ST. AUGUSTINE: "DE CIVITATE DEI CONTRA PAGANOS": BOOK V
Introduction:
In Book IV of "The City of God" Augustine lays bare the falsity and futility of the gods worshipped by the Romans (see the translation of this book published on this blog on 19 December 2021). In Book V, he sets out a detailed study of the Roman character and the reasons for Rome's greatness and dominance over other nations, and he is adamant that it was Roman virtue that was responsible for their worldly success. As Sallust explains in his historical writings, the Romans of the early Republic were eager for the praise of their fellow-countrymen, and in their desire for glory they suppressed all other desires. They felt it was shameful for their country to be in servitude, either to kings or to other nations, and glorious for it to rule and command. So the early Romans fought first for independence and then for dominion over others. In Book V Augustine provides a summary of Roman history, in which this ambition for dominance, and the glory which it brought, is fully catalogued. Although the Romans were idolaters, and therefore excluded from eternal life, God nevertheless gave them the proper reward on earth for their virtues, i.e. dominance over all other people. While this love of glory and power was in itself a vice, according to Augustine, and the love of glory must be subordinated to the love of truth, the virtuous conduct of the Romans provided examples of heroism for Christians to follow. If the Romans could do such things for the love of glory, what should a Christian not do for the love of God? Augustine concluded Book V with three chapters (xxiv-xxvi), which describe the successful reigns of the Christian emperors Constantine (306-337 A.D.) and Theodosius (379-395 A.D.). Their successes in government and on the battlefield are duly emphasised in order to confound pagan critics who saw divine retribution as the cause of the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410 A.D. However, Augustine stresses that these Christian emperors deserve to be called happy, not because of their long and prosperous lives, but because of the perfection in their characters which was appropriate to a Christian prince.
Preface: Since it is established that happiness is the sum total of all things that are to be desired, and that it is not a goddess but the gift of God, and therefore no god should be worshipped by men except (one) who is able to make them happy - hence, if she were a goddess, she alone could be said to be rightly worshipped - , consequently let us now see for what reason God, who can also bestow such blessings as even evil, and for this (reason) also, unhappy (men) can possess, has willed that the Roman empire should be so great and enduring. For, since we have already asserted at some length that the great number of false gods that they worshipped did not do (this), we shall speak further (on this matter) when (the time) should seem to be appropriate.
Chapter I: - that the existence of the Roman empire and of all (other) kingdoms is not a matter of chance, nor does it depend on the position of the stars.
So the cause of the greatness of the Roman empire is neither a matter of chance nor of fate, as in the judgment or the opinion of those who say that these (things) are fortuitous, and that they either have no causes or that they are not derived from any rational pattern, but that they (are) predestined and that they happen by the necessity of a certain pattern rather than by the will of God or of men. In short, the kingdoms of men are established by divine providence. So, if anyone attributes them to fate, because he calls this will or power of God by the name of fate, let him retain his opinion but correct his language. For why does he not say at the beginning what he will say later, when someone has asked him what he meant (by) fate? For when men hear this (word), in the familiar usage of language they do not understand (anything) but the influence of the position of the stars, such as it is (at the moment) when someone is born or conceived; some distinguish this from the will of God, while others even maintain that it depends on it.
But those who are of the opinion that the stars, apart from the will of God, determine what we shall do, or what blessings we shall enjoy, or (what) disasters we shall suffer, must be denied the right of a hearing by all, not only by those who hold the true religion, but also by those who choose to be worshippers of gods of any sort, false though (they may be). For what else can this opinion mean, but that no god should be worshipped or prayed to at all? Our dispute is not only directed against them, but against those who, in defence of those whom they think (are) gods, are opposed to the Christian religion.
But those who make the position of the stars depend upon the will of God, (while the stars) somehow determine what sort (of man) each shall be, and what good shall come to him and what evil shall befall (him), if they suppose that these same stars have this power handed to them by that supreme power to make decrees of their own choice, they do the heavens a grave injustice by supposing that in that most distinguished senate, as (we may call it), (meeting in) that most splendid senate-house, such crimes were decreed to be committed, that if any earthly state had decreed (them), the (whole) human race would have decreed its destruction. What sort of judgment is then left to God concerning the deeds of men, to whom constraint is applied by heavenly (forces), since he is Lord of both stars and men? Or, if they say that the stars, having received their power from the supreme God, do not make these decrees of their own will, but simply comply with his commands when imposing such constraints upon (men), should we then think of God himself in a way which seemed highly improper (for us) to think with regard to the will of the stars?
But if the stars are said to portend those (deeds) rather than to cause (them), so that their position, which predicts the future, is a kind of statement, not an active (force) - for this was the view of men of no ordinary learning - , so astrologers are not in the habit of saying, as they might say for example: "Mars in this position portends a murderer," but "makes a murderer." However, let us concede that they do not use the words that they ought (to use) and that they ought to acquire from the philosophers the correct way of speaking so as to predict what they think they find in the position of the stars, how does it happen that they can never explain why in the life of twins, in their actions, in their experiences, their jobs, their accomplishments, and (all) the other things pertaining to human life, and even in death itself, there is generally such great diversity, that, in so far as these matters are concerned, many strangers are more similar to them than the twins themselves (are) to each other, and yet in their birth they were separated by a very brief interval of time, and in their conception (they were) also begotten at a single moment by one (act of) intercourse?
Chapter II: - on the similar and dissimilar health of twins.
Cicero says that Hippocrates, that most famous doctor, left a written account of two brothers that, when they began to fall sick at the same time, and their illness grew worse at the same time, and began to ease at the same time, he suspected that (they were) twins; Posidonius, the Stoic, (who was) much devoted to astrology used to assert that they were born and conceived simultaneously under the same configuration of the stars. So, what the doctor believed was due to a similar physical constitution, the philosopher-astrologer (ascribed) to the influence and configuration of the stars, which was present at the time when they were conceived and born. In this case the conjecture of the doctor is much for acceptable and obviously more credible, since the physical condition of their parents at the time when they lay together could so have affected the germ cells of the (children) conceived that, following the first (period of) growth in their mother's body, they were born with a similar constitution; thereafter, they were nourished in one household with the same food, (and) when medical science testifies that climate and and physical location and water supply can have a great influence on the condition of the body, whether for good or ill, (and), accustomed also to the same (kinds of) exercise, they were physically so similar that they were even made to become ill in a similar way at the same time and for the same reasons. But to seek to attribute the configuration of the sky and the stars which was present (at the time) when they were conceived or born to that parallel timing of their falling sick, when so many (individuals) of different races, and totally different in their activities and fortunes, could have been conceived and born at the same time in one region of the earth beneath the same (aspect) of the sky is an unbelievably strange idea.
But we have known twins, (who) not only had (different) occupations and had travelled to different places, but (who had) also endured different (kinds of) sickness. Hippocrates gives a very simple explanation for this situation, it seems to me, (when he says) that different states of health could befall them on account of different foods and (types of) exercise, which do not depend on the constitution of the body but on the mind's free choice. But as for Posidonius, or any other advocate of the fateful (influence) of the stars, (it would be) surprising if he could find anything to say, unless he is willing to play with the minds of the ignorant in relation to matters which are unknown to them. For (this is) the point which they are they trying to make concerning that small interval of time which separated them when they were being born (as) twins: for with regard to that particle of sky, where the marking of the hour, which they call a 'horoscope', is placed, this is either not important enough to account for the diversity in their inclinations, actions, character, and fortunes, or (it is) too important (to allow) the same humility or nobility of birth in the case of twins, and they do not account for any very great difference in this respect, except in relation to the hour in which each (of them) is born. And for (this) reason, if one (twin) is born so soon after the other, that the appearance of the horoscope remains the same, I look for everything (in their lives to be) identical, (something) which cannot be found in the case of twins; but if a delay (in the birth) of the second (child) changes the horoscope, I look for different parents, which twins cannot have.
Chapter III: - about the argument which Nigidius the astrologer derived from the potter's wheel in relation to the problem of twins.
For that well-known story of the potter's wheel is offered in vain, (that story) which, it is said, Nigidius (i.e. Publius Nigidius Figulus, praetor 58 B.C. a friend and adviser of Cicero) put forward (when) vexed by this problem, and on account of which he was called Figulus (i.e. the potter). For while he whirled the potter's wheel with as much force as he could, and, while it was turning, he made two very rapid strokes on it with black ink, supposedly on the one spot, then, when the motion stopped, the marks which he had made were found (to be) quite some distance apart on the very edge of that wheel. "Thus," he says, "with regard to the great velocity of the sky, even if the second (twin) were born as quickly after the other (one) as I twice struck the wheel, in the broad expanse of heaven it makes a big (difference). From this," he says, "arise all the differences that are reputed (to occur) in the character and fortunes of twins."
This story is more fragile than the vases which are fashioned on that revolving wheel. For if (something) which cannot be observed in the constellations is of so much importance in the sky that an inheritance falls to one of the twins, (and) does not fall to the other, how do they dare, when they have examined their constellations, to make such statements to others who are not twins that depend on that mystery which no one can comprehend, and comment on the times of their births? But if therefore they make such statements in relation to the births of others, it is because these relate to longer intervals of time; but these very small moments of time, which can separate the births of twins are considered very small matters concerning which astrologers are not usually consulted - for who would consult (them about) when to sit down, when to go for a walk, (or) when or what to eat - but are these the things we say when we point out the very many and the wide differences in the character, services, and fortunes of twins?
Chapter IV: - on the twins Esau and Jacob, and the great difference between them in the nature of their characters and actions.
In the ancient record of our forefathers - to make mention of a notable (instance) - two twins were born one after the other in such a way that the second (one) was grasping the heel of the first (one). So great was the diversity in their (way of) life and character, so great (was) the disparity in their actions, so great was the the difference in the love (shown them) by their parents that this very disparity made them mutual enemies. Does this mean that one was walking while the other was sitting down, and that one was asleep while the other was awake, and that one was speaking while the other was silent - such things belong to those minute (details) which cannot be understood by those who record the configuration of the stars under which each (man) is born, so that astrologers may be consulted (about them)? On led the life of a hired servant, the other was not a servant; one was especially prized by his mother, the other was not so prized; one lost the honour which was considered a great (one) among the people, the other acquired (it). (And what shall I say) of their wives, what of their sons, what of their belongings, what a difference (there was)! So, if these (things) depend on those brief (intervals of) time, which separate twins, and are not to be attributed to the constellations, why do they mention these (things) when examining the constellations that (affect) others? But, if they so mention (them), because they do not refer to brief and incomprehensible (flashes of time) but to periods of time that can be observed and recorded, what (role) does that potter's wheel play at this point, but that men with hearts of clay should be sent (spinning) in a circle, so that the nonsense spoken by the astrologers shall not be demonstrated?
Chapter V: - in what ways astrologers are shown to profess a false science.
(Now) what of those same two (brothers) whose illness (led) Hippocrates, while he was examining them medically, to suspect that they were twins, because it appeared (to get) worse and (then) better at the same time; do not these (circumstances) refute (those) who would attribute to the stars what (really) came from a similar bodily constitution? For why did they fall ill in the same way at the same time, and not one first and then the other, just as they were born, since they could not of course both have been born simultaneously? Or, if (the fact) that they were born at different times did not cause them to grow sick at different times, why do they contend that the different time of their birth is the cause of their differences in other matters? How is it that they could travel at different times, get married at different times, beget children and (do) many other (things) besides at different times, (all) because they were born at different times, but could not for the same reason also grow ill at different times? For if the space of time between their separate births changed the horoscope and caused the difference in (all) the other (things), why did this (similarity), which resulted from being conceived at the same time, persist (only) in relation to (matters of) sickness? Or, if the outcomes of health are said to depend on (the moment of) conception, but all other things to relate to (the moment of) birth, they ought not to make some statement about health (based) on inspecting the constellations at the time of birth (as they do), since the hour of conception is not given to them for the purpose of inspection. But, if they thus predict (periods of) illness without inspecting the horoscope of conception, seeing that the moments of birth indicate them, how could they tell either of the twins when he was going to be sick by considering the hour of his nativity, when the other (one), who did not have the same hour of nativity, had of necessity to be sick at the same time?
Then I ask (this question): if there is such a difference of time in the birth of twins that the configurations of the stars are bound to be different on account of (this), (then) the horoscope is different, and for this (reason) all the cardinal (points are) different, and to these such influence is attributed that such differences are also predicted (to stem) from this, (but) how could this happen when the time of their conception cannot be any different? Or, if two (persons) conceived at one moment in time could have different destinies governing their birth, why can two (persons) born at one moment in time not have different destinies governing their life and death? For, if the single moment at which they were both conceived did not prevent one being born earlier (and) the other being born later, why, if the two are born at one moment, should anything prevent one dying earlier and the other later? If conception at a single moment (still) allows twins to have different fortunes in the womb, why does birth at one moment not also allow any two persons on the earth to have different fortunes, and so all the inventions of this science, or rather of this falsehood, may be swept away? Why is it that (those who have been) conceived at one time. at a single moment, and under one and the same aspect of the heavens, have different destinies which bring them to birth at different hours, and (yet) two (persons), similarly born from two mothers at one moment in time under one and the same disposition of the heavens, cannot have different destinies, which bring them to different requirements of living or dying?
Or, (when they are) conceived, do they not yet have destinies which they cannot have unless they are born? Then, what (is it) that is meant, (when) they say that, if the hour of conception could be discovered, many (things) could be said by them more prophetically? Thus, it is also proclaimed by some that some wise (man) chose the hour in which he would lie with his wife, so that he might beget a wonderful son. And finally from this there also comes the story of the reply that Posidonius, that great astrologer and philosopher too, made concerning those twins falling ill together; so he said that it had happened because they had been born at the same time and conceived at the same (time). For he especially included conception (in his statement) for the following reason, lest it should be pointed out to him that they could not have been born at the same time, (though it was) clearly established that they had been conceived at the same time; (he did this) in order that he might not ascribe the fact that they fell ill in a similar way and at the same time to their very similar bodily constitution, but also that he might make the similarity in their health dependent on the influence of the stars. So, if there is such power in conception to (cause) equality of destinies, these same destinies ought not to have been changed by birth. Or, if the destinies of twins are so altered, because they are born at different times, why should we not rather take it that they had already been altered, so that they could be born at different times? So, does the will of the living not change the destinies fixed at birth, although the order of birth changes the destinies (fixed) at conception?
Chapter VI: - on twins of opposite sex.
With regard to the conception of twins, when both (of them) are certainly (conceived) at the same moment, how does it happen that under the same fateful position of the stars one is conceived (as) a male, (and) the other (as) a female? I know twins of different sex, both (of whom) are still living, (and) both (of whom) are still of an age to be active; although they are similar to one another in their physical appearance, in so far as that is possible in relation to a different sex, yet they are very different with regard to their way of living and their purpose in life, and, especially, with regard to their occupations, where it is necessary for those of a woman to be different from from those of men - in that he serves on the staff of a count and is almost always away from his home, (while) she does not leave her native soil or her own (part of) the country - , (and) besides - and this is (all) the more incredible if the destinies fixed by the stars are to be believed in; but (it is) not all strange if man's free will and the gifts of God are taken into account - , he is married, (and) she is a consecrated virgin; he has begotten a number of children, and she is unmarried. But still, they say, the power of the horoscope is very great. I have already shown it is nothing. But whatever (its power) may be, they say it is strong at (the time of) birth; is it also powerful at (the time of) conception? And here it is clear that there is (but) one (act of) intercourse, ans such is the force of nature that, when a woman has conceived, then she is quite unable to conceive another; from this it follows in the case of twins that their conception must occur at the same moment. Or (will they say) perhaps, that, because they were born under different horoscopes, either he was changed into a male, or she into a female, while they were being born?
So, since it cannot be entirely absurd for it to be said with regard to physical differences only that certain sidereal influences are strong, just as we also see the seasons of the year itself change with the approach and receding of the sun, and with the waxing and waning of the moon (we see) certain kinds of things grow and shrink, such as sea-urchins and oysters, and the marvellous tides of the oceans; but the inclinations of the mind are not subject to the positions of the stars, and now, when the (astrologers) try to make our actions depend on them, they remind is to ask why their reasoning may not be correct, even with regard to physical matters. For what is as important to the body as its sex? And yet under the same position of the stars twins of a different sex could be conceived. So what statement or belief could (be) more senseless than that the position of the stars, which was the same for (them) both at the hour of their conception, could not have arranged (it) so that she was not of a different sex from her brother, with whom she shared the same constellation; (or to have believed) that that the position of the stars which was (present) at the hour of their birth could have caused (her) to differ so greatly from him in (her life of) virginal sanctity.
Chapter VII: - on the choice of a day, on which a woman is led (to the altar to be married), or on which something is planted or sown in the field.
Now who can endure the (notion) that, by choosing certain days, people create some new destinies for their actions? That (man I mentioned) was certainly not destined to have an extraordinary son, but rather to beget (one) of no significance, and so that learned man chose the hour on which he should have intercourse with his wife. So, he created a destiny which he did not have (previously), and, as a result of his (actions), he began to be destined (as) a man of action, (something) which had not been destined at (the time of) his birth. O (what) utter foolishness! A day is chosen to marry a wife; so I believe that, unless it is (properly) chosen, it can occur on an inauspicious day, and the marriage (can be) unlucky. Then, where is (the destiny) which the stars had already decreed on the day he was born? Can a man, by the choice of a day, change what has already been decreed for him, and cannot what he himself has determined by choosing that day be changed by some other power?
Again, if it is only men (who) are subject to the configurations of the stars, and not everything that lies under the heavens, why then do they choose (certain) days as appropriate for the planting of vines, or trees, or crops, and other days for the taming of animals or for the admission of males, by which herds of mares and cows are to be made fertile, and other (things) of this kind? But if certain selected days are so prioritised for these matters, because the position of the stars has dominion over all earthly bodies and living (things) in accordance with differences in the moments of time, (then) let them consider what a countless (number of things) are born, or raised, or begin at one point of time, and could have such different outcomes that they would persuade any child that these observations should be laughed at. For who is so stupid as to say that all trees, all vegetables, all beasts, serpents, birds, fishes, (and) worms each have different moments of birth? Yet men are accustomed to test the skill of the astrologers by bringing them the horoscopes of dumb animals, whose birth they carefully observe at their home for the purpose of this examination, and they prefer those astrologers who, after studying the horoscopes, declare that it is not a man but an animal that has been born, to the rest. They even venture to say what sort of animal (it is), whether (it will be) good for wool-growing, or for riding, or for ploughing, or for guarding the house. For they are even tested with regard to the destinies of dogs, and the (things) that say in reply (are met) with loud shouts of admiration.
Men are so foolish that that they think that, when a man is born, the birth of (all) other creatures is delayed, so that not even a fly is born with him under the same region of the sky. For, if they were to let in this (fly), logic will proceed, and step by step, by small increases (in size) it would lead them from flies to camels and elephants. Nor do they wish to notice this (point), that, when a day has been selected to sow a field, so many seeds fall to the ground at the same time, germinate at the same time, (and), as the crop rises up from (the ground), they put out shoots, come to maturity, and turn golden (all) at the same time, and yet of this (crop), some ears of the same age and, so to speak, congerminal with the rest, blight destroys some (of them), birds ravage others, (and) men pluck further ones. How can their horoscopes be said to have been any different from those which they see have such different outcomes? Or will they change their minds about choosing days for these things, and will they say that they are not subject to the decrees of heaven, and will they subject men alone to (the influence of) the stars, the only (creatures) on earth, to whom God has granted free will?
All things considered, it is not unjustly believed that, when astrologers miraculously give very truthful replies, this is due to the secret prompting of evil spirits, whose aim is to sow these false and harmful beliefs about astral destinies in the minds of men, and to confirm (them), and not to any art of observing and studying horoscopes, (an art) which does not exist.
Chapter VIII: - concerning those who call by the name of fate not the position of the stars but the system of causes which depends on the will of God.
But, (as to those) who call by the name of fate not the disposition of the stars, as it may exist, when any creature is conceived, or born, or begins its existence, but the union and sequence of all causes, whereby everything happens that happens, there is no great need (for me) to struggle and strive with them in verbal controversy, seeing that they attribute the very order and system of causes, as it were, to the will and power of the most high God, who is very well and truly believed to know all (things) before they come to pass and to leave nothing in a state of disorder; all powers are (derived) from him, although the wills of all (men) are not (derived) from him. So that it is chiefly the will of the most high God, whose power is extended invincibly across the whole (universe), that they call fate is proved by the following (verses). Unless I am mistaken, these verses are (those) of Annaeus Seneca (i.e. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, the Younger, 4 B.C. - 65 A.D., Stoic philosopher, writer and poet, tutor and adviser to the young Nero, suffect consul 55 A.D.) :
"Lead (me), supreme father, ruler of the lofty sky, to wherever it pleases (you), and I will obey without hesitation. I am present (and) eager; make (me) unwilling, (then) I shall accompany (you) with groans, and, as an evil (man), I shall endure what I might have done as a good (man). The Fates lead the willing, (and) the unwilling they drag." (viz. these lines are taken from Seneca' 'Epistle 107,' and they are a free translation from the Greek of Cleanthes.)
(It is) surely most evident (that) in this last verse he called the Fates what he had earlier referred to (as) the will of the supreme father; he says that (he is) ready to obey him, to be led willingly, and not to be dragged unwillingly; of course (this is) because "the Fates lead the willing, (and) the unwilling they drag."
The following Homeric lines, which Cicero translates into Latin also support this opinion:
"The minds of men are such as father Jupiter himself purified the fruitful earth with the light (of day)." (viz. this is a free translation by Cicero of Homer's 'Odyssey,' Book 18, ll. 136-7.)
On this question, the view of a poet should have no weight; but, since he says that the Stoics are accustomed to employ these verses from Homer when asserting the power of fate, this discussion is not concerned with the opinion of the poet but (with that) of these philosophers, since, through these verses which they employ in the argument which they are having about fate, they very clearly declare what they think fate is, as they call (the one) whom they think (is) the highest god Jupiter, and from him they say the chain of fates depends.
Chapter IX: - concerning the foreknowledge of God and the free will of man, contrary to Cicero's definition.
1. Cicero so struggles to refute them (i.e. the Stoics) that he does not consider he can achieve anything against them unless he can dispense with (the idea of) divination. He attempts to get rid of it in such a way as to deny that there can be any knowledge of future (happenings), and he argues with all his might that it does not exist in any way at all, either in man or in God, and that there is no way of predicting events. So he both denies the foreknowledge of God and attempts to overthrow all prophecy (even that that is) clearer than daylight, by spurious arguments and by opposing to himself certain oracles which can easily be refuted; yet, he does not even (manage to) refute them. However, with regard to his refuting of the conjectures of the astrologers, his oratory is triumphant, since these are of such (a kind) that they even destroy and refute themselves.
But (those) who even maintain that (there are) astral destinies are much more bearable than the (man) who abolishes (all) preknowledge of future (events). For it is a most conspicuous (act of) madness both to agree that God exists and to deny his prescience of the future. Since he too was aware of this, he even tried (to assert) that which is written (in Scripture): "The fool has said in his heart: there is no God (viz. Psalm 14. 1);" but (he does) not (say this) in his own person. For he saw how unpopular and annoying it would be, and so he made Cotta (i.e. Gaius Aurelius Cotta, consul 75 B.C., and uncle of Gaius Julius Caesar) argue against the Stoics on this point in his work "On the Nature of the Gods," and he chose to deliver his own opinion through the mouth of Lucius Balbus (i.e. Quintus Lucilius Balbus, a Stoic philosopher, fl. c. 100 B.C.), to whom he assigned the role of defending the position of the Stoics, rather than through that of Cotta, who maintained that there was no divine nature. But in his work "On Divination," he very openly attacks (belief in) the foreknowledge of the future in his own person. But this whole (argument) seems designed not to agree the existence of fate and thereby to destroy the (idea of) free will. For he thinks that (once), the knowledge of future (events) has been conceded, so the existence of fate follows in consequence, so that it cannot possibly be denied.
But, whatever may be the outcomes of these most perplexing debates and disputes of the philosophers, let us, in order that we may confess (our belief) in the most high and true God, thus confess (our belief in) his will, supreme power, and foreknowledge; nor do we fear lest, for this reason, we do not do by will what we do by will, because he whose foreknowledge cannot be mistaken, has foreknowledge that we should do it; (this was) what Cicero feared, so he opposed (the idea of) foreknowledge, and the Stoics said that not everything comes to pass by necessity, although they did contend that everything happens through fate.
2. What is it, then, that Cicero (so) feared with regard to foreknowledge of the future that he strove to undermine it by that abominable (line of) argument: Doubtless (it was this), that, if all future (events) are foreknown, they will happen in the order in which it was foreknown that they would occur; and, if they were to occur in this order, there is a fixed order of events foreknown by God; and, if there is a fixed order of events, (then) there is a fixed order of causes; for nothing can happen, which some efficient cause has not preceded; but, if there is a fixed order of causes, by which everything happens that happens, all (things) that happen, happen, he says, by fate. But, if this is the case, (then) there is nothing in our power, and there is no freedom of the will; but, he says, if we concede this, the whole (basis of) human life is overthrown, laws are enacted in vain, reprimands, praises, censures, and exhortations are (all) employed in vain, and no (system of) justice is established (which provides) rewards for good (men) and punishments for bad (ones). So, in order that these (things), (so) disgraceful, absurd, and harmful for human affairs (as they are), should not follow, he does not want foreknowledge of the future to exist; and he pushes the religious mind towards this dilemma, so he has to choose one of two (things), either that something is governed by our will, or that there is no foreknowledge of the future, since he thinks that both cannot exist (together), but that, if one is confirmed, (then) the other is excluded: if we choose foreknowledge of the future, freedom of the will is abolished; if we choose freedom of the will, foreknowledge of the future is abolished. And so, as he (i.e. Cicero) was a great and learned man, and (he was) much and very expertly concerned about human life, of these two (things) he chose free control of the will; (and,) in order that it should be confirmed, he denied foreknowledge of the future, and so, while he wished to make (men) free, he made (them) irreverent.
But the religious mind chooses both, acknowledges both, and reinforces both by its pious faith. But how? says he; for, if there is foreknowledge of the future, all those (things) that are connected must follow, until the conclusion is reached that nothing can be (done) in accordance with our will. Then again, if there is anything that (remains) in our power, by reversing these same steps the conclusion is reached that there is no foreknowledge of the future. For all these (steps) are retraced as follows: if freedom of the will exists, (then) all (things) do not happen by fate; if all (things) do not happen by fate, (then) there is no fixed order for all causes; if there is no fixed order for all causes, (then) neither is there an order of events fixed for a foreknowing God, and these cannot happen unless they are preceded by efficient causes; if there is no fixed order of events for a foreknowing God, (then things) do not all come to pass in such a way as he knew beforehand that they would come to pass; moreover, if (things) do not all come to pass in such a way as it was foreknown by him that they would come to pass, (then) he says, the foreknowledge of all future (events) does not exist in (the mind of) God.
3. Against these rash (assertions), irreverent and profane (as they are), we (Christians) declare both that God knows all (things) before they happen, and that we do through our own free will whatever we feel and know to be done by us only on the basis of our own free will. But that all (things) come to pass by fate we do not say, (but) on the contrary that nothing comes to pass by fate; since the name of fate, when it is commonly used by speakers, with regard, that is, to the position of the stars when someone is conceived or born, we have shown that it means nothing, as the business itself (i.e. astrology) is a vain one. Yet, as for the order of causes, where the will of God is all powerful, we neither deny (it), nor do we call (it) by the name of fate, unless perhaps we may understand fate as derived from 'fari', that is, from speaking; for we cannot deny that it is written in the holy writings (i.e. the Scriptures): "God has spoken once; these two (things) have I heard, that power belongs to God, and that to you belongs mercy, (O) Lord, who renders to each (man) according to his works (viz. Psalm 62, 11-12)." For the expression, "God has spoken once," is to be understood (as meaning) he has spoken immovably, that is, unchangeably, inasmuch as he knows unchangeably all (the things) that are going to happen in the future, and (all the things) that he himself is going to do. So, for this reason, we might call (the name of) fate as if it were derived from 'fari', if this name were not already understood in another sense, to which I do not wish the hearts of men to be inclined. But, if for God there is a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing therefore depends on the free (exercise) of our will. For in fact our wills themselves are also in the order of causes, which for God is fixed and is included in his foreknowledge, for the wills of men are also the causes of the actions of men; and so (he) who foresaw all the causes of things could certainly not have also been ignorant of our wills among those causes which he foresaw were the causes of our actions.
4. For even that same (statement) that Cicero concedes, that nothing happens unless an efficient cause precedes it, is enough to refute him on this question. For how does it help him because he says that nothing in fact happens without a cause, but that not every cause is a matter of destiny, as there is a fortuitous cause, there is a natural (one), (and) there is a voluntary (one)? It is enough that he admits that everything that happens only happens because of a preceding cause. For these causes which are said (to be) fortuitous, from the root of which (word) the name of fortune comes, we do not say that they are non-existent, but that (they are) latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God or (to the will) of whatever spirits you please, and we by no means separate those from the will of him who is the author and founder of all nature. But now, (as to) the voluntary causes, these belong either (to the will) of God, or of the angels, or of men. or of animals of any description, if those movements of animals devoid of reason, by which they act in some way in accordance with their own nature, when they seek or shun something, are still to be called wills. But, (when) I speak of the wills of angels, (I mean) either (the wills) of good (angels), whom we call angels of God, or of bad (ones), whom we call angels of the devil, or even demons - and so, (with regard to the wills) of men, (I mean) of course (those) both of good and of bad (men).
And from this we draw the conclusion that there are no efficient causes of all (things) that come to pass but voluntary (ones), such as (relate) to that being that is the breath of life. For this air (around us) is also called "breath;" but since it is a material thing, it is not the breath of life. So, the breath of life, which gives life to all (things) and is the creator of every body and of every created spirit, is God himself, the absolutely uncreated spirit. In his will lies the highest power, that assists the the good wills of created spirits, sits in judgment on evil (wills), and regulates (them) all; and to some he grants powers, (but) he does not grant (them) to others. For, just as he is the creator of all beings, so (he is) the giver of all powers, (but) not of (all) wills. Evil wills, of course, do not come from him, since they are contrary to nature, which does come from him. Bodies, then, are more subject to wills, some to our (wills), that is (to the wills) of all mortal beings and more (to the wills) of men than of beasts; and others (to the wills) of angels; but all (bodies) are especially subject to the will of God, to whom all wills are also subject, since they have no power, unless he grants it (to them). So the cause of things, which creates (things only) and is not created, is God; but (all) other causes both create and are created, just as all the created spirits do, especially the rational (ones). But material causes, which are created more than they are creating, are not to be counted among efficient causes, because they can (only do) what the wills of spirits do through them.
How, then, does the order of causes, which is fixed in the prescience of God, arrange it so that nothing is dependent on our will, when our wills have such a very important place in the order of causes itself? So, let Cicero argue the case with those who say that this order of causes is determined by fate, or rather call (the order) itself by the name of fate, which we shrink from, especially on account of the word, for (men) are not accustomed for it to be understood in relation to any true matter. But, (whereas) he denies that the order of all causes is most certain and most evident to a prescient God, we detest this (view even) more than the Stoics (did). For he either denies that God exists, (something) which indeed, in his assumed (image) of another person he has laboured to do in his book, "On the Nature of the Gods;" or, id he acknowledges that God exists, but denies that he has foreknowledge of future (events), even so he says nothing other than that "The fool has said in his heart: there is no God (viz. Psalm 14. 1)." For (he) who is not prescient of all future (events) is surely not God. And therefore our (acts of) will should have as much power as God wished them to have and foresaw (they would have); and so whatever power they have they have (it) most assuredly, and they will most certainly do what they are going to do, because he whose foreknowledge cannot be mistaken foresaw that they would have the power (to do it) and that they would do (it). Therefore, if I saw fit to apply the name of fate to anything at all, I would rather say that the fate of the weaker is the will of the stronger. who has it in his power, than that the freedom of our will is removed from that order of causes which, by an unusual (use of the word), but in accordance with their own custom, the Stoics call fate.
Chapter X: - whether some necessity rules over the wills of men.
1. There is no need then to dread that necessity, which the Stoics, in their fear of it, took such pains to distinguish between the causes of things that they removed some from (the constraint of) necessity, while they subjected others (to it), and among those (causes) which they did not wish to be under (the constraint of) necessity, they even placed our (acts of) will, (thinking) that they would obviously not be free if they were subject to necessity. For, if our (word) necessity is spoken of (as) something which is not in our power, but it accomplishes what is within its power, even if we do not wish (it), as for example, the necessity of death, (then) it is clear that our wills, by which, rightly or wrongly, we live (our lives), are not under any such necessity. For we do many (things), which we would certainly not do, if were unwilling (to do so). To this (class of things), belongs the will itself in the first place; for, if we will (something), it exists; if we do not will (something), it does not; for we should not will (something), if we were unwilling.
But, if the (term) necessity is defined to be in accordance with what we say it is necessary that something should be as it is, or happen as it does, I see no reason why we should fear that it might take away our freedom of will. For we do not put either the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under (the power of) necessity, if we say that it is necessary that God should live forever and foreknow all (things); likewise, his power is not diminished, when we say that he cannot die or be in error. For he cannot do this for this (reason), but if he could, he would certainly be rather less powerful. Of course, he is rightly called omnipotent, on account of his doing what he wills, not on account of his suffering what he does not will; if that should befall (him), he would by no means be omnipotent. For this reason, therefore, he cannot do certain (things) because he is omnipotent. So also when we say it is necessary that, when we exercise our will, we do so of our own free choice: we both affirm (what is) true beyond doubt, yet we do not thereby subject our free will itself to a necessity which takes away our liberty.
Our wills, therefore, exist, and they do whatever we do willingly, (something) which would not happen if we were unwilling. But, (whenever) anyone suffers something against his wishes through the will of other men, the will remains in control: even if the will is not his, (it is) still (that) of a man; but its power (comes) from God. For, if it were only a will, and could not do what it willed, it would be thwarted by a more powerful will; so the will would still be nothing but a will, not (the will) of another, but it would be (the will) of him who had a will, even if he could not accomplish what he willed. So, whatever a man suffers contrary to his will, he ought not to attribute to the wills of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather (to the will) of him who gives power to wills.
2. So, (it is) therefore not (the case) that there is no (power) in our will, because God knew beforehand what would be in our will. For he, who foresaw this, did not foresee nothing. Moreover, if he who foresaw what would be in our will, did not foresee nothing at all, but (he did foresee) something, and there is certainly something in our will, of which he had foreknowledge. Therefore, we are in no way compelled either to do away with the freedom of the will, if we retain (the concept of) the foreknowledge of God, or, in retaining (the concept of) the freedom of the will, to deny that God has foreknowledge of the future; but we embrace both (doctrines), and we faithfully and sincerely confess both (doctrines), the former (i.e. the prescience of God) so that we may have correct beliefs, (and) the latter (i.e. man's free will) so that we may live well. And it means living badly, if one does not have correct beliefs about God. So, far be it from us, in order that we should have free will, to deny the prescience of him, by whose assistance are are, or shall be, free. Consequently, laws, reprimands, exhortations, praises, and denunciations are not useless, because he (i.e. God) knew in advance that they would be (used), and they are most effective, just as he knew in advance that they would be effective, (and) prayers are also effective for obtaining those (things) which he foresaw he would grant to those who pray, and rewards are justly provided for good deeds and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore fail to sin, because God foresaw that he would sin; on the contrary, therefore, it cannot be doubted that (man) himself sins when he sins, because he whose foreknowledge cannot be mistaken foresaw that it would not be fate, or fortune, or anything else that would sin, but (man) himself. If he chooses not (to do so), he certainly does not sin; but, if he chooses not to sin, God foresaw this also.
Chapter XI: - on the universal providence of God, by whom all (things) are kept together.
So, the supreme and true God, with his Word and Holy Spirit, which three are one, (is) the one almighty God, creator and maker of every soul and of every body, and (it is) by participation in him that all (who) are happy are happy in the truth (and) not in illusion; he made man a rational animal in soul and body, and, when he sinned, he did not allow him to go unpunished, but he did not abandon (him) without mercy; to the good and to the evil he gave being, (shared) also with stones, seminal life, (shared) also with trees, sensual life (shared) also with animals, and intellectual life, (shared) with angels alone; from him comes every size, every type, every class (of being); from him comes measure, number, and weight; from him comes everything which naturally exists, of whatever kind it is, (and) of whatever value it is; from him comes the seeds of forms, the forms of seeds, and the movements of seeds and forms; he also gave flesh its origin, its beauty, its health, its fecundity in propagation, the disposition of the limbs, (and) the security of harmony; he also gave memory, feeling, and appetite to the irrational soul; but, in addition (to these), (he gave) to the rational (soul) a mind, intelligence, and a will; not just heaven and earth, not just angels and men, but not even the entrails of a tiny and contemptible animal, nor the little wing of a bird, nor the little flower on a plant, nor the leaf on a tree has he left without a harmony and some (kind of) peace, so to speak, among its parts; and it cannot in any way be supposed that he would have excluded the kingdoms of men, and their dominations and servitudes, from the laws of his providence.
Chapter XII: - by what (good) qualities the ancient Romans merited (the fact) that the true God should enlarge their empire, even though they did not worship him.
1. Next, let us consider what (were) the (good) qualities of the Romans, and for what reason the true God, in whose power the earthly kingdoms also lie, deigned to help (them) to enlarge their empire. In order that I might discuss this matter more clearly, I have written the preceding book with reference to it, (to show) that in this matter the gods, whom they saw fit to worship even in relation to trivial things, have no power, and the earlier parts of the present volume, which I have brought up to this (point), (are intended) to dispose of the problem of fate, lest anyone, who might already have been persuaded that the Roman empire had not been extended and preserved by the worship of those gods, might (still) be attributing it to some kind of fate rather than to the most powerful will of the highest God.
So, the first of the ancient Romans, as their history teaches and commends, although they worshipped false gods, as (did all) the other nations except one, the people of the Hebrews, and sacrificed victims, not to God, but to demons, yet "they were avid for praise, generous with their money, (and) sought great glory and riches honourably acquired (viz. Sallust: 'Catilina' 7.6);" this (glory) they loved most ardently, (and) on account of it they chose to live, and on behalf of it they they did not hesitate to die; (all) other desires they suppressed, through their enormous desire for this one (thing). In short, since it seemed shameful for their native-land to be in servitude, but glorious (for it) to dominate and to command, they firstly longed with all their zeal (for it) to be independent and then (for it) to win dominion. Hence it was that they could not endure kingly rule, (and) they created for themselves "an annual (system of) authority and two commanders, who were called consuls from taking counsel, not kings or lords, from ruling and dominating"; now, since kings would surely seem to be better derived from ruling, as reign (is) from kings, but kings, as it is said, from ruling; but (it was) not the discipline of a ruler, or the benevolence of an adviser, that was thought (to be the cause) of their disdain for royalty, but the arrogance of a despot.
So, when king Tarquin (i.e. Tarquinius Superbus, or Tarquin the Younger, King of Rome 534-509 B.C.) had been expelled and the consuls had been established, there followed (a time) to which the same author (i.e. Sallust) alludes in his praises of the Romans, in which "it is incredible to relate how great the state grew in (so) short a time; so great was the desire for glory that had come upon them (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 7.3)." So, this eagerness for praise and desire for glory induced many wonderful deeds, (which were) doubtless considered praiseworthy and glorious in accordance with the judgment of men.
The same Sallust praises the great and famous men of his own time, Marcus (Porcius) Cato and Gaius (Julius) Caesar, saying that for a long time the state had had no one great in virtue, but that within his memory there had been these two (men) of outstanding merit, (although) different in character. Now, in his praises of Caesar, he declares that he longed for a great empire and an army for himself, (and) a fresh war, where his valour might shine forth. So, it came about in the prayers of the men (who were) great in virtue that Bellona (i.e. the Goddess of War) should incite the wretched nations to war and lash (them) with her bloody whip, so there might be (an occasion) when their valour might shine forth. Such indeed was the result of that eagerness for praise and desire for glory. So, in the first place, by their love of liberty, (and) afterwards also (by their love of) dominion and by their desire for praise and glory, they achieved many great (deeds). Also, their famous poet gives them testimony of both of these things, when indeed he says: "Then when Porsenna (i.e. Lars Porsenna, King of Clusium, who besieged Rome in 508 B.C.) ordered (them) to restore Tarquin, and oppressed the city with a mighty siege, the sons of Aeneas rushed to arms to (defend) their liberty (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 8.646-8)." So great (a thing) it was in their (eyes) either to die bravely or to live (as) free (men).
But, when freedom had been acquired, so great a passion for glory had come upon (them) that freedom seemed too little in itself, unless dominion (over others) were also being sought, while they set great store (by) what the same poet says, as if he were speaking through the mouth of Jupiter: "Yes, even the resentful Juno, who now wearies the sea, and the earth, and the heavens with her fear, shall amend her plans for the better, and, together with me, will favour the Romans, the masters of all (things) and the nation that wears the toga. Thus it has pleased (the fates). With the sacred seasons gliding along, the time will come when the house of Assaracus (i.e. the Romans: Assaracus was Priam's great-uncle, and the member of the royal house of Troy from whom Aeneas, the ancestor of the Romans, was descended) will crush in servitude (even) Phthia and glorious Mycenae, and will rule in conquered Argos (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 1.279-85)."
When Virgil represents Jupiter as predicting these (things) in the future, he was in fact recalling (things that had been) done, and was contemplating present (realities); but I have therefore chosen to mention those (things) in order to show that the Romans had such a regard for dominion after liberty that it was placed among those things on which they bestowed their greatest praises. And so it is that that (passage) of the same poet, where he preferred the peculiar arts of the Romans, those of ruling, and commanding, and subjugating, and subduing (other) peoples in war, to the arts of other nations: "Others (i.e. the Greeks), (this) I do believe, will beat out breathing bronze more smoothly, will draw living likenesses out of marble with more delicacy, will plead cases better, and will trace with a rod the movements of the heavens and predict the rising of the stars (more accurately); you, (O) Roman, remember to rule with authority the peoples (of the earth). These will be your arts: to impose the custom of peace, to spare the vanquished, and to subdue the proud in war (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 6.847-53)."
3. The more skilfully they practised these arts, the less they gave themselves up to pleasures, and to the enervation of mind and body in coveting and accumulating wealth, and in corrupting morals by these (means), by plundering their wretched fellow-citizens, (and) by their great generosity to base stage-players.
At the time when Sallust was was writing, and Virgil was reciting these (things), these men outstripped their ancestors in moral decline and abounded (in wealth), and they did not canvass for honours and glory by these arts, but by cunning and deceit. Thus the same (writer) says: "But at first (it was) ambition rather than avarice that stirred the minds of men, and this vice was quite close to (being) a virtue. For the god and the dishonourable (man) alike desire glory, honour, (and) power, but the former," he says, "strives (for them) by the true path, (whereas the latter) claims (them) by trickery and deceit, because, in his case, the good arts are lacking (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 11.1-2)." These good arts are those through which by virtue, and not by deceitful ambition, (he) evidently (means) to arrive at honour, and glory, and power; yet these (are the things) which the good and the dishonourable (man) alike desire for themselves; but the former, that is the good (man),b strives by the true path. The path is virtue, along which he strives, as if to seize his goal, that is to (achieve) glory, honour, and power.
That this (ideal) had been ingrained (in the minds) of the Romans, they also indicate by the presence of those temples of the gods, Virtue and Honour, which they had set up very close to each other, since they considered as divine (beings) what they had been given by God. From this we can understand what they who were good chose to be the goal of virtue, and to which they referred it, namely to honour; for bad (men) did not possess it, although they desired to have honour, which they tried to acquire by evil arts, that is by trickery and deceit.
4. Cato is more highly praised. Since of him it is said: "The less he sought glory, the more it pursued him (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 54.6)." For the glory, for which they burned with desire, is the (favourable) judgment of men who think well of (other) men; and is virtue is better, as it is not content with human testimony unless (it is that) of his own conscience. So the Apostle says: "For this is our glory: the testimony of our conscience (viz. St. Paul: '2 Corinthians' 1.12);" and in another place: "But let every single one of us test his own work, and then he will have glory only in himself and not in another (viz. St. Paul: 'Galatians' 6.4)." So, (as for) the glory, and honour, and power, which they desired for themselves, and which good (men) strove to attain by good arts, virtue ought not to follow (them), but they (should follow) virtue. For there is no true virtue, except that which is directed towards that end where is (found) the good of man, (other) than which there is no better. So, Cato ought not to have sought even the honours which he did seek, but the state (should have) granted them on account of his virtue, without his seeking (them).
5. But, although at that time there were two Romans great in virtue, Caesar and Cato, Cato's virtue seemed to have been far nearer to the true (nature of virtue) than (that) of Caesar. So, let us consider what, in Cato's own opinion, was the condition of the state at that time, and what it had been earlier: "Do not suppose," he says, "that our ancestors made the republic great by arms (alone). If that had been so, we should be keeping it in the most excellent (condition), since we have a greater supply of allies and citizens, as well as of arms and horses, as they (had). But there were other (things) which made them great, which we do not possess at all, (such as) industry at home, just rule abroad, a spirit free in its deliberations, and addicted neither to crime nor to lust. In place of these (virtues) we have extravagance and avarice, public destitution (and) private opulence; we extol riches (and) pursue indolence; (there is) no distinction at all between good (men) and bad (ones); (and) self-seeking takes possession of all the rewards of virtue. Nor (is this) surprising: when each one of you takes account of his own interests on an individual basis, when you are slaves to pleasures at home, (and) to money and influence here (in the senate), from this it comes about that an attack is made on a defenceless state (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 52. 19-23)."
6. He who hears these words of Cato, or of Sallust, thinks that all or most of the ancient Romans were then like those who are praised. That is not the case; otherwise those (things) would not be true, which he himself writes, and which I have quoted in the second book of this work (viz. 'De Civitate Dei' 2.18), where he says that the injuries inflicted by the powerful, and, because of them, the secession of the plebs from the patricians, and other domestic dissensions, had already existed from the beginning, nor, after the expulsion of the kings, (were men) governed by a fair and moderate administration for very long, (and only) as long as the fear (caused) by Tarquin existed, (that is) until the serious war with Etruria, which had been undertaken on his account, was finished. Afterwards, however, the patricians exercised power over the plebeians as if they were slaves, flogged (them) in the manner of kings, drove (them) from the land, and wielded their power alone, excluding (all) others; to these discords, while one class wished to dominate, and the other refused to be slaves, the end came with the Second Punic War (i.e. 218-201 B.C.), since a great fear began to press upon (them) once more, and to restrain their restless spirits from those disturbances by another (and) a greater anxiety, and to recall (them) to civic harmony.
But important (matters) were managed by a few men, who were good in their own way, and, when these evils were endured and mitigated through the foresight of a few good men, the state began to thrive; as the same historian says, as he read or heard of the many famous deeds which the Roman people performed at home and abroad. on sea and on land, he liked to consider what (was) the thing that especially sustained such great achievements; for he knew how often the Romans in a small band had fought with great battalions of the enemy, (and) he had learned that wars had been fought with scanty resources against wealthy kings; and he said that, after he had given the matter much consideration, he had reached the conclusion that the exceptional virtue of a few citizens had achieved everything, and that for this (reason) it had happened that poverty had overcome wealth, and the few (had overcome) the many. "But," he adds, "after the community was corrupted by luxury and idleness, the republic again bore by its greatness the vices of its generals and magistrates (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 53.2-5)."
So, the virtue of the few, who strive by the true path, that is by virtue itself, to (attain) glory, honour, (and) power, was praised even by Cato. That was the source of the hard work at home, that Cato mentioned, (which ensured) that the treasury was wealthy, (while) private resources (were) small. So, on the contrary, when morals had been corrupted, he expresses (it as) a vice that the public (purse was) in need, (but there was) private opulence.
Chapter XIII: - on the love of praise, which, although it is a vice, is regarded (as) a virtue for the (reason) that by means of it the greater vices are checked.
Therefore, when there had been splendid kingdoms in the East for a long time, God willed that (an empire) should also arise in the west, which was later in time but more splendid in the extent and the magnitude of its power. And, in order to overcome the grievous evils of many nations, he granted this dominion to those men, who, for the sake of honour, praise, and glory, served the interests of their country, on behalf of which they were seeking such glory, and (who) did not hesitate to put its safety before their own safety, suppressing the desire for money and many other vices in favour of this one vice, the love of praise. For he seems (to have) a saner (point of view) who knows even the love of praise to be a vice, (something) which did not escape (the notice of) the poet Horace, who says: "Do you swell with the love of praise? There are some sure (and certain) remedies, which will be able to restore you (to moral health) if you read the booklet three times with a pure heart (viz. Horace: 'Epistles' 1.1.36-7)." And, in order to repress the lust for domination, the same (poet) in a lyric verse recited as follows: "By taming your covetous spirit, you will rule more widely than if you were to unite Libya and distant Gades, and both Punic (peoples) were to serve a single (master) (viz. Horace: 'Odes 2. 2. 9-12)."
However, (those) who do not bridle their baser passions by the faith of piety, obtained through the Holy Spirit, and by the love of intelligible beauty (i.e. the Platonic notion of beauty, apprehended by the intellect, not by the senses), (do,) at least, (live) better, not yet saints, to be sure, but they are less base. Even Tullius (i.e. Cicero) could not disguise this fact in those books which he wrote on the republic, when he speaks about training the leader of the state, whom he says should be nurtured on glory, and, further on, he records that his own ancestors had performed many marvellous and famous (deeds) through their desire for glory (viz. Cicero: 'De Republica' 5.7.9). So, they not only failed to resist this vice, but they even regarded it (as something) to be encouraged and kindled, thinking it to be advantageous to the state. And yet, not even in his books of philosophy does Tullius shrink from this pernicious (idea), when he reveals it more clearly than daylight. For, when he speaks of these studies, which are especially to be pursued with the goal of true good, not for the windiness of human praise, he introduced this universal and general sentiment: "(It is) honour (that) nourishes the arts, and all (men) are spurred to (pursue) their studies by glory, and those (studies) are always neglected that are not valued by people in general (viz. Cicero: 'Tusculanae Disputationes' 1.2.4)."
Chapter XIV: - on cutting back the love of human praise, since all the glory of the righteous is in God.
Without doubt, therefore, (it is) better for this desire to be resisted rather than for it to be allowed. For the more a man is like God, the cleaner (he) also (is) from this impurity. Even if in this life it cannot be completely eradicated from the heart, since it does not cease to tempt the minds even of those who are making good progress, at least let the love of glory be surpassed by the love of righteousness, so that, if in some place (things) which are held in low esteem by people in general are neglected, (yet) if they are good, if (they are) right, even the love of human praise may blush and yield to the love of the truth. For, if the desire for glory is greater in the heart than the fear or love of God, so hostile is this vice to pious faith, that the Lord said: "How can you believe, when you expect glory from one another and do not seek the glory that comes from God alone (viz. John 5.44)?" Likewise, with regard to those who had believed in him, but were afraid to confess (it) openly, the evangelist says: "They loved the glory of men more than (the glory) of God (viz. John 12.43)."
This was not what the holy apostles did; when they preached the name of Christ not only in those places where it was held in low esteem, - just as that (man) says: "(Things) which are held in low esteem by people in general are always neglected (viz. Cicero: 'Tusculanae Disputationes' 1.2.4)" - but even (in places where) it was regarded with extreme abhorrence, as they bore in mind what they had heard from their good master, who was also the healer of minds: "If anyone shall deny me before men, I shall deny him before my father in heaven, and before God's angels (viz. Matthew 10.33; Luke 12.9)," (and) amid curses and reviling, amid the most bitter persecutions and cruel punishments, they were not deterred from preaching the salvation of humanity by so great a clamour of human hatred. And, because they did and said divine (things) and lived in a divine manner, and subdued hard hearts in a certain way and instituted the peace of righteousness, great glory in the church of Christ came their way, but they did not rest on that as if it were the goal of their virtue, but they also ascribed it to the glory of God, by whose grace they were what they were, and with that tinder they set fire to (the hearts of) those whom they were guiding to (show) their love for him by whom they had become what they were. For their master had taught them not to be good for the sake of human glory, when he said: "Beware of practising your righteousness in the presence of men, so that you are seen by them; for otherwise you will have no reward from your father, who is in heaven (viz. Matthew 6.1)." But again, lest they should take this in the wrong way and be afraid to be pleasing to men, and, by concealing that they are good (men), they should be of less use (to others), he showed (them) for what end that ought to attract attention: "Let your works (so) shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your father who is in heaven (viz. Matthew 5.16)." (Your purpose) therefore (is) "that you should not be seen by them," that is with the intention that you should wish them to turn to you, for by yourselves you are nothing; but "so that they may glorify your father who is in heaven," let them turn to him and become what you are.
The martyrs followed them, and, by not inflicting punishments on themselves but by enduring (the punishments) inflicted on them, they surpassed the Scaevolae, and the Curtii, and the Decii, both in their true courage, since (it sprang) from true piety, and in their countless multitude. But, since those (Romans) were in an earthly city, and the aim of all their services on its behalf was thought (to be) its security and a kingdom not in heaven but on earth, not with regard to a life eternal, but with regard to the departure of the dead and their replacement by those who were about to die, what else were they to love apart from the glory, whereby they would live on after death, as if on the lips of those who praised (them)?
Chapter XV: - on the temporal reward that God gave in return for the good character of the Romans.
So, to such men as these (God) was not going to grant eternal life with his holy angels in his heavenly city, to the fellowship of which true piety leads, and which does not offer that service of religion, which the Greeks call 'latreia', except to the one true God; but, if he were not to grant them this earthly glory of a pre-eminent empire, a reward would not have been rendered for their good arts, that is for the virtues by which they strove to attain so great a glory. For with regard to such (men), (men) who appear to do something good in order that they may be glorified by (other) men, the Lord also says: "Verily I say unto you, they have received their reward." So, they also disregarded their own private affairs for the sake of the commonwealth, that is (for the sake of) the republic and for its treasury, they resisted avarice, they took account of their country's well-being with an independent mind, nor (were they) guilty of any offence against their laws, nor any (act of) lustful indulgence; by all these arts, as though by the true path, they strove to (attain) honours, power, (and) glory: they were honoured among almost all nations, they imposed the laws of their own empire upon many nations, and today they are the subject of glory in literature and history among almost all nations. Nor is there anything of which they can complain with regard to the justice of the supreme and true God; "they have received their reward."
Chapter XVI: - on the reward of the holy citizens of the Eternal City, to whom examples of the virtues of the Romans are useful.
Yet very different is the reward of the saints, who even here endure reproaches with regard to that City of God, which is (so) hateful to those who love this world. That city is eternal; no one is born there, because no one dies; there, there is true and full felicity, not a goddess, but a gift of God; from it we have received the pledge of faith, (and) for as long as we are on our journey we sigh for its beauty; there the sun does not rise on the good and the evil, but the sun of righteousness protects only the good; there, there will be no great industry to enrich the public treasury, while private property (is) scanty, (for) there the storehouse of truth is common (property). So, the Roman empire was expanded to (achieve) glory among men, not only that such a reward should be paid to those men, but also so that the citizens of that Eternal City, so long as they are journeying here, may contemplate diligently and soberly these examples, and see how much love is due to the heavenly country on account of eternal life, if the earthly (country) was so much loved by its citizens on account of the glory of men.
Chapter XVII: - for what profit the Romans waged wars, and how much they bestowed on those whom they conquered.
1. For, as far as it concerns this life of mortals, which is spent and ended in a few days, what does it matter under whose rule a man, who is about to die, may live, if (only) those who rule do not force (him) to (commit) unholy and iniquitous (deeds)? Or did the Romans really do anything harmful to those nations which they subjugated and brought under their own laws, apart from the vast slaughter (occasioned) by their wars? Now, if it had been dome with their agreement, it would have occurred with greater success, but there would have been no glory for those celebrating triumphs. For the Romans were not exempt from living under their own laws, which they imposed on others. If this had been done without Mars and Bellona, so that Victoria had no place, and with no one being conquered when no one had fought, would not the circumstances of the Romans and the other nations have been one and the same? (This would have been) especially (true), if it had been done at once what was afterwards done most graciously and most humanely, (namely) to grant all (those) who belonged to the Roman empire the fellowship of the state, so that they became Roman citizens, and so what was previously (the privilege) of a few became (the privilege) of all; only (there was this one condition), that the people that had no lands of their own should live at the public expense; this feeding of the (people) by good administrators of the republic would have been provided with a better grace by agreement, rather than it being extorted from conquered (peoples).
2. For with regard to the security and good character, and certainly the honourable positions, of men, I do not see at all what difference it makes that some have conquered (and) others have been conquered, except for that utterly worthless pride in human glory, in which they have received their reward who have burned with an intense desire for it, and have (therefore) waged wars with great eagerness. For do not their lands pay tribute? Is it permitted to them to learn what is not permitted to others? Are there not many senators in other countries who do not know Rome even by sight? Take away their boasting and what are all men but (simply) men? But, even if the perversity of the times should permit that all the better (men) should be more highly honoured, human honour should not therefore be considered of great (importance), since smoke has no weight.
But, even in these matters, let us make use of the favour of our Lord God; let us consider all the (hardships) they made light of, what (sufferings) they endured, what desires they suppressed for the sake of human glory, seeing that they deserved to receive it, (as) a reward, as it were, for such virtues, and may this (thought) even give us the strength to suppress our pride; (and), so that, since that city. in which we shall reign differs as greatly from this earthly (one) as heaven differs from the earth, (as) eternal life (differs) from temporal joy, (as) solid glory (differs) from empty praises, (as) the fellowship of mortals (differs) from the fellowship of angels, (and as) the light of him who made the sun and the moon (differs) from the light of the sun and the moon, the citizens of so great a country should not think that they have done anything great, if, in order to attain it, they have done some good work or endured some evils, since they did such (deeds and) endured such (evils) for the sake of the earthly (home) they already possessed. (And this is) especially (the case), because the remission of sins, which gathers citizens to the eternal country has something (in it), in which there was some shadowy resemblance to that sanctuary of Romulus, by which an amnesty in respect of all kinds of crimes brought together the multitude through which that state was founded.
Chapter XVIII: - how far Christians should be from boasting, if they have done anything for love of their eternal country, seeing that the Romans did such great (things) for the sake of human glory and for an earthly city.
1. So, why is it such a great (thing) to despise all the allurements of this world, however sweet (they may be), for the sake of that eternal and heavenly country, if, for the sake of this temporal and earthly (one), Brutus (i.e. Lucius Junius Brutus, one of the first two consuls in 509 B.C.; he put his two sons to death for plotting to restore the Tarquins) could even put his sons to death, (something) which that former (country) compels no one to do? But it is certainly more difficult to kill one's sons than to do what must be done for the sake of the (heavenly) country, (that is) either to distribute to the poor those (things) which were thought to be worthy to be collected and preserved for one's sons, or to let (them) go, if a trial should arise which requires this to be done for the sake of faith and righteousness. For earthly riches do not make either us or our children happy, as they must either be lost by us while we are living, or be acquired when we are dead by (those) whom we do not know, or by (those) whom we would not wish (to have them); but (it is) God (who) makes (us) happy, and he is the true wealth of our souls. But, as for Brutus, because he killed his sons, even the poet who praises (him) bears witness to his unhappiness. For he says: "And (he) their father, for the sake of glorious liberty, will summon his sons to punishment when they stir up rebellion, unhappy (man that he is) however posterity may extol those deeds (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 6.820-22)." But in the following verse he consoled the unhappy (man): "Love of country prevails, and a boundless passion for renown (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 6.823)."
These are those two (things), liberty and the desire for human praise, which impelled the Romans to (perform) wondrous deeds. So, if, for the sake of the liberty of those who were destined to die, and through the desire for the praise which is sought from mortals, sons could be killed by their father, what a great (thing) is it, if, for the sake of true liberty, which makes us free from the tyranny of sin, and death, and the devil, and not through the desire for human praise, but through a love of freeing men, not from King Tarquin, but from demons and the prince of demons, we do not slay our sons, but we reckon Christ's poor (ones) among our sons?
2. If another Roman leader, named Torquatus (i.e.Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, consul 347, 344 and 340, and dictator 353, 349, and 320), slew his son, (this was) not because he had fought against his country, but rather for his country (i.e. against the Latins in 340), but because, having been challenged by the enemy, he had fought with youthful ardour contrary to what (he) his father had ordered, (and) even though he had been victorious; (he was put to death) lest more harm should come from an order being scorned, than good from an enemy being slain: so, why should they boast themselves, if, on account of the laws of their immortal country, they (i.e. Christians) despise all the good things of the earth, which are loved (by them) much less than their sons?
If Furius Camillus (i.e. Marcus Furius Camillus, consular tribune 401, 384 and 381, and dictator 396, 390, 389, 368, and 367), (who had freed) his ungrateful countrymen, from whose necks he had cast the yoke of their most bitter foes, the Veientes (i.e. in 401), and had (then) been condemned by his rivals, freed (them) for a second time, from the Gauls (i.e. in 390), because he had no better (place) where he could live in glory, why should (a man) be extolled, as if he has done something great, who, having perhaps suffered the grievous wrong of being deprived of his office in the church at the hands of his carnal enemies, did not go over to its enemies, the heretics, or found some heresy himself to oppose it, but rather defended it, as far as he was able to, from the most pernicious depravity of the heretics, since it is not for the lack of somewhere else where he can live in the glory of (the eyes of) men, but (of somewhere else) where eternal life may be gained?
If Mucius (i.e. Gaius Mucius Scaevola), in order that peace could be made with King Porsenna (i.e. Lars Porsenna of Clusium), who was oppressing the Romans in a grievous war (i.e. in 508), because he had not been able to kill Porsenna himself and had killed another (man) instead of him by mistake, stretched out his right hand into the burning altar (flames) before his eyes, saying that (there were) many (men, who) seemed to be just like (he was) himself, (who) had conspired to destroy him, and he, horrified by his daring and the conspiracy of men such as him, removed himself from the war by making peace, (if Mucius did this,) who will be crediting his services to the kingdom of heaven, if for this reason he gave not just one hand, but his whole body to the flames, not of his own accord, but in submission to some persecutor?
If (Marcus) Curtius, (fully) armed, spurred on his horse and plunged headlong into a yawning chasm in the earth (i.e. the pit which had opened up in the Roman Forum in 362 after an earthquake) in obedience to the oracles of his gods, since they had ordered that the best thing which the Romans possessed should be thrown into it, and they could (only) understand that they excelled in nothing other than in men and arms, and so it was necessary that in accordance with the commands of the gods an armed man should be cast headlong to his death, (if indeed he did this,) what great (deed) will anyone say he has done for his eternal country, when he encounters some enemy of his faith, and does not dispatch himself to such a death on a voluntary basis, but dies after being dispatched by him; for he has received a surer oracle from his Lord, (who is) also the king of his country: "Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul (viz. Matthew 10.28)."
If the Decii (i.e. Publius Decius Mus, consul in 340 who sacrificed his life in order to ensure the defeat of the Latins at the Battle of Vesuvius; his son of the same name was consul in 312, 308, 297, and 295, in which year he followed the example of his father in order to defeat the Samnites at the Battle of Sentinum; and his grandson, also of the same name, who was consul in 279, in which year he fought, and was reputed to have been killed, at the Battle of Asculum against King Pyrrhus of Epirus) dedicated themselves to being killed, consecrating (themselves) by a fixed form of words, in order that the Roman army should be freed when they fell and placated the wrath of the gods with their blood, let the holy martyrs by no means boast, as though they have done anything worthy of participation in that country where there is eternal and true happiness, if, right up to the shedding of their blood, they have struggled to love not only their brothers, for whom it was shed, but also their enemies, by whom it was shed, as they were commanded (to do) in the faith of charity and in the charity of faith.
If Marcus (Horatius) Pulvillus (i.e. suffect consul in 509, the first year of the republic, and consul in 507), when the death of his son was falsely reported to him by envious (men) when he was dedicating a temple to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva (i.e. on the Capitoline Hill in 509), so that, disturbed by the news, he might withdraw, and so the glory of the dedication might go to his colleague (i.e. Publius Valerius Poplicola), thought so little of it, that he had even ordered that he should be cast out unburied - the desire for glory had so overcome the grief of the loss of a child in his heart - , how shall (that man) say that he has done anything great for the preaching of the holy gospel, by which citizens of the heavenly country are freed from their various errors and gathered together, (that is the man) to whom the Lord said, when he was worried about his father's burial: "Follow me, and let the dead bury their dead (viz. Matthew 8.22)."
If Marcus (Atilius) Regulus (i.e. consul in 267 and 256), in order not to break the oath he had sworn to his most cruel foes, returned to them from Rome itself, since, as he is said to have replied to the Romans when they wished to retain him, that he could not keep the dignity of an honourable citizen there (at home), after he had been a slave to Africans (n.b. he had been defeated and captured by the Carthaginians in 255), and, since he had spoken against them in the Roman senate, the Carthaginians put him to death with the most frightful tortures, (if Regulus could have acted thus, then) what tortures are there which should not be disregarded for the sake of faith in that country, to whose blessedness faith itself leads? Or "what shall be rendered to the Lord for all that he has rendered (viz. Psalms 116.2)," if, for the faith which is owed to him, a man shall suffer as Regulus suffered for the faith which he owed to his most deadly foes?
And how shall a Christian dare to pride himself in his voluntary poverty, (which he has adopted) in order that he may walk the path less encumbered in the pilgrimage of this life, which leads to the country where God himself is (the author) of the true riches, when he hears or reads that Lucius Valerius (i.e. Publius Valerius Poplicola), who died during his consulship (i.e. in 504; he had been consul previously in 509, 508, and 507), was so poor that money was even collected from the people to pay for the expenses of his burial? Let him hear or read about Quintius Cincinnatus (i.e. Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, suffect consul in 460, and dictator in 458 and 439), since he owned four acres and was cultivating them with his own hands, when he he was taken from the plough to become dictator, (an appointment) surely greater in honour than consul, and, after conquering the enemy and acquiring great glory, (n.b. he defeated the Aequi at the Battle of Mount Algidus in 458), he continued in the same (state of) poverty.
Or how will anyone proclaim that he has done (something) great, when he has refused to be lured away from his allegiance to that eternal country by any reward of this world, when he learns that Fabricius (i.e. Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, consul 282 and 278) could not be torn from (his loyalty to) the Roman state by the lavish bribes of Pyrrhus, King of the Epirotes, and even by the promise of a fourth part of his kingdom, and that he preferred to remain in his poverty (as) a private (citizen)? For, although what (is called) the republic, that is the people's estate, the country's estate, or the common estate was very rich and wealthy, its (inhabitants) were so poor in their own homes that one of them, who had already been consul on two occasions (i.e. Publius Cornelius Rufinus, consul in 290 and 277), was expelled from that senate of poor men by a decision of the censors (n.b. one of them was Fabricius), because he was found to have silver vessels of ten pounds in weight; so poor were those very (men) by whose triumphs the public treasury was enriched! Ought not all Christians, who, with a more noble purpose, make common (property) of their wealth, according to what is written in 'The Acts of the Apostles', that distribution should be made to each one, as his need is, and no one may say that anything (is) his own, but they should have all (things) in common, understand that they ought not to be airing their boasts for this (reason), if they are doing it to obtain the company of the angels, when those others did something almost the same to preserve the glory of the Romans.
3. How could these (deeds) and whatever other (things) of this kind that are found in their books have become so well-known, and how could they have been acclaimed with such renown, if the Roman empire had not spread far and wide and been enlarged by its magnificent successes? So (it was) through that empire, so extensive and so long-lasting and renowned through the virtues of such great men that the reward which they sought for their efforts was received, and their examples are set before us as a necessary reminder (of our duty), in order that, if we do not, for the sake of that most glorious city of God, cling to those virtues which are in some way similar (to those) to which they clung for the sake of the glory of an earthly city, we shall be stung with shame; if we hold (them) fast, let us not be exalted with pride; for, as the Apostle says: "The sufferings of this (present) time are not worthy to (be compared with) the future glory which will be revealed in us (viz. St. Paul: Romans 8.18)." But to (obtain) the glory of men in this present time the life of those (men) was deemed worthy enough.
So (it was) that the Jews, who put Christ to death, were also most justly awarded (to the Romans as a mark) of their glory (n.b. in 70 A.D. the Romans, led by Titus, the son of Vespasian captured and sacked Jerusalem), since the New Testament reveals what was hidden in the Old, (namely) that (it was) not for the sake of earthly and temporal benefits, which divine providence grants to the good and bad alike, but for the sake of eternal life, and everlasting gifts, and the fellowship of the heavenly city itself, that the one true God should be worshipped, so that those who sought and acquired earthly glory through their virtues, such as they were, should conquer those who, in their great wickedness, slew and rejected the giver of true glory and of the eternal city.
Chapter XIX: - how the desire for glory and the desire for dominance differ one from the other.
There is a clear difference between the desire for human glory and the desire for dominance. For, though it is easy (for one) who delights excessively in human glory also to aspire ardently to dominance, yet (those) who covet true glory, though (it be) the praise of men, take pains not to displease those who form good judgments. For there are many good (qualities) in the characters of those who form good judgments, although many do not have them; (it is) by means of these good qualities (that men) strive for glory and power or dominance, (and) of these Sallust says: "But he climbs by the true path (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 11.2)." But anyone, who desires to rule and command without (having) the desire for glory, through which a man fears to displease those who form good judgments, generally seeks to obtain (the thing) that he loves even by barefaced acts of criminality. Therefore, (anyone) who covets glory either climbs by the true path or at least "he strives by trickery and deceit (viz. Sallust: 'Catiline' 11.2)," wishing to appear to be good, which he is not.
And therefore it is a great virtue in (a man who) has virtues to desire glory, because his disregard (of it) is in the sight of God, but is not disclosed to human judgment. For whatever he does before the eyes of men, through which he may appear (to be) a despiser of glory, if it is thought that he does (it) to (gain) greater praise, that is greater glory, there he is no way in which he can demonstrate to the perceptions of those who suspect him that (the circumstances) are other than they suspect. But (he) who disregards the opinions of those who praise also disregards the rashness of those who suspect (his motives), but, if he is truly good, he does not disregard their salvation, for so great is the righteousness of (the man) who takes his virtues from the Spirit of God, that he even loves his own enemies, and he so loves (them) that he wishes to correct his haters and detractors and have (them) as his associates, not in an earthly, but in a heavenly, country; but, with regard to those who praise him, although he makes little of (the fact) that they praise him, yet he does not make little of (the fact) that they love (him), and he does not wish to take no notice of their praising him, lest he should forfeit their love (for him); and so he urges keenly that praise should rather go to the one from whom a man receives whatever in him is rightly praised.
For he who despises glory, (yet) is eager to dominate, exceeds the wild beasts either in the cruelty of his vices or in his self-indulgent lifestyle. Some of the Romans were (men) of this kind: for, though they had lost any concern for their reputation, they did not lack the desire for dominance. History indicates that there have been many such (men); but (it was) Nero Caesar (i.e. Emperor 54-68 A.D.) (who) first attained the summit and citadel, so to speak, of this vice, and so great was his extravagance that one would have thought (there was) nothing manly to be feared from him; (yet) so great (was) his cruelty that one would not have believed that he had anything effeminate (in his nature), if one had not known (about it). Yet the power to dominate is not granted even to such (men) except by the providence of the supreme God when he deems the affairs of mankind worthy of such masters. The voice of God is clear on the matter when the wisdom of God is the speaker: "Through me kings reign, and through me tyrants hold the land (viz. 'Proverbs' 8.15)." But, lest those who are called tyrants should be thought (to be) not wicked and unjust kings but brave (men) in accordance with ancient usage - so Virgil says: "To have touched the right-hand of the tyrant will be to me the token of peace (viz. Virgil: 'Aeneid' 7.266)" - , it is most plainly said of God in another place: "That he causes a hypocritical man to rule because of the perversity of the people (viz. Job 34.30)." Therefore, although, I have sufficiently explained, as far as I am able to, for what reason the one true and just God helped the Romans, in accordance with the particular standard of an earthly state, to acquire the glory of an empire, there could, however, also be another more hidden cause, better known to God than to us, on account of the diverse merits of the human race; while it is agreed among all (those who are) truly religious that no one can have true virtue without true piety, that is (without) the worship of the true God, and that it is not true (virtue) when it is in the service of human glory' yet those who are not citizens of the eternal city, which in our sacred books is called the City of God, are more useful to the earthly city, when perhaps they have their own kind of virtue, than if (they are) without it.
But, if those who are endowed with true piety and live good lives have the skill to rule people, there is nothing more fortunate for human affairs than if, by the mercy of God, they have power. But such men, however great (are) the virtues they can have in this life, attribute (them) only to the grace of God, because he has bestowed these virtues (on them) in response to their wishes, their beliefs, and their prayers, and at the same time they understand how far they fall short of that perfection of righteousness, such as is (found) in the fellowship of those holy angels, to which they strive to adapt themselves. But however much that virtue, which without true piety is a slave to the glory of men, may be praised and proclaimed, it can by no means be compared with the meagre beginnings of the saints, whose hope was placed in the glory and mercy of the true God.
Chapter XX: - (it is) as shameful for the virtues to be a slave to human glory as to bodily pleasure.
Philosophers, who place the end of human good in virtue itself, in order to put to shame certain (other) philosophers, who indeed approve of the virtues, but then measure them with the aim of bodily pleasure, and think that such (pleasure) should be sought for its own sake, and the (virtues) on account of (pleasure) itself, are wont to paint a certain picture in words, in which Pleasure sits on a royal throne like some voluptuous queen; and (all) the virtues are subordinated to her (as) slaves, watching for her nod in order that they may do whatever she commands, and she orders Prudence to inquire carefully how Pleasure may reign, and be safe; she orders Justice to bestow what benefits she can to provide the friendships (which are) necessary for physical satisfaction; she does no one wrong, lest Pleasure cannot live secure; if any affliction befalls her body which does not lead to her death, she orders Fortitude to keep her mistress, that is Pleasure, steadfastly in her mind's eye, so that she many soften the barbs of present pain by the recollection of her former delights; she orders Temperance to take only a certain amount of food, even if some kinds are delightful, for fear that through some harmful excess she should disturb her health, and Pleasure, which the Epicureans assume (to be) very largely a matter of physical health, should be seriously damaged. So the virtues with all the glory of their status will be slaves to Pleasure, as if to some domineering and vulgar woman. They say that there is nothing more disgraceful and more perverted, and which the sight of good (men) can bear less, than this picture; and they speak the truth. But I do not think that the picture would have enough of the beauty that it ought (to have), even if (another) such (picture) were painted, where the virtues were in the service of human glory. For, although glory herself is not a tender woman, she is puffed up and has much emptiness (in her). Hence, it is unworthy of any of the solidity and firmness of the virtues that they should serve her, so that Providence should foresee nothing, Justice bestow nothing, Fortitude endure nothing, Temperance regulate nothing, other than to please men in some way, and to be of service to their wind-filled glory.
Nor can they defend themselves from such baseness, who, when they scorn the opinions of others, as if (they are) despisers of glory, seem wise to themselves, and are self-satisfied. For their virtue, if indeed they have any, is dependent on human praise in some other way; for he who is not satisfied with himself is no man. But he, with true piety towards God, whom he loves, believes in and has hope in, pays more attention to those (things) in which he is dissatisfied with himself, than on those (things), if there are any in him, which are pleasing, not so much to himself, as (they are) to the truth; nor does he attribute that by which he can now please (the truth to anything) but to the mercy of him, whom he has feared to displease; he gives thanks for the curing of some of his (faults), and pours out prayers for the curing of the rest.
Chapter XXI: - the empire of the Romans is ordained by the true God, from whom is (the source of) all power and from whose providence all (things) are governed.
Since these (things) are so, let us not ascribe the power of granting kingdoms and empires to (any) but the true God, who bestows happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the pious alone; but earthly kingdoms he grants to both the pious and the impious, as it pleases him, to whom nothing unjust is (ever) pleasing. For, although I have discussed some (point) that (God) wished to be made clear to me, yet it is too great (a task) for me, and (one that) far surpasses my strength, to investigate the secrets of human (affairs), and, by a clear test, to pass judgments on the merits of kingdoms. So he (who) is the one true God, who never leaves the human race without both his opinion and his help, gave an empire to the Romans at the time that he wished and to the extent that he wished; he gave (one) to the Assyrians, and also to the Persians, by whom, (as) their books relate, only two gods are worshipped, one good (i.e. Ormuzd, or Ahura Mazda) and the other bad (i.e. Ahriman), to say nothing of the Hebrew people, of whom I have already said as much as seemed sufficient, (they) who worshipped none but the one God, even when they were a kingdom. So (he it is) who gave the Persians crops without their worship of Segetia, (and) who (gave them) the other gifts of the earth without their worship of those many gods, whom the (Romans) assigned each one to their own function, or even several to one function, and he also gave them (i.e. the Persians) an empire without the worship of those (gods) through whose worship the (Romans) believed that they ruled.
So (he also granted power) to men: he (granted it) to Marius, and also to Gaius Caesar; he (granted it) to Augustus, and also to Nero; he granted it to the two Vespasiani, both father and son (i.e. Titus), those most attractive of emperors, and also to Domitian, the most cruel (one); and, so that it should not be necessary (for me) to go through each one of them, he (granted it) to the Christian Constantine and also to the apostate Julian, whose distinguished nature his sacrilegious and detestable (sense of) curiosity beguiled by his love of power, and by the vain oracles, to which he was devoted, when, relying on the assurance of victory, he burned the ships, in which the necessary provisions were being transported; then, pressing on fervently with unrestrained daring, and, having been killed as the price of his recklessness, he left his army in hostile territory without supplies, so that it could not otherwise have escaped from there, if, contrary to the auspices of the god Terminus, of whom I spoke in the preceding book, the boundaries of the Roman empire had not been moved. For the god Terminus yielded to necessity, (though) he had not yielded to Jupiter. Clearly, the one true God rules and governs these (matters) as he pleases; and, if his reasons are hidden, are they therefore unjust?
Chapter XXII: - the timing and the outcome of wars depend on the decision of God.
So also the periods of warfare themselves are (fixed) in accordance with his will, and just judgement, and mercy, either to chasten or to comfort the human race, so that some are finished more quickly, (and) others more slowly. The war with the pirates was completed by Pompey (i.e. in 67 B.C.) and the Third Punic War by Scipio (i.e. Scipio Aemilianus, or the Younger Scipio, in 146 B.C.) with incredible speed and brevity of time. Also the war with the runaway gladiators (i.e. those led by Spartacus in 73-71 B.C.), although many Roman generals and two consuls (i.e. Lucius Gellius Publicola and Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus in 72 B.C.) were defeated, and Italy terribly wasted and ravaged, was still brought to end in its third year, after (so) much had been destroyed. The Picentes, the Marsi and the Paeligni, (who were) not foreign but Italian peoples, after a long and most devoted (period of) servitude under the Roman yoke, sought to raise their heads to (regain) their freedom, though many nations had now been subjected to Roman power and Carthage had been destroyed; in this war (i.e. the Social War 91-87 B.C.) with the Italians, when the Romans were very often defeated, two consuls (i.e. Publius Rutilius Rufus in 90 B.C. and Lucius Porcius Cato in 89 B.C.) and other most noble senators perished, yet this evil was not drawn out over a long (period of) time; for the fifth year put an end to it. But the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), accompanied by the greatest losses and disaster for the republic during (a period of) eighteen years, diminished the strength of the Romans and almost exhausted (it); almost seventy thousand Romans fell in two battles (i.e. at Lake Trasimene in 217 B.C. and at Cannae in 216 B.C.). The First Punic War went on for twenty-three years (i.e. 264-241 B.C.); the Mithridatic War (for) forty (i.e. 104-63 B.C.). But so that no one should suppose that in the early days of the Romans they were braver, and so able to complete their wars more quickly, (it was) in those early times (which are) much lauded for their virtue that the Samnite War was protracted for almost fifty years (i.e. 342-290 B.C.); in this war the Roamns sufferd such a defeat that they were even sent under the yoke (i.e. at the Caudine Forks in 321 B.C.). But, because they did not love glory for the sake of justice, but they seemed to love justice for the sake of glory, they broke the peace treaty that had been made.
So I mention these (things), because many (who) are ignorant of past events, and some that even conceal their knowledge, (who), if they see in our Christian times some war protracted a little longer (than usual), make a most insolent attack on our religion, exclaiming that, if it did not exist, and the deities were worshipped in accordance with the ancient rites, (then) by that Roman valour, which, with the help of Mars and Bellona, speedily brought such great wars to an end, this (war) would also now be speedily concluded. So let those who have read (my account) reflect on how prolonged (were) those wars (which) were waged by the Romans, how varied (were) their outcomes, (and) how grievous their disasters, as the world is accustomed to be tossed, like a most stormy sea by the changing tempests of such misfortunes, and let them admit what they do not wish (to admit), nor destroy themselves and deceive the ignorant by (the use of) crazy language against God.
Chapter XXIII: - on the war, in which Radagaisus, king of the Goths, (and) a worshipper of demons, was conquered in one day, along with his vast army.
Yet they (i.e. the pagans) do not recall with any thanksgiving (that event) which (occurred) at a most recent moment in our memory, (when) God acted wonderfully and mercifully, but, in as far as it lies within them, they try, if it can be done, to bury (it) in the oblivion of all mankind; but if we should be silent about it, we should be similarly ungrateful. When Radagaisus, king of the Goths, had already taken up a position in the vicinity of the City, he was threatening the very lives of the Romans, (but) in one day he was so defeated (n.b. he was routed by Stilicho, the father-in-law of the Emperor Honorius, at Fiesole in 406 B.C.) with such great speed that not even one of the Romans was, I do not say slain, but wounded, (while) many more than a hundred thousand of his army were laid low, and he himself was soon captured and put to death, the punishment he deserved. For if that (man), as ungodly (as he was,) had entered Rome with such ungodly troops, whom would he have spared? On what martyrs' shrines would he have conferred honour? With regard to what person would he have shown the fear of God? Whose blood (would he have wished to keep) unshed, whose chastity would he have wished (to remain) inviolate? And what voices would they have (raised) in favour of their gods, with what insolence would they have boasted that he had conquered and that he had been able (to achieve) such great (things) for the reason that he had sought to propitiate and win the support of the gods by daily sacrifices, (something) which the Christian religion does not allow the Romans to do?
For when he was now approaching those places, where he was crushed at the nod of the Supreme Majesty, since his fame was everywhere on the increase, we at Carthage were told that the pagans believed this, and spread (it) abroad and boasted that, with the protection and help of their friendly gods, to whom he was offering daily sacrifice, he could not possibly be defeated by those who were who were making no such sacrifices to the Roman gods and were not allowing (them) to be made by anyone. And (now) these poor wretches are not giving thanks to God for his great mercy, for, although he had decided to punish by a barbarian invasion the behaviour of men who deserved harsher (punishments), he tempered his indignation with such mildness, that he arranged, in the first place, that he should be miraculously conquered, lest glory should be conferred on those demons, whom it was known that he worshipped; then, he (allowed) Rome to be captured by those barbarians, who, contrary to every custom of wars waged previously, protected, out of a reverence for the Christian religion, (those) fleeing for refuge to the holy places, and (who) were so opposed to the demons themselves and to the rites of unholy sacrifices, on which that man (i.e. Radagaisus) had relied, that they seemed in the name of Christians to be waging a far more bitter war with them than with men; thus, the true lord and governor of our affairs has both scourged the Romans with his merciful (rod), and, with those worshippers of demons having been so incredibly defeated, he has shown that those sacrifices were not (even) necessary with regard to the things of the present, so that the true religion may not be abandoned on account of current urgencies by those who do not argue wilfully, but give their prudent attention (to the facts), but rather hold fast (to it) in the most confident expectation of eternal life.
Chapter XXIV: - the happiness of the Christian emperors, and how true it was.
For we do not call certain Christian emperors happy for the reason that they either reigned for longer (than others), or left their sons to rule (after them) after a peaceful death, or that they subdued the enemies of the state, or were able both to guard against, and to crush, hostile citizens who rose against them. These and other rewards and consolations of this wretched life even some worshippers of demons have deserved to receive, (those) who do not belong to the Kingdom of God, to whom these (emperors) belong; and this came to pass in accordance with His mercy, lest (those) who believed in Him should long for such (gifts) from Him as if (they were) the highest blessings. But we do call them happy, if they rule justly, if, amid the voices of those who (give) them sublime honours, and the obsequiousness of those who greet (them) with excessive humility, they are not exalted (with pride), and they remember that they are (but) men; if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty, so as to extend the worship of God as widely as possible; if they fear, love and worship God; if they love that kingdom more, where they do not fear to have partners; if they are slower to punish (and) pardon readily; if they inflict that punishment through the need to rule and protect the state, not so as to satisfy a hatred of their private enemies; if they grant that pardon not so that iniquity should go unpunished, but in the hope of improvement; if they balance the harshness that they are usually compelled to decree with the tenderness of mercy and an abundance of benevolence; if self-indulgence is as slender in their case as it could have been unrestrained; if they would rather control their base desires than any number of nations, and, if they do all these (things) not on account of a passion for empty glory, but through a yearning for eternal happiness; if, in return for their sins, they do not neglect to offer to their true God the sacrifice of humility, and compassion and prayer. We declare Christian emperors of this kind to be happy, in hope at present, and they will be afterwards in the event itself, when what we are expecting shall have come to pass.
Chapter XXV: - on the prosperity that God conferred on the Christian emperor Constantine.
For the good God, lest men, who had believed that he should be worshipped for the sake of eternal life, should think that no one could attain the heights of earthly rule, unless he offered worship to demons, on the grounds that these spirits have much power in such (matters), loaded the Emperor Constantine, who did not seek the favour of demons but worshipped the true God Himself, with such great earthly rewards that no one could dare to hope for; He even granted him (the honour) of founding a city (as) a partner in the Roman empire (i.e. Byzantium or Constantinople in 330 A.D.), a daughter, so to speak, of Rome itself, but without any temple or image of the demons. He ruled for a long time (i.e. 307-337 A.D.), (and) held and defended the whole Roman world as the sole Augustus; he was most victorious in the wars which he directed and waged, he was successful in crushing tyrants throughout the whole (of his reign) (i.e. especially Maxentius in 312 A.D. and Licinius in 324 A.D.), (and) he died at a great age of sickness and old age, (and) left his sons to rule (in his place).
But, on the other hand, lest any emperor should be a Christian for the reason that he should acquire the good fortune of Constantine, when each (man) should (only) be a Christian for the sake of eternal life, he removed Jovian (i.e. emperor for six months in 363-364 A.D.) much more quickly than Julian (i.e. Julian the Apostate, emperor 360-63) (and) he allowed Gratian (i.e. emperor 367-383 A.D.) to be slain in much more mitigating (circumstances), to be sure, than the great Pompey (i.e. he was murdered in Egpyt in 48 B.C, after the Battle of Pharsalus), who worshipped the so-called gods of the Romans. For he could not be avenged by Cato, whom he had left, to some extent, as his heir (i.e. Cato committed suicide in Utica, North Africa, after the Battle of Thapsus in 46 B.C.); but, although pious souls require no such consolation, he was avenged by Theodosius (i.e. Theodosius I, emperor 379-395 A.D. who defeated and killed Gratian's murderer, Magnus Maximus, in 388 A.D.), whom he had made his partner in royal power, even though he had a little brother (i.e. Valentinian II, emperor 375-392 A.D.), (as he was) keener on (having) a reliable associate than excessive power.
Chapter XXVI: - on the faith and piety of Theodosius Augustus.
1. And for this reason he not only preserved the loyalty which he owed (him while he was) living, but also after his death, (when) as a Christian he took his little brother Valentinian (as) a ward into his part of the empire, after he had been driven out by his murderer Maximus, (and) guarded (him) with paternal affection, although he could have removed him without any trouble, destitute (as he was) of all resources, if he had been animated by the desire of a more extensive dominion rather than the love of doing good; so (he chose) rather to preserve his imperial dignity, and taking him into his care he consoled him by his very kindness and favour. Then, in the most difficult circumstances of his anxieties, when that success was making Maximus formidable, he did not fall into unholy and forbidden superstitions, but he sent (a message) to John, established (as he was) in the Egyptian desert, for he had learned from his growing fame that this servant of God (was) endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and from him he received the most definite assurance of victory.
(As) the destroyer of the tyrant Maximus, he (i.e. Theodosius) soon restored, with the most compassionate respect, the boy Valentinian to the part of their empire from which he had been driven, and, when he (i.e. Valentinian) perished soon afterwards, either in an ambush, or by some other device, or by chance (i.e. he was strangled by the Frankish general Arbogast in 392 A.D.), in the certainty of his faith, as he had again received a prophetic response, he crushed (i.e. at the Battle of the River Frigidus, near Aquileia, in 394 A.D.) another tyrant, (called) Eugenius, who had been illegally elected in the place of that emperor, (and) against whose very strong army he fought more by prayer than by force of arms. Soldiers, who were present. have reported to me that the missiles which they were throwing were torn from their hands, when a violent wind blew from the direction of Theodosius' (forces) against our enemies, and not only did it drive with great rapidity all (the missiles) which were hurled against them, but it also returned their own darts into their bodies. So, even the poet Claudian, although a stranger to the name of Christ, spoke nevertheless in his praise: "O (prince) so greatly beloved of God, for whom heaven is fighting, even the winds come sworn (to obey) at (the call of) the trumpet (viz. 'Panegyricus de tertio consulatu Honorii Augusti 96-98)."
Now, (being) the victor, as he had believed and foretold (he would be), he (i.e. Theodosius) threw aside the statues of Jupiter, which had been consecrated, as it were, against him by some kind of rites, and set up in the Alps, and, when his courtiers were jesting - (something) which the joy of the occasion allowed - about their thunderbolts, which were made of gold, and were saying that they would happily be struck down by them, he graciously presented (them to them). (As for) the sons of his enemies, whom the onset of war had removed, and not through his own order, when they fled for refuge to a church, even (though they were) not yet Christians, he wanted (to use) this (as) an opportunity that they should become Christians, and he showed (them) the love of Christian charity, and he did not deprive (them) of their property, but added to their honours. After his victory, he did not permit private animosities to affect anyone. (He was) not like Cinna, and Marius, and Sulla, and other such (men), (who) did not wish to end the civil wars (that were) finished, but he rather regretted that they had arisen than he wanted to harm anyone after they were ended.
Amid all these (events), from the very beginning of his reign, he (i.e. Theodosius) did not cease to help the church, which Valens the heretic had grievously impaired (by) favouring the Arians, in her struggle against the impious by (passing) the most just and most merciful laws; he rejoiced more that he was a member of this church than that he ruled upon the earth. He ordered that the statues of the gentiles (i.e. the pagans) be everywhere thrown down, knowing full well that earthly favours are not placed in the power of demons but in (the power) of the true God.
Now what was more wonderful than his pious humility, after he was compelled, by the uproar of certain (men) who were his associates, to give a punishment for the the very serious crime of the Thessalonians, (i.e. in 390 A.D. the mob murdered the governor in a riot after he had imprisoned a popular charioteer) for which, at the intercession of the bishops, he had already promised a pardon, and, curbed by the discipline of the church he did penance in such a manner that the people, as they prayed for him, wept more at the sight of the imperial loftiness prostrate (before them), than (they had when) they feared its anger at their wrongdoing?
These and other similar good works, which it would take too long to relate, he carried from this temporal mist of whatever preeminence and human loftiness you like; the reward for these works is eternal happiness, of which God is the giver to the truly pious alone. But (all) the other heights or props of this life, such as the world itself, the light, the air, the earth, the waters, the fruits, the soul of man himself, his body, senses, mind (and) life, he bestows on good and bad (alike); among these also is (the gift) of an empire of a certain size, which he manages in accordance with his governance of temporal (affairs).
2. And now I see that we must answer those who, having been confuted and convicted by the clearest proofs, by which it is shown that to (obtain) those worldly (things,) which only fools desire to possess, that multitude of false gods is of no use at all, try to assert that the gods should be worshipped, not with a view to any advantage in this present life, but for the sake of that which is to come after death. For, in the case of those who for the sake of their friendships in this world are willing to worship vanities and complain that they are not permitted (to indulge) their childish whims, I think they have been answered sufficiently in these five books. When I had published the first three of these, and they had begun to come into the hands of many, I heard that certain (people) were preparing some sort of response to them in writing. Then, I was told that they had already written (it), but they were looking for a time when they could publish (it) without danger. I (would) advise these (men), not to wish for (something) which is not of use to them. For it is easy for someone, who is unwilling to be silent, to seem to have given a reply. For what is more loquacious than vanity? It cannot therefore (mean) that (it is) the truth, because it can, if it wishes, shout even louder than the truth.
But let them consider carefully all (the things we have said), and, if they can perhaps judge without partisan zeal, they may perceive that there are such (cases) as can be more easily shaken than uprooted by shameless garrulity and the frivolity, as it were, of satires and mimes; let them keep their absurdities in check, and choose rather to be corrected by the wise than praised by the shameless. For if they are waiting for an opportunity, not to (have) the freedom to tell the truth, but to (have) the licence to slander, may that (fate) not befall them that Tullius (i.e. Cicero) says concerning someone who was called happy due to his licence to sin: "O wretched (man), who was at liberty to do wrong!" So, whoever there is who thinks he is happy with the freedom to slander, he will be happier if he is not permitted (to do) this at all, since he can put aside the emptiness of boasting, (and) even at this time, as with zeal of a consultant, raise whatever objections he likes, and he can hear as much as he ought (to hear) from those whom he consults in an amicable discussion in an honourable, serious, and candid manner.
