being defended) by the praetor Quintus Pedius with one legion, he perished, having been struck by a stone (thrown) from the wall. And Caelius, having set out, as he kept saying, to (join) Caesar, reached Thurii. There, when he sought to win over certain men of that town, and promised money to Caesar's Gallic and Spanish cavalrymen, who had been sent there as a garrison, he was killed by them. So the beginnings of such great events, which, through the preoccupation of the magistrates and (the troubles) of the times, had made (all) Italy anxious, had a quick and easy ending.
IV. Antony runs the gauntlet (Chapters 23-30).
Chapter 23. Libo, having sailed from Oricum with the fleet of fifty ships, of which he was in command, came to Brundisium and seized an island which was opposite the harbour of Brundisium, because he thought it was better to keep a watch on that one place, from which it was necessary for our men to set out, than the whole coast-line and its harbours, (which had been) blockaded by a guard. He, owing to his sudden arrival, took and set fire to some transport ships (lit. set fire to some transport ships [which he had] taken) and took away one (which was) loaded with grain, and caused great alarm to our men, and, soldiers and archers having been landed (lit. put on land), he dislodged a garrison of cavalry, and profited to such an extent from the favourable nature of his position that he sent a dispatch to Pompey, (saying) that he might order, if he wished, the rest of his ships to be beached and repaired; (and) that he would hold back Caesar's reinforcements with his own fleet.
Chapter 24. At this time Antony (i.e. Gaius Antonius) was at Brundisium; relying on the courage of his soldiers, he covered the boats of about sixty of his war-ships with wicker hurdles and screens and on them he put aboard some selected troops and stationed these separately at several points on the coast, and he ordered two ships with three banks of oars, which he had caused to be built at Brundisium, to progress to the mouth of the harbour to exercise the oarsmen (lit. for the purpose of the oarsmen being exercised). When Libo saw these advancing towards (him), he sent five quadriremes against them, hoping that they could be intercepted, and, when these approached our ships, our veterans began to withdraw into the harbour, (and) they, flushed with excitement, pursued (them) incautiously. Then, the signal having been given, Antony's boats suddenly bore down on (lit. urged themselves on against) the enemy from all directions, and, at the first encounter, they took one quadrireme out of these (five), (together) with its oarsmen and marines, (and) forced the rest to flee ignominiously. In addition to this loss, it happened that they were prevented from fetching water by the cavalry (which had been) stationed by Antony along the sea-shore. Distressed by (the want of) this necessity and by the disgrace (of his defeat), Libo departed from Brundisium and gave up the blockade of our men.
Chapter 25. Many months had now (passed) and winter was well advanced, and the ships and legions had not come to Caesar from Brundisium, and several opportunities for this happening seemed to Caesar to have been missed, as favourable winds had often blown, to which he thought they must surely entrust (themselves) (lit. to which it was surely needing to be entrusted [by them]). And, as more time passed, so (those) who were in command of (Pompey's) fleet were keener to (act as) guards (of the coast), and they had a greater faith in their preventing (the landing of our men), and they were reproved in frequent dispatches from Pompey, since they had not prevented Caesar from coming in the first place, (and were being urged) that they should stop the rest of his army, and they were expecting a season with gentler winds (which would prove) daily more difficult for transporting (men). Alarmed by these circumstances, Caesar wrote quite sharply to his (officers) at Brundisium, (instructing) that, (when they) got a suitable wind, they should not miss the chance of sailing, if they could possibly hold a course to the coast of the Apollonians, and bring their ships into land there. Those parts were mainly free from the guard of ships, as they did not dare to venture too far from the harbours.
Chapter 26. They (i.e. Caesar's officers), their boldness and courage having been exhibited, with Mark Antony and Fufius Calenus directing (them), (and) with the soldiers themselves strongly encouraging (them) and not refusing any danger in return for Caesar's safety, (on) obtaining a south wind, set sail (lit. loosened [the sails of] their ships) and on the next day sailed past Apollonia and Dyrrachium. When they were seen from the mainland, (Gaius) Coponius, who was in command of the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrachium, led his ships out of harbour, and when, with a gentler wind, they had already come near to our (ships), the same south wind sprang up and served as a protection for our men. But he did not cease from his efforts for that reason, but hoped that, through the toil and perseverance of his sailors, the violence of the gale could be overcome, and he none the less kept on pursuing (our men who had been) carried past Dyrrachium by the extreme force of the wind. Our men, (while) making use of the kindness of fortune, feared however an attack of their fleet, if by chance the wind should abate. Reaching a port, which is called Nymphaeum, three miles (lit. three thousand paces) beyond Lissus, they put their ships in there - this port was protected from a south-west wind, (but) was not secure from a south wind - and they considered the danger of a storm (to be) less than (that) of the (enemy's) fleet. As soon as they entered (lit. it was entered) within (the harbour), by (a stroke of) incredible good fortune, the south wind, which had been blowing for two days, veered round to (lit. turned itself towards) the south-west.
Chapter 27. Here one can (lit. it was permitted [to one] to) observe a sudden change of fortune. A most secure harbour was receiving those who had just been alarmed for themselves; (and those) who had brought danger to our ships were forced to feel alarm at their own (danger). And so, the circumstances having been changed, the storm both protected our ships and battered the Rhodian ships to such an extent that all the decked ships, sixteen in number, were shattered and lost as wrecks, and, out of the large number of oarsmen and marines, some were dashed against the rocks and killed (lit. some, having been dashed against the rocks, were killed), and others were hauled off by our men, and of these all were spared and (lit. all, having been spared, were) sent back home by Caesar.
Chapter 28. Two of our ships, their passage having been accomplished more slowly, having been brought together during the night, since they were unaware of what place the others had reached, lay at anchor off Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who was in command of Lissus, several boats and smaller vessels having been sent out, prepared to storm them; at the same time he began discussions about their surrender, and promised quarter to those (who) surrendered (themselves). One ship of these (two) had taken on board two hundred and twenty (men) from a legion of recruits, the other a little less than two hundred (men) from a legion of veterans. Here one could understand (lit. it was permitted [to one] to be understood) what great protection there can be to men from firmness of spirit. For, the recruits, terrified by the great number of ships and worn out by the high seas and by sea-sickness, his oath that the enemy would not harm them at all having been accepted, surrendered themselves to Otacilius; all of them, having been brought before him, were slain most cruelly in his sight contrary to the sanctity of his oath. On the other hand, the soldiers from the legion of veterans, having been afflicted likewise by the evils of storm and bilge-water, did not consider that anything of their former courage should (lit. was needing to) be discarded, and, the first part of the night having been prolonged by terms being discussed and by the pretence of their surrender, they compelled the helmsman to bring the ship in to land, (and) finding a suitable spot, they passed the night there, and at dawn (lit. at first light), around four hundred cavalry, who were guarding that part of the sea-shore, as well as some armed men from the garrison who had followed them, having been sent against them by Otacilius, they defended themselves, and some of their (attackers) having been slain, they retreated (lit. betook themselves) to our men unharmed.
Chapter 29. This having happened, the corporation of Roman citizens, who occupied Lissus, a town which Caesar had previously assigned to them and had caused to be fortified, admitted Antony and was of help (to him) in every matter. Otacilius, fearing for himself, fled from the town and went to Pompey. All his forces, the sum of which was three legions of veterans and one of recruits, and eight hundred cavalrymen, having been disembarked, Antony sent most of the ships back to Italy in order to transport the rest of his soldiers and cavalry (lit. for the purpose of the rest of his soldiers and cavalry being transported), and he left the ferry-boats, which are a kind of Gallic ship, at Lissus with this purpose, that, if by any chance Pompey, thinking Italy was free (of soldiers), should transport his army thither - and this idea was widespread among the common people -, Caesar should have some means of pursuing (him), and he quickly sent messengers to him (informing him) in what areas he had landed his army and what (number) of soldiers he had brought across.
Chapter 30. Caesar and Pompey learned of these (events) at almost the same time. For they had seen the ships sailing past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, (and) they had, themselves, directed their march after them by land, but for the first (few) days they were unaware whither they had been carried. And, this information having been ascertained, they both adopted a different plan for themselves: Caesar, to join forces (lit. unite himself) with Antony as soon as possible; Pompey, to oppose (lit. set himself against) (them while) approaching on their march, and (to see) if he could attack them unsuspecting in an ambush. And both of them led out their armies from their base (lit. standing) camps by the River Apsus on the same day, Pompey secretly and by night, Caesar openly and by day. But Caesar's march was the further due to a detour (lit. a longer route) upstream (lit. the river [being] adverse), so that he could cross (it) by a ford. Pompey, his march (being) straightforward, because it was not necessary for him to cross the river (lit. the river was not needing to be crossed by him), hurried towards Antony by forced marches. And, when he learned that he was approaching, he, having found a suitable spot, concentrated his forces there, and kept all his men in camp, and prevented fires from being made, in order that (lit. by which [means]) his arrival might be the more secret. These (events) were immediately reported to Antony by some Greeks. Messengers having been sent to Caesar, he stayed (lit. kept himself) in camp for one day; on the next day Caesar reached him. His arrival having been learned of, Pompey, (fearing) lest he might be trapped between the two armies, withdrew from his position and went with all his forces to Asparagium in the territory of the people of Dyrrachium, and pitched camp there in a suitable spot.
V. The legates in Macedonia (Chapters 31-38).
Chapter 31. During this period, Scipio, some losses having been sustained around Mount Amanus, had called himself 'imperator'. This having happened, he had proceeded to demand large (sums of) money from the local communities and rulers, he had likewise exacted from the tax-farmers of his province the money owed by them for two years as well as a loan from them for the following year, and had levied cavalry from the whole province. These things having been collected, (and) his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians, who shortly before had killed the commander Marcus (Licinius) Crassus and had kept Marcus Bibulus under siege, having been left behind him, he led his legions and cavalry out of Syria. Since the province had fallen into the highest (state of) anxiety and fear of a war with Parthia, and since some soldiers' voices had been heard (saying) that they would go against the enemy, if they were led, (but) that they would not bear arms against a citizen and a consul, his legions having been led off into Pergamum and into winter-quarters in the most opulent cities, he made (them) very large payments of money and, to encourage (the loyalty of) his soldiers (lit. for the sake of his soldiers being encouraged [to be loyal]), gave the cities over to them to be plundered.
Chapter 32. Meanwhile, (sums of) money were being exacted most fiercely throughout (lit. in all of) the province. In addition, many (imposts) of various kinds were being devised to (satisfy) his avarice. A tax was laid on each head of a slave and of a freeman; columns, doors, grain, soldiers, arms, oarsmen, engines, (and) carriages were made subject to duty; if only a name could be found for such a thing, this seemed sufficient for money to be collected. Not only in the cities, but almost in (all) the villages and fortresses, individuals with authority were put in charge. Of these, (the man) who did anything with great severity and with great cruelty was thought (to be) both the best of men and (the best of) citizens. The province was full of lictors and officials, who, apart from the (sums of) money demanded, also served their own private gain; for they continually said, so as to cover their most shameless conduct with a respectable pretext, that they, having been driven from their home and country, were in want of all necessary things. To this was added the most exorbitant (rates of) interest, as is generally accustomed to happen in war-time, with all available money having been demanded; in these circumstances, they said that postponement for a day is a gift. So, the province's debt multiplied in this two-year period. None the less, for that reason (taxes) were demanded from the Roman citizens of that province, and they asserted that these (were) loans exacted by a decree of the Senate; (and) the tax for the ensuing year (was demanded) from the tax-farmers as an advance loan, as they had done in Syria.
Chapter 33. Moreover, Scipio ordered the money (which had been) deposited in the temple of Diana at Ephesus to be removed. And, an appointed day for this having been determined, when he came to the temple, several men of the senatorial order, whom he had summoned, having been invited (to attend), a dispatch from Pompey was delivered to him, (informing him) that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; (he was ordered to) hasten to join (lit. come to) him with his army and to regard everything (else) which (he was doing) behind that. This dispatch having been received, he sent away (those) whom he had summoned; he, himself, began to prepare for his journey to Macedonia and set out after a few days. This circumstance saved (lit. brought security to) the money of Ephesus.
Chapter 34. Caesar, Antony's army having been joined with, (and) the legion, which he had stationed (there) for the sake of the sea-coast being protected, having been led out of Oricum, thought that the provinces should (lit. were needing to) be tested by him and that he should advance further (lit. that it was needing to be advanced further [by him]); and, when ambassadors came to him from Thessaly and Aetolia to promise that, if he were to send a garrison (lit. a garrison having been sent), the states of those peoples would do (the things which he had) ordered, he sent Lucius Cassius Longinus with a legion of recruits, which was called the twenty-seventh, and two hundred cavalry into Thessaly, (and) likewise Gaius Calvisius Sabinus with five cohorts and a few cavalrymen into Aetolia; he urged them strongly to make provision for a corn supply, because these districts were nearby. He ordered Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus with two legions, the eleventh and the twelfth, and five hundred cavalry to proceed to Macedonia; Menedemus, the chief man of those areas, having been sent (as) an ambassador from that part of this province which was called 'free', professed the the enthusiastic support of all his people.
Chapter 35. Of these, Calvisius, having been received on his first arrival with the utmost good-will of all the people of Aetolia, the (enemy's) garrisons at Calydon and Naupactus having been expelled, took possession of all Aetolia. Cassius arrived in Thessaly with his legion. Since there were two factions there, he enjoyed a varied reception from the communities: Hegesaretos, a man of long established influence, was a supporter of Pompey's interests; Petraeus, a young man of the highest nobility, was keenly assisting Caesar with his own and his followers' resources.
Chapter 36. At the same time Domitius arrived in Macedonia; and, when numerous deputations from the local communities began to come to him, it was reported (to him) that Scipio was close at hand with his legions, with great speculation and rumour of everyone; for in the case of novelty rumour generally precedes the event. He, not delaying in any place in Macedonia, proceeded towards Domitius with great impetus, and, when he was twenty miles (lit. thousand paces) away from him, he suddenly made for (lit. directed himself towards) Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He did this so quickly that his approach and his arrival were reported simultaneously, and, so that he might make his march more speedily, he left Marcus Favonius at the river Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts as a guard for the legions' baggage, and ordered a fortress to be built there. At the same time, the cavalry of King Cotys, which was accustomed to hover (lit. be) around Thessaly, swooped down on Cassius' camp. Then, Cassius panic-stricken with fear, Scipio's arrival having been ascertained, and cavalry, which he thought was Scipio's, having been seen, made for (lit. directed himself towards) the mountains which enclose Thessaly, and from these places began to make his march towards Ambracia. But a dispatch from Marcus Favonius overtook Scipio (as he was) hurrying in pursuit, (saying) that Domitius was close by (him) with his legions, and that he could not remain (lit. keep himself) where he had been stationed (as) a guard without assistance from Scipio. This dispatch having been received, Scipio changed his plan and his line of march; he stopped pursuing Cassius, (and) hastened to bring help to Favonius. Therefore, his march having been conducted by day and night without a break, he reached him at a moment so opportune that the dust of Domitius' army was perceived at the same time as the first of Scipio's vanguard was seen. Thus, the energy of Domitius brought safety to Cassius, and the speed of Scipio (brought safety) to Favonius.
Chapter 37. Scipio, having remained for two days in his base (lit. stationary) camp by the Haliacmon river, which flowed between him and Domitius' camp, at dawn (lit. first light) on the third day led his army across (it) by a ford, and, a camp having been pitched, early on the following day he drew up his forces before the front of his camp. Then Domitius also thought, his legions having been brought out, that he ought to (lit. that it was not needing to be doubted by him, but that he should) decide the issue in battle. But, since there was a plain (stretching for) about three miles (lit. thousand paces) between the two camps, Domitius brought his battle-line up to Scipio's camp, (but) he persisted in not departing from his rampart. But Domitius' men having been restrained with difficulty, it happened that a battle was not fought (lit. it was not contended in battle), and (this was) especially because a stream with steep banks, (which was) bordering on Scipio's camp, hindered the advances of our men. When Scipio understood their eagerness and keenness for battle, suspecting that he would either be forced to fight, against his will, on the following day, or that (he) who had come with great expectation, should stay (lit. keep himself) in his camp with great disgrace, his reckless advance had a shameful ending, and at night, without even (the signal for packing up) the baggage having been proclaimed, he crossed the river and went back to the same area from which he had come, and there pitched camp at a spot near the river (which was) elevated by nature. A few days having elapsed, he placed a cavalry ambush at night in the place where our men had been generally accustomed to go for fodder in the preceding days; and, when Quintus (Atius) Varus, Domitius' cavalry commander, had come in accordance with daily routine, they suddenly rose up out of their ambush. But our men bravely withstood their attack, and each man quickly returned to (his place in) the ranks, and they all, on their own part, made a charge against the enemy. About eighty of them having been killed, (and) the rest having been thrown into flight, they returned (lit. betook themselves) to camp, with (only) two (men) having been lost.
Chapter 38. These things having been transacted, Domitius, hoping that Scipio could be enticed into battle, pretended that he was striking camp, having been induced by a shortage in his corn supply, and (the signal for packing up) the baggage having been announced in accordance with military custom, (and,) having advanced for three miles (lit. thousand paces), he stationed all his army and cavalry in a suitable and concealed spot. Scipio, (being) ready to follow, sent forward a large contingent of cavalry to reconnoitre Domitius' route and discover (it) (lit. for the purpose of Domitius' route being reconnoitred and discovered). When they had advanced, and their leading squadrons had entered the (place of) ambush, their suspicions having been aroused by the neighing of horses, they began to retreat (lit. betake themselves) to their own men, and (those) who were following them, observing their speedy withdrawal, halted. Our men, their ambush having been discovered, (fearing) that they should await the rest in vain, came upon and intercepted two squadrons (lit. having come upon two squadrons, intercepted [them]). Among these was Marcus Opimius, the commander of the cavalry. All the rest (of the men) of these squadrons they either killed or captured and brought (lit. or brought [them], having been captured,) to Domitius.
VI. Stalemate at Dyrrachium (chapters 39-58).
Chapter 39. Caesar, his garrisons having been drawn away from the sea-coast, as has been mentioned above (see Chapter 34), left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town (lit. for the sake of the town being protected) and entrusted to them the guarding of the war-ships, which he had brought across from Italy. The legate Manius Acilius was in charge of this duty and the town. He brought our ships back into the inner (part of) the harbour behind the town and moored (them) to the land, and he placed a sunken transport ship in the mouth of the harbour and fastened a second (one) to it; on top of this he built a tower and put (it) at the very entrance of the harbour (lit. he put at the very entrance of the harbour a tower having been built [by him]) and filled (it) with soldiers and entrusted (it) to be guarded (by them) against all sudden emergencies.
Chapter 40. These events having been learned about, Gnaeus Pompeius, the son, who was in command of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum and, (after) striving zealously by means of a tow-rope and many cables, he hauled up the submerged ship, and, attacking with several ships, in which he had constructed towers of equal size, the other ship, which had been put on guard by Acilius, so that, (by) fighting from a loftier position and (through) continually sending in fresh men for tired ones, and at the same time at other points attempting (to scale) the walls of the town by land with ladders and from the fleet in order to divide the forces of his adversaries, he overcame our men through their fatigue and the large number of his missiles, and, the defenders, all of whom, having got to their feet, escaped in small boats, having been dislodged, he stormed that ship, and at the same time on the other side (of the town) he seized the natural mole (which was) opposite, which had almost made the town an island, and brought across into the inner (part of the) harbour four biremes (which he had) impelled by a lever, four wooden rollers having been placed underneath. So, attacking from both sides the war-ships which were moored to the land and (were) unmanned, he carried four of them off and set fire to the rest. This business having been completed, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he had removed from (command of) the Asiatic fleet, to prevent provisions from being brought into the town from Byllis and Amantia. He, himself, having gone to Lissus, (and) attacking thirty transport ships, which had been left within the port by Mark Antony, set fire to (them) all; attempting to storm Lissus, (but) having been delayed for three days by defending Roman citizens, who were of that community, and by the soldiers, whom Caesar had sent (there) as a garrison, a few men having been lost, he departed thence without achieving his purpose (lit. the matter [being] unfinished).
Chapter 41. When he realised that Pompey was at Asparagium, Caesar, having set out for that place with his army, the town of the Parthini, in which Pompey had a garrison, having been stormed on the march, reached Pompey in Macedonia on the third day and pitched camp beside him, and on the following day, all his forces having been led out, (and) a battle-line having been drawn up, he gave Pompey the opportunity of fighting it out. When he noticed that he was remaining in (lit. keeping himself within) his entrenchments, his army having been led back to camp, he thought that he should adopt another plan (lit. that another plan was needing to be adopted by him). Accordingly, on the following day he set out for Dyrrachium with all his forces by a long detour and by a difficult and narrow path, hoping that Pompey could either be forced towards Dyrrachium or (could) be cut off from it, because he had gathered together there all his food supplies and his equipment for the whole war: (and) so it happened. For Pompey, at first being unaware of his purpose because he had seen (him) setting off from that district, thought that he had been forced to depart due to a difficulty with his corn supply; afterwards, having been informed (lit. made more sure) by his scouts, he struck camp the next day, hoping that he could counteract him by a shorter route. Caesar, suspecting that this would be (the case), and encouraging his soldiers to endure the fatigue cheerfully (lit. with an easy mind), his march having been interrupted for (only) a small part of the night, came to Dyrrachium early in the morning, when Pompey's vanguard was perceived in the distance, and pitched camp there.
Chapter 42. Pompey, having been cut off from Dyracchium, when he could not attain his objective, employing an alternative plan, built a camp on an elevated place, which is called Petra and (which) has fairly easy access to ships and protects them from certain winds. He ordered some of his war-ships to muster there, and grain and foodstuffs to be conveyed (there) from Asia and from all the regions which he controlled. Caesar, thinking that the war was going to be conducted for rather a long time, and despairing of supplies from Italy, because the entire coast was occupied by Pompey's forces with great diligence, and his own fleets, which he had constructed during the winter in Sicily, Gaul and Italy, were detained, sent his legates Quintus Tillius and Lucius Canuleius to Epirus for the sake of the corn supply, and, as these districts were rather far away, he built granaries in designated places, and assigned the conveyance of the grain to the neighbouring states. He likewise ordered that a search was to be made for (lit. it was to be searched for) whatever corn there might be in Lissus, the (territory of the) Parthini and all their strongholds. This (quantity) was very small, both due to the nature of their land, as their country is rough and mountainous and (the inhabitants) enjoy imported grain, and because Pompey had foreseen this, and in the preceding days he had occupied the (territory of the) Parthini as an occasion for plunder, and, their houses having been pillaged and ransacked, he had carried off by means of his cavalry all the grain (which had been) gathered to Petra.
Chapter 43. These events having been heard about, Caesar adopted a plan from the nature of the terrain. For around Pompey's camp there were several high and rugged hills. Firstly, he occupied these with garrisons and built on them. Then, a line of entrenchment having been extended from fortress to fortress, as the nature of each position allowed, he began to surround Pompey, (and he did this) bearing in mind the following (considerations): that he enjoyed a restricted supply of corn, and that Pompey was so strong due to his large amount of cavalry that he could bring up corn and foodstuffs for his army with less danger, and, at the same time, so that he should prevent Pompey from foraging and (thus) make his cavalry ineffective for waging war (lit. for war being waged), and, thirdly, (that) he should reduce the reputation, upon which he appeared chiefly to rely among foreign peoples, when a report should spread throughout the world that he was being blockaded by Caesar and did not dare to engage in battle.
Chapter 44. Pompey was not willing to leave (lit. depart from) the sea and Dyrrachium, because he had concentrated there all his equipment for the war, (namely) missiles, weapons (and) siege-engines, and was bringing up grain and foodstuffs for his army, and he could not prevent Caesar's entrenchments unless he was willing to fight it out in battle, (something) which he had decided that he should not do (lit. that it was not needing to be done [by him]) at that time. He was left pursuing an extreme battle strategy, (namely) to occupy as many hills as possible and to hold with his garrisons as wide an area as possible, and to spread Caesar's forces as widely apart as he could; and this happened. For, twenty-four fortresses having been built, (and through) embracing fifteen miles in a circuit, he obtained fodder within this space; and there were within this area many crops (lit. things sown by hand), on which he could graze his animals for a time. And, just as our men were seeing to it that their entrenchments (were) continuous, so that Pompey's men should not burst through at any point and attack our men behind their backs, so they were making a continuous line of entrenchments in their inner space, lest our men should enter at any point and be able to beset them from the rear. But they were winning in these works, because they had an advantage both in their number of soldiers and (because) they had a smaller perimeter to their space. Whatever positions Caesar wanted to take (lit. were needing to be taken by Caesar), although Pompey had decided to hold back all his forces and not to fight (a pitched battle), nevertheless he sent archers and slingers, of whom he had a large number, to positions of his own (choice), and many of our men were being wounded, and a great fear of arrows had come upon (them), and almost our soldiers had made jerkins or coverings of felt or of quilt or of hide, through which they might ward off the missiles.
Chapter 45. In seizing these posts (lit. In these posts being seized), each man exerted great energy: Caesar, in order to contain Pompey as tightly as possible; Pompey, in order to occupy as many hills as possible in as great a circuit as possible; and frequent skirmishes occurred for that reason. In (one of) these, when Caesar's ninth legion had seized a certain post and had begun to fortify (it), Pompey occupied a hill (which was) close to and opposite to this position, and began to hamper our men in their work, and, as on one side the approach (to our position) was almost on level (ground), at first archers and slingers having been thrown around, (and) then a great multitude of light-armed (troops) having been sent and ballistic engines having been brought up, he hindered our fortification works. Nor was it easy for our men to defend themselves and work at the fortifications at one (and the same) time. When Caesar saw that his men were being exposed to injury (lit. were being wounded) from all directions, he ordered them to withdraw and to abandon the position. Their retreat route was down (lit. by means of) a slope. But they (ie. Pompey's men), on this (account), pressed on (all) the more keenly, and did not allow our men to retire, because they seemed to be leaving their position having been induced by fear. Pompey is said, (while) boasting among his men, to have remarked at this point that he would not object to being thought of (as) a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions had withdrawn without severe damage from a position whither they had rashly advanced.
Chapter 46. Caesar, feeling anxious at the withdrawal of his men, ordered hurdles to be brought to the edge of the hill (as a protection) against the enemy and to be placed in their way, (and) that, soldiers having been concealed behind these, a ditch should be dug to a fair breadth, and that the ground should be obstructed as much as possible in all directions. He, himself, stationed slingers at suitable points in order to serve as protection to our men (while they were) withdrawing. These arrangements having been completed, he ordered the legion to be withdrawn. At this, Pompey's men began, more insolently and audaciously (then ever), to pursue and press our men hard, and they pushed over the hurdles (which had been) put in front of our entrenchments in order to cross the trenches. When he observed this, Caesar, fearing that they might appear not to have been withdrawn, but to have been routed, and that a greater setback might be suffered, (and) encouraging our men (when they were) at about the half-way stage (lit. at about the middle of the distance) through Antony, who was in command of that legion, ordered the signal to be given by trumpet and an attack to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth legion suddenly hurled their spears in unison (lit. having come together), and, from a lower position, rushing at the charge up the slope, they drove Pompey's men headlong (before them) and forced them to turn to flight (lit. to turn their backs); The upright hurdles, and the long poles (which had been) placed in their way, and the trenches, (which had been) established, served as a great hindrance to them in their retreat. But our men, who thought it sufficient to get away without damage, several (of their men) having been killed, (and) five of their own men in all having been lost, quietly retired, and, some other hills a little short of that position having been seized, they completed their (system of) fortifications.
Chapter 47. This was a new and unusual method of warfare, both with regard to so large a number of forts, and so great an area and such great entrenchments and the whole nature of the blockade, as well as with regard to other circumstances also. For whichever men have have tried to besiege another, they (have) attacked an enemy unnerved and weakened, or have hemmed in (one) overcome in battle or demoralised by some misfortune, when they, themselves, have been superior in the number of cavalry and foot-soldiers; but the reason for a siege is generally accustomed to be this, (namely) to cut the enemy off from (a supply of) corn. But now Caesar was trying to confine forces (which were) fresh and unharmed with an inferior number of soldiers, when they were abounding with plenty of everything; for, on a daily basis, a large number of ships was combining to bring in supplies, nor could any wind blow but that it had a favourable course from some direction (or other). Whereas he, himself, all the the corn from far and wide having been consumed, was in the greatest difficulties. But yet his soldiers were bearing these (circumstances) with exceptional patience. For they recalled that they, having suffered the same (situation) in Spain the previous year, had, by their efforts and endurance, brought a very great war to an end; they remembered that they, having endured a great scarcity at Alesia, (and) even a much greater (one) at Avaricum, had come away victors over the greatest tribes. They did not object to barley, when it was given to them, nor vegetables; indeed, they held in high esteem the cattle (meat), of which commodity there was a most plentiful supply from Epirus.
Chapter 48. There was also a kind of root, found by those who were off-duty (lit. disengaged from work), which was called 'chara', (and) which, having been mixed with milk, greatly relieved their want. They made it into something resembling bread. There was a large supply of this. When, in conversation, Pompey's men taunted our men with famine (lit. threw famine against our men) they commonly used to throw loaves made from this at them, in order to dash (lit. reduce) their hopes.
Chapter 49. The corn was now beginning to ripen, and mere hope sustained their want, and they trusted that in a short time they would have plenty. And frequent voices of soldiers were heard (when they were) on guard and in conversation (with each other), (saying) that they would live on bark from trees before Pompey would slip from their hands. They also learned with gladness from deserters that their horses were being sustained, but that that their other animals had perished; moreover that they themselves were not enjoying good health, with the cramped conditions of the place, and the foul smell (emanating) from the large number of corpses, and their daily toil, (as they were) unaccustomed to (construction) work, as well as having suffered from the extreme shortage of water. For Caesar had either diverted all the rivers and all the streams which ran down (lit. extended) to the sea, or had dammed (them) by great works, and, as these districts were mountainous and rugged, he had barricaded the defiles of the valleys, with stakes having been driven into the ground, and had conveyed earth to (these places) to hold back the water. So, they were forced by necessity to look for low and marshy places and to dig wells, and they added this to their daily tasks; but these springs were quite a long distance away from their guard-posts, and quickly dried up in the hot conditions. Caesar's army, on the other hand, was enjoying the best of health and a plentiful supply of water, (and) had an abundance of every kind of provision except corn; (and) they saw a better time approaching daily and greater hopes being laid before them with the ripening of the corn.
Chapter 50. In this new kind of warfare, new methods of fighting were being devised by both sides. When they noticed from our fires that our cohorts were sleeping at night beside the fortifications, attacking in silence, they shot all their arrows among the multitude and immediately retired (lit. betook themselves) to their men. Our men, having been taught by experience of these circumstances discovered this (as) a remedy, (namely) to make fires in one place (and sleep in another) ....
(N.B. There is a considerable break in the manuscripts here. From Appian, Book 2, Chapter 60, it may reasonably be inferred that the missing passage described an unsuccessful attack by Caesar on Dyrrachium, and then an attack on Caesar's lines by Pompey. The text begins again with an account of how this attack was beaten off.)
Chapter 51. In the meantime, Publius (Cornelius) Sulla, whom Caesar, (as he was) departing, put in charge of the camp, having been informed (lit. made more sure) (of this), came to the assistance of the cohort with two legions; on his arrival Pompey's men were easily repulsed. Indeed, they did not withstand the sight or the charge of our men, and, their front ranks having been overthrown, the rest turned to flight (lit. turned themselves around) and abandoned their position. But Sulla recalled our men (while they were) in pursuit (lit. pursuing [them]), lest they chased (them) too far. In fact, most people think that, if he had wished, the war could have been finished on that day. His decision does not seem worthy to be censured. For the functions of a legate are different from (lit. other than) (those) of a commander; one does everything to order, the other should (lit. ought to) take measures freely in accordance with the general interest (lit. the gist of events). Having been left in the camp by Caesar, Sulla, his men having been freed, was content with this, and did not wish to engage in a battle, an event which, in any case, might perhaps bring misfortune, lest he might seem to have taken upon himself the duties of the commander. The situation with regard to their retreat
brought great difficulty to Pompey's men. For, having advanced from an unfavourable position, they had halted on the top (of a hill); if they were to withdraw (lit. betake themselves) down (lit. by means of) the slope, they dreaded our men pursuing (them) from higher ground; nor was much time left until sunset (lit. the setting of the sun); for, in the hope of the business being concluded, they had prolonged the encounter almost until nightfall. So, Pompey, his plan having been adopted from necessity and on the spur of the moment, occupied a certain hillock, which was so far from our fortress that no missile, discharged from a ballistic engine, could be directed towards (them). At this spot he took up his position and fortified it, and kept all his men there.
Chapter 52. At the same time, there was fighting (lit. it was being fought) at two further places; for Pompey had attempted (to take) several forts simultaneously so as to keep our men apart (lit. for the sake of our men being separated), in order that help could not be provided (lit. it could not be assisted) from the neighbouring guard-posts. In one place (Lucius) Volcatius Tullus withstood the assault of a legion with three cohorts, and drove it from the position; in another (place) some Germans, having sullied out from our entrenchments, several (of the enemy) having been slain, retired (lit. betook themselves) to their men in safety.
Chapter 53. So, six battles having happened on one day, three at Dyrrachium and three at the fortifications, when a computation of them all was held, we found that up to two thousand in number of the Pompeians had fallen, several (being) recalled veterans and centurions; in that number was (Publius) Valerius Flaccus, son of that Lucius (Valerius Flaccus) who had governed Asia (as) praetor; and six military standards were taken. Our men had lost (lit. were missing) not more than twenty in all these skirmishes. But in the fort there was no one at all among the soldiers but that he was wounded, and from one cohort four centurions had lost eyes. And, when they wished to produce proof of their exertions and their danger, they counted up in front of Caesar about thirty thousand arrows (which had been) fired into the fort, and, the shield of the centurion (Cassius) Scaeva having been brought to him, a hundred and twenty holes were found in it. As he had done (such) a service to him and to the republic, Caesar announced that he was promoting him, (after he had been) presented with two hundred thousand (sesterces), from the eighth rank to the (rank of) primipilus (i.e. senior centurion of the legion) - for it was clear that the fort had been saved in great measure by his efforts - and, afterwards, he lavishly presented the cohort with double pay, corn, clothing, food rations and military decorations.
Chapter 54. Pompey, some large fortifications having been added at night, constructed some towers in the ensuing days, and, these works having been raised to a height of fifteen feet, he covered that part of the camp with mantelets, and, five days having elapsed, getting a second cloudy night, with all the gates of the camp having been barricaded, (and) obstacles having been put in front (of them) as a hindrance, he led his army out of the camp in silence at the beginning of the third watch (lit. the third watch having been entered), and withdrew (lit. betook himself) to his old fortifications.
Chapter 55. Every day after that Caesar drew up his army in battle-order on level ground, such that he brought his legions almost up to Pompey's camp, in case Pompey was willing to engage in a battle; and the front line was only so far distant from his rampart that no missile could be directed (at it) from a ballistic engine. But Pompey, in order to maintain his esteem and reputation among men, positioned his army in front of his camp in such a way that its third line was right up against (lit. touching) the rampart, (and) indeed that his whole army, (when) drawn up, could be covered by missiles (which had been) fired from the rampart.
Chapter 56. Aetolia, Acarnania (and) Amphilochus having been recovered by Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, as we have mentioned (see Chapter 35 in the case of Aetolia; the recovery of Acarnania and Amphilochus may have been described in the lost passages between Chapters 50 and 51), Caesar thought that he should try Achaea (lit. that Achaea was needing to be tried by him) and that he should advance (lit. it was needing to be advanced [by him]) a little further. So, he sent Quintus Calenus there, and joined Sabinus and Cassius with their cohorts to him. Their arrival having been ascertained (by him), (Publius) Rutilius Lupus, who, having been sent by Pompey, was in control of Achaea, began to fortify the Isthmus (of Corinth), to keep Fufius out of Achaea. Calenus recovered Delphi, Thebes and Orchomenus with the consent of those states themselves, subdued others by force, (and) endeavoured to win over the other states, envoys having been sent around (to them). Fufius was usually occupied in these matters.
Chapter 57. When these things were being done in Achaea and at Dyrrachium, and it was known that Scipio had come to Macedonia, Caesar, not forgetting his original purpose, sent to him (Aulus) Clodius, his own and that man's (i.e. Scipio's) friend, whom, having been introduced in the first place and recommended by him, he had begun to regard in the number of his close associates. He gave him (i.e. Clodius) a letter and a verbal message to him (i.e. Scipio), the gist of which was as follows: that he (had) tried everything with regard to peace; that nothing (had) yet been done he regarded as the fault of those whom he had chosen to be his agents in that matter, because they were afraid of putting his proposals to Pompey at an inopportune moment. That he was (a man) of such authority that he could not only explain freely what he recommended, but also (that) he could, to a great extent, reproach and direct (him if he were) going astray; moreover, that he was in command of an army on his own account, so that, besides his authority, he also had the strength to exercise compulsion. That, if he were to do this, everyone would refer the credit for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces (and) the security of the empire having been secured to (him) alone. Clodius referred these proposals to him, and during the first (few) days, he was, as he seemed, readily heard, (but) in succeeding (days) he was not admitted to any discussion, Scipio having been castigated by Favonius, as we afterwards learned, the war having been brought to an end, and he withdrew (lit. betook himself) to Caesar without achieving his purpose (lit. the matter [being] unfinished).
Chapter 58. Caesar, so that (lit. by which means) he might the more easily contain Pompey's cavalry at Dyrrachium, and prevent (it) from (getting) fodder, strengthened the two approaches (to the town), which we have said were narrow, with large (construction) works, and placed fortresses at these positions. When he realised that nothing was being achieved by his cavalry, after a few days (lit. a few days having elapsed) Pompey withdrew it again by ship to his own lines (lit. to himself) within the fortifications. There was such a shortage of fodder that they were feeding their horses with leaves stripped from trees, and with the tender roots of reeds (which they had) pounded up; for they had consumed the corn (which had been) sown within their entrenchments. And they were being obliged to bring in fodder from Corcyra and Acarnania after a long voyage (lit. a long distance of sailing coming in between), and, as the supply of that commodity was less, to supplement (it) with barley, and to maintain their cavalry by this means. But, when not only the barley and the fodder from all these places and the grass (which had been) cut, but even the foliage from the trees, had begun to fail, the horses having been wasted with hunger, Pompey thought that he should attempt something of a sally (lit. that something of a sally was needing to be attempted by him).
VII. Setbacks for Caesar (Chapters 59-74).
Chapter 59. There were among the number of horsemen around Caesar two brothers, the Allobroges Roucillus and Aegus, sons of Adbucillus, who had held the chieftaincy in his state for many years, men of exceptional courage, of whose excellent and most gallant services Caesar had availed himself in all the Gallic wars. For these reasons he had entrusted to them the most honoured offices in their own state and had seen to it that they had been selected for the senate on an exceptional basis (lit. outside the [usual] arrangement), and had bestowed (upon them) lands in Gaul (which had been) captured from the enemy and large rewards of monetary value, and had made (them) wealthy (men) from needy (ones). On account of their valour they were (held) in high esteem not only with Caesar but were also regarded (as) beloved among the army; but, relying on Caesar's friendship, and puffed up with stupid and barbarous arrogance, they began to look down on their own people, cheat the cavalry of their pay, and divert all the plunder to their own use. They all (i.e. the cavalry) went to Caesar and complained openly of their wrongdoings, and to these other (charges) they added that a false number of cavalry had been reported by them, whose pay they were embezzling.
Chapter 60. Caesar, not thinking that this was the (proper) time for their punishment, and overlooking a lot on account of their valour, deferred the matter; he severely rebuked them in private, inasmuch as they were making money out of the cavalry, and advised that they should look for everything from his friendship and should hope for future things on the basis of his past services. However, these matters brought upon them indignation and scorn on the part of everyone, and they understood that this was so both from the reproaches of others and also from their personal judgment and a guilty conscience (lit. the knowledge in their minds). Induced by this (sense of) shame and thinking that perhaps they were not being acquitted but were being reserved for another occasion, they decided to leave (lit. depart from) us and to try a new fortune and experience new friendships. And, having spoken with a few of their adherents, with whom they ventured to commit so great a crime, they first attempted, as we afterwards learned, the war having been brought to an end, to kill Gaius Volusenus, the commander of the cavalry, in order that they might appear to have deserted to Pompey with some service (having been performed); when this seemed too difficult and no opportunity for accomplishing (it) was afforded (to them), borrowing as much money as they could, as though they were wanting to give satisfaction to their men and restore what they had embezzled, a large number of horses having been purchased, they deserted to Pompey (together) with those whom they had (as) associates in their plot.
Chapter 61. Pompey led them around all his guard-posts and showed (them) off, because they were born in a noble rank and splendidly equipped, and were reckoned (to be) brave men and had been (held) in esteem with Caesar, and because something new and contrary to usual practice had occurred. For before that time, no one, either an infantry soldier or a cavalryman, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, while they were deserting almost daily from Pompey to Caesar, most commonly indeed all those soldiers (who had been) enrolled in Epirus and Aetolia and those regions which were being held by Caesar. But they (i.e. the brothers Roucillus and Aegus), all things having been ascertained, whether what had not been completed in our fortification works, or what was seen, by those who were pretty skilful in military matters, to be deficient in the times of events and the intervals between posts, the varying (degrees of) diligence having been observed according as to whether the temperament or zeal of each of those who were in charge of the arrangements was prevailing, reported all these things to Pompey.
Chapter 62. These things having been ascertained, (and) a plan for a sally having already been adopted, as has been mentioned before, he ordered his soldiers to make coverings for their helmets out of osiers (i.e. wicker-work) and to provide (materials for) the trench (i.e. fascines, or faggots of brushwood used to fill in ditches). These things having been prepared, he embarked at night a great number of light-armed (troops) and all (the material for) the trench into boats and pinnaces (lit. fast ships), and, just after mid-night, sixty cohorts from his main camp having been brought down, he led (them) to that part of the fortifications which extended to the sea and was furthest away from Caesar's main camp. To the same (place) he sent the ships, which we have mentioned (as) having been filled with (material for) the trench and light-armed troops, as well as the war-ships which he had at Dyrrachium, and issued instructions as to what he wished to be done by each (commander). To this (part of the) fortifications, Caesar had the quaestor (Publius Cornelius) Lentulus Marcellinus positioned with the ninth legion, and had despatched Fulvius Postumus in support (lit. [as] a helper), because he was not in full health.
Chapter 63. There was in that place a ditch fifteen-foot (wide) and, facing the enemy, a rampart ten feet in height, and the mound of this rampart extended the same distance in width. Six hundred feet away from that (place) (lit. An interval of six hundred feet from that [place] having intervened,) there was another rampart with slightly lower fortifications facing in the opposite direction. For Caesar, fearing that our men might be surrounded by ships, had made this double rampart in that place, so that, if there should be fighting on two sides, resistance should be possible (for us) (lit. if it were to be fought in a two-sided battle, it could be resisted). But the extent of the (lines of) fortification and the continual toil for all those days, inasmuch as he had included (lit. embraced) within his entrenchments seventeen miles (lit. thousand paces) in circumference, did not give (him) a chance of completing (the work). Therefore, the transverse rampart, facing the sea, which would join these two (lines of) fortification, had not yet been finished. This circumstance was known to Pompey, having been reported (to him) by the Allobrogian fugitives, and it brought great disadvantage to our men. For, when our cohorts of the ninth legion had camped outside by the sea, the Pompeians suddenly arrived at daybreak (lit. first light); at the same time, some soldiers, sailing around in their ships, began to hurl their missiles at the outer rampart, and the ditches were filled with fascines, and the legionary (soldiers), scaling ladders having been brought up, alarmed the defenders of the inner fortification with ballistic engines and missiles of every kind, and a vast horde of archers surrounded (them) on both sides. Moreover, the coverings of osiers on their helmets defended (them) well from the blows of the stones, which were to our men their only weapons. So, when our men were being hard pressed in every way and were holding out with great difficulty, the defect in our fortifications was noticed, and, having been disembarked from their ships by means of the sea, they (i.e. Pompey's men) made an attack upon our men from the rear, and, (after they had been) ejected from each of the two (lines of) fortification, forced (them) to flee (lit. turn their backs).
Chapter 64. This disorder having been reported (to him), Marcellinus despatched some cohorts to the relief of our struggling men. These (cohorts), seeing (the men) fleeing, could neither put heart into them by their arrival, nor sustain the enemy's assault. So, whatever (contingent) was added to the assistance, this, having been infected by the panic of those fleeing, (merely) increased the terror and the danger; for their retreat was being impeded by the large number of men. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer had suffered (lit. had been affected with) a serious wound, and was growing weaker (lit. was failing in his strength), (on) seeing our cavalry, he said, "I have guarded this (eagle) with great diligence for many years both (while) alive and now, (when) dying, I restore (it) to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not (lit. Be unwilling to) allow, I beseech (you) any dishonour to be sustained in the field (lit. in the military business), (something) which has not happened in Caesar's army before, and carry (this) to him safely (lit. unharmed)." By this chance, the eagle was saved, although all the centurions of the first cohort were slain (lit. all the centurions of the first cohort having been slain), except the senior centurion of the second line.
Chapter 65. And now the Pompeians, after the great slaughter of our men, were approaching Marcellinus' camp, no small amount of terror having been struck into the remaining cohorts, and Mark Antony, who was holding the nearest guard-post, this event having been reported (to him), was observed coming down from the higher ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the Pompeians and encouraged our men to recover (lit. restrain themselves) from their extreme terror. Not long afterwards, a signal having been made by smoke from fort to fort, as was the custom on earlier occasions, Caesar came to the same (place) with some cohorts (which had been) drawn from his outposts. This loss having been ascertained, when he noticed that Pompey (had) advanced beyond our (line of) fortifications to a camp next to the sea, so that he could forage freely and also have access (lit. and not have no access at all) to ships, his strategy for the war having been changed, since he could keep to his plan, he ordered (a camp) to be built alongside Pompey.
Chapter 66. This fortification work having been completed, it was noticed by Caesar's scouts that some cohorts, (a number) which appeared (to them) as good as a legion, were behind the wood and were being led to the old camp. The situation of the camps was as follows: a few days earlier, when Caesar's ninth legion had been opposing (lit. had put itself in the way of) Pompey's forces, and, as we have said, was building entrenchment works around (them), he pitched a camp in that spot. This (camp) bordered on a certain wood, and was not further away from the sea than three hundred paces. Afterwards, his plan having been changed for certain reasons, Caesar moved his camp a little distance beyond that place, and, after a few days (lit. a few days having elapsed), Pompey occupied this same spot, and, because he had intended to keep several legions in that place, he added greater fortification works, the inner rampart having been left (standing). Thus the lesser camp enclosed within the greater took the place of a fortress and a citadel. Also, he dug (lit. drew) an entrenchment from the left-hand corner of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces (away), so that (lit. by which means) his troops might fetch water freely and without risk. But he also, his design having been changed for certain reasons which it is not necessary to relate, left that place. In this condition the camp remained for several days; indeed all its fortifications were intact.
Chapter 67. His scouts reported to Caesar that the standard of a legion (had been) taken to that (place). (Those who were) in certain higher forts confirmed that this same thing (had been) seen. This place was about five hundred paces away from Pompey's new camp. Hoping that he could overwhelm this legion, and wishing to make good the losses of that day, Caesar left two cohorts in that entrenchment to give the appearance of fortification work; he himself led out, by an indirect route, (and) as covertly as he could, the remaining cohorts, thirty-three in number, in which was the ninth legion, many of its centurions having been lost and the number of its soldiers reduced, in a double line against Pompey's legion and the smaller camp. Nor did his first supposition deceive him. For, he even reached (it) before Pompey could be aware (of it), and, although the fortifications of the camp were strong, yet (by) swiftly attacking with his left wing, in which he himself was (placed), he drove the Pompeians down from the rampart. A 'hedgehog' (i.e. a barrier consisting of a wooden beam studded with sharp spikes) had been blocking the gates. There was fighting (lit. it was fought) here for a short time, since our men were trying to break in, (and) they were defending the camp, with Titus Puleio, on whose responsibility, (as) we have shown, the army of Gaius Antonius (had been) betrayed, fighting very bravely in defence of that place. But, nevertheless, our men prevailed through their valour, and, the 'hedgehog' having been cut down, they burst firstly into the larger camp, then also into the smaller camp, which had been enclosed within the larger camp, as the routed legion had retreated (lit. betaken itself) thither; they killed a good many (who were) defending themselves there.
Chapter 68. But fortune, which exerts great power both in all other matters and especially in war, effects great shifts in affairs from slight causes; (and) so it happened on this occasion. The cohorts on Caesar's right wing, through ignorance of the area, followed the (line of) fortification which we have shown above extended from the camp to the river, since they were looking for a gate and they thought that this was the fortification of the camp. But, when they (lit. it was) realised that it was joined to the river, the fortification having been demolished with no one defending (it), they crossed (it), and all our cavalry followed these cohorts.
Chapter 69. In the meantime, Pompey, after quite a long interval (lit. this fairly long interval having intervened), and the situation having been reported (to him), led five legions, (which he had) withdrawn from their fortification work, to the support of his men. At the same time, his cavalry was approaching our cavalry, and his battle-line, (which had been) drawn up, was seen by our men, who had seized the camp, and suddenly everything changed. Pompey's legion, encouraged by the expectation of speedy support, began trying to resist at the rear gate, and, of their own accord, made an attack on our men. Caesar's cavalry, as they were climbing along the entrenchments by a narrow passage, fearing for their (line of) retreat, began to flee (lit. made a beginning of flight). The right wing, which had been cut off from the left, the cavalry's panic having been observed, in order that they should not be overwhelmed inside the fortifications, began to withdraw by that route through which they had rushed forward, and most of them threw themselves headlong from the ten-foot rampart into the trenches, lest they should fall into the narrow passages, and, the first (of them) having been trampled down, the rest procured safety and a means of escape (lit. a way out) for themselves by means of their bodies. The soldiers on the left wing, when they perceived from the rampart that Pompey was close at hand, and that their men were fleeing, fearing lest they might be cut off by the narrow passages, since they had the enemy outside and inside (the fortifications), began to plan their retreat by the same direction whither they had come, and everything was full of turmoil, consternation (and) flight, to such an extent that, when Caesar grasped (lit. took hold with his hand of) the standards of those fleeing and ordered (them) to halt, some, their horses at the gallop (lit. [the reins of] their horses having been released), continued to flee in the same direction, (and) others, out of fear, even dropped their standards, nor did anyone halt at all.
Chapter 70. Among these very great troubles, compensating factors occurred, whereby our entire army was not destroyed, inasmuch as Pompey, fearing an ambush, because, I suppose, those things had happened contrary to the expectations of someone who had, (only) a little time before, seen his own men fleeing from the camp, did not venture to approach the entrenchments for some time, and (as) his cavalry was delayed by the narrow passage-ways, and moreover by these having been occupied by Caesar's troops. Thus, trivial circumstances had great consequences for both sides. For the (line of) fortifications,(which had been) drawn from the camp to the river, interrupted Caesar's victory, (which), Pompey's camp having already been stormed, (was) now almost at hand, (and) the same circumstance, with the speed of those pursuing having been impeded, brought safety to our men.
Chapter 71. In these two battles in one day, Caesar lost nine hundred and sixty soldiers and some notable Roman knights, Tuticanus Gallus, the son of a senator, Gaius Felginas from Placentia, Aulus Granius from Puteoli, (and) Marcus Sacrativir from Capua, five military tribunes and thirty-two centurions. But the great part of all of these men perished without any wound, having been crushed in the trenches and on the fortifications and on the banks of the river; and thirty-two military standards were lost. Pompeius was hailed as 'imperator', and afterwards allowed himself to be so greeted, but he was neither accustomed to make use (of it) in his letters, nor to display the badge of laurel in his fasces. But Labienus, when he had obtained agreement from him that the prisoners should be handed over to him, (and after) all (of them) had been brought out, as it seemed, for the sake of display, in order that (lit. by which [means]) confidence (in him as) a deserter might be regarded (as) greater, addressing (them as) fellow-soldiers and asking them in insulting terms (lit. with great insult in words) whether veteran soldiers were in the habit of fleeing, put (them) to death in the sight of all.
Chapter 72. So much confidence and spirit came to the Pompeians as a result of these events that they did not ponder over their strategy for the war, but they appeared to themselves to have been victorious already. They did not consider that the small number of our soldiers, the difficulty of our position and its confined space, the camp having been occupied (by them) before, and the two-fold fear (of attack) within and without the fortifications, nor that our army (had been) separated into two parts, when one part could not bring assistance to the other, had been the reasons (for our defeat). They did not add to these (considerations) that there had been fighting (lit. [it had been] fought) not in accordance with a vigorous assault, nor a battle, having happened, and that our own men had brought greater loss on themselves from their (small) number and their confined space than they had received from the enemy. Lastly, they did not remember the common misfortune of war, how often trifling causes, whether through false suspicion or sudden panic or interposing religious scruple, have inflicted great damage, or how often an army had come to grief (lit. it had come to grief within an army) due to the failings of a general or the fault of a tribune. But, just as if they had been victorious through their own valour, or (as though) no reversal of fortunes could occur, they made known their victory on that day through out the world (lit. orbit of the earth) by word of mouth (lit. by report) and by despatches.
Chapter 73. Caesar, having been driven away from his previous intentions, thought that he should change his whole strategy for the war (lit. that his whole strategy for the war was needing to be changed by him). And so, at one (and the same) moment, all his guard-posts having been led back, and the blockade having been abandoned, and the army having been mustered in one spot, he held a discourse with his soldiers and encouraged (them) not to suffer (too) seriously (from) what had happened, nor to be alarmed by these events, but to put this one setback, and that a moderate (one), against their many successful engagements. (He said) that they should give thanks to fortune (lit. that thanks was needing to be given to fortune [by them]), that they had taken Italy without some bloodshed, that they had pacified the two Spanish (provinces) belonging to the most warlike of men with the most skilled and experienced of generals, (and) that they had brought back under their control the neighbouring provinces (which were) full of corn (i.e. Thessaly, Aetolia and Macedonia). Lastly, that they should remember with what good fortune they had all been transported safely (lit. unharmed) through the midst of the enemy's fleets, with not only the ports but also the coasts having been filled (with their soldiers). But if not everything turned out favourably, that they should assist fortune (lit. that fortune was needing to be assisted) by their industry. That whatever loss had been sustained should be attributed to the fault of anyone at all rather than to his own. (He declared) that he had given (them) level ground for fighting, that he had taken possession of the enemy's camp, that he had driven (them) out, and overcome (them in the) fighting. But whetheric their own anxiety, or some mistake, or even fortune (itself) had interrupted a victory (that was) almost achieved and about to happen, that they all needed to make an effort (lit. that an effort was needing to be made by all [of them]), in order to repair the damage through their valour. But if this were to be done, that it would turn out, as it had happened at Gergovia, that their loss would turn to their benefit, and that (those) who had been afraid to fight before would offer themselves for battle voluntarily.
Chapter 74. This discourse having been held, he marked several standard-bearers with disgrace, and demoted (them) (lit. moved [them] in rank). Indeed, such great grief on account of this setback and such great zeal to repair their disgrace (lit. for their disgrace being repaired) had come upon the whole army that no one felt the want of an order either from a tribune or a centurion, but each man imposed on himself even heavier labours (then usual) in place of punishment, and, at the same time, they were all burning with desire for fighting, while some men of higher rank, influenced by (considerations of) strategy, also thought that they should remain in that place (lit. that it was needing to be kept in that place [by them]), and that the issue should (lit. was needing to) be committed to battle. On the other hand (lit. Against this), Caesar was not sufficiently confident in his demoralised troops and thought that that they should be given some time to lay revive their spirits (lit. that an interval (of time) was needing to be interposed for their spirits to be revived), and he was exceedingly anxious about the corn supply, with the fortifications having been abandoned.
VIII. Caesar moves to Thessaly (Chapters 75-81).
Chapter 75. And so, without delay (lit. no delay having elapsed), account having been taken of the wounded and sick only, he sent all the baggage ahead in silence early in the night from the camp to Apollonia, and told (them) not to stop before the journey (had been) completed. One legion was sent as their escort. These operations having been accomplished, he retained two legions in the camp, sent the rest ahead, (after they had been) led out through several gates during the fourth watch, by the same route, (and then) a little later (lit. a small interval [of time] having elapsed), in order both to preserve military procedure, and (so that) his setting out might be discovered as late as possible, ordered that the signal be given (for striking camp), and, leaving at once and following the rear of the column, he soon disappeared out of sight of the camp. Nor, indeed, did Pompey, his (i.e. Caesar's) plans having been ascertained, effect any delay in following (him), but, looking in the same direction, (to see) if he could catch (them) on a march hampered with baggage and frightened, he led his army out of camp and sent his cavalry ahead to delay the rear of our column (lit. for the purpose of the rear of our column being delayed), but he could not overtake (it), because Caesar, on a march unencumbered with baggage, had got a long way ahead. But when they reached (lit. it was come to) the river Genusus, because, the banks (being) steep (lit. difficult), their cavalry had caught up our hindmost men, it detained (them) in battle. Caesar set his own cavalry against them, and mixed in (with them) four hundred of his front-line light-armed men, who made such good progress that, battle with their cavalry having been joined, they drove (them) all back and killed several (of them), and retired (lit. they betook themselves) to the column without loss (lit. unharmed).
Chapter 76. The exact march, which he had proposed for that day, having been completed, and his army having been led across the river Genusus, Caesar took up position in his old camp opposite Asparagium, and kept all his foot-soldiers within the rampart of the camp, and ordered the cavalry, (which had been) sent out for the purpose of foraging, to return without delay by the rear gate. In like manner, Pompey, his march on that day having been completed, took up his position in his old camp near Asparagium. His soldiers, because they were free from construction work, the fortifications (being) intact, some proceeded some distance for the sake of fetching wood and fodder, others, a large part of the beasts of burden and the baggage having been left behind, because they had taken the decision to go out in a hurry, (and) having been induced by the proximity of their former camp to recover these things (lit. with the purpose of these things being brought back), their arms having been deposited in their tents, left their entrenchments. These men having been hampered from pursuit, (something) which Caesar had foreseen, at about the time of midday, the signal for marching having been given, he led out his army, and, that day's march having been doubled, he advanced about eight miles (lit. thousand paces) from his position. Pompey could not do this owing to the departure of his troops.
Chapter 77. Similarly on the next day, Caesar, the baggage having been sent forward early in the night, departed himself just after the fourth watch, so that, if he should be forced to fight (lit. if any necessity for fighting should be imposed [upon him]), he should meet the sudden emergency with his army unencumbered. He did this same thing on succeeding days. By these means he ensured (lit. it was effected) that, although the rivers were very deep and the routes very difficult (lit. the rivers [being] very deep and the routes very difficult), he received no setback. For Pompey, a delay having been incurred on the first day, and his efforts having been undertaken in vain on the succeeding days, when he exerted himself by forced marches and was keen to catch up with those (who had) got ahead (of him), on the fourth day made an end of the pursuit, and decided that he should adopt another plan (lit. another plan was needing to be adopted by him).
Chapter 78. It was necessary for Caesar to go to Apollonia to deposit the wounded, pay the army, encourage his allies, (and) leave garrisons (lit. for the purpose of the wounded being deposited, pay being given to the army, the allies being encouraged, [and] garrisons being left) in the cities. But he assigned to these matters only as much time as was necessary for (a man) in a hurry (lit. for a hurrying [man]). Being anxious for Domitius, lest he should be surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened towards him with all speed and urged on by eagerness. However, his strategy for the entire campaign was based on the following considerations: that, if Pompey marched by the same route, he could force him, (once he had been) taken away from the sea coast and from those supplies which he had prepared at Dyrrachium, and (had been) removed from his corn and his provisions, to fight with him on equal terms of warfare; if he were to cross over into Italy, his army having joined forces (lit. having been united with) Domitius, he could march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; (and) if he tried to attack Apollonia and Oricum and exclude him from the whole sea coast, he could, Scipio having been besieged, force him to bring help to him of necessity. Accordingly, messengers having been sent ahead, Caesar wrote to Gnaeus Domitius and pointed out what he wished to be done, and (a number of) cohorts having been left as garrisons, four at Apollonia, one at Lissus, (and) three at Oricum, and (those) who had been disabled on account of their wounds having been deposited, he began to make his march through Epirus and Athamania. Pompey also, guessing (lit. judging through conjecture) about Caesar's intentions, considered that he should hasten to Scipio (lit. that it was needing to be hastened to Scipio by him), if Caesar should direct his march thither in order to bring help to Scipio, (but,) if he should be unwilling to quit (lit. depart from) the sea coast and Oricum, because he was waiting for legions and cavalry from Italy, (then) he himself might attack Domitius with all his forces.
Chapter 79. For these reasons, each of them applied himself to speed, both in order that he might be of assistance to his own (forces), and so that he might not miss an opportunity of time for crushing his enemies (lit. for his enemies being crushed). But (his engagements) atApollonia had diverted Caesar from the direct route; Pompey (on the other hand) had an easy march through Candavia into Macedonia. Another unexpected difficulty arose because Domitius, who for several days had had his camp placed near to Scipio's camp, had left (lit. departed from) that place and had (then) made a march to Heraclia Sentica, which is near to Candavia, as fortune itself seemed to expose him to Pompey. At that time, Caesar was unaware of this. At the same time, letters having been despatched by Pompey through all the provinces and states (telling) about the battle (which had) happened at Dyrrachium (in) much more enlarged and exaggerated (terms) than the (actual) events had justified, (and) a rumour had spread abroad that Caesar (had been) driven to flee, with almost all his forces having been lost. These (reports) had made the roads dangerous (and) had turned some of these states from their alliance with him. Due to these things it happened that those sent by several routes from Caesar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Caesar, could by no means complete their journey. But the Allobroges and the associates of Roucillus and Aegus, whom we have shown (as) having fled to Pompey, having caught sight of Domitius' scouts on the road, either on account of their old acquaintance, as they had waged war together in Gaul, or (through being) puffed up with vainglory, set forth everything which had happened, and told (them) of Caesar's setting out and Pompey's approach. Having been informed (lit. made more sure) by these (scouts), Domitius, (who was) scarcely ahead (of them) (lit. preceding [them]) by an interval of four hours, avoided the danger by the kindness of the enemy, and came to meet Caesar, (as he was) coming (on his march), at Aeginium, which is on the way to and opposite Thessaly.
Chapter 80. His army having been united, Caesar arrived at Gomphi, which is the first town in Thessaly, (as one is) coming from Epirus. The people there had sent ambassadors to Caesar on their own initiative a few months before, (saying) that he might make use of all their resources, and had sought a garrison of soldiers from him. But the report, which we have spoken of above, concerning the battle of Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many aspects, had already preceded him . And so, Androsthenes, the ruler of Thessaly, since he preferred to be the associate of Pompey in victory (rather) than the ally of Caesar in adverse circumstances, gathered all the large number of slaves and freemen from the countryside, and closed the gates, and sent messengers to Scipio and Pompey, (asking them) to come to his aid: (he said) that he could rely on the fortifications of the town, if he were relieved quickly; (but that he) could not withstand a lengthy investment. The departure of the armies from Dyrrachium having been ascertained, Scipio had taken his legions to Larissa; (and) Pompey was not yet nearing Thessaly. Caesar, his camp having been fortified, ordered scaling ladders and penthouses, and screens to be made, for a sudden assault. These things having been done, (while) exhorting his soldiers, he told (them) how much advantage might be had with regard to relieving their shortage of supplies (lit. with regard to their shortage of supplies being relieved) by their taking possession of a well-stocked and wealthy town, (and) at the same time (how much) terror they might strike into other states through the example of this town, and (how) this should be done speedily, before any help could rush in. Accordingly, taking advantage of the exceptional enthusiasm of his soldiers, beginning to attack the town, (despite) its very high walls, after the ninth hour on the same day on which he had arrived, he stormed (it) before sunset (lit. the setting of the sun), and gave (it) to his soldiers for the purpose of plundering, and at once moved his camp from the town and went to Metropolis, so that he preceded any messengers and reports of the town having been stormed.
Chapter 81. The inhabitants of Metropolis, having been influenced by the same rumours, (and) at first employing the same plan, shut their gates, and manned their walls with armed men, but soon afterwards, the fate of the state of Gomphi having been ascertained from some prisoners, whom Caesar had caused to be brought up to the wall, they opened their gates. These people having been preserved with very great care, (and) the good fortune of the people of Metropolis having been compared with the fate of the inhabitants of Gomphi, there was no state in Thessaly, except the people of Larissa, who were being held by the very large contingents of Scipio, that did not obey Caesar and carry out (lit. but that it obeyed and carried out) his commands. He, finding a suitable place in that countryside for the provision of corn, which was now almost ripe, decided to await Pompey's arrival there and to make it (lit. confer upon it) his entire theatre of operations (lit. strategy) for the war.
IX. Pompey follows (Chapters 82-84).
Chapter 82. Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days afterwards, and, (when) giving an address to his whole army, he gave thanks to his own men, (and) he exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that, with victory now having been secured, they should wish to be participants in the booty and the rewards, and, all his legions having been admitted into one camp, he shared the honour (of command) with Scipio, and ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his (i.e. Scipio's) tent, and another commander's tent to be pitched for him. Pompey's forces having been increased, and two great armies having been united, his former reputation was confirmed with everyone, to such an extent that, whatever time should elapse, that seemed (merely) to delay their return to Italy, and, if ever Pompey did anything rather slowly or with a degree of caution, they would declare that it was the business of a single day, but that he took pleasure in command and having ex-consuls and ex-praetors in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly among themselves about military commands or about priesthoods, and they designated (people to) the consulship for (several) years (to come), (and) some were laying claim to the houses and property of those who were in Caesar's camp; and there was great controversy among them in their council-of-war, as to whether the registration of (Quintus) Lucilius Hirrus (as a candidate) in his absence at the next praetorian election ought to be allowed, as he had been sent by Pompey against the Parthians, when his friends were imploring Pompey's assurance that he would fulfil (the undertakings) which he had received (when) departing, so that he should not appear (to have been) cheated by means of his authority, (but) the rest were objecting that one man should not take precedence over all (those who had been) amidst equal toils and dangers.
Chapter 83. (Lucius) Domitius (Ahenobarbus), Scipio, and (Publius Cornelius) Lentulus Spinther, in their daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, had already descended openly to the most virulent verbal invective, when Lentulus proffered the respect due to his age, Domitius boasted of his influence and prestige in the city, (and) Scipio was relying on his relationship with Pompey. Acutius Rufus even charged Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betrayal of the army, (something) which he declared had happened in Spain. Domitius said in the council that he was resolved (lit. it seemed good to him) that three tablets should be given for judgment to those who were in the senatorial order and who had been present together with them in the war, (so that) they could pass sentence on each one (of them) who had remained in Rome, and (each one) who had been within Pompey's garrisons but had taken no part in the military action: one would be (for those) who voted that (they) should be freed from all peril, the second (for those) who were wishing to condemn (them) to loss of civic rights, (and) the third (for those) who wished to punish (them) with a fine. In short, they were all busying themselves either with their own advancement (lit. offices) or with monetary rewards or with pursuing their enemies (lit. their enemies being pursued), and they were not considering by what means they could win victory, but in what manner they should make use of victory.
Chapter 84. A corn supply having been arranged, and his soldiers' (morale) having been strengthened, and a long enough period of time having elapsed from the battle at Dyrrachium, so that it appeared (to him) that the spirit of his troops had been sufficiently observed, he considered that he ought to put to the test whatever intention or wish Pompey had for joining battle (lit. that Pompey's intention or wish to join battle was needing to be put to the test). Accordingly, he led his army out of camp and drew up a battle-line, at first on their own ground, and some distance away from Pompey's camp, but on succeeding days (in such a way) that he advanced from his own camp and brought up his battle-line under Pompey's hills. This action made his army more confident every day. However, with regard to his cavalry, he kept to his former tactic, as we have described (see Chapter 75), so that, since they were in many degrees inferior in number, he ordered some young and light-armed infantrymen, (who had been) selected from the front-line men for their swiftness in battle, to fight with the cavalry, (and) they, through daily practice, also acquired a familiarity with this kind of fighting. By these means it was brought about that a thousand cavalrymen might venture, even on rather open ground, to withstand a charge of seven thousand Pompeians, when the need was present, nor were they greatly dismayed by the large number of them. For, indeed, even during these days, he undertook a successful cavalry battle, and killed, (together) with certain (others), one Allobrogian out of the two, whom we have mentioned above (see Chapter 60) as having deserted to Pompey.
X. The battle of Pharsalus (Chapters 85-101).
Chapter 85. Pompey, who had his camp on a hill, drew up his battle-line on the lowest spurs of the mountain, all the time waiting, as it seemed, (to see) if Caesar would expose himself to unfavourable ground. Caesar, thinking that Pompey could by no means be lured into battle, decided that this was the most appropriate method of (conducting) the war, (namely) to move his camp from that spot and always to be on the march, with this in mind (lit. bearing these things in mind), that by moving his camp (lit. by his camp being moved) and by going to several places (lit. by several places being gone to) he should enjoy a more advantageous corn supply, and, at the same time, that (by being) on the march he might get some opportunity for fighting a battle, and (that) by daily marches he might exhaust Pompey's army, (which was) unaccustomed to toil. These matters having been decided, the signal for marching having already been given and the tents having been struck, he (lit. it was) noticed that Pompey's battle-line had advanced a little further forward (than usual) beyond its daily practice, so that he could fight a battle without being (lit. so that it could be fought not) in an unfavourable position. Then, Caesar said to his men, when the column was already at the gates, "We must put off the march (lit. The march is needing to be put off by us) for the time being, and we must think about battle (lit. it is needing to be thought about battle), just as we have always asked for. Let our minds be ready (lit. let us be ready in mind) for battle; we shall not easily find an opportunity afterwards." And he immediately led out his forces lightly armed.
Chapter 86. Pompey also, as it was afterwards learned, with the encouragement of all his (friends), had decided to engage in battle. For indeed he had even declared in council during the preceding days that, before the battle-lines should clash together, it would happen that Caesar's army would be routed. When most people were surprised at this, he said, "I know that I am promising something (that is) almost incredible; but listen to the tactics of my plan, so that (lit. by which means) you may go into battle with a more confident spirit. I have persuaded our cavalry, and they have confirmed to me that they will do it, that, when the armies are within quite close range (lit. it has been approached quite closely), they should attack Caesar's right wing on its exposed flank, and, their battle-line having been surrounded from the rear, rout their army, (after it has been) thrown into confusion, before any missile should be hurled at the enemy by us. In this way we shall put an end to the war without any risk to our legions and almost without any casualties. However, this is not difficult, since we are so very strong in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice that their minds should be ready (for battle) (lit. that they should be ready in mind [for battle]) on the following day, and since the opportunity for fighting a battle, as they had often been eagerly requesting, was come, (he exhorted them) not to disappoint their own expectations nor (those) of others.
Chapter 87. Labienus came after him, in order, when he had belittled Caesar's forces, to extol Pompey's plan with the highest praises: "Do not (lit. Be unwilling to) think, Pompey," he said, "that this is the army which totally conquered Gaul and Germany. I took part in all the battles and I am not speaking thoughtlessly about something (of which I am) ignorant. A very small part of that army (now) survives, a large part (of it) has gone completely, (something) which was bound to happen with so many battles, the autumn pestilence in Italy carried off many, many have left for home, (and) many have been left behind on the continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are made up out of those who remained by reason of ill-health? These forces which you see (now) were recruited from the levies in Cisalpine (lit. Hither) Gaul during those years, and the majority are from the colonies north of the Po. Moreover, what was the pick (of them) perished in the two battles at Dyrrachium." When he had said these things, he swore an oath that he would not return to camp except (as) a victor, and he exhorted the others to do the same. Praising this (proposal), Pompey swore the same (oath); nor indeed did was there anyone among the rest (of them) who hesitated to swear. When these things had happened in the council, they broke up (lit. it was broken up) amidst great hope and the joy of all; and in their minds they were already anticipating victory, as it seemed that no assurance could be given in vain concerning so important a matter and by so experienced a general.
Chapter 88. When Caesar approached Pompey's camp, he observed that his battle-line (had been) drawn up in the following manner: on the left wing were the two legions (which had been) handed over by Caesar at
the beginning of the dispute in accordance with the decree of the Senate; of these, one was called the First, (and) the other the Third. Pompey himself was at that location. Scipio was holding the centre of the line with his Syrian legions. The Cilician legion, having been joined together with the Spanish cohorts, which we have mentioned (had been) brought over by Afranius, were stationed on the right wing. Pompey believed that these were (lit. that he had these [as]) his steadiest (cohorts). He had interspersed the rest between the centre of line and the wings, and he made up his cohorts to the number of a hundred and ten. These were forty-five thousand (men), (plus) about two (thousand) recalled veterans, who, (coming) from the privileged soldiers of former armies, had flocked to (join) him; he dispersed these throughout the (lit. in the whole) battle-line. He stationed the remaining seven cohorts as a guard for the camp and the neighbouring forts. A certain river with steep banks (i.e. the Enipeus) was protecting his right wing; for this reason he placed all his cavalry, and all his archers and slingers, on the left wing.
Chapter 89. Caesar, maintaining his previous arrangement, had stationed the Tenth legion on the right wing, and the Ninth on the left, although it had been severely weakened by the battles at Dyrrhacium, and he attached the Eighth to it in such a way that he almost made one (legion) out of the two, and he ordered one to be of assistance to the other. He had eighty cohorts stationed in the battle-line, the sum of which was twenty-two thousand (men); he left seven cohorts as a garrison for the camp. He put Antony in charge of the left wing, Publius Sulla the right, and Gnaeus Domitius the centre of the line. He himself took up his position opposite Pompey. At the same time, those dispositions (of the enemy), as we have mentioned, having been noticed, (and) fearing lest his right wing might be surrounded by the large number of their cavalry, he rapidly extracted one cohort from each (legion) in the third line, and from them established a fourth (line) and placed (it) opposite the cavalry, and gave (them) his instructions (lit. made known what he wished to be done), and warned that victory on that day would depend on the valour of those cohorts. At the same time, he commanded the third line, and the army as a whole, not to charge without his order; (and he said) that he would give them a signal with his flag when he wished that to happen.
Chapter 90. When he was exhorting his army to battle, in accordance with military custom, and was proclaiming his good services to them at all times, he especially recalled that he could call (lit. employ) his soldiers (as) witnesses to the great earnestness with which he had sought peace, what (efforts) he had made through Vatinius by conversations (with Labienus), what (efforts he had made) through Aulus Clodius (by conversations) with Scipio, (and) in what ways he had striven with Libo with regard to envoys being sent. (He said) that he had never wished to spill soldiers' blood, nor to deprive the republic of this or the other army. This speech having been delivered, he gave the signal to his soldiers (who were) demanding (it) and (who were) burning with desire for battle.
Chapter 91. There was in Caesar's army a recalled veteran (named Gaius) Crastinus, a man of surpassing valour, who in the previous year had or marched with him (as) the primipilus (i.e. senior centurion) in the Tenth legion. The signal having been given, this man said, "Follow me, (those of you) who were men in my maniple (i.e. company) and give service to your commander as you have resolved. Only this one battle is left; this having been completed, he (will recover) his dignity and we shall recover our liberty." At the same time. looking back at Caesar, he said, "I shall act to day, General, in such a manner that you will give thanks to me, either alive or dead." When he had said these things, he was the first on the right wing to charge (lit. he charged first on the right wing), and about a hundred and twenty chosen troops, volunteers from this century, followed him.
Chapter 92. Between the two battle-lines there was so much space left that there was enough for a charge by both armies. But Pompey had ordered his men to await Caesar's assault, and not to budge (lit. move themselves) from their position and allow their battle-line to be disrupted; and he was said to have done this on the advice of Gaius (Valerius) Triarius, in order that the initial charge and impact (lit. force) of their (i.e. Caesar's) soldiers might be broken, and their battle-line stretched out, and (so that) they (i.e. the Pompeians), (still) arranged in their ranks, might attack (them while they were) disordered. And he expected that their javelins would do less damage (lit. fall more lightly) than if, these missiles having been discharged, they should be running forward themselves, (and) at the same time that it would happen that Caesar's soldiers, through running twice the distance (lit. by a double run), would be out of breath and exhausted by fatigue. It seemed to us that this was done by Pompey without sufficient reason, on account of the fact that there is a certain eagerness of spirit in everyone, which is inflamed by desire for battle. Generals ought not to repress this, but to encourage (it); nor was it instituted of old in vain, that signals from all sides should sound together and everyone raise a war-cry; by these means, they thought that the enemy would be scared and one's own men inspired.
Chapter 93. But, when, the signal having been given, our troops ran forward with their javelins couched (lit. with hostile javelins), and noticed that Pompey's men were not running to meet them (lit. that it was not being run to meet [them] by Pompey's men), they, (being) experienced through practice and trained in previous battles, checked their charge of their own accord and halted at almost the mid-point of the space (between them), lest they should arrive with their strength exhausted, and, a short space of time having elapsed, and their charge having been renewed again, they discharged their javelins, and quickly drew their swords, as they (lit. it) had been ordered by Caesar. Nor indeed were the Pompeians found wanting in the circumstances. For they both caught the missiles (which had been) discharged (at them) and bore the onset of the legions, and they kept their ranks, and, their javelins having been released, reverted to their swords. At the same time, all the cavalry galloped forward from Pompey's left wing, as they (lit. it) had been instructed, and a whole horde of archers rushed forth. Our cavalry did not withstand their attack, but, having been dislodged from their position, they withdrew a little, and Pompey's cavalry began to press them the more vigorously, and to deploy (lit. spread themselves out) in squadrons, and to surround our battle-line on its exposed flank. When Caesar observed this, he gave the signal to the fourth line, which he had arranged in the number of six cohorts. They rushed forward quickly, and with hostile standards made an attack on Pompey's cavalry with such great force that not one of them could withstand (it), and they all, wheeling around, not only abandoned their position, but spurred on, forthwith, by flight, they sought the highest mountains. These men having been withdrawn, all the archers and slingers, having been left defenceless (and) without protection, were slain. In the same attack the cohorts encircled the left wing, with the Pompeians in the battle-line still fighting and resisting, and attacked them in the rear.
Chapter 94. At the same time, Caesar ordered his third line, which had been inactive and had remained (lit. held itself) in its position up to that time, to advance. So, when fresh and unscathed men took the place of weary (ones), and others were attacking (them) from the rear, the Pompeians could not hold out, and they all fled (lit. turned their backs). Nor indeed was Caesar mistaken (lit. had it deceived Caesar) in thinking that the origin of victory would arise from those cohorts which had been placed in the fourth line to oppose (lit. opposite) the cavalry, as he himself had publicly declared in encouraging his men (lit. in his men being encouraged). For, in the first place, the cavalry were repulsed by them, the slaughter of the archers and slingers (was) carried out by them, (and) the Pompeian battle-line was surrounded from the left wing and the beginning of the rout (was) effected by them. But, when Pompey saw that his cavalry (had been) routed, and observed that that part (of his army) upon which he especially relied (was) panic-stricken, despairing of the others, he quitted the battle-field, and at once rode (lit. conveyed himself by horse) to his camp, and said loudly to those centurions, whom he had placed in post at the praetorian gate, in order that the soldiers could hear, "Guard the camp and defend (it) diligently, if anything rather awkward should occur. I am going round to the other gates and will make sure of the camp's guards." When he had said these things, he rode (lit. conveyed himself) to his tent, nervous in the highest degree, and yet (still) awaiting the outcome.
Chapter 95. The Pompeians having been driven in their flight within their entrenchments, Caesar, thinking that no respite (lit. interval) should be given to (them) in their panic, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of the kindness of fortune and attack the camp. Although exhausted by the great heat - for the battle had been prolonged up to midday - yet they, ready in their minds for every (sort of) toil, obeyed his command. The camp was zealously defended by the cohorts which had been left there as a garrison, and even more keenly by the Thracian and foreign auxiliaries. For the majority of the troops who had fled for refuge from the battle-field, both terrified in spirit and exhausted by fatigue, their arms and military standards having been dropped, were thinking more about further flight than about defence of the camp. Nor indeed, could (those) who had been stationed on the rampart sustain the multitude of missiles any longer, but, weakened by their wounds, they abandoned their position, and employing their centurions and military tribunes (as) guides, they fled together to the highest hill-tops, which extended to their camp.
.Chapter 96. In Pompey's camp, one could (lit. it was permitted to) see pavilions (which had been) erected, a great weight of silver (which had been) laid out, tents (which had been) spread with sods of turf, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and several others (which had) even (been) covered with ivy, and many things besides, which indicated too much luxury and a confidence in victory, so that it could readily be inferred that those who were acquiring these unnecessary pleasures had no fears at all concerning the outcome of that day. But these men reproached Caesar's most wretched and most long-suffering army, which had been all the time lacking everything with regard to indispensable necessity, with self-indulgence. When our men were already busy inside their rampart, Pompey, finding a horse, (and) his general's insignia having been stripped off, rushed (lit. flung himself) out of his camp by the rear gate, and at once hastened to Larissa at the gallop (lit. his horse having been spurred on). Nor did he stop there, but with the same speed, collecting a few of his men in his flight, his nocturnal journey not having been interrupted, he reached the sea in the company of thirty cavalrymen, and embarked upon a grain-ship, all the time complaining, as it was said, that he had been so greatly mistaken (lit. that it had so greatly deceived him) in his opinion that he appeared almost (to have been) betrayed, the beginning of the flight having been caused by the very kind of men from whom he had expected victory.
Chapter 97. Caesar, having taken possession of the camp, entreated his soldiers, that, (being) intent upon plunder, they should not let slip the opportunity of undertaking the rest of their task (lit. for the rest of their task being undertaken). Their consent having been obtained, he began to invest the hill with an entrenchment. As the hill was without any water, the Pompeians, despairing of this position, (and) the hill having been abandoned, all began to retreat along its ridges towards Larissa. This action having been noticed, Caesar divided his forces, and ordered some of the legions to stay in Pompey's camp, sent others back to his own camp, (and) took four legions with him and started to intercept the Pompeians by a more convenient route, and, having advanced six miles (lit. thousand paces), he drew up his battle-line. This action having been noticed, the Pompeians halted on a certain hill. A river flowed past the foot of the hill. Caesar, having exhorted his troops, although they were tired due to their continual labour all day and night was coming on, nevertheless cut off the river from the hill by an entrenchment, so that the Pompeians could not fetch water during the night. This work having been completed, they, envoys having been sent, began to talk about surrender. A few men of senatorial rank, who had joined (lit. united themselves to) them, sought safety during the night.
Chapter 98. At dawn (lit. first light) Caesar ordered all those who had encamped on the hill to come down from the higher ground to the plain and discard their weapons. When they did this without any objection, and, throwing themselves to the ground weeping, they begged him for mercy with hands outstretched (lit. with open palms), reassuring (them), he ordered them to get up, and, saying a few (words) to them about his leniency, so that they might have less fear (lit. whereby they might exist with less fear), he spared (them) all and committed (them) to the protection of his own soldiers, so that none of them should be harmed nor lose any of his (property). This care having been applied, he ordered the other legions in the camp to come and meet him, and those which he had taken with him to rest in their turn and return to the camp, and he arrived at Larissa on the same day.
Chapter 99. In that battle he was deprived of not more than two hundred men, but he lost around thirty centurions, (all of them) valiant men. Crastinus, of whom we have made mention above, was also killed, fighting very bravely, a sword having been thrust right into his mouth. Nor was that false, which he had said, (when) marching into battle. For thus Caesar considered that Crastinus' courage in that battle had been most outstanding, and judged that he deserved very well of him. Of Pompey's army, about fifteen thousand (men) appeared to have fallen, but more than fifteen thousand came into captivity - for the cohorts, which had been in the forts as a garrison, gave themselves up to Sulla -, many besides fled for refuge to the neighbouring states, and a hundred and eighty military standards and nine eagles were brought to Caesar from that battle. Lucius Domitius, (while) fleeing from the camp on the hill-top, was slain by the cavalry, when his strength failed him die to exhaustion.
Chapter 100. At the same time, Decimus Laelius came to Brundisium with his fleet, and, with the same tactic, as we have described before (see Chapter 23), (was) employed by Libo, he occupied an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. Similarly, Vatinius, who was in command at Brundisium, some boats having been decked and fitted out, enticed out Laelius' ships, and, of these, he took one quinquereme and two smaller (vessels) in the narrow (entrances) to the harbour, and likewise he managed to prevent the marines from obtaining water by means of the cavalry (which he had) stationed (there). But Laelius, taking advantage of a more convenient time of year for sailing, brought up water from Corcyra and Dyrrachium in his transport-ships, nor was he deterred from his mission, nor could he be expelled from the harbour and the island, either by the disgrace of his ships having been lost, nor by the want of necessary provisions, before the battle (which had) occurred in Thessaly (was) known about.
Chapter 101. At about this time, Cassius came to Sicily with a fleet of Syrians, Phoenicians and Cilicians, and, since Caesar's fleet had been divided into two parts - the praetor Publius Sulpicius (Rufus) was in command of one part by the straits at Vibo, (and) Marcus Pomponius of the other (part) at Messana -, Cassius swooped down on Messana with his ships before Pomponius was aware of his approach, and, finding him in a state of confusion, with no guards and no fixed ranks, the wind (being) strong and favourable, he sent in transport-ships filled with pine-wood and pitch, and tow and other things which are combustible (lit. intended for fire-raising) against Pomponius' fleet, and set fire to thirty-five of his ships, of which twenty were decked. And so great a panic arose from this action, that, although there was a legion on guard at Messana, the town could scarcely be defended, and, if some news of Caesar's victory had not been brought by the cavalry (which had been) stationed (there), the majority (of people) were of the opinion that it would have been lost (lit. it would have been that it was lost). But, the news having been brought very opportunely, the town was defended; and Cassius then set out for Sulpicius' fleet at Vibo, and, our ships having been brought into land on account of the same fear, (events) happened in the same manner as before; Cassius, obtaining a following wind, sent in about forty transport-ships (which had been) fitted out for fire-raising, and, flames having taken hold on each wing, five ships were consumed. And, when the fire began to creep over a wider distance on account of the force of the wind, the soldiers from the legions of veterans in the ranks of the sick, who had been left on guard over the ships, could not endure the disgrace, but, on their own initiative, got aboard some ships and cast off from the land, and, an attack having been made upon Cassius' fleet, they captured two quinqueremes, on one of which was Cassius, but, having been taken off on a small boat, Cassius escaped; in addition, two triremes were sunk. Not long afterwards news came (lit. it was learned) about the battle (which had) happened in Thessaly, so that even the Pompeians were convinced (lit. so that belief occurred to the Pompeians themselves); for before that time they thought that it had been invented by Caesar's officers and friends. These facts having been ascertained, Cassius departed from these regions with his fleet.
XI. Pompey's death (Chapters 102-105).
Chapter 102. Caesar thought that, all (other) things having been put aside (lit. left), he should pursue Pompey (lit. it was necessary for Pompey to be pursued by him) in whatever direction he had retreated (lit. betaken himself) in his flight, so that he could not raise (lit. procure) any other forces and renew the war, and he advanced daily by as long a march as he could make with the cavalry, and ordered one legion to follow by shorter stages. An edict had been published in Pompey's name at Amphipolis, to the effect that all the young men of that province, (both) Greeks and Roman citizens, should gather for the purpose of swearing the (military) oath. But whether Pompey had published (this) to avert suspicion (lit. for the sake of suspicion being averted), in order that he could conceal his plan of further flight, or whether he was trying, if no one should stop (him), to keep hold of Macedonia with fresh levies, could not be judged. He lay at anchor for one night, and, his friends at Amphipolis having been summoned to (see) him, and money for essential expenses having been gathered by request and Caesar's approach having been ascertained, he departed from that place, and in a few days came to Mytilene. Having been delayed for two days by a storm, and some pinnaces having been added to his other ships, he arrived at Cilicia, and thence Cyprus. There he learned that, with the agreement of all the people of Antioch and of the Roman citizens who were doing business there, the citadel had been seized with the intention of excluding him (lit. of him being excluded) and that messengers (had been) despatched to those who were said to have retreated (lit. betaken themselves) in flight to the neighbouring states, (telling them) not to go to Antioch; (and that) if they did that, their lives would be in great danger (lit. there would be a great danger to their lives). This same thing happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been consul in the previous year, and to the ex-consul Publius Lentulus, and to several others at Rhodes; these, when they had come to the island, were not admitted into the town and port, and, messages having been sent to them that they should leave (lit. depart from) that area, they set sail (lit. loosened [the sails of] their ships) (much) against their will. For the news of Caesar's approach was now being brought to these states.
Chapter 103. These circumstances having been learned about, Pompey, his plan of Syria being visited having been set aside, money having been raised from the companies of tax-farmers and having been taken from certain private individuals, and a great weight of bronze (coins) having been loaded on to the ships for military purposes, and two thousand men having been armed, some whom he had selected from the household slaves of the tax-farmers (and) others (whom) he had gathered from the merchants, and whom each of his (friends) thought suitable for the purpose, reached Pelusium. By chance, King Ptolemy (XIV Dionysus) was there, a boy in age, (when) waging war against (lit. with) his sister Cleopatra (VII), whom a few months before he had expelled from the kingdom by means of his relatives and friends; and Cleopatra's camp was not a long distance away from his camp. Pompey sent (messengers) to him, (asking) that he might be received in Alexandria in return for his hospitality and friendship to his father, and (that) he might be protected by his resources. But (the men) who had been sent by him, the duty of their mission having been completed, began to converse quite freely with the King's soldiers, and to urge them to give their services to Pompey, and not to despise his ill-fortune. Among this number were several of Pompey's troops, whom, having been taken from his army in Syria, Gabinius had conducted to Alexandria, and, the war having been finished, he had left with Ptolemy (XIII Auletes), the boy's father.
Chapter 104. These things having been learned about, the King's friends, who were in charge of the kingdom on account of his (young) age, either having been induced by fear, as they afterwards declared, lest, the royal army having been suborned, Pompey took control of Alexandria and Egypt, or his ill-fortune having been despised, as enemies generally spring from friends in a calamity, replied generously in public to those, who had been sent by him, and bade him come to the King; (but) they, a plot having been secretly entered into, despatched Achillas, an officer of the King, (and) a man of singular audacity, and Lucius Septimius, a military tribune, to murder Pompey (lit. for the purpose of Pompey being murdered). Having been courteously addressed by them, and having been deluded by some acquaintance with Septimius, who had led a company under him in the war against the pirates, he embarked in a little boat with a few of his (friends); there he was murdered by Achillas and Septimius. Likewise, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the King, and put to death in prison.
Chapter 105. When Caesar came to Asia, he found that Titus Ampius (Balbus) was trying to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus, and that he had summoned all the senators from the province, so that he might employ them (as) witnesses to the amount of money (involved), but, having been interrupted, had fled. So, on two occasions, Caesar had saved (lit. brought help to) the money of Ephesus. It was also established that, at the temple of Minerva in Elis, the days having been retraced and enumerated, on the day in which Caesar had fought his successful battle, the image of Victory, which had been placed before Minerva herself, and had hitherto looked towards the image of Minerva, had turned itself around to face (lit. towards) the folding-doors and threshold of the temple. On the same day, at Antioch in Syria such a great noise of an army and (so loud) a sound of (trumpet) signals was heard on two occasions, that the community ran to the walls armed. This same thing happened at Ptolemais (i.e. Acre). And at Pergamum, in the secret and hidden (parts) of the temple, which the Greeks call sanctuaries, (and) in which it is not lawful (for anyone) except priests to go, drums sounded. Likewise, at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, where they had consecrated a statue of Caesar, a palm-tree was shown, during those days, to have sprouted up within the building from the pavement, between the joints of the stones.
XII. Caesar at Alexandria (Chapters 106-112).
Chapter 106. Having stayed in Asia for a few days, Caesar, when he heard that Pompey (had been) seen in Cyprus, conjecturing that he was making his way to Egypt, because of his connections with that kingdom and the other advantages of that place, went to Alexandria with one legion, which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and a second (one), which he had summoned from his legate Quintus Fufius in Achaea, and eight hundred cavalrymen, and ten war-ships (lit. long ships) from Rhodes and a few from Asia. In these there were three thousand two hundred legionaries; the rest, having been overcome by wounds in battle and by the toil and the extent of the march, were not able to follow (him). But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits (lit. the things which he had done), did not hesitate to set out with inadequate (lit. weak) forces, thinking that all places would be equally safe for him. At Alexandria he learned of Pompey's death, and there, just (as he was) disembarking from his ship, he heard the shouting of soldiers, whom the King had left in the town as a garrison, and saw a mob rushing towards him, because the 'fasces' were being carried before (him). With regard to this, the whole crowd were proclaiming that this was diminishing the majesty of the King. This commotion having been allayed, frequent riots occurred on successive days due to the gathering of the crowd, and several soldiers were killed in the streets in all parts of the city.
Chapter 107. These things having been observed, he ordered that the other legions, which he had formed from Pompey's soldiers, should be brought to him from Asia. For he himself was forcibly (lit. of necessity) detained by the Etesian winds, which blow (as) most unfavourable winds for (those) sailing from Alexandria. In the meantime, thinking that the disputes of the sovereigns were matters of concern (lit. pertained) to the Roman people and to himself, because he was consul, and that it was all the more consistent with his duty (to act), because in his earlier consulship an alliance had been made with their father Ptolemy by a law and a decree of the Senate, he made it clear (lit. disclosed) that he had decided (lit. it seemed good to him) that King Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra should disband their armies and settle debate their disputes before him in a court of law rather than (settle them) by (force of) arms between themselves.
Chapter 108. Because of the (young) age of the boy, his tutor, a eunuch, Pothinus by name, was in charge of the kingdom. Firstly, he began to complain and express his indignation among his (friends) that the King was being summoned to plead his cause (lit. for the purpose of his cause being pleaded); then, having secured some supporters for his plan from the King's friends, he secretly summoned the army from Pelusium to Alexandria, and put the same Achillas, whom we have mentioned above (see Chapter 104), in charge of all these forces. This man, having been aroused (and) inspired by his promises and by (those) of the King, he gave (him) his instructions (lit. he told [him] what he wished to be done) by despatches and by messengers. In the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons, and the one of his two daughters who was the more advanced in age, had been designated (as) his heirs. In the same will, Ptolemy entreated the Roman people, by all the gods and by the treaty which he had made at Rome, to see that these things were carried out. One copy of his will had been taken to Rome by his ambassadors, in order that it might be deposited in the treasury - when this could not be deposited (there) on account of the public seizures, it was lodged with Pompey -, another (copy) from the same original, (which had been) left behind and sealed up in Alexandria, was revealed.
Chapter 109. When there was a debate (lit. it was debated) about these matters before Caesar, and he very much wanted to settle these disputes between the sovereigns as a friend to both parties and as an arbiter, the King's army and all his cavalry was suddenly reported to be coming to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so great that he could rely on them, if he should need to fight a battle (lit. if [a battle] was needing to be fought [by him]) outside the town. His remaining recourse was (lit. It remained) to stay (lit. keep himself) in his positions within the town, and to discover Achillas' intentions. However, he ordered all his troops to remain (lit. exist) in arms, and exhorted the King to send (those) of his close associates whom he had with the most influence (as) envoys to Achillas and to make clear (lit. show) what his will was. Dioscorides and Serapion, (the persons) sent by him, who had both been ambassadors at Rome and had had considerable influence with Ptolemy the father, went to Achillas. When they came into his presence (lit. into his sight), before he heard (them) or learned for what purpose they had been sent, he ordered them to be seized and put to death; one of them, a wound having been received, and having been taken up by his (friends), (was) carried off as dead; the other was killed. This having happened, Caesar arranged to have the King under his control (lit. in his power), supposing that the King's name would have great authority among his (people), and so that the war would appear (to have been undertaken) as the private (plot) of a few brigands rather than through the design of the King.
Chapter 110. The forces with Achillas were such that they did not seem worthy to be despised either in number or in quality of men or in their experience of military affairs. For he had twenty thousand (men) under arms. These consisted of Gabinius' soldiers, who had become accustomed to (lit. had come into the habit of) the lifestyle and licentiousness of Alexandria, and had disregarded (lit. forgotten) the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had married wives (lit. had led wives [to the altar]), from whom most of them had children. To these were added (men who had been) collected from the pirates and freebooters of Syria and the province of Cilicia and the neighbouring areas. In addition, many convicted criminals (lit. many men condemned to death) and exiles had gathered (there). All our runaway slaves had (lit. There was to all our runaway slaves) a safe refuge and an assured way of life in Alexandria, (on condition) that, their names having been given, they were enrolled as soldiers (lit. they existed in the number of soldiers). If anyone of them should be apprehended by his master, he was rescued by the common agreement of the soldiers, who themselves averted any violence to their (comrades) because they were involved in a similar guilt. They were accustomed to demand that friends of the King (be put) to death, they (were accustomed) to plunder the property of the wealthy, to besiege the King's palace for the sake of increasing their pay (lit. their pay being increased), to expel some from the throne, (and) to summon others (to it) by some ancient practice of the Alexandrian army. There were, besides, two thousand cavalry. They were all veterans of several wars in Alexandria, they had restored Ptolemy the father to his throne (i.e. in 55 B.C.), had killed the two sons of Bibulus (i.e. in 50 B.C.), (and) had waged war against (lit. with) the Egyptians. They had experience of military matters from these sources.
Chapter 111. Trusting in these forces, and scorning the small number of Caesar's troops, Achillas occupied Alexandria, except that part of the town which Caesar was holding with his soldiers, trying in his initial assault to burst into his palace. But Caesar, his cohorts having been posted throughout the streets, withstood his attack. At the same time, there was fighting (lit. it was fought) at the harbour, and this affair produced by far the most severe struggle. For, the forces having been divided, fighting was going on (lit. it was being fought) in several streets, and the enemy were attempting with their large multitude (of men) to take control of the war-ships (lit. long ships). Fifty of these had been sent as assistance to Pompey, and, the battle in Thessaly having taken place, they had returned home, all (of them) quadriremes and quinqueremes, suitably equipped and fitted out for sailing in all circumstances, except those twenty-two, all (of them) decked, which were accustomed to be in Alexandria for its protection. If they were to seize these, Caesar's fleet having been taken (from him), they would have the harbour and the whole sea in their power, and would prevent Caesar from (procuring) provisions and reinforcements. Accordingly, (the battle) was conducted with as great an effort as it ought to be conducted, when one side could see victory in this situation, and the other side (could see) that their safety depended (on it). But Caesar kept control of the situation, and set fire to all those ships, and the others which were in the dockyards, because he could not guard so wide (an area) with (so) small a force, and he immediately disembarked his men (lit. put his men out of their ships) by the Pharos.
Chapter 112. The Pharos is a tower of prodigious height, constructed by wonderful works on an island; it took its name from the island. This island, lying opposite Alexandria, forms a harbour; but, a mole of nine hundred paces in length having been built out into the sea by previous kings, it is joined with the town by a narrow causeway and a bridge. On this island there are houses belonging to Egyptians and a village of the size of a town, and, when any ships, through carelessness or through bad weather, depart a little from their course, they (i.e, the inhabitants) are in the habit of plundering (them) like (lit. in the manner of) pirates. But against the will of those by whom the Pharos is held (lit. with those by whom the Pharos is held [being] unwilling), there cannot be any access by ships to the harbour, on account of the narrow straits. Then, being anxious on account of this, Caesar, the enemy having been preoccupied by the fighting, and troops having been disembarked, seized the Pharos and placed a garrison there. By these actions it was arranged that corn supplies and reinforcements could be brought to him by ship. For he had sent around to all the neighbouring provinces and had summoned reinforcements from them. In other parts of the town, the fighting went (lit. it was fought) in such a way that they parted (lit. it was departed) equal in battle, and neither side was overcome - the confined position caused this - and, a few men on both sides having been killed, Caesar, having secured the most essential positions, fortified (them) during the night. In this area of the town there was a small part of the palace, into which he himself had been introduced at the beginning for the purpose of living (quarters), and a theatre (was) joined to the house, which acquired the position of a citadel, and he had access to the harbour and to the royal dockyards. He augmented these fortifications on subsequent days, so that he might have (these) thrown up in place of a wall, and (so that) he might not be compelled to fight against his will (lit. unwillingly). Meanwhile, the younger daughter of King Ptolemy (i.e. Arsinoe), hoping for possession of the throne (while it was) empty, escaped from (lit. flung herself out of) the palace to (join) Achillas, and began to direct the war together (with him). But a quarrel quickly arose between them concerning the leadership, and these circumstances increased the bounties (distributed) among the soldiers; for both tried to win over their affections (lit. minds) through their sacrifices. While these things were being done among the enemy, Pothinus, the boy's tutor and the regent of the kingdom, (who was) in Caesar's part of the town, when he sent messengers to Achillas and urged (him) not to desist from the enterprise nor to lose heart, was put to death by Caesar, his intermediaries having been betrayed and apprehended. These (events) were the beginnings of the Alexandrian war.
