Introduction. For details about the life of Sallust, his political affiliations, his qualities as a historian and as a writer, readers are referred to the full introduction at the head of the translation of his famous monograph "On the Conspiracy of Catiline", published on this blog on 9th November 2011. Sallust is renowned for his two monographs, both "The Jugurthine War", and "The Conspiracy of Catiline", just mentioned, and he also wrote a "History" of Rome covering the period 78-67 B.C., of which, unfortunately, only fragments survive. In addition to these works, concerning which Sallust's authorship is not in doubt, two letters, ostensibly addressed by Sallust to Caesar, and the so-called "Invectiva in Ciceronem", i.e. an attack upon Cicero, were preserved in a Ninth/Tenth century A.D. Latin codex from the Vatican. For a long time it was believed that these three short works were written as 'suasoriae', i.e. exercises in hortatory writing, by a First Century rhetorician, but purporting to be from the pen of Sallust. The absence of any contemporary reference to these works, or indeed of any reference to them at all during antiquity, makes their attribution to Sallust difficult to accept perhaps, although during the middle of the Twentieth Century a number of classical scholars did accept his authorship as genuine. Notable among these was Lily Ross Taylor, author of the celebrated "Party Politics in the Age of Caesar", University of California, 1949. On the other hand, Sir Ronald Syme, author of "Roman Revolution", Oxford University Press, 1939, although displaying some admiration for the letters, sits on the fence as regards their authenticity, and scepticism in this respect remains the most common view among scholars of the period.
Whether Sallust was their author or not, the tone of both letters is, by the standards of other Latin authors of the age, strikingly moralistic and anti-capitalist, and generally in line with the views he expresses in his acknowledged works. The writer displays a visceral hatred of the Optimate clique, which, in league with Pompey, he saw prior to the outbreak of the Civil war as in control of the Senate, the law-courts and the Centuriate Assembly, which elected the consuls and praetors. In the second, but earlier letter (See Letter B below) relating to 51 B.C. he recommends that the franchise, that is the number of Roman citizens, should be increased - in practice that meant extending citizenship to the Transpadanes - , that the property base for both jury service and voting be significantly widened, and that the number of senators should be increased and secret ballots introduced for voting in the Senate. Caesar did enfranchise the Transpadanes in 49 B.C. via the Lex Roscia, and he later increased the size of the Senate to 900 members. Otherwise, he did not act on the proposals in the second letter, and by the time of 46 B.C. to which the first but later letter (See Letter A below) is attributed, Sallust or the Pseudo-Sallust, perhaps now being more aware of Caesar's real intentions and inclinations, has gone quiet on the other reforms to the constitution which he had recommended in 51. Instead, he contents himself with some proposals for social reforms by which he hopes the condition of the state will be improved.
The text for these two works is taken from the edition of Sallust, published by Loeb Classical Library, 1921, and is also available on the LacusCurtius website.
A. AD CAESAREM SENEM DE RE PUBLICA ORATIO (Speech concerning the state [addressed] to Caesar in his later years) 46 B.C.
Whether Sallust was their author or not, the tone of both letters is, by the standards of other Latin authors of the age, strikingly moralistic and anti-capitalist, and generally in line with the views he expresses in his acknowledged works. The writer displays a visceral hatred of the Optimate clique, which, in league with Pompey, he saw prior to the outbreak of the Civil war as in control of the Senate, the law-courts and the Centuriate Assembly, which elected the consuls and praetors. In the second, but earlier letter (See Letter B below) relating to 51 B.C. he recommends that the franchise, that is the number of Roman citizens, should be increased - in practice that meant extending citizenship to the Transpadanes - , that the property base for both jury service and voting be significantly widened, and that the number of senators should be increased and secret ballots introduced for voting in the Senate. Caesar did enfranchise the Transpadanes in 49 B.C. via the Lex Roscia, and he later increased the size of the Senate to 900 members. Otherwise, he did not act on the proposals in the second letter, and by the time of 46 B.C. to which the first but later letter (See Letter A below) is attributed, Sallust or the Pseudo-Sallust, perhaps now being more aware of Caesar's real intentions and inclinations, has gone quiet on the other reforms to the constitution which he had recommended in 51. Instead, he contents himself with some proposals for social reforms by which he hopes the condition of the state will be improved.
The text for these two works is taken from the edition of Sallust, published by Loeb Classical Library, 1921, and is also available on the LacusCurtius website.
A. AD CAESAREM SENEM DE RE PUBLICA ORATIO (Speech concerning the state [addressed] to Caesar in his later years) 46 B.C.
1. It was formerly considered as true that fortune gave as gifts kingdoms and empires, as well as the other (things) which are eagerly desired among mortal (men), as they were often (found) in the hands of the undeserving, as if (they had been) given by caprice, nor did they remain with anyone unspoiled. But experience has taught that what Appius (Claudius Caecus) says in his verses is true, that every (man) is the architect of his own fortune, and especially in relation to you, who have excelled others to such an extent that men are exhausted by praising your deeds before you (are exhausted) by doing (things) worthy of praise. But, as in the case of (things) which have been built, so it is right that (things) which have been achieved by virtue are treated with as much care, so that they are neither marred by neglect nor collapse due to weakness. For no one willingly yields power to another, and, however good and merciful he may be, (one) who has more power is feared in the end, because he is allowed (lit. it is permitted [to him]) to be wicked. This occurs for this (reason), since most powerful (men) in states take perverse decisions, and think themselves the more firmly entrenched, the more wicked those whom they rule might be. But, contrary to that, one should (lit. it is proper to) strive, since one should be good and virtuous oneself, so that you should rule over the best possible (people). For the very worst men endure a master most reluctantly.
But for you it is harder than for all before you to manage what you have achieved by arms, because you waged war more gently than the peace of the others. Besides, the victors seek booty, (but) the vanquished are citizens. Among these difficulties, you have (lit. it is necessary [for you]) to find your way, and the state has (lit. the state [is] needing) to be strengthened for the future, not only in arms and against the enemy, but in the kindly arts of peace, (something) which is much, much more difficult. Therefore, the situation calls hither all (men), of great or of moderate wisdom, to deliver the best (advice) of which each (one) is capable. And thus it seems to me: in whatever way you make use of your victory, so will everything else (be arranged).
2. But now, so that you may arrange (matters) better and more easily, accept in a few (words) what my mind instructs me (to say).
You were at war (lit. There was to you a war) with a famous man, with great resources, greedy for power, of greater good fortune than wisdom, whom a few of your enemies followed on account of their injury to you, as well as (those) whom affinity or some other imperative drew (to him). For not one (of them) was a partner in his power, nor, if he had been able to allow (it), would the world have been convulsed by war. The rest of the multitude followed (him) more from the custom of the rabble than from a deliberate decision, one after another, as if he (were) wiser (than himself). At the same time, men, for whom everything had been defiled with infamy and debauchery, having been induced by the slanders of the unjust in the hope of seizing control of the state, flocked into your camp, and openly threatened peaceable (men) with death, robbery and everything which flowed from a perverted mind. A large part of these (men), when they see that debt was not being remitted, and that you were not treating your fellow-citizens like enemies, fell away; (but) a few remained, for whom there would be more ease in your camp than in Rome; so great a throng of creditors was hanging over (them). But, for the same reason, an enormous number of prominent (men) and as many (ordinary) mortals afterwards went over to (Gnaeus) Pompeius (Magnus), and during the whole period of the war debtors made use of him as though (he were) a sacred and inviolable sanctuary.
3. Therefore, since it is necessary for you to live (as) victor with (both) war and peace, in order that you may put an end to the one like a citizen, (and) that the other may be as just and as long-lasting as possible, first consider with regard to you yourself, you who are about to settle these (things), what may be the best (thing) in your conduct. For my own part, I believe that all hard-hearted regimes (are) more bitter than long-lasting, nor should anyone be dreaded by the many, but that the fear from the many recoils upon itself; (and I believe) that such a life engages in an eternal and dangerous warfare, since you are not safe in front, from behind or on your flanks, (and) you always live in peril or fear. On the contrary, to those who have tempered their rule with kindness and mercy, everything (has) seemed cheerful and happy, (and) even their enemies (have appeared) more friendly (to them) than their fellow-citizens to one another.
I dare say some will declare that, with these words, I (am) the corrupter of your victory and (show) too much good will towards the vanquished. Doubtless, because those (privileges) which both we and our ancestors have bestowed upon foreign nations, (who are) our enemies by nature, I believe that those very (things), should be granted to our fellow-citizens, nor should they be atoned for, after the manner of barbarians, by murder in respect of murder and by blood in respect of blood.
4. Or has forgetfulness destroyed those (anathemas) which a short time before this war were proclaimed against Gnaeus Pompeius and the victory of (Lucius Cornelius) Sulla (Felix): (it was said) that (Lucius) Domitius (Ahenobarbus), (Gnaeus Papirius) Carbo and (Marcus Junius) Brutus, as well as others (were) slain, not in arms, nor in battle in accordance with the rules of war, but afterwards, (when they were) suppliants, by means of the utmost wickedness, (and) that Roman people (were) slaughtered like cattle in the Villa Publica? Alas, before victory was won by you, how savage and cruel were those secret deaths of citizens and their sudden murders, the flight of women and boys to the bosom of their parents or children, (and) the devastation of homes! To such (atrocities) those (men) are likewise urging you; doubtless (the matter) in dispute was this, the outrages of which one of you could be done with authority, but (it was declared) that the state was not restored, but was taken captive by you, and that, for this reason, the best and the oldest of all (the soldiers) of our army, having completed their periods of military service, contended in arms against their brothers and their parents; (and furthermore) that through the misfortunes of strangers, the worst of men might acquire the means to satisfy their bellies and their immoderate lusts, and be a disgrace to your victory, and the praise of decent (men) is contaminated by the crimes of these (men). For I do not think that it escaped your notice with what kind of practice or behaviour each one of them conducted himself, even at at a time when victory (was) uncertain, and in what manner, during the prosecution of the war, some of them gave themselves up to harlots and feasts, and their age could not touch upon such pleasures without disgrace even during a time of peace.
5. Enough (has been) said about war. Since you and all your (followers) are deliberating about peace being established, firstly I beg this (of you), consider what sort of thing it is that you are reflecting about; thus, when you have separated good and evil (things), you will proceed along a broad highway to the truth. I think as follows: since all things which have begun come to an end, on the day on which the destiny of its destruction shall come upon the city of Rome, citizen will join in close combat with citizen, (and) thus exhausted and enfeebled, they will become prey to some king or nation. Otherwise, neither the whole world nor all the nations banded together, can disturb or destroy this empire. Therefore, the blessings of harmony, if you like, should be established, and the evils of discord should be expelled. This will come to pass thus: if you check the licence towards extravagance and pillaging, not (by) recalling old principles, which, as our morals have been corrupted long ago, are a laughing-stock, but if you lay down the domestic income of each man (as) the limit of his expenditure. Since then this practice has become prominent, that youthful men think (it) a very fine (thing) to waste their own (substance) and (that) of others, (and) to refuse nothing to their lust and to others making depends upon (them), (and) they consider such (conduct) as virtue and high-mindedness, and modesty and self-restraint (as) cowardice. So the headstrong spirit entering upon a perverse course, when his habits are not supplied, rushes madly now upon our allies, now upon the citizens, disturbs what has been agreed, and looks to a revolution as much as to the ancients. Therefore, for the future, the money-lender should be removed, so that we can, each one of us, take care of our own property. This is the true and straightforward way to undertake a magistracy for the people, not for the creditor, and to demonstrate greatness of mind in adding to, not pillaging, the state.
6. And yet I know how harsh these steps will be at the beginning, especially to those who believed that, in (the hour of) victory, they would be more unrestricted and freer than more constrained. If you have regard for the welfare of such men rather than for their desires, you will establish both them and us, along with our allies, in a solid peace; but, if our young men continue to have (lit. there will be to our young men) the same inclinations and moral qualities (as at present), then that eminent renown of yours will soon be destroyed, together with the city of Rome.
Finally, wise (men) wage war for the sake of peace, and endure toil in the hope of ease. Unless you bring about such a lasting (peace), what does it matter (whether) you are conquered or have conquered? Therefore, by (all) the gods, take the republic in hand, and surmount all the difficulties, as you are accustomed (to do). For, either you can heal (us), or everyone must give up the (attempt at a) cure. But no one is calling you towards cruel punishments or harsh sentences, by which the state is more ravaged than corrected, but (rather) to keep wicked practices and evil passions from our youth. True mercy consists of this, to take care that citizens are not expelled from their native-land undeservedly, (and) are kept from folly and false pleasures, that peace and harmony are established, but not (by) indulging crimes (and) allowing offences a temporary gratification, since you will soon be submitting to a future evil.
7. And I have (lit. There is to me) an especially confident spirit concerning matters about which others are afraid: concerning the size of the task, and because you need to settle all (things) on land and sea at the same time. For so great a genius could not deal with small matters, and a great responsibility has a great reward (lit. there is a great reward to a great responsibility). Therefore, you should (lit. it behoves [you] to) take care that the common people should have their occupations, by which they may be deterred from public mischief; (and that) our young men should cultivate honesty and hard work, not extravagance and wealth. This will indeed come to pass, if you deprive money, which is the greatest evil of all, of its advantage and honour. For, when I have gone over in my mind, (as I) frequently (have done), by what means each eminent person had acquired greatness, and what things had advanced peoples and nations with great increases (in power), and then for what reasons the most prosperous kingdoms and empires had collapsed, I always discovered the same virtues and vices, that is, that all the victors despised riches and (all) the vanquished coveted (them). Only thus (lit. Not otherwise) can any mortal exalt himself and draw near to the gods, unless, having cast away the delights of wealth and bodily (pleasure), he indulges his mind not by flattery, nor by satisfying his desires, and allowing (it) a perverse gratification, but by exercising (it) in toil, in endurance, and in virtuous precepts and brave deeds.
8. For to build a mansion or a country house, to adorn it with statues, tapestries and other works (of art), and to make everything (in it) more worth seeing than oneself, that is not to have one's riches as an honour, but to be a disgrace to them oneself. Moreover, those, for whom it is their custom to overload their stomachs twice a day and not to pass a night without a harlot, have oppressed the mind in slavery, when it was proper to have ruled (it); (and) they wish in vain to find it (ready) for action, after (it has been thus) dulled and crippled. For these and other evils, together with the worship of money, will come to an end, if neither magistracies nor any of the other (things which are) commonly desired are for sale.
Besides, you must (lit. it is necessary for you to) provide the means by which Italy and the provinces will be safer; that (is) not something which it is difficult to do. For these same (men) wreck everything, by abandoning their own homes, and wrongly appropriating (those) of others. Likewise,(you must ensure) that military service should not be unjust or inequitable, as (it has been) up till now, when some serve on campaign for thirty years, (and) others none at all. And it will be appropriate to give the corn distribution, something which was formerly the reward of idleness, to those throughout the municipal towns and colonies, who, after completing their terms of military service, have returned to their homes.
I have related, in as few (words) as possible what (actions) I think (will be) necessary for the republic and glorious for you. It does not seem out of place to set out now a few (words) about my action (in writing this). Most men have, or pretend (to have) sufficient ability to sit in judgement; nevertheless, the minds of all are (so) keen to censure the deeds or sayings of other (men) that scarcely any mouth seems sufficiently open or any tongue (sufficiently) ready to disclose (the things) which are being contemplated in their hearts. I do not regret that I have been subjected to such (criticisms), but I should have regretted to have kept silent. For whether you proceed on this course or on some better (one), at any rate you have been advised and assisted by me to the best of my ability. It (only) remains (for me) to pray that the immortal gods may approve those (actions) which have seemed good to you, and allow (them) to turn out well.
B. AD CAESAREM SENEM DE RE PUBLICA EPISTULA (Letter concerning the state [addressed to] Caesar in his later years) 51 B.C.
1. I realise how difficult and unrewarding it is to do to give advice to a king or a commander and ultimately to any man whose powers are supreme, since there is, of course, available to such (men) as well an abundance of counsellors, and no one can be sufficiently clever and sufficiently wise about the future. Indeed, bad counsels often have more successful outcomes than good (ones), since fortune directs (the course of) events in accordance with its own caprice.
But in my early youth, I had (lit. there was to me) a desire to go in for politics, and I had a long-lasting and deep concern to get to know about such (matters); (and hoping) thereby not only to achieve office, which many have attained by dishonourable means, but also to make myself familiar with public business at home and abroad and how much spending there could be on arms and men. Therefore, (after) considering many (things) in my mind, I took (lit. there was to me) the decision to regard my own reputation and self-respect as subordinate to your honour, and to undertake a dangerous task of whatever kind you like, if only something should be added to your glory from (doing) it. And I have decided this not rashly, nor out of regard for your good fortune, but because I have found in you, in addition to others, one unusually admirable quality, that you always had (lit. there was to you always) a greater spirit in adverse circumstances than in favourable (ones). But that matter is (made) clearer by means of other people, because men are exhausted by praising and admiring your munificence, before you (are exhausted) in performing (deeds) which are worthy of glory.
2. For my part, it has been decided by me that nothing so profound can be found that cannot be easily grasped by you. Nor have I written to you with a view to what I think about public affairs, because my advice and my own ability should be appraised more highly than is fair, but, (because), amid the toils of military service and amid battles, victories (and the duties of) command, I thought you should be reminded about the city's troubles. For, if there is in your heart this consideration only, (that is), to protect yourself from the attacks of your enemies, and by what means you may retain the affections of the people in the face of a hostile consul, you will be pondering (things) unworthy of your courage. But if there is in you that spirit, which has indeed from the (very) beginning frustrated the faction of the nobility, (which) has restored the common people of Rome to liberty from a grievous servitude, (which) has routed the arms of your enemies (while) unarmed, (which) has achieved at home and in the field such great and such glorious deeds that not even your enemies venture to complain of anything other than of your greatness, if indeed you (have that spirit), accept these (things) which I shall say about the most important aspects of the public welfare. You will certainly find them either true or at any rate not far from the truth.
3. But, since Gnaeus Pompeius (Magnus), either from perverseness of mind, or because he preferred nothing more than to harm you, has fallen to such an extent that he has put weapons into the hands of the enemy, it is necessary for you to restore the republic by the same means by which he has overthrown (it). Firstly, he has handed over to a few senators the greatest power of all, (that) of regulating the revenues, expenditure and the courts, (and) he has left the common people of Rome, (in) whose (hands) the supreme power previously was, in slavery, under laws (which are) not even equal (for all). Even though the courts have been entrusted to the three orders, as before, yet those same factional (groupings) control (them), give and take away whatever they please, cheat the innocent, (and) exalt their own (members) to high position. Neither crime nor shame nor disgrace bars them from taking up magistracies; finally, just as if the city has been taken captive, they employ their own caprice and license instead of the law.
But in fact, a moderate resentment only would distress me, if they were taking advantage by means of slavery, in accordance with their own custom, of a victory which had been won by valour. But these most indolent men, all of whose strength and courage is situated in their tongues, are insolently exercising a tyranny occasioned by chance and through the folly of another. For what rebellion or civil conflict has utterly ruined so many and such illustrious families? Or whose spirit in victory was ever so violent and uncontrolled?
4. Lucius (Cornelius) Sulla (Felix), to whom everything in victory was permitted by the rules of war, although he was aware that his party could be strengthened by the execution of his enemies, yet, having (only) killed a few (of them), preferred to restrain the rest by kindness rather than by fear. But, by Hercules! forty senators, as well as many young men of excellent promise, have been butchered like sacrificial victims; yet, meanwhile, these most ill-natured kinds of men cannot be sated by the blood of so many wretched citizens: not orphaned children, not parents at the end of life, not the groaning of men and the lamentation of women, could alter their monstrous purpose, which (growing) very much harsher day by day in deed and in word, they have proceeded to deprive some of their rank, others of their citizenship.
Then, what shall I say of you, whose humiliation those most listless of men are willing, if it is permitted, to buy with their own lives. They do not have (lit. There is not to them) as much pleasure in their dominance, although it has happened without their expectation, as regret at your high status; indeed, they would prefer to endanger (lit. bring about a danger to) liberty through your downfall than that through you the Roman people should become the greatest empire from (being) a great (one). It is all the more necessary for you to consider in your mind again and again by what means you may fortify and strengthen the state. For myself at any rate, I shall not hesitate to speak out what my mind suggests; but it will be for your intellect to judge what you think (it is) right and expedient to do.
5. I believe, as I have heard from our forefathers, that our community (is) divided into two sections, into senators and the common people. In the past, the greatest authority was amongst the senators, but by far the greatest strength (was) among the common people. So, there was quite often a secession in the state, and the power of the nobility was constantly reduced and the rights of the people increased. But the common people used to agitate freely for this (reason), because no one's power was above the law, and the nobleman surpassed the commoner not in wealth and pride but in good repute and in brave deeds; each most humble (man) (was) in want of nothing required in the fields or on military service, (but) there was enough for him and enough for his country.
But, when idleness and poverty gradually drove these (men) from the fields (and) compelled (them) to have uncertain homes, they began to covet the wealth of others, (and) to regard their own liberty, together with the republic, (as) up for sale. So, gradually, the people, who had been the master, (and) had ruled all nations, became degenerate, and each (man) procured servitude for himself individually in place of the common sovereignty. Therefore, this multitude of ours, firstly having been steeped in evil habits, then having been dispersed among different occupations and ways of living, (and) in no way agreeing among one another, seems to me quite unsuitable to run the state. But, if new citizens are added, a great hope takes hold of me that it would happen that all would bestir themselves towards liberty; for the concern would arise both among the former to retain their liberty, and among the latter to throw off their slavery. I advise (you) to settle these new (citizens) in colonies, mixed together with the older (ones); for, in this way, our military situation will be more powerful, and the common people, being occupied with useful occupations, will cease to cause public mischief.
6. But, when these things are done, I am not ignorant or unaware of what rage and what storms there will be among the men of the nobility, when they will cry out in anger that everything is being thrown into utter confusion, that such servitude is being inflicted upon the original citizens, in short that there will be a kingdom (formed) out of a free state, when a great multitude attains to citizenship through the bounty of one (man). For my part, I make up my mind thus: that he commits a crime (lit. evil deed) against himself, who procures favour for himself at the expense of the public welfare; but when a public benefit is also of service to an individual, to hesitate to undertake it, I consider (a mark) of stupidity and cowardice.
Marcus (Livius) Drusus always had a plan during his tribunate to strive on behalf of the nobility with his utmost strength; nor, at the beginning, did he intend to do anything, unless they had been the originators (of it). But when factious men, to whom resentment and malice were dearer than loyalty, understood that the greatest benefit (of all) was being granted to many people by one man, they thought with regard to Marcus Drusus that he was just like themselves, namely each was aware of himself as (a man) with an evil and disloyal mind. So, (by) striving against him, in fear that by means of so great a favour he might take control of affairs by himself, they frustrated his plans and their own. You, general, must arrange loyal friends and many garrisons with all the more care.
7. It is not difficult for an energetic man to suppress an enemy (who is) facing (him); it is not easy to lay hidden snares, or for good (men) to avoid (them). Therefore, when you bring them into the community, since the common people will indeed be regenerated, you must pay particular attention to (lit. you must exercise your mind especially in) this matter, so that good morals should be cultivated and harmony should grow between former and new (citizens). But by far the greatest blessing you can procure for your country and fellow-citizens, for yourself and your children, (and) ultimately for the (whole) human race, (will be) if you either remove or reduce, as far as circumstances allow, the desire for money. Otherwise, neither private nor public affairs can be regulated, either at home or abroad. For, whenever the desire for riches enters in, neither training nor good qualities nor any intellect is strong enough (to resist it), but the mind, (whether) more or less at its peak, at last succumbs (to it) all the same. I have often now heard how kings, how states and nations have lost, through luxurious living, the mighty empires, which they had won (when) poor; nor is this at all surprising. For, when a good (man) sees an inferior (made) more renowned and acceptable by riches, at first he seethes (with anger) and ponders many (things) in his breast, but, when day by day vainglory prevails more (and more) over virtue, (and) luxurious living over honour, his mind turns away from the truth towards pleasure. In fact, hard work feeds upon (lit. is nourished by) glory; when you take that away, virtue by itself is bitter and harsh. In the end, wherever riches are regarded (as) a sign of distinction, there all good (things), loyalty, propriety, modesty and chastity, are (considered) worthless. For the path to virtue is a steep (one); (but) one exerts oneself towards money whenever one pleases; and it may be procured by dishonourable, as well as honourable, means.
In the first place, therefore, take away the authority of money. No one should judge (cases) affecting life or rank to a greater or lesser (extent) on the basis of his wealth, just as no praetor or consul should be elected on account of his wealth but on account of his worth. However, the judgement of the people is easily made in the case of a magistrate; for jurors to be approved by a few (people) is tyranny, (for them) to be chosen on the basis of money (is) shameful. Therefore it seems right (to me) that all (citizens) of the first class should be jurors, but that a greater number (lit. more in number) should serve as jurors than (at present). Neither the Rhodians nor (the people of) any other state have ever had cause to repent of their courts, when rich and poor decide indiscriminately, as the lot falls upon each (man), on the most important matters just as on the least important (ones).
8. But on the election of magistrates, the law, which Gaius (Sempronius) Gracchus proposed during his tribunate, that the centuries should be convoked from the five classes mixed together, seems good to me, (and) in no way inappropriate. Thus, money is made equal to worthiness, (and) one (man) will hasten to surpass another in virtue. I am prescribing these (as) the great remedies against riches. For everything is commended and desired just as it is of advantage in matters of this kind. Deceit is practised for financial rewards; when you take these away, no one at all is wicked for nothing. But avarice is a wild beast, monstrous and intolerable; wherever it turns, it devastates towns, fields, shrines and homes, it intermingles divine with human (things), neither armies nor walls can stop (it) from penetrating their (possessions) with its strength; it robs all men of their reputation, their chastity, their children, their native country and their parents. But, if you remove the honour given to money, that great power of avarice will be easily conquered by good morals.
But, even if all (men), just and unjust (alike), acknowledge that they regard (all) these (things) in this way, yet you will need to contend with the faction of the nobility in no moderate manner. If you avoid their deceit, everything else will be straightforward. For, if they could be sufficiently strong in virtue, they would be keener to emulate good (men) than (to be) envious (of them). Because sloth and indolence, dullness and lethargy, have taken possession of them, they shout out, they are abusive, (and) they consider another's good reputation (as) a disgrace to themselves.
9. But why should I say more (about these nobles) as though (they are men) unknown to you? The courage and strength of mind of Marcus (Calpurnius) Bibulus ended in the consulship: (he is a man) dull of speech, more malicious than clever by nature. What would he venture (to do), whose consulship, the (source of) supreme power, served as his greatest disgrace? Is there any great strength in Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus), not one of whose members is free from disgrace or crime, (a man of) false tongue, blood-stained hands, (and) fleeing feet, most dishonourable (in the parts) which cannot be honourably named.
But the crafty, loquacious, (and) clever talent of Marcus (Porcius) Cato I do not despise. Such (qualities) are prepared by the training of the Greeks. But manliness, vigilance (and) toil are wholly absent among the Greeks. For do you think that power can be maintained by the precepts of those who have lost their own freedom at home through idleness?
There are in this faction other most indolent noblemen, in the case of whom there is absolutely no additional contribution except, like in an inscription, a famous name. (Men such as) Lucius Postumius, and Marcus Favonius seem to me to be like the superfluous cargo of a great ship; when they arrive safely, they are of some use; if anything disastrous arises, being thrown overboard occurs most readily in their case, because they are of the least value.
10. Now, since, as it seems to me, I have set down enough about the regeneration and correction of the common people, I shall speak of (the things) which seem necessary for you to do concerning the Senate. After age had developed my intellect (lit. my age and intellect had matured), I have almost never exercised my body with arms and horses, but have employed my mind on literature (lit. letters), (and) have kept in toil that (part of my person) which was by nature the stronger. Moreover, in that way of life, by much reading and listening, I have thus learned that all kingdoms, as well as states and nations, have held power successfully for as long as wise counsels have prevailed among them; (but) wherever favour, fear or pleasure have corrupted these (counsels), after a short (time) their strength (is) reduced, then their power is removed, (and,) finally, slavery is imposed (upon them).
For my part, I have made up my mind as follows: whoever has (lit. to whomever there is) in his own state a more powerful and more distinguished position than others, has (lit. there is to him) a great concern for the public welfare. For to others their liberty is secure only if the city is safe; (those) who, by their virtue, have won for themselves riches, honour (and) respect, when the state, declining somewhat, begins to be disturbed, their minds are tormented with manifold anxieties and troubles; (such a man) defends his reputation or his liberty or his household property, he is present in all places, he hurries about; the more prosperous he was in favourable circumstances the more harshly and the more alarmingly is he harried in adversity.
Therefore, when the common people obeys the Senate, as the body (obeys) the soul, and carries out its decrees, it is fitting that the fathers are strong in counsel, (but) for the people cleverness is unnecessary. Accordingly, when our ancestors were harassed by the harshest wars, although horses, men and money were lost, they were never weary of striving in arms for supremacy. No scarcity in the treasury, no strength of the enemy, no disastrous event, could prevent their great hearts from preserving, so long as they had breath (lit. together with their breath), what they had won by their valour. And these (successes) were achieved more by brave counsels than by successful battles. For in their time the republic would be united, everyone had regard for it, a faction was formed (only) against the enemy, each (man) exerted body and soul for his country, not for his own power. But, at present (lit. at this time), on the contrary, those noblemen, whose minds indolence and cowardice have occupied, (while being) ignorant of toil, the enemy (and) military service, (and) provided with a faction at home, are arrogantly dominating all nations.
11. So, the fathers, by whose advice the wavering republic was formerly made stable, having been overthrown, are agitated, tossing about hither and thither, according to the caprice of others; they decree now one thing, now another; as the enmity or favour of those, who rule (them) requires, so they judge (what is) good and bad for the public.
But if the freedom (of action) of all (senators was) equal, or, (if) their voting was more hidden, the state (would have) more strength and the nobility would be less powerful. But, since it is difficult to make the influence of everyone equal - for the valour of their ancestors has left with those (nobles) inherited glory, prestige and clients, (while) the rest of the multitude are, for the most part, grafted (upon the state) - , (you should) free the votes of the latter from (the effects of) fear; thus, each (man's judgment), (if conveyed) in secret, will be dearer to him than the power of another. Independence is desirable to good and bad, (and) to the stout-hearted and timid (man) alike. But most men forsake it. The most foolish of mortals, they accept, through cowardice, something in relation to themselves, as though (they are) conquered, which would be doubtful in a struggle, in whatever direction it may turn out.
I think, therefore, that the Senate can be strengthened in two ways: if, having been increased in number, it can show its opinion by means of a ballot. A ballot will serve as a screen, whereby it can venture to act with a more independent spirit; in a large number there will be both more protection and a greater usefulness. For in these times (with) some, being involved in the public courts (and) others in their own private business and (that) of their friends, they are, as a rule, scarcely to be found during the deliberations of the republic; but it is not so much their business engagements as the insolence of those in power that keeps them away. Noblemen, together with a few senators, whom the increasing size of the faction includes, undertake to approve, hold back (or) decree, as their fancy requires, whatever measures they like. But, when, after the number of senators has been increased, the vote is taken by ballot, those (men) will surely set aside their arrogance, when they have to obey (those) whom they previously commanded in such a merciless fashion.
12. Perhaps, general, after you have read this letter, you may wish (to know) what number of senators I think should be appointed, and in what way their many and diverse duties should be distributed; and, since I reckon that jury-service should be entrusted to all (members) of the first class, what apportionment there should be (and) what number in each division.
It would not in fact be difficult for me to set out all these (things) in detail; but, first, it has seemed (to me) that I should work out the main purpose of the plan, and prove to you that it is a reasonable (one). If you do decide to follow this course, the rest will be easy. (For myself) I wish my advice to be wise and, above all, (that it should be) practicable; for, wherever the plan turns out successfully for you, there a good reputation will befall me. But the desire (which) exercises me even more than that (is) that, by whatever means, the republic may be helped as soon as possible. I rate liberty dearer than renown, and I beg and exhort you, (O) most distinguished commander, now that you have subdued the Gallic nation, that you do not suffer the supreme and unconquered power of the Roman people to wither away through old age and to dissolve through excessive apathy.
If that should happen, surely neither night nor day would allay the anxiety of your mind, but, tormented by sleeplessness, frenzied and maddened, you would be possessed by a deranged mind. For I am firmly convinced (lit. it is well-known to me as the truth) that the lives of all mortals (are) watched over by a divine power; (and that) no one's action, either good or evil, is overlooked (lit. is regarded as unimportant), but from the natural order of things different rewards await the good and the bad. Meanwhile, if perhaps these (rewards) are slow in coming (lit. come rather slowly), in the case of each man his own mind supplies expectation from his conscience.
13. But if your country and your forefathers could speak with you, they would certainly say these (things) to you: "We, the bravest of men have begotten you, O Caesar in the best of cities (as) a glory and protection to us, (and as) a terror to our enemies. What we had won we handed these (things) to you at your birth together with the breath (of life): the mightiest native-land on earth, the most distinguished house and family in that native-land, (and) in addition excellent talents, honourable wealth, in short, all the ornaments of peace and (all) the prizes of war. In return for these splendid benefits, we ask of you neither disgrace nor evil deeds, but to restore our liberty which has been overthrown. When this had been achieved, the report of your prowess will assuredly wing its way across all nations. For, at present (lit. at this time), even if you have performed exploits renowned (both) at home and abroad, yet your glory is equal to (that) of many brave men. But if you were to rescue the city with the most famous name and the greatest power almost from the brink of ruin, who on earth would be more famous, who greater, than you? For if it should now turn out badly for this empire due to sickness or to fate, who could doubt but that throughout the world devastation, wars, (and) slaughter would arise? But if you should have (lit. there should be to you) the noble passion of obliging your native-land and your forefathers, and in the time to come, when you have restored the republic, you will bask in glory above all (other) mortals, and in death you will be more famous than the life of any single man. For fortune sometimes, envy often, torments the living; (but) when the breath of nature ceases, (and) when detractors have been removed, merit exalts itself more and more."
I have written, in as few (words) as I could, (the things) which seemed to me most useful (for you) to do and (the things) which I believed would be advantageous to you. But I entreat the immortal gods that, in whatever way you act, that course of action may turn out favourably for you and for the republic.
5. I believe, as I have heard from our forefathers, that our community (is) divided into two sections, into senators and the common people. In the past, the greatest authority was amongst the senators, but by far the greatest strength (was) among the common people. So, there was quite often a secession in the state, and the power of the nobility was constantly reduced and the rights of the people increased. But the common people used to agitate freely for this (reason), because no one's power was above the law, and the nobleman surpassed the commoner not in wealth and pride but in good repute and in brave deeds; each most humble (man) (was) in want of nothing required in the fields or on military service, (but) there was enough for him and enough for his country.
But, when idleness and poverty gradually drove these (men) from the fields (and) compelled (them) to have uncertain homes, they began to covet the wealth of others, (and) to regard their own liberty, together with the republic, (as) up for sale. So, gradually, the people, who had been the master, (and) had ruled all nations, became degenerate, and each (man) procured servitude for himself individually in place of the common sovereignty. Therefore, this multitude of ours, firstly having been steeped in evil habits, then having been dispersed among different occupations and ways of living, (and) in no way agreeing among one another, seems to me quite unsuitable to run the state. But, if new citizens are added, a great hope takes hold of me that it would happen that all would bestir themselves towards liberty; for the concern would arise both among the former to retain their liberty, and among the latter to throw off their slavery. I advise (you) to settle these new (citizens) in colonies, mixed together with the older (ones); for, in this way, our military situation will be more powerful, and the common people, being occupied with useful occupations, will cease to cause public mischief.
6. But, when these things are done, I am not ignorant or unaware of what rage and what storms there will be among the men of the nobility, when they will cry out in anger that everything is being thrown into utter confusion, that such servitude is being inflicted upon the original citizens, in short that there will be a kingdom (formed) out of a free state, when a great multitude attains to citizenship through the bounty of one (man). For my part, I make up my mind thus: that he commits a crime (lit. evil deed) against himself, who procures favour for himself at the expense of the public welfare; but when a public benefit is also of service to an individual, to hesitate to undertake it, I consider (a mark) of stupidity and cowardice.
Marcus (Livius) Drusus always had a plan during his tribunate to strive on behalf of the nobility with his utmost strength; nor, at the beginning, did he intend to do anything, unless they had been the originators (of it). But when factious men, to whom resentment and malice were dearer than loyalty, understood that the greatest benefit (of all) was being granted to many people by one man, they thought with regard to Marcus Drusus that he was just like themselves, namely each was aware of himself as (a man) with an evil and disloyal mind. So, (by) striving against him, in fear that by means of so great a favour he might take control of affairs by himself, they frustrated his plans and their own. You, general, must arrange loyal friends and many garrisons with all the more care.
7. It is not difficult for an energetic man to suppress an enemy (who is) facing (him); it is not easy to lay hidden snares, or for good (men) to avoid (them). Therefore, when you bring them into the community, since the common people will indeed be regenerated, you must pay particular attention to (lit. you must exercise your mind especially in) this matter, so that good morals should be cultivated and harmony should grow between former and new (citizens). But by far the greatest blessing you can procure for your country and fellow-citizens, for yourself and your children, (and) ultimately for the (whole) human race, (will be) if you either remove or reduce, as far as circumstances allow, the desire for money. Otherwise, neither private nor public affairs can be regulated, either at home or abroad. For, whenever the desire for riches enters in, neither training nor good qualities nor any intellect is strong enough (to resist it), but the mind, (whether) more or less at its peak, at last succumbs (to it) all the same. I have often now heard how kings, how states and nations have lost, through luxurious living, the mighty empires, which they had won (when) poor; nor is this at all surprising. For, when a good (man) sees an inferior (made) more renowned and acceptable by riches, at first he seethes (with anger) and ponders many (things) in his breast, but, when day by day vainglory prevails more (and more) over virtue, (and) luxurious living over honour, his mind turns away from the truth towards pleasure. In fact, hard work feeds upon (lit. is nourished by) glory; when you take that away, virtue by itself is bitter and harsh. In the end, wherever riches are regarded (as) a sign of distinction, there all good (things), loyalty, propriety, modesty and chastity, are (considered) worthless. For the path to virtue is a steep (one); (but) one exerts oneself towards money whenever one pleases; and it may be procured by dishonourable, as well as honourable, means.
In the first place, therefore, take away the authority of money. No one should judge (cases) affecting life or rank to a greater or lesser (extent) on the basis of his wealth, just as no praetor or consul should be elected on account of his wealth but on account of his worth. However, the judgement of the people is easily made in the case of a magistrate; for jurors to be approved by a few (people) is tyranny, (for them) to be chosen on the basis of money (is) shameful. Therefore it seems right (to me) that all (citizens) of the first class should be jurors, but that a greater number (lit. more in number) should serve as jurors than (at present). Neither the Rhodians nor (the people of) any other state have ever had cause to repent of their courts, when rich and poor decide indiscriminately, as the lot falls upon each (man), on the most important matters just as on the least important (ones).
8. But on the election of magistrates, the law, which Gaius (Sempronius) Gracchus proposed during his tribunate, that the centuries should be convoked from the five classes mixed together, seems good to me, (and) in no way inappropriate. Thus, money is made equal to worthiness, (and) one (man) will hasten to surpass another in virtue. I am prescribing these (as) the great remedies against riches. For everything is commended and desired just as it is of advantage in matters of this kind. Deceit is practised for financial rewards; when you take these away, no one at all is wicked for nothing. But avarice is a wild beast, monstrous and intolerable; wherever it turns, it devastates towns, fields, shrines and homes, it intermingles divine with human (things), neither armies nor walls can stop (it) from penetrating their (possessions) with its strength; it robs all men of their reputation, their chastity, their children, their native country and their parents. But, if you remove the honour given to money, that great power of avarice will be easily conquered by good morals.
But, even if all (men), just and unjust (alike), acknowledge that they regard (all) these (things) in this way, yet you will need to contend with the faction of the nobility in no moderate manner. If you avoid their deceit, everything else will be straightforward. For, if they could be sufficiently strong in virtue, they would be keener to emulate good (men) than (to be) envious (of them). Because sloth and indolence, dullness and lethargy, have taken possession of them, they shout out, they are abusive, (and) they consider another's good reputation (as) a disgrace to themselves.
9. But why should I say more (about these nobles) as though (they are men) unknown to you? The courage and strength of mind of Marcus (Calpurnius) Bibulus ended in the consulship: (he is a man) dull of speech, more malicious than clever by nature. What would he venture (to do), whose consulship, the (source of) supreme power, served as his greatest disgrace? Is there any great strength in Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus), not one of whose members is free from disgrace or crime, (a man of) false tongue, blood-stained hands, (and) fleeing feet, most dishonourable (in the parts) which cannot be honourably named.
But the crafty, loquacious, (and) clever talent of Marcus (Porcius) Cato I do not despise. Such (qualities) are prepared by the training of the Greeks. But manliness, vigilance (and) toil are wholly absent among the Greeks. For do you think that power can be maintained by the precepts of those who have lost their own freedom at home through idleness?
There are in this faction other most indolent noblemen, in the case of whom there is absolutely no additional contribution except, like in an inscription, a famous name. (Men such as) Lucius Postumius, and Marcus Favonius seem to me to be like the superfluous cargo of a great ship; when they arrive safely, they are of some use; if anything disastrous arises, being thrown overboard occurs most readily in their case, because they are of the least value.
10. Now, since, as it seems to me, I have set down enough about the regeneration and correction of the common people, I shall speak of (the things) which seem necessary for you to do concerning the Senate. After age had developed my intellect (lit. my age and intellect had matured), I have almost never exercised my body with arms and horses, but have employed my mind on literature (lit. letters), (and) have kept in toil that (part of my person) which was by nature the stronger. Moreover, in that way of life, by much reading and listening, I have thus learned that all kingdoms, as well as states and nations, have held power successfully for as long as wise counsels have prevailed among them; (but) wherever favour, fear or pleasure have corrupted these (counsels), after a short (time) their strength (is) reduced, then their power is removed, (and,) finally, slavery is imposed (upon them).
For my part, I have made up my mind as follows: whoever has (lit. to whomever there is) in his own state a more powerful and more distinguished position than others, has (lit. there is to him) a great concern for the public welfare. For to others their liberty is secure only if the city is safe; (those) who, by their virtue, have won for themselves riches, honour (and) respect, when the state, declining somewhat, begins to be disturbed, their minds are tormented with manifold anxieties and troubles; (such a man) defends his reputation or his liberty or his household property, he is present in all places, he hurries about; the more prosperous he was in favourable circumstances the more harshly and the more alarmingly is he harried in adversity.
Therefore, when the common people obeys the Senate, as the body (obeys) the soul, and carries out its decrees, it is fitting that the fathers are strong in counsel, (but) for the people cleverness is unnecessary. Accordingly, when our ancestors were harassed by the harshest wars, although horses, men and money were lost, they were never weary of striving in arms for supremacy. No scarcity in the treasury, no strength of the enemy, no disastrous event, could prevent their great hearts from preserving, so long as they had breath (lit. together with their breath), what they had won by their valour. And these (successes) were achieved more by brave counsels than by successful battles. For in their time the republic would be united, everyone had regard for it, a faction was formed (only) against the enemy, each (man) exerted body and soul for his country, not for his own power. But, at present (lit. at this time), on the contrary, those noblemen, whose minds indolence and cowardice have occupied, (while being) ignorant of toil, the enemy (and) military service, (and) provided with a faction at home, are arrogantly dominating all nations.
11. So, the fathers, by whose advice the wavering republic was formerly made stable, having been overthrown, are agitated, tossing about hither and thither, according to the caprice of others; they decree now one thing, now another; as the enmity or favour of those, who rule (them) requires, so they judge (what is) good and bad for the public.
But if the freedom (of action) of all (senators was) equal, or, (if) their voting was more hidden, the state (would have) more strength and the nobility would be less powerful. But, since it is difficult to make the influence of everyone equal - for the valour of their ancestors has left with those (nobles) inherited glory, prestige and clients, (while) the rest of the multitude are, for the most part, grafted (upon the state) - , (you should) free the votes of the latter from (the effects of) fear; thus, each (man's judgment), (if conveyed) in secret, will be dearer to him than the power of another. Independence is desirable to good and bad, (and) to the stout-hearted and timid (man) alike. But most men forsake it. The most foolish of mortals, they accept, through cowardice, something in relation to themselves, as though (they are) conquered, which would be doubtful in a struggle, in whatever direction it may turn out.
I think, therefore, that the Senate can be strengthened in two ways: if, having been increased in number, it can show its opinion by means of a ballot. A ballot will serve as a screen, whereby it can venture to act with a more independent spirit; in a large number there will be both more protection and a greater usefulness. For in these times (with) some, being involved in the public courts (and) others in their own private business and (that) of their friends, they are, as a rule, scarcely to be found during the deliberations of the republic; but it is not so much their business engagements as the insolence of those in power that keeps them away. Noblemen, together with a few senators, whom the increasing size of the faction includes, undertake to approve, hold back (or) decree, as their fancy requires, whatever measures they like. But, when, after the number of senators has been increased, the vote is taken by ballot, those (men) will surely set aside their arrogance, when they have to obey (those) whom they previously commanded in such a merciless fashion.
12. Perhaps, general, after you have read this letter, you may wish (to know) what number of senators I think should be appointed, and in what way their many and diverse duties should be distributed; and, since I reckon that jury-service should be entrusted to all (members) of the first class, what apportionment there should be (and) what number in each division.
It would not in fact be difficult for me to set out all these (things) in detail; but, first, it has seemed (to me) that I should work out the main purpose of the plan, and prove to you that it is a reasonable (one). If you do decide to follow this course, the rest will be easy. (For myself) I wish my advice to be wise and, above all, (that it should be) practicable; for, wherever the plan turns out successfully for you, there a good reputation will befall me. But the desire (which) exercises me even more than that (is) that, by whatever means, the republic may be helped as soon as possible. I rate liberty dearer than renown, and I beg and exhort you, (O) most distinguished commander, now that you have subdued the Gallic nation, that you do not suffer the supreme and unconquered power of the Roman people to wither away through old age and to dissolve through excessive apathy.
If that should happen, surely neither night nor day would allay the anxiety of your mind, but, tormented by sleeplessness, frenzied and maddened, you would be possessed by a deranged mind. For I am firmly convinced (lit. it is well-known to me as the truth) that the lives of all mortals (are) watched over by a divine power; (and that) no one's action, either good or evil, is overlooked (lit. is regarded as unimportant), but from the natural order of things different rewards await the good and the bad. Meanwhile, if perhaps these (rewards) are slow in coming (lit. come rather slowly), in the case of each man his own mind supplies expectation from his conscience.
13. But if your country and your forefathers could speak with you, they would certainly say these (things) to you: "We, the bravest of men have begotten you, O Caesar in the best of cities (as) a glory and protection to us, (and as) a terror to our enemies. What we had won we handed these (things) to you at your birth together with the breath (of life): the mightiest native-land on earth, the most distinguished house and family in that native-land, (and) in addition excellent talents, honourable wealth, in short, all the ornaments of peace and (all) the prizes of war. In return for these splendid benefits, we ask of you neither disgrace nor evil deeds, but to restore our liberty which has been overthrown. When this had been achieved, the report of your prowess will assuredly wing its way across all nations. For, at present (lit. at this time), even if you have performed exploits renowned (both) at home and abroad, yet your glory is equal to (that) of many brave men. But if you were to rescue the city with the most famous name and the greatest power almost from the brink of ruin, who on earth would be more famous, who greater, than you? For if it should now turn out badly for this empire due to sickness or to fate, who could doubt but that throughout the world devastation, wars, (and) slaughter would arise? But if you should have (lit. there should be to you) the noble passion of obliging your native-land and your forefathers, and in the time to come, when you have restored the republic, you will bask in glory above all (other) mortals, and in death you will be more famous than the life of any single man. For fortune sometimes, envy often, torments the living; (but) when the breath of nature ceases, (and) when detractors have been removed, merit exalts itself more and more."
I have written, in as few (words) as I could, (the things) which seemed to me most useful (for you) to do and (the things) which I believed would be advantageous to you. But I entreat the immortal gods that, in whatever way you act, that course of action may turn out favourably for you and for the republic.
