Introduction:
Sabidius translated the
Third Book of the "De Bello Civili" as long ago as 5th November 2013 and before the other two written by Caesar, because it contains an account of the great battle of Pharsalus, which was the key event of the Civil War. Sabidius has now returned to this work and has translated below the First Book, which begins with an account of how the War broke out, of Caesar's initial successes when he advanced into Italy at the beginning of 49 B.C. and how Pompey managed to escape to Illyricum with his army; after that he writes of the siege of Massilia which he is obliged to conduct. However, the second half of the Book (Chapters 37-87) consists of a detailed account of his campaign against Pompey's forces in Spain, which he felt he had to confront before he could pursue Pompey across the Adriatic. Led by Pompey's experienced lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, these forces provide Caesar with significant opposition, and Caesar follows his usual practice of not understating the strength of his opponents and the problems and dilemmas he has to face, so that when victory comes, it appears all the more laudable.
The reader is recommended to read the full introduction to Sabidius' translation of Book III, which discusses at some length the nature and the virtues of Caesar's "Commentarii." However, in this translation of Book I, he does not follow his previous practice of specially highlighting Caesar's use of Ablative Absolutes or, in order to demonstrate his heavy reliance on Reported Speech, his main verbs. In the former case, this is because he has concluded that, while literal translations of Ablative Absolutes may be of assistance to a reader, who is trying to translate the Latin accurately, it is often unnecessarily clumsy to retain such literal translations in English, particularly when they involve the use of the Passive Voice. Furthermore, the ability to translate an Ablative Absolute into effective English is surely a key part of the task of translating Latin well. Nevertheless, with this obvious exception, in his translation of Caesar's "De Bello Civili" Book I, Sabidius has not strayed very far from his usual mission of seeking to stick as closely as possible to the structure of the Latin sentence and the actual Latin words used. Here, he quotes from his introduction to Book III, where he writes: "It is Sabidius' belief that colloquial or free translations of the Latin original into allegedly more agreeable everyday English can distort the author's intended meaning with only a very marginal benefit being offered in terms of the accessibility of the English."
1. Intransigence at Rome (Chapters 1-6).Chapter 1. Gaius (Julius) Caesar's dispatch (i.e. this had said that Caesar would give up his command if Pompey would do the same) having been delivered to the consuls by Fabius (n.b. here the manuscript is in error; it was actually delivered by Gaius Scribonius Curio), it was grudgingly accepted by them after the strong representations of the tribunes of the people that it should be read in the senate, but their permission could not be obtained that (the contents) of the dispatch should be referred to the senate (for discussion). (Instead) the consuls initiated a general (debate) on the (state of) the republic. The consul, Lucius (Cornelius) Lentulus (Crus), promised that he would not fail in his duty to the republic, if they were prepared to state their opinions courageously and vigorously; but if they were concerned about Caesar and sought his favour, as they had done on previous occasions, (then he said) that he would adopt his own policy, and would not comply with the senate's authority; (and he reminded them) that he too had (the capacity) to return to Caesar's favour and friendship. (Quintus Caecilus Metellus Pius) Scipio (Nasica) (i.e. cos. suff. 52 B.C.) spoke in the same vein: (he said that,) with regard to Pompey (i.e. Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, cos. i. 70), there would be no wanting in his duty to the republic, if the senate would follow (him); (but,) if it hesitated and acted too mildly, (then) the senate would ask for his help in vain, if they should want (it) afterwards.
Chapter 2. As the (meeting of) the senate was being held in the city and Pompey was (living) nearby, this speech of Scipio's seemed to be coming from the mouth of Pompey himself. Some expressed their opinion in milder terms, like, in the first instance, Marcus (Claudius) Marcellus (i.e. cos. 51), who launched into a speech (declaring that a decision) on this matter ought not to be referred to the senate until a levy (had been) held throughout Italy and armies had been enrolled, under whose protection the senate might venture to pass whatever (decrees) it wished in safety and in freedom; (and) like Marcus Calidius, who was of the opinion that Pompey should set out for his provinces (i.e. in Spain), so that there should not be any cause for hostilities, (and thought) that Caesar was afraid that Pompey appeared to be holding on to the two legions which had been taken from him and to be retaining them near the city, to his detriment; (and also) like Marcus (Caelius) Rufus, who supported Calidius' motion with just a few words altered. (But) they were all attacked and censured by the reprimand of the consul Lucius Lentulus. Lentulus refused altogether to put Calidius' motion to the vote, (and) Marcellus, alarmed by these reproofs, withdrew his motion. So, compelled by the tirades of the consul, the terror of a nearby army, (and) by the threats of Pompey's friends, the majority (of the senate), reluctantly and under pressure, supported Scipio's motion: (namely) that Caesar should disband his army before a day to be fixed; if he should not do (so), it should be considered that he would be acting against the state. Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius (Longinus), tribunes of the people, (then) interposed their vetoes. There was an immediate debate on (this use of) the tribunes' veto. Harsh views were expressed; and whoever spoke with the most acrimony and the most vindictiveness, so he was most highly applauded by Caesar's enemies.
Chapter 3. When the senate had been dismissed towards evening, all who were of that order were summoned by Pompey. He praised those who arrived promptly, and encouraged them with regard to the future; those who were more tardy, he reproved and urged (them) on. From all directions many were called out from Pompey's former armies by the hope of rewards and advancement, and many were sent for from the two legions which had been handed over by Caesar. The city and the comitium itself (i.e. the place of assembly, adjacent to the forum, where the Roman people met to vote) were filled with tribunes, centurions, (and) veteran volunteers. All the friends of the consuls, (and) the adherents of Pompey and of those who bore old grudges against Caesar, gathered together in the senate, (5) and the weaker (sort) were terrified, the waverers had their minds made up, and the power to decide in true freedom was taken from the majority, by their declarations and their uproar. The censor, Lucius (Calpurnius) Piso (Caesoninus) (i.e. cos. 58) offered to go to Caesar himself, and the praetor Lucius Roscius (Fabatus) likewise, to acquaint him with these circumstances; they asked for a period of six days to complete their mission. The view was also expressed by others that delegates should be sent to Caesar, to announce to him the will of the senate.
Chapter 4. There was resistance to all these (proposals), and there was opposition to all of them in speeches by the consul (i.e. Lentulus), by Scipio, and by (Marcus Porcius) Cato (i.e. praetor 53). Old grievances concerning Caesar and resentment at his (electoral) rejection incited Cato. Lentulus was motivated by the size of his debts, and by the prospect of an army, and provinces, and the bribes of rulers requiring recognition of their titles, and he boasted among his (friends) that he would be a second Sulla (i.e. Lucius Cornelius Sulla Felix, dictator 82-79), to whom supreme power should revert. The same hopes of a province and armies, which he thought he would share with Pompey, by virtue of (his being) a relative (i.e. Pompey was his son-in-law, having married his daughter Cornelia in 53 B.C.), impelled Scipio, besides his fear of prosecutions, and his vanity, and his desire to flatter those powerful (men) who held considerable sway at that time in the state and the law-courts. Pompey, himself, encouraged by Caesar's enemies and because he wished no one to be equal with him in prestige, had totally withdrawn himself from his friendship (with him), and had achieved a reconciliation with their common enemies, the majority of whom he himself had inflicted upon Caesar at the time of their marriage alliance (i.e. in 59 B.C. Pompey had married Caesar's daughter Julia); moreover, (as he was) perturbed by the discredit arising from the two legions which he had diverted from the expedition to Asia and Syria for the purposes of his own power and dominance, he was determined that the situation should be settled by (force of) arms.
Chapter 5. For these reasons, everything was done in haste and confusion. No opportunity was given to those close to Caesar to inform him (of these events), nor to the tribunes of the people to protest about their own danger, nor even to preserve their most fundamental right, which Lucius Sulla has left (them), the authority conferred (on them) by the veto, but on the seventh day they were compelled to think of their own safety, whereas in former times even the most turbulent of the tribunes of the people had managed (not) to consider (themselves) at risk until the end of the eighth month of their official duties. Recourse is had to that extreme and ultimate decree of the senate, which had never been resorted to before, except by the daring of its proposers in (circumstances when) the city was on the very point of destruction, and when there was desperation about everyone's safety: 'let the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and (those) who are in the vicinity of the city as proconsuls, take care that the republic should suffer no harm.' These (words) were recorded in a decree of the senate on the seventh day before the Ides of January (i.e. 7th January); and so on the first five days on which the senate could meet from the day on which Lentulus entered his consulate, the two days of elections excepted, the severest and the most virulent decrees were passed with regard to the government of Caesar and those most eminent of men, the tribunes of the people. At once, the tribunes of the people fled from the city and went to Caesar. At that time, he was at Ravenna, and he was awaiting a response to his own most moderate demands, (to see) if by some equitable (act) on the part of those men the matter could be brought to a peaceful (resolution).
Chapter 6. During the following days, the senate was convened outside the city. Pompeius emphasised the same things, which he had indicated by means of Scipio, he applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, and he revealed (the extent of) his forces: (he told them) that he had ten legions ready: moreover, he was aware and had been informed that his soldiers were estranged in their minds against Caesar, nor could they be persuaded to defend him or to follow (him into battle). At once, (motions) were referred to the senate on other matters: (that) levies should be held throughout Italy, (that) Faustus (Cornelius) Sulla should be sent to Mauretania as propraetor; that money should be granted to Pompey from the public treasury. It was also proposed that, with regard to king Juba, he should be (honoured with the title of) ally and friend (of the Roman people.) (But Gaius Claudius) Marcellus (i.e. Lentulus' colleague as consul) said that he would not allow (this) at present; (Lucius Marcius) Philippus, a tribune of the people blocked (the appointment of) Faustus. On the other matters decrees of the senate were recorded. Provinces, two (of them) consular, the remainder praetorian, were allotted to private (individuals). Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus), (i.e. cos. 56). (Lucius Marcius) Philippus (i.e. cos. 56 and father of the tribune mentioned above) and (Lucius Aurelius) Cotta (i.e. cos. 67), were passed over by a private stratagem, nor were their lots (even) admitted. To the remaining provinces praetors were sent. Nor did they wait, as had happened in previous years, for (the assignment) of their commands to be referred to the people (for ratification), and to depart (from the city) in military garb, once their vows had been formally offered. (Both) consuls left the city, (something) which had never happened before that time, and private (citizens) had lictors in the city and on the Capitol, contrary to all precedents of former times. Levies were held throughout Italy, arms were requisitioned, money was exacted from municipal towns and removed from temples, (and) all divine and human rights were confounded.
2. Caesar reacts (Chapters 7-15).
Chapter 7. Having acquired a knowledge of these events, Caesar (gathered) his men around (him and) addressed (them). He related to them the wrongs (done to him) by his enemies at all times; he complained that Pompey, whose honour and dignity he himself had always favoured and been a supporter of, (had been) led astray and corrupted by them through envy and a belittling of his glory. He complained that a new precedent (had been) introduced into the (affairs of) the republic, (namely) that the tribunician power of veto, which in previous years had been restored by (force of) arms, had (now) been forbidden and suppressed by (force of) arms. (He said) that, although Sulla had stripped the tribunician function of (almost) all its powers, he had, nevertheless, left the power of veto unrestrained, (but) that Pompey, who was thought to have restored (the powers they had) lost, had even deprived them of the privileges which they had formerly kept. That, whenever it had been decreed 'that the magistrates should take care that the republic should suffer no harm', by which words and by which decree of the senate the Roman people had been called to arms, (it had only been) passed in (the circumstances of) pernicious laws, of tribunician violence, and of the secession of the people, when the temples and the loftier sites had been occupied; and he told (them) that these examples of former times had been atoned for by the fates of Saturninus (i.e. Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, d. 100) and the Gracchi (i.e. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, d. 133, and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus d. 121); that nothing of such a kind (had) happened at that time, nor had it even been considered; no law (had been) promulgated, no appeal involving the people (had been) put in motion, no secession (had been) organised. He exhorted (them) to defend from his enemies the reputation and honour of that general, under whose leadership they had for nine years supported the republic with the greatest of good fortune, and had fought countless successful battles, (and) had pacified the whole of Gaul and Germany. The men of the Thirteenth Legion, which was present - for, at the beginning of the troubles, he had summoned it, (while) the others had not yet joined (them) - exclaimed that they were ready to defend their general and the tribunes of the people from any injuries.
Chapter 8. Once the disposition of his men had become clear (to him), he set out for Ariminum with this legion and there he met the tribunes of the people who had fled to him; he summoned the remaining legions from their winter quarters and ordered (them) to follow (him) closely. The young Lucius (Julius) Caesar, whose father had been Caesar's legate (i.e. Lucius Julius Caesar, cos. 64) came there. Having completed the rest of his conversation on the business for which he had come, he revealed that he had a message to him from Pompey concerning their personal relationship: (he said) that Pompey wished that he should be cleansed in Caesar's (eyes) lest he should see those things which he had done for the sake of the republic as a personal affront. (For) he had always considered the interests of the state as more important than the claims of personal connections. Caesar, too, for the sake of his own reputation, ought to subordinate his own desires and (sense of) resentment to the (good of) the republic, and not be so violently angry with his enemies, that, although he might hope that he would (only) hurt his enemies, he might (also) do harm to the republic. He added a few (words) in the same vein, with a excuse relating to Pompey. The praetor Roscius conferred with Caesar on the same subject and in almost the same words, and emphasised that Pompey had asked him (to do so).
Chapter 9. Although these things appeared to have done nothing to alleviate his injuries, yet, having obtained proper persons through whom he might convey what he wanted to him, he asked both of them, since they had conveyed Pompey's requirements to him, not to object to passing his own demands to him also, (to see) if with a little trouble they could put an end to a great dispute and free all Italy from fear.(He said) that his prestige had always been his foremost (consideration), and (was) more important than his life. He was greatly pained because the favour of the Roman people was being wrested from him through ill-treatment by his enemies, and (because), a half-year's command having been taken from (him), he was being dragged back to the city, (even though) the people had ordered that account should be taken of his (standing) in his absence at the next (consular) elections. Yet, he had borne this loss of his honour for the sake of the republic; (but,) when he sent letters to the senate (asking) that all (commanders) should give up their armies, he did not even attain that. (He complained) that levies were being held throughout Italy, that the two legions which had been taken from him under the pretence of a Parthian war had been kept (at home), and that the state was in arms. To where do all these (things) lead, other than to his ruin? But, (he was) still prepared to submit to everything and to endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own provinces, let them both disband their armies, let everyone in Italy lay down their arms, let fear be removed from the city, let free elections and (the conduct of) the republic be entrusted to the senate and people of Rome. So that these things may be performed the more easily and on fixed terms, and so that they may be confirmed by the swearing of an oath, let either (Pompey) himself draw near or allow (Caesar) to go to meet him; if this were to happen, all our disputes would be settled through discussion.
Chapter 10. This message having been received, Roscius went with (Lucius) Caesar to Capua, and there he found the consuls and Pompey; he reported Caesar's demands. Having deliberated upon the matter, they replied, and sent back to him by the same (persons) written instructions, the gist of which was this: Caesar should return to Gaul, leave Ariminum, (and) disband his army; if he were to do these (things), Pompey would go to Spain. Meanwhile, until security was given that Caesar would do what he promised, the consuls and Pompey would not suspend their levies.
Chapter 11. It was an inequitable arrangement to require that Caesar should leave Ariminum and return to his province, but that he himself
(i.e. Pompey) should keep both his provinces and another man's legions; to desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded while he was holding levies; (and to say) that he should (merely) promise to go to his province, but not prescribe the day on which he would go, so that, (even) if he had not set out until after Caesar's consulate had expired, he would still not appear to be bound by any religious scruples concerning falsehood. But his failure to give a time for a conference, or to promise that he would set out (to meet him), brought great despair to (those hoping for) peace. Therefore, he
(i.e. Caesar) sent Marcus Antonius with five cohorts from Ariminum to Arretium, (while) he himself remained at Ariminum with two (cohorts), and there he began to hold a levy; he took possession of Pisaurum, Fanum (and) Ancona, (each) with a single cohort.
Chapter 12. Meanwhile, having been informed that the praetor, (Quintus Minucius) Thermus was holding Iguvium with five cohorts, (and) was fortifying the town, but that the attitude of all the Iguvians was well-disposed towards himself, he sent Curio (there) with the three cohorts which he held at Pisaurum and Ariminum. When he learned of his approach, Thermus, suspicious of the mood of the citizens, withdrew his cohorts from the city and fled. His soldiers deserted him on the road and returned home. Curio recovered Iguvium with the full support of all (its inhabitants). On learning of these events, Caesar, relying on the good-will of the citizens, took the cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion from its garrison, and set out for Auximum; (Publius) Attius (Varus) (i.e. praetor 53) was holding this town with the cohorts which he brought into (it), and was holding a levy throughout Picenum by means of the senators which he sent around (it).
Chapter 13. When they heard of Caesar's approach, the town councillors of Auximum came to Attius Varus in a body; they told (him) that, (while) it was not a matter for them to determine, neither they, nor the rest of their citizens, could allow Gaius Caesar, a general who deserved (so) well of the republic, after performing such great achievements, to be shut out of their town and its walls; therefore he should have regard to the future and to the danger of his own (position). Disturbed by their declaration, Varus withdrew from the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A few men from Caesar's front rank pursued him, and compelled (him) to halt. Battle having been joined, Varus is deserted by his (men), a number of his soldiers went home; the rest came over to Caesar, and their chief centurion, Lucius Pupius, was apprehended and brought along together with them, (a man) who had previously held the same rank in the army of Gnaeus Pompey. But Caesar commended Attius' soldiers, let Pupius go, gave thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised that he would remember their action.
Chapter 14. When these events were reported, so great a panic suddenly seized Rome, that, when the consul Lentulus came to open the treasury in order to supply money to Pompey in accordance with the senate's decree, as soon as he had opened the treasury reserve (i.e. this reserve, built up by a 5% tax on the freeing of slaves, was only supposed to be available in emergencies), he immediately fled from the city. For Caesar (was said) to be arriving at any moment, and his cavalry were falsely reported to be there (already). His colleague Marcellus and most of the magistrates followed him. Gnaeus Pompey had set out from the city on the previous day, and was making his way to the legions which he had taken from Caesar and had stationed in Apulia for the purpose of winter quarters. The levies around the city were suspended; nowhere on this side of Capua was thought to be at all secure. At Capua they first took courage and rallied, and they began to hold a levy of colonists who had been settled at Capua by the Julian law (i.e. the Lex Julia, passed during the consulship of Caesar in 59, had distributed unoccupied state lands, including those on the fertile Campanian plain, to needy citizens); Lentulus brought into the market-place gladiators whom Caesar had kept there in a training-school, and he confirmed (them) in their expectation of freedom and assigned horses to them and told (them) to follow him. (But) afterwards, having been advised by his friends that this action was censured by the judgment of everyone, he distributed them among the households of the district of Campania for the sake of security.
Chapter 15. Having left Auximum, Caesar hurried through the whole land of Picenum. All the prefectures in these districts received (him) with the most willing disposition and assisted his army in every respect. Envoys even came to him from Cingulum, a town which (Titus Atius) Labienus (i.e. Caesar's deputy in Gaul 58-49, but who was now returning to the service of Pompey) had founded and built at his own expense, and they promised that they would do with the utmost zeal whatever he commanded. He demanded soldiers; they sent (them). In the meantime, the Twelfth Legion came to join Caesar. With these two (legions of his) (i.e. the Twelfth and the Thirteenth, which he already had), he made for Asculum in Picenum. (Publius Cornelius) Lentulus Spinther (i.e. cos. 57) was occupying that town with ten cohorts; on learning of Caesar's approach, he fled from the town, and tried to take his cohorts with him, (but) he was deserted by a large part of his men. Abandoned on the road with a few (men), he fell in with (Lucius) Vibullius Rufus, (who had been) sent by Pompey to the land of Picenum in order to confirm (the loyalty) of its men. Having been informed by him what things were going on in Picenum, Vibullius took his soldiers from him, and let (Spinther) himself go on his way. From the neighbouring regions, he also mustered what cohorts he could from Pompey's levies; among them he welcomed (Gaius) Lucilius Hirrus, (who was) fleeing from Camerinum with six cohorts, which he had had in the garrison there; collecting these together, he made up thirteen (cohorts). With these he made his way by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium, and informed (him) that Caesar was close at hand with two legions. For his part, Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from Alba, from the Marsi and the Paeligni, and from the neighbouring regions.
3. The siege of Corfinium (Chapters 16-23).
When Firmum (i.e. a town on the Adriatic coast of Picenum) had been taken and Lentulus (i.e. Spinther) expelled, Caesar ordered that the soldiers who had deserted him should be rounded up, and that a levy should be established. Having delayed there for one day for the sake of (creating) a corn-supply, he himself hurried to Corfinium. When he arrived there, five cohorts, sent out from the town by Domitius, were (in the process of) demolishing a bridge over the river (i.e. the Aternus), which was about three miles from the town. Having joined battle with Caesar's advance-guards, Domitius' men were speedily driven back from the bridge and retreated into the town. Having led his legions over (the river), Caesar halted before the town and set up camp close to the walls.
Chapter 17. When he learned of this, Domitius offered a large reward (to men) who were well acquainted with the region, and sent messages to Pompey in Apulia that begged and entreated (him) to come to his assistance; (he said) that Caesar could easily be trapped between their two armies and prevented from (obtaining) corn through the difficulties of the countryside. Unless he did this, he and more than thirty cohorts, and a large number of senators and Roman knights, would come into danger. In the meantime, he encouraged his (men) and positioned catapults on the walls, and assigned to each man certain areas of the city to guard; at an assembly he promised his troops (grants of) land from his own estates, (at the rate of) four acres to each one, and a proportionately (higher) share to centurions and re-enlisted veterans.
Chapter 18. In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of Sulmo (i.e. a Paelignian town, later the birth-place of the poet Ovid), which was a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, were eager to do whatever he wanted, but were prevented (from doing so) by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and by Attius, a Paelignian, who were holding the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius there with five cohorts of the Thirteenth Legion, and, as soon as the people of Sulmo saw our standards, they opened the gates, and all of them, both townsmen and soldiers, went out to meet Antonius with joy. Lucretius and Attius threw themselves from the walls. Brought before Antonius, Attius begged that he be sent to Caesar. Antonius, together with the cohorts and Attius, returned on the same day on which he had set out. Caesar joined these cohorts together with his own army, and released Attius unharmed. In (the course of) the first (few) days, Caesar resolved to fortify his camp with major works, and to bring in corn from the neighbouring municipal towns, and to await the rest of his forces. Within three days the Eighth Legion came to him there, and twenty-two cohorts from the fresh Gallic levies, and about three hundred cavalrymen from the king of Noricum (i.e. a territory between the Danube and the Alps). On their arrival, he set up a second camp on the other side of the town (i.e. Corfinium); he put Curio in charge of this camp. During the remaining days he undertook to surround the town with a rampart and redoubts. When the greatest part of this work had been completed, at almost the same time (those who had been) sent to Pompey returned.
Chapter 19. Having read through their dispatch, Domitius concealed (its content) and announced at his council (of officers) that Pompey was about to come speedily to their assistance, and he urged them not to lose heart and to prepare whatever (arrangements) were necessary to defend the town. He himself held a secret conference with a few of his intimate friends, and determined to effect a plan of escape. Since Domitius' countenance was not in line with his words, and he was doing everything with more anxiety and fearfulness than he had been accustomed (to do) in the previous days, and that, contrary to his usual custom, he was spending much (time) talking in secret with his friends for the purpose of planning, (and) was avoiding councils and meetings with his men, the situation could not be concealed or misrepresented any longer. For Pompey had written back in reply that he would not be putting his cause into the greatest jeopardy, and that Domitius had transferred himself into the town of Corfinium without his advice or consent: therefore, if any opportunity should (arise), he should come to him with all his forces. (But) this could not be done, and this was the case because of the blockade and circumvallation of the town.
Chapter 20. (Word of) Domitius' plans having spread about, the soldiers, who were in Corfinium, withdrew into groups in the early evening, and they expressed the following thoughts among themselves by means of their military tribunes, their centurions, and the most reputable of their own kind: they were being besieged by Caesar; his works and fortifications were nearly completed; their general, Domitius, in whom they had continued to place their hopes and trust, had abandoned (them) all and was arranging a plan of escape; they ought to have regard for their own safety. At first, the Marsi began to dissent from this (view), and they occupied that part of the town which seemed most defensible, and so violent a dispute arose between them, that they tried to engage in close combat and to fight it out with arms; after a short (time), however, mediators having been sent from one side to the other, they (i.e. the Marsi) learned about the flight of Lucius Domitius. Therefore, (they were) all of one opinion, and, having dragged Domitius into the public (view), they stood around (him) and kept (him) under guard, and they sent envoys from their own number to Caesar, (saying) they were ready to open the gates and to do whatever he might command, and that they would deliver Lucius Domitius alive into his power.
Chapter 21. When he became aware of these declarations, Caesar, although he thought it was of great importance that he should be master of the town and transfer its cohorts into his own camp as soon as possible, lest any change in their inclinations might occur through bribes, or through a renewal of their courage or false rumours, because in war great accidents are often brought about by trifling circumstances, yet, fearing that the town might be looted on the entry of his troops and due to the licence engendered by night-time, he commended those who had come (to him) and sent (them) back to the town and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He, himself, stationed his men around those earth-works, which he had started to build, not spaced at fixed intervals, as had been his custom in previous days, but in a continuous (line) of sentries and guard-posts, so that they were in touching distance of one another and formed a complete circle around the fortification; he sent the military tribunes and officers around (the guard-posts), and exhorted (them) not only to be on their guard against sallies (from the town), but also to watch carefully for any stealthy exits of individual men. Indeed, not a single one of all (his men) was so slack or sluggish in his mind that he fell asleep that night. So keen was their anticipation of the final outcome that each one (of them) was carried off to a different subject in his heart and mind: what (would happen) to the Corfinians themselves, what (would happen) to Domitius, what (would happen) to Lentulus, what would happen to the rest (of them), and what events would overtake each one (of them)?
Chapter 22. At about the fourth watch (i.e. towards the end of the night), Lentulus Spinther conversed from the walls with our sentries and guardsmen; (he said) that, if permission were given him, he wished to meet with Caesar. Permission having been given, he was escorted out of the town, nor did Domitius' men leave him until he was brought into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with him for his life, and implored (him) to spare him, and reminded (him) of their old friendship and acknowledged Caesar's kindnesses to him, which had been very great: that (it was) through him that he had been admitted into the college of pontiffs, that he had held the province of Spain after his praetorship, and that he had received support in his quest for the consulship. Caesar interrupted his speech: (he said) that he had not left his province for the sake of harming (anyone), but to protect himself from the assaults of his enemies, to restore to their dignity those tribunes of the people (who had been) expelled from the city on his account, and to liberate himself and the Roman people (who were being) oppressed by the faction of a few (men). Encouraged by his words, Lentulus sought leave to return to the town; (he said) that what he had obtained concerning his own safety would also be of comfort to the rest to hope for their own; some (of them) were so terrified that they were being driven to take desperate measures with regard to their own lives. He was given permission and departed.
Chapter 23. When it was light, Caesar ordered all the senators, senators' sons, military tribunes, and Roman knights to be brought before him. There were fifty (of them): of senatorial rank (there were) Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, the quaestor Sextus Quintilius Varus, (and) Lucius Rubrius; in addition (there were) the son of Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman knights and councillors, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal towns. When they were brought before (him), he protected them all from the jeers and taunts of the soldiers; he told them in a few words that he had not received any thanks on their part for the very great benefits (which) he (had bestowed) upon them; (then) he sent (them) all away unharmed. The six million sesterces, which Domitius had brought (there) and deposited in the public (treasury), (and which had been) brought to him by the magistrates of Corfinium, he returned to Domitius, lest he might appear to have been more sparing with regard to the lives of men than with regard to money (matters), although it was well known to be public money, (and to have been) given by Pompey as pay (for the troops). He ordered Domitius' soldiers to take the oath of allegiance to himself, and on that day, after spending even days in total at Corfimium, he made a regular days' march, and came to Apulia via the territories of the Marrucini, the Frentani (and) the Larinates.
4. Pompey leaves Italy (Chapters 24-29).
Chapter 24. On learning of these events which had taken place at Corfinium, Pompey set out from Luceria to Canusium, and from there to Brundisium. He ordered all the forces (raised) from every quarter in the recent levies to join him; he armed slaves (and) shepherds, and assigned horses to them; from these he made up about three hundred cavalrymen. The praetor Lucius Manlius (Torquatus) fled from Alba with six cohorts, (and likewise) the praetor (Publius) Rutilius Lupus from Tarracins with three; having caught sight, from a distance, of Caesar's cavalry, over which Vibius Curius was in command, they deserted their praetor and transferred their standards to Curius and went over to him. In the same way during the rest of his journey several cohorts fell in with Caesar's (infantry) column (and) others with his cavalry. Numerius Magius from Cremona, Gnaeus Pompey's chief engineer, (was) captured on the road and brought to him. Caesar sent him back to him with this message: since up to this moment there had been no opportunity for a conference, and he himself would be coming to Brundisium, (he believed) it was of great importance to the republic and to the common safety that he should converse with Pompey; nor indeed could the same (effect) be achieved while there was a long distance of road (between them), when their proposals would be conveyed by others, as (it could) if there were a discussion of all their proposals face to face.
Chapter 25. Having delivered this message, he came to Brundisium with six legions, three of veterans, and the rest, (those) which he had raised in the recent levy and brought up to strength on the march; for he had immediately sent Domitius' cohorts from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the consuls (i.e. Lentulus and Marcellus) had gone to Dyrrachium (i.e. a harbour in Illyricum on the eastern shore of the Adriatic) and that Pompey was remaining at Brundisium with twenty cohorts; but he could not find out for certain whether he had stayed there for the sake of holding on to Brundisium, so that he might the more easily keep under his control the whole of the Adriatic sea from the extreme parts of Italy and the coastal regions of Greece, and so that he might be able to conduct the war from both sides (of the sea), or whether he had been stuck there through a lack of ships, and, fearing lest he might decide not to leave Italy, he resolved to blockade the port of Brundisium and (obstruct) its operations as a port. The plan for these works was as follows: (at the place) where the mouth of the harbour was most narrow, he threw up (great) mounds of earth on both sides of the inlet, because in these places the sea was shallow. As the work progressed, when the mole could not be continued in the deeper water, he placed two rafts, thirty feet square exactly opposite the mound. These he made fast with four anchors at their four corners, lest they were disturbed by the waves. Having completed them and put (them) in place, he then joined (them to) other rafts of equal size. These he covered over with a pile of earth, lest access (to them) and boarding (them) for the purpose of defence might be hindered; in their front and on both sides of them he covered them over with a parapet of wickerwork; on every fourth one of these he erected a turret two storeys (high), by means of which he might defend (them) against more effectively from attack by ships and being set on fire.
Chapter 26. Against these (measures), Pompey fitted out some large merchant vessels, which he seized in the harbour of Brundisium. On these he erected turrets three storeys high, and, having equipped them with a number of catapults and weapons of every kind, he propelled (them) at Caesar's works in order to break up the rafts and disrupt the (siege-)works. So, on both sides they went on fighting every day at a distance with slings, arrows and other weapons. However, Caesar was conducting these (operations) in a way that was compatible with his thinking that (the hope of) peace should not be dismissed; but, yet, he was greatly surprised that Magius, whom he had sent to Pompey with proposals, was not sent back to him; and, although his attempts at such a settlement often retarded his plans of attack, he still thought that he ought, by all means, to persevere in this (line of thought). He, therefore, sent his legate (Gaius) Caninius Rebilus to his close friend and relation (Lucius) Scribonius Libo for the purpose of an interview; he charged (him) to exhort Libo on the need to bring about peace; (and) he asked that he should speak with Pompey himself; he explained that he had great hopes, that, if the opportunity for such a meeting occurred, (the result) would be that they would lay down their arms on level terms; (and) that a great part of the glory, and the credit for this event would go to Libo, if through his agency and his efforts there should be an end to hostilities. When he had finished his conversation with Caninius, Libo went to Pompey. Shortly afterwards he came back with the reply that, because the consuls were absent, there could be no discussion of a settlement. So, Caesar finally decided that he should abandon his frequent and vain attempts (to reach) an understanding, and that the war should (now) be prosecuted (with vigour).
Chapter 27. When nearly half of the (siege)-works had been carried out by Caesar, and nine days had been spent on this activity, the ships, which had transported the first part of the army there, (were) sent back from Dyrrachium by the consuls, and returned to Brundisium. Pompey, either alarmed by Caesar's works, or because he had decided even right from the start to leave Italy, began to prepare his departure on the arrival of the ships, and, so as to check the more readily Caesar's assault, lest his soldiers should break into the town at the very (moment) of his departure, he blocked up the gates, barricaded the streets and avenues, (and) dug trenches across the roads, and fixed spikes and sharpened stakes in them. He covered these (trenches) with light hurdles and earth; furthermore, he barricaded the two access roads, which led to the harbour beyond the walls, with very large pointed beams fixed in them. After making these arrangements, he ordered his soldiers to go aboard the ships in silence, while he stationed here and there on the wall and the turrets some light-armed (men that he had picked) from his veterans, archers and slingers. These he resolved to recall by a fixed signal, when all his soldiers had embarked on the ships, and he left some swift vessels for them in an accessible spot.
Chapter 28. The people of Brundisium, disturbed by their ill-treatment at the hands of Pompey's troops and the insults (they had received) from Pompey himself, were in favour of Caesar's cause. When, therefore, they learned of Pompey's departure, while his men were rushing about and were preoccupied by their embarkation, they made signs publicly from the roof-tops. Having discovered through them what was happening, Caesar ordered scaling ladders to be made available and his men to be armed, lest he should lose any opportunity for action to be taken. Pompey set sail at nightfall. (Those) who had been stationed on the wall in order to guard (it) were recalled by the signal which had been agreed, and hurried down to the ships by well-known paths. (Caesar's) men fixed their ladders and climbed the walls, but, having been warned by the inhabitants of Brundisium of the hidden palisade and the trenches, they halted, and, having been conducted by them around a long detour, they reached the harbour, and caught and took possession of two (of Pompey's) ships with their soldiers which had fallen foul of Caesar's mole, (and) they took off (their passengers) by means of some skiffs and small boats.
Chapter 29. Though Caesar, in the hope of the issue being settled, strongly approved of collecting a fleet to cross the sea and follow Pompey before the latter could strengthen his (position) with overseas auxiliaries, yet he was afraid of the delay and the long period of time that such activity (would involve), because by gathering all (the available) ships Pompey had deprived him of the present opportunity of pursuing (him). It was left (to him) that he should await ships from the remoter regions of Gaul and Picenum, and from the straits (i.e. the Sicilian straits, or the straits of Messana). This, on account of the time of year, appeared (to be) a lengthy and troublesome (operation). In the meantime, he was unwilling that a veteran army and the two Spanish (provinces), one of which was bound to Pompey by the great benefits (he had bestowed upon it) (i.e. Hispania Citerior, or Hither Spain, where he had given Roman citizenship to a number of Spaniards in 72 B.C, after his campaign against Sertorius), should be confirmed (in their allegiance), (and) that auxiliary forces (and) cavalry should be raised (there), and Gaul and Italy attacked in his absence.
5. Caesar's Senate (Chapters 30-33).
Chapter 30. So, for the present he gave up his intention of pursuing Pompey, (and) decided to go to Spain, (and) he commanded the magistrates of all the municipal towns to collect ships and arrange for (them) to be brought to Brundisium. He dispatched his legate (Quintus) Valerius (Orca) to Sardinia with one legion, Curio as propraetor to Sicily with two legions, and he ordered the same (man), when he had recovered Sicily, to transport his army across to Africa at once. Marcus (Aurelius) Cotta was holding Sardinia, (and) Marcus Cato Sicily; (Lucius Aelius) Tubero was due to take over Africa by lot. As soon as the inhabitants of Caralis (i.e. a town in Sardinia) heard that Valerius had been sent, even though he had not yet set out from Italy, they expelled Cotta from their town. Terrified, because he thought that the whole province shared their feelings, he fled to Africa. In Sicily, Cato was repairing old ships of war, (and) requisitioning new (ones) from the city-states. He was doing these (things) with great zeal. Through his lieutenants he was holding levies of Roman citizens among the people of Lucania and Bruttium, (and) he was exacting a fixed quota of cavalrymen and infantrymen from the city-states of Sicily. When these arrangements were almost completed, he learned of Curio's approach and complained at a public meeting that he had been abandoned and betrayed by Gnaeus Pompey, who had undertaken an unnecessary war with everything unprepared, and that, when questioned by him and by others in the senate, he had assured them that everything was ready and prepared for war. Having made these complaints in his speech, he fled the province.
Chapter 31. Having obtained (provinces) vacated by their governors, Valerius Sardinia (and) Curio Sicily, they proceeded to them with their armies. When Tubero arrived in Africa, he found Attius Varus in power in the province; having lost his cohorts at Auximum, as I have related above, he had gone straight to Africa as a refuge, and had taken control of it in its vacant (state) on his own initiative, and by holding a levy had managed to raise two legions, having found the means to carry these (things) out through his knowledge of its people and places, and his experience of the province, because a few years earlier he had acquired that province after his praetorship.
Chapter 32. After making these arrangements, Caesar, in order that there might be some break from their labour for the rest of the season, distributed his troops among the nearest towns; he himself went to the city. Having summoned the senate, he reminded (them) of the injuries (done to him) by his enemies. He told (them) that he had sought no extraordinary honour, but had awaited the statutory interval between consulships (i.e. ten years) and had been content with what was allowed to every citizen; that a bill had been carried by ten tribunes of the people - although his enemies had spoken against (it), with Cato in particular opposing (it) most bitterly and effecting a delay by his usual custom of speaking for a day - that permission should be given him (to stand) in his absence, with Pompey himself as consul (i.e. in 52 B.C.). If he had disapproved of (it), why had he allowed it to be passed? If he had approved of (it), why should he debar him from enjoying the people's favour? He referred to his own forbearance, when he had voluntarily proposed that the armies should be disbanded, (a proposal) with regard to which he would have suffered a loss of prestige and honour. He spoke of the bitterness of his enemies, who demanded from another what they would reject in relation to themselves, and (who) would prefer that all (things) should be thrown into confusion rather than that they should lose their power and their armies. He proclaimed their injustice in taking away his legions, and their cruelty and insolence in restricting (the privileges of) the tribunes of the people; he recalled the terms that had been laid down by him, and the conference (which he had) sought and (which had been) refused (by them). For these reasons he exhorted and urged (them) to undertake to govern the republic together with him. If they should shrink from (the task) in fear, he would not be a burden to them, and he would govern the republic by himself. Envoys should be sent to Pompey; nor was he put off by what Pompey had said in the senate a short (time) before, that authority was acknowledged to be attributed to those to whom envoys were sent, and fear to those who sent (them). Such (views) appeared (to be the mark) of a shallow and feeble mind. But, just as he had striven to surpass (all others) in achievements, so he was eager to outdo (them) in justice and equity.
Chapter 33. The senate approved the decision to send envoys; but none could be found to be sent, as everyone declined the task of being an envoy on account of a very great fear for himself. For, as he was departing from the city, Pompey had said in the senate that he would regard (those) who had remained at Rome and (those) who had been in Caesar's camp (as though they had been) in the same place. So, three days were wasted in arguments and excuses. Also, Lucius (Caecilius) Metellus, a tribune of the people, was induced by Caesar's enemies to obstruct this business, and to hinder anything else he might try to do. After he had discovered this plot, Caesar, having spent a number of days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any more time, and went to Further (i.e. Transalpine) Gaul, without achieving those (things) which he had intended to do.
6. Resistance at Massilia (Chapters 34-36)
Chapter 34. When he arrived there, he learned that Vibullius Rufus, whom he himself had captured a few days earlier at Corfinium (and then) released, (had been) sent to Spain by Pompey; that, likewise, Domitius (had) gone to occupy Massilia (i.e. modern Marseilles) with seven swift ships, which had been requisitioned (by him) from some private (citizens) on Igilium (i.e. a small island off the coast of Etruria) and in the area around Cosa (i.e. an Etruscan town), (and then) manned by his slaves, freedmen (and) tenant farmers; (and) that also some young Massilian noblemen (had been) sent ahead to their homeland (as) messengers, and Pompey had urged them as they were leaving the city not (to let) Caesar's recent services erase the memories of his won past favours to them. When they had received these messages, the Massilians had closed their gates to Caesar; they had sent for the Albici, a barbarian people, who had been in alliance with them since ancient times and (who) lived in the mountains above Massilia, and they had conveyed corn from the neighbouring districts and from all their forts into the city, and they had established workshops for (making) weapons in the city and were starting to repair their walls, gates and fleet.
Chapter 35. Caesar sent for the fifteen leading citizens of Massilia. He addressed them with these (words): that, lest the beginning of war being made should be caused by the Massiliotes, they ought to follow the example of all Italy, rather than submit to the will of one man. He mentioned other (things) which he thought would tend towards their minds responding to reason. The deputies took his words back home, and, with the authorisation of their senate, reported back to Caesar as follows: that they understood that the Roman people were divided into two factions. That they possessed neither (the ability) to judge nor the strength (of mind) to determine which of the two parties had the juster cause. But that the leading men of these factions were Gnaeus Pompey and Gaius Caesar, (both) patrons of their city-state, of which the former had publicly granted them the lands of the Vocae Arecomici (i.e. a Gallic tribe based around Nemausus, or modern Nîmes) and of the Helvii (i.e. a Gallic tribe from the Cevennes), (and) the latter, after defeating the Sallyes (i.e. a Gallic tribe living on the River Durance) in war, had made (them) their tributaries and (thus) augmented their revenues. Therefore, (having received) equal favours from both of them, they ought to show them equal good-will too, and assist neither of them against the other or admit (either) into their city or its harbours.
Chapter 36. While these (matters) were being discussed between them, Domitius arrived at Massilia with his ships, and was admitted by them and put in charge of the city; the whole management of the war was entrusted to him. At his command, they dispatched their fleet in all directions; they seized merchant vessels, wherever they could (find them), and escorted (them) into their harbour, (where) they utilised the bolts, and timber, and rigging, (which they took) from (those that were) inadequately fitted out, to rig out the other (ships); what corn was found (in them) they stored in the public (granary); the rest of their merchandise and provisions they kept back for a siege, in case one should happen. Provoked by these illegal acts, Caesar led three legions to Massilia, and resolved to bring up turrets and penthouses for the purpose of assaulting the city, and to build warships, twelve in number, at Arelate (i.e. the modern Arles). These having been completed and fitted out within thirty days from the time when the timber was cut down, and having been brought to Massilia, he put Decimus (Junius) Brutus in command of them, (and) left his legate Gaius Trebonius to attack the city.
7. The first Spanish campaign - Ilerda (Chapters 37-55).
Chapter 37. While he was preparing and organising these (arrangements), he sent his legate Gaius Fabius ahead (of him) into Spain with three legions, which he had stationed in Narbo (i.e. modern Narbonne) and those places roundabout for the purpose of passing the winter, and ordered that the passes of the Pyrenees, which at that time were being held by detachments of (Pompey's) legate Lucius Afranius, should be speedily occupied. He ordered the remaining legions, which were spending the winter further away, to follow. As he had been ordered, Fabius applied speed in dislodging the garrison from the pass, and by forced marches came up with Afranius' army.
Chapter 38. On the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus, whom it has been mentioned (had been) sent into Spain by Pompey, Pompey's legates Afranius, (Marcus) Petreius, and (Marcus Terentius) Varro, the first of whom held Hither Spain with three legions, the second Further (Spain) from the pass of Castulo to the (River) Anas (i.e. the modern Guadiana), (and) the third (Further Spain) from the (River) Anas to the territory of the Vettones and Lusitania with a like number of legions, reallocated their spheres of duty among themselves, so that Petreius was to proceed with all his forces from Lusitania through the Vettones to (join) Afranius, (while) Varro was to keep watch over the whole of Further Spain with those legions that he had. These deployments having been decided, cavalry and auxiliary troops were demanded from the whole of Lusitania by Petreius, (and) from Celtiberia (i.e. a mountainous region of Hither Spain inhabited by savage tribes), the Cantabrians, (i.e. a tribe inhabiting Northern Spain), and all the barbarous (tribes) whose (territories) stretch to the Ocean by Afranius. When these (forces) had been gathered together, Petreius came quickly through the Vettones to (join) Afranius, and they resolved by a shared plan to wage war in the region of Ilerda (i.e. modern Lérida. This circumstance , a town in north-east Spain) on account of the advantages (offered) by that very site.
Chapter 39. There were, as mentioned above, three legions belonging to Afranius, (and) two to Petreius, besides around eighty cohorts of long-shielded men (i.e. men carrying the 'scutum') from the Hither Province and of men carrying a small round Spanish shield (i.e. the 'caetra' or targe) from Further Spain, and about five thousand cavalrymen drawn from both provinces. Caesar had sent ahead (of him) into Spain six legions, five thousand auxiliary infantrymen, three thousand cavalrymen, which he had (with him) in all his previous campaigns, and a similar number from Gaul, which he himself had pacified, having summoned individually the noblest of men, and the bravest too, from all the states; to these he had added (some of) the best kind of men from the Aquitanians and from the mountains which border on the Gallic province. He had heard that Pompey was making his way to Spain with his legions through Mauretania (i.e. North-west Africa), and would shortly be arriving. At the same time, he took borrowed money from his military tribunes and centurions; this he distributed to his army. By doing this, he achieved two things, in that he bound the hearts of his centurions (to him) by his pledge (to repay them), and he won the good-will of his soldiers by his bounty.
Chapter 40. Fabius tried to influence the inclinations of the states by letters and by messengers. He built two bridges over the River Sicoris (i.e. the modern River Segre, a tributary of the Ebro) with a distance of four miles between them. He sent (men) across these bridges to forage, because he had (already) consumed during the preceding days what (forage) had existed on his side of the river. The generals of the Pompeian army did almost the same thing, and for the same reason, and they engaged in frequent cavalry battles between each other. When two of Fabius' legions, having gone out of their (camp) as a guard for the foragers in accordance with their daily custom, had crossed the river by the nearer bridge, and the baggage-train and all the cavalry were following, the bridge collapsed due to a sudden blast of wind and a mass of water, and the main body of the cavalry was left stranded. What (had happened) was perceived by Petreius and Afranius from the lumps of earth and the pieces of wood that were being carried downstream, and Afranius quickly led four legions and all his cavalry across his own bridge, which he built to connect the town and his camp, and he encountered Fabius' two legions. When the news of his approach was reported, Lucius (Munatius) Plancus, who was in command of those legions, compelled by the necessity of the situation, took up his position on higher (ground), and arranged his battle-line into two sections, facing in opposite directions, so that he could not be surrounded by their cavalry. So, though encountering an unequal number, he withstood the strong attacks of legions and cavalry. When battle had been joined by the cavalry, the standards were seen in the distance by both (sides) of the two legions which Gaius Fabius had sent by the further bridge to reinforce our (men), suspecting that what did happen would (happen), (that is) that the generals of our adversaries, would take advantage of the opportunity (provided by this stroke) of good fortune to attack our (men). The arrival of these (forces) put an end to the battle, and both (sides) led their legions back to camp.
Chapter 41. Two days after that Caesar arrived at the camp with nine hundred cavalry, which he had kept as his bodyguard. The bridge, which had been broken up by the storm, had almost been repaired; he ordered that it should be finished that night. He himself, being aware of the nature of the countryside, left behind six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp and all his baggage, and the next day he set off for Ilerda with all his forces drawn up in three lines, and halted close to Afranius' camp, and, pausing there under arms for a short time, he created the opportunity to fight on level ground. The opportunity having been given (him), Afranius led out his forces, and positioned (them) in the middle of a hill close to his camp. When Caesar realised that it was due to Afranius that he was not engaged in battle, he decided to make camp at a distance of about four hundred yards from the very foot of the hill, and, in order that his soldiers should not be alarmed by a sudden enemy incursion and be prevented from working, he said that that (the camp) should not be fortified by a rampart, which was bound to be prominent and to be visible from a distance, but he did order a trench to be dug, fifteen feet in width, facing the enemy. Now the first and second lines remained under arms, as they had been constituted from the beginning; behind them the work was carried out in secret by the third line. As a result, the whole of the work was completed before it was discovered by Afranius that the camp was being fortified. In the evening Caesar led his legions back inside the trench, and there under arms they reposed during the following night.
Chapter 42. The next day he kept the whole army inside the trench, and, because materials had to be brought from a considerable distance, he followed, for the present, the same plan of operation, and assigned to each one of the legions one side of the camp for the purpose of fortification, and ordered trenches to be dug of the same size (as the first one); he kept the remaining legions under arms (but) without baggage to ward off the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, in order to frighten (us) and obstruct our work, brought up their forces to the very foot of the mountain, and challenged (us) to a battle. But Caesar did not interrupt the work for this reason, relying on the protection afforded by the three legions and the fortification of the trench. After staying (there) for a short time, and, advancing no further from the bottom of the hill, they led their forces back to their camp. On the third day, Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, (and) ordered the other cohorts, which he had left in the previous camp, and the baggage to be brought up to them.
Chapter 43. Between the town of Ilerda and the nearby hill, where Petreius and Afranius had their camp, there was a plain about three hundred yards (in width), and almost in the middle of this space there was a small eminence raised up a little (from the ground). Caesar was sure that, if he could occupy this and fortify (it), he would cut the enemy off from the town, and the bridge, and all the provisions which they had brought with (them) into the town. With this expectation, he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his battle-line in a suitable position, he ordered the advance-guards of one legion to rush forward and seize the hillock. When this plan was understood, Afranius' cohorts that were in post in front of his camp were hastily sent by a shorter route to occupy the same spot. They engaged in battle, but, because Afranius' men had arrived at the hillock first, our (men) were driven back, and, as other (enemy) reinforcements were dispatched, they were forced to retreat and go back to their legionary standards.
Chapter 44. It was the method of fighting (employed) by those (enemy) soldiers to charge forward with great force at the outset (and) boldly take a position, not (to) keep their ranks very strictly, (and to) fight in open order (and) spread out (in small groups); if they were hard pressed, they did not think (it was) disgraceful to give up their position, as they were accustomed to this barbarous manner of fighting with the Lusitanians and other barbarian (tribes); for it generally happens that every soldier becomes used to the customs of those regions in the places where they have spent much (time). This practice, however, upset our (men), unaccustomed (as they were) to this kind of fighting; for, (when they saw) individuals running forward on their exposed flanks, they thought they were being surrounded; yet, they, themselves, thought it was their duty to preserve their ranks, and not to desert their standards, nor, without a serious reason, to be detached from the position which they had taken up. And so, when the advance-guard was thrown into confusion, the legion which had been stationed on that wing did not hold its ground but retreated to the next hill.
Chapter 45. With almost his whole army being alarmed (by this), because it had occurred contrary to their expectation and custom, Caesar urged his legions on, and led the Ninth Legion in their support; he checked the enemy in their insolent and eager pursuit of our (men), and compelled (them) in their turn to retreat and withdraw to the town of Ilerda, and to halt under its walls. But the soldiers of the Ninth Legion, being full of enthusiasm, while they wished to repair the setback they had received, and, having rashly pursued the fleeing (enemy) too far, advanced into an unfavourable position and came to the foot of the mountain on which the town of Ilerda had been built. When they tried to withdraw from that position, the enemy attacked our (men) again from higher ground. The ground was steep and sheer on each side and was only wide enough so that three cohorts, drawn up (in line of battle) could fill the space, but no reinforcements could be sent up on the flanks, nor could cavalry be of any help (to them) if they got into distress. From the town, however, the sloping ground inclined gently downwards for a distance of about four hundred yards. It was necessary for our (men) to retreat this (way), because, aroused by their eagerness, they had advanced somewhat incautiously; the battle was fought on this ground, unfavourable (as it was) both on account of its narrowness and because they had taken up their position at the very foot of the mountain, so that no missile could be hurled at them to no effect. Yet, they exerted themselves with courage and endurance, and sustained every (kind of) wound. The (enemy's) forces were being augmented, and cohorts were being repeatedly sent up from their camp through the town, so that fresh (men) might relieve the weary. Caesar was forced to do the same (thing), so that, by sending up (fresh) cohorts to the same spot, he might rescue his exhausted (men).
Chapter 46. When there had been continual fighting in this manner for five hours, and our (men) had been very hard pressed by a greater number (of men) (and) all their javelins had been used up, they drew their swords and made a charge up the hill against their cohorts, and, having killed a few (men), they compelled the rest to turn back. When their cohorts had been pushed back to the wall, and a number (of their men) had been driven into the town on account of their fear, an easy retreat was granted to our (men). Moreover, our cavalry, although on both flanks it had taken up its position on low-lying and unfavourable ground, yet it struggled with great courage to the top (of the hill), and, riding up and down between both battle-lines, it afforded our (men) an easier and safer retreat. So the fighting took place with differing results. In the first encounter about seventy of our (men) fell, (and) among them (was) Quintus Fulginius, (centurion) of the senior (company) of 'hastati' (i.e. the second line) of the Fourteenth Legion, who had been promoted to to that position from the lower ranks on account of his exceptional bravery; more than six hundred were wounded. Of Afranius' men, Titus Caecilius, a principal centurion, and four centurions in addition to him, and over two hundred men, were killed.
Chapter 47. But the belief spread about on that day that both sides thought they had come away better off: Afranius' men, because, although they were considered to be inferior by everyone, they had stood their ground at close quarters and had resisted the attack of our (men), and they had initially held their post on the hill, which had been the cause of the fighting, and, in the first encounter, had forced our (men) to retreat; but our (men) because, even though they were fighting on unfavourable ground and with an unequal number (of men), they had sustained the battle for five hours, (and) because they had ascended the hill with drawn swords, and forced their adversaries to flee from the higher ground and had driven (them) into the town. The (enemy) fortified the hill, on behalf of which the fighting had occurred, with substantial (defence) works, and placed a garrison there.
Chapter 48. Also, two days after these (actions) had been carried out, there occurred an unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed that there had never been any greater rainfall in those territories. At that time, then, it washed down the snow from every mountain, and rose above the top of the river-banks, and broke up in one day both the bridges which Gaius Fabius had built. For, since our camp, as mentioned above (n.b. this is an error, as it has not been referred to previously), was (pitched) between two rivers, the Sicoris and the Cinga (i.e. the modern River Cinca), thirty miles apart, and neither of these could be crossed, they were, of necessity, confined within these (limits). Neither could the states, which had gone to Caesar in friendship, supply (him with) corn, nor (could) those (men) return, who had gone some distance away in search of forage, cut off (as they were) by the rivers, nor (could) the large (stocks of) provisions, which had come to them from Italy and Gaul, get through to their camp. Besides, it was the most awkward time (of the year), when there were no (stocks of) corn in the winter stores, and (this year's crop) was not very far from ripeness, and the states' (supplies were) exhausted because Afranius had carried off almost all their corn before Caesar's arrival, (and) Caesar had consumed in the previous days whatever had been left over; the cattle, which could have been an alternative source (of food) in case of want, the neighbouring states had removed some distance away. Lusitanian light-armed (infantry) and targeteers (i.e. those bearing a targe or a 'caetra') from Hither Spain, who knew those districts well, harried those who had gone out for the sake of obtaining fodder or corn; for them it was a straightforward (matter) to cross a river, because it was the custom of all of them not to go on campaign without bladders (i.e. inflatable skins).
Chapter 49. But Afranius' army had an abundant supply of everything. A large (stock of) corn had been provided and gathered together in earlier times, (and) much (of it) was brought in from all over the province; (and) a great abundance of fodder was in store. The bridge at Ilerda afforded access to all these things without any danger, and the places across the river, to which Caesar could not go at all, (were) untouched.
Chapter 50. The floods lasted for several days. Caesar attempted to repair the bridges, but the height of the river did not permit (it), nor did the enemy cohorts stationed on the bank allow (the work) to be completed. It was easy for them to prevent (it), not only on account of the nature of the river itself and the height of the water, but also because their missiles were thrown from all along the bank on to one confined spot; and it was difficult to carry out the works in a very fast flowing river and, at the same time, to avoid the missiles.
Chapter 51. The news was brought to Afranius that the great supply convoys, which were on their way to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the Rutheni (i.e. a Gallic tribe) had arrived there, (as well as) cavalry from Gaul, together with many wagons and a large (train of) baggage, as Gallic custom requires. In addition, there were around six thousand men of all kinds, together with slaves and freedmen; but there was no organisation, no fixed authority, as everyone followed his own inclination, and they all made the journey without any apprehension, enjoying the (same) freedom (as they had experienced) on marches on previous occasions. There were (also) several young men of good family, sons of senators and of equestrian rank; there were ambassadors from the states, and (some) of Caesar's lieutenants. All these the rivers held back. Hoping to overpower them, Afranius set out at night with all his cavalry and three legions, and, the cavalry having been sent out ahead, he took (them) unawares. But the Gallic horsemen quickly sorted themselves out, and joined battle. (Though) few, they withstood the vast number of the enemy, while the action could be fought on equal terms; but when the standards of the legions began to approach, they took themselves off to the nearest mountains, with a few (men) lost. The time (spent) on this battle was of great importance to the safety of (the rest of) our (men). For, some time having been gained, they withdrew to higher ground. On that day, about two hundred bow-men, a few cavalrymen, and a small number of servants and (pieces of) baggage were lost.
Chapter 52. Due to all of these (circumstances), corn increased (in price). Such an increase usually happens not only due to a present shortage, but also due to fear that the position will become worse at some time in the future. (The price of) corn had already reached fifty denarii for each bushel, and the shortage of corn had diminished the soldiers' strength, and the difficulties were increasing on a daily basis; and, in a few days. so great a change in their circumstances had occurred and fortune had (so) turned itself around, that our (men) were (now) struggling with a great shortage of all necessary commodities, (while) the (enemy) had an abundance of all supplies, and were considered to be in a stronger position. Caesar demanded cattle from those states that had joined his alliance, because their supply of corn was so low; he packed off the camp followers to more distant states; he, himself, sought to address the current shortage with whatever assistance he could (find).
Chapter 53. Afranius and Petreius and their friends sent even fuller and more fruitful accounts of these (events) to their (adherents) at Rome. These reports exaggerated (the circumstances) considerably, so that the war seemed almost at an end. When these letters and messengers arrived at Rome, great crowds gathered at Afranius' house and (there were) lavish congratulations; many (men) set out from Rome to (join) Gnaeus Pompey, some lest they might seem to have waited for the outcome of the war, and (others lest they might seem) to have arrived last of all.
Chapter 54. When his affairs were in this difficult (situation) and all roads were blocked by Afranius' soldiers and cavalrymen, and the bridge could not be repaired, Caesar ordered his men to build boats of the kind which his experience of Britain in earlier years had taught him. The keels and the basic ribs were made of light timber; (then) the rest of the boats' hulk was bound with wickerwork and covered with hides of leather. When they were finished, he conveyed them at night on linked wagons twenty-two miles from the camp, and transported his men across the river in these boats, and unexpectedly took possession of a hill adjoining the bank. He quickly fortified (it), before this was perceived by his adversaries. To this place he later transferred a legion, and, having started (to build) a bridge from both sides, he completed (it) in two days. By this means he safely rescued the supply convoys and (those) who had gone out in search of corn, and he began to improve the position with regard to the distribution of corn.
Chapter 55. On the same day he sent a large part of his cavalry across the river. Falling unexpectedly on a part of foragers, who had been dispersed without any fear (of attack), they intercepted a considerable number of cattle and men, and, when some cohorts of targeteers had been sent to their assistance, they cleverly divided themselves into two groups, one to guard the spoil, (and) the other to stop the advancing (foe) and beat them back, and they cut off and surrounded and slaughtered one cohort, which had rashly charged forward out of line (and) ahead of the others, and (then) they returned unharmed to the camp by the same bridge with a large (quantity of) booty.
8. A naval fight at Massilia (Chapters 56-58).
Chapter 56. While these (events) were taking place at Ilerda, the Massiliotes, following the instructions of Lucius Domitius, prepared the number of seventeen warships for action, eleven of which were decked. To these they added several smaller vessels, (hoping) that our fleet might be intimidated by such a large number. On (them) they put a great number of archers and of the Albici, who have been referred to previously, and these they bribed by the promise of rewards. Domitius required a certain (number of) ships for his own (use), and these he manned with farmers and shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. When his fleet had been thus equipped with all necessities, they bore down with great confidence on our ships, which Decimus Brutus was commanding. These had their anchorage off an island which is opposite Massilia.
Chapter 57. Brutus' (position) was much inferior in terms of the number of his ships. But Caesar had assigned to that fleet the bravest men (who had been) chosen from all his legions, advance-guards and centurions, (men) who had demanded (that they should perform) this (type of) service on his behalf. They had prepared iron hooks and grappling-irons, and had equipped themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts and other missiles. So, having learned of the enemy's approach, they sailed their ships out of harbour, (and) engaged with the Massiliotes. Both sides fought with the greatest bravery and eagerness; nor did the Albici, a hardy people from the highlands and (well) versed in arms, fall far short of our (men) in courage; and they, having just come from the Massiliotes, retained their recent promises in their minds, and Domitius' shepherds, spurred on by the hope of freedom, were keen to demonstrate their exertions before the eyes of their master.
Chapter 58. The Massiliotes, themselves, relying on the speed of their ships and the skill of their helmsmen, continually eluded our (ships), and evaded their attacks, and, as long as they were permitted to take advantage of a wider space, they strove to surround us by extending their line further, or to attack single (ships of ours) with several ships (of their own), or to sail close by (them) and snap off their oars, if they could. When they were forced to come closer, (they moved away) from the knowledge and skill of their pilots and had recourse to the courage of the men from the mountains. Our (men) were both making use of less practised oarsmen and less skilful pilots, who had (just) been hastily recruited from merchant vessels, and were as yet still unacquainted even with the technical names of the ships' gear, and they were also hampered by the tardiness and weight of our vessels; for, having been hastily constructed out of green timber, they did not have the same capacity for speed. So, when the opportunity was offered to fight at close quarters, they readily put up one (of their own) against two (of the enemy's) ships, and, by using grappling-irons and holding both ships fast, they fought on both sides of the deck and boarded the enemy's vessels, and, having killed a great number of Albici and shepherds, they sank some of the ships, captured a number of the others together with their crews, and forced the rest into the harbour. On that day, nine of the Massiliotes' ships were lost, including those which were taken.
9. Spain - a war of attrition (Chapters 59-80).
Chapter 59. The (news of) this (battle) was reported to Caesar at Ilerda at the same time as the bridge was completed, and a swift change of fortune occurred. Alarmed by the courage of our cavalry, the (enemy) moved around less freely (and) less boldly (than before); sometimes they would venture out (only) a short distance from the camp, so they could make a swift retreat, and they would forage over narrower areas; at other times they avoided our guard-posts and parties of horsemen (by taking) a longer route, or having sustained some loss or having seen our cavalry in the distance, they would flee in the midst of their journey, (while) discarding their packs. Finally, they resolved to cease foraging for several days, and, contrary to the usual practice of everyone, (to do so only) at night.
Chapter 60. In the meantime, the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were incorporated with the Oscenses, sent envoys to him (i.e. Caesar) and promised that they would obey his instructions. The Tarraconenses, and the Jacetani, and the Ausetani, and, a few days later, the Illurgavonenses, who live by the River Ebro, followed them. He required all of them to help him by (supplying) corn. (This) they promised (to do), and, having collected all the pack animals from all parts (of their territories), they convey (it) (i.e. corn) into the camp. A cohort of the Illurgavonenses also went over to him, on learning of their state's decision, and transferred its standards from the place where they were stationed. A great change in the situation (had) rapidly (occurred). Now that the bridge had been finished, five important states had joined themselves in alliance (with Caesar), (and,) with the problem of the corn (supply) having been settled, and, with the rumours of the legionary reinforcements, which were said to be coming with Pompey through Mauretania, having been extinguished, many of the more distant states defected from Afranius and pursued an alliance with Caesar.
Chapter 61. While the minds of his adversaries were thoroughly alarmed by these developments, Caesar, in order that he might not always have to send his cavalry on a long detour by the bridge, once he had found a suitable place, began to dig several ditches thirty feet in width, by which he might divert some of the waters of the Sicoris and make a ford over the river. When these works had almost been completed, Afranius and Petreius developed a great fear, that they might be cut off altogether from (their supplies) of corn and fodder, because Caesar was so strong in cavalry. So, they themselves decided to leave the district and to transfer the war to Celtiberia. The following circumstance also confirmed (them) in this decision, (namely) that, of the two opposing parties, the states that had sided with Sertorius in the late war, and had been conquered, (still) trembled at the name and power of Pompey, (even) in his absence, (and those) that had remained in alliance (with him), and had received great favours (from him), continued to be devoted to him, but the name of Caesar was quite unknown among the barbarians. From them they were expecting great (numbers) of cavalry and great (numbers) of auxiliary troops, and they planned to extend the war into the winter on ground of their own (choosing). Once they had decided on this course of action, they ordered boats to be collected from all along the River Ebro and that they be brought to Octogesa (i.e. the modern Mequinenza). This town was situated on the Ebro, and was thirty miles away from the camp. At this place on the river, they ordered a bridge to be made by joining boats together, and they led two legions across the River Sicoris and fortified their camp with a rampart twelve feet (high).
Chapter 62. Having learned of these events from his scouts, Caesar continued, through the great labour of his soldiers, the work of draining the river (all) day and night, and had so far reduced the level (of the water), that the cavalry, although it was done with difficulty and discomfort, were able and bold enough to cross the river, but the infantry, had only their shoulders and the upper (part of) their breasts above the water-line, and were prevented from crossing (the river) not only by the height of the water, but also by the speed of the current. But, yet, at almost the same time, the bridge over the Ebro was reported (to be) nearly completed, and a ford was found in the Sicoris.
Chapter 63. But now they (i.e. Afranius and Petreius) thought (it was) all the more necessary to hasten their march. And so, having left two cohorts of auxiliaries to guard Ilerda, they crossed the Sicoris with their whole force, and they set up camp together with the two legions which they had sent across on the previous days. No (course) was left (open) to Caesar other than to harass and wear down his enemy's column with his cavalry. For (the use of) his own bridge involved a long detour, while the (enemy) could reach the Ebro by a much shorter route. Detached by him, the cavalry crossed the river, and, when Petreius and Afranius struck camp around the third watch (i.e. after midnight), they suddenly appeared at the rear of the column, and, surrounding them in great numbers, they began to retard and impede their march.
Chapter 64. At dawn, it was perceived from the higher ground, which was adjoined to Caesar's camp, that their rearguard was being vigorously pressed by the attacks of our cavalry, and that the end of their column was sometimes being held up and disrupted, (but) that at other times our (men) were being attacked and driven back by a charge of all their cohorts together, and then, in turn, pursued when they had turned around. But, throughout the camp the soldiers were gathering in groups and lamenting that the enemy were slipping from their hands, (and) that the war was being drawn out over a longer period of time than was necessary, and they went to their centurions and military tribunes and begged that Caesar should be told by them not to spare them from toil or danger; (for) they were ready and able, and would venture to cross the river (at the place) where the cavalry had been transported. Encouraged by their zeal and clamour, Caesar, although he was afraid to expose his army to the magnitude of so great a river, yet he judged that he should try to attempt (a crossing). Accordingly, he ordered the weaker soldiers, whose courage or strength seemed to be unable to withstand (it), to be selected from each of the centuries. These he left behind with one legion to guard the camp; the rest of the legions he marched out, lightly armed, and, having stationed a large number of pack animals in the river, above and below (the crossing place), he led his army across. A few of these men, having been carried away by (the force of) the current, were stopped by the horses and lifted up; indeed no one perished. Once the army had safely crossed, he drew up his forces and led (them) in triple line. And so great was the enthusiasm among the troops that, although the detour to the ford had added six miles to the journey, and a considerable delay had occurred (in the crossing) of the river, before the ninth hour of the day (i.e. about three o'clock in the afternoon) they overtook those who had departed at the third watch (i.e in the small hours of the night).
Chapter 65. When Afranius, together with Petreius caught sight of them, seen in the distance, being alarmed by this fresh development, he halted (their men) and formed a battle-line. Caesar rested his army on the plain, so they should not be exposed to battle in a state of exhaustion; but when they tried to move on again he pursued (them) and stopped (them). The (enemy) were forced to pitch camp earlier than they had intended. For they were close to the mountains, and difficult and narrow roads awaited (them) five miles further on. They were keen to get into the mountains, in order to escape Caesar's cavalry, and, by stationing guards in the narrow (passes), to block his army on its route, (so that) they might lead their forces across the Ebro without any danger or anxiety. It was essential for them to attempt this and to bring it about by all (possible) means; but, wearied by a whole day's fighting and by the toil of their march, they put it off to the following day. Caesar, too, pitched his camp on a nearby hill.
Chapter 66. Around midnight, when some of their men, who had gone too far from the camp for the sake of fetching water, were captured by our cavalry, Caesar was informed by them that his opponents' generals had led their forces out of their camp in silence. When he learned this, he ordered the signal to be given, and (the instructions for packing up) the baggage to be sounded, in accordance with military custom. Hearing the noise, the (enemy), fearing that they might be forced to fight at night, (while) encumbered with their packs, or that they might be penned into the narrow (passes) by Caesar's cavalry, put a stop to their march and contained their forces in their camp. The next day, Petreius went out secretly with a few cavalrymen to explore the country. The same thing was done in Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was sent with a few (men) to examine the layout of the land. Both (parties) reported back similarly to their (armies): that the route was over level ground for the next five miles, (and) then a rough and mountainous country came after (it); (and) that whoever should obtain possession of the narrow (pass) first should have no trouble in keeping his enemy away from it.
Chapter 67. There was a discussion in the council meeting between Petreius and Afranius, and the timing of their march was its subject. The majority were of the opinion that they should make the journey at night; they could (then) reach the pass before this was perceived (by Caesar). Others adduced as proof that their ground could not be left in secret, because of the alarm which had been given in Caesar' camp on the previous night. (They said) that Caesar's cavalry were circling around at night and were blocking every place and road, and that it was necessary to avoid nocturnal engagements, because in a civil war a frightened soldier was more likely to take account of his fear than of his oath of loyalty. But at dawn a strong (sense of) shame by itself in the eyes of all, (and) the presence of military tribunes and centurions, the factors by which the soldiers were usually kept in line and maintained in their loyalty, were also brought to bear. Therefore, they should, by all means, try to force their way through during the day; even if they should suffer some losses, yet the bulk of their army (would be) safe, (and) they should be able to take the place they were making for. This view prevailed in the council meeting, and they decided to set off at dawn on the following day.
Chapter 68. Having reconnoitred the district, Caesar led his forces out of the camp as soon as the sky grew light, and he took his army on a long detour by no fixed route. For the roads, which led to the Ebro and Octogesa (i.e. the modern Mequinenza), were overlooked by the enemy's opposing camp. He was obliged to cross deep and awkward gullies, (and) in many places craggy cliffs hindered their march, so that their weapons had to be passed from hand to hand, and the soldiers completed a large part of the journey unarmed and supporting one another. But none of them objected to this labour because they thought that there would be an end to all their toils, if they could exclude the enemy from the Ebro and cut off their corn supply.
Chapter 69. At first, Afranius' men ran joyfully out of their camp to watch, and pursued our (men) with taunting voices: (they said) that through lack of necessary provisions, we were being forced to flee and return to Ilerda. For our route was different from our destination, and we appeared to be going in the opposite direction. But their generals applauded their own plan to keep themselves in their camp; they were strongly supported in their opinion, because they saw (our men) setting off on their march, as they were sure that we could not endure this lack (of provisions) for very long. But, when they saw our column gradually wheel to the right, and observed that our vanguard was already passing the boundary line of their camp, there was no one (among them) so sluggish or so averse to fatigue that he did not know it was necessary to leave their camp at once and come to meet (us). The call to arms was raised, and, leaving a few cohorts behind as a guard, all their forces set out and marched to the Ebro by the direct route.
Chapter 70. The whole contest was dependent on speed, (that is) which one of them would occupy the defile and the mountains first. But, (while) the difficulties of the route impeded Caesar's army, Caesar's cavalry pursuing (them) delayed Afranius' forces. But the situation, from (the point of view of) Afranius' men was necessarily reduced to this, that, if they managed to reach the mountains which they were seeking first, they would avoid danger themselves, (but) they could not (then) save the baggage of their whole army, or the cohorts which they had left behind in their camp; to these, when they were intercepted by Caesar's army, help could not by any means be conveyed. Caesar completed the march first, and, having found some level ground between the large rocks, he formed a line of battle there facing the enemy. Afranius, since he saw that the rear of his column was being harassed by our cavalry, and that the enemy (was) before him, when he came upon a certain hill, he halted there. From that place he sent four cohorts of targeteers to the mountain which was the highest (one) of all (those) in sight. He ordered (them) to hurry (there) at the double and seize it, with the intention that he himself might march to the same place with all his forces, and (then) change his route and come to Octogesa over the (mountain) ridges. Since the targeteers were making for it by a side route, Caesar's cavalry caught sight of (them) and made an attack on their cohorts; nor were the targeteers able to withstand, even for a very small amount of time, the assault of our cavalry, but they were surrounded by them and slaughtered in the sight of both armies.
Chapter 71. There was (now) an opportunity to manage the campaign successfully, Nor, indeed, did it escape Caesar's (attention) that an army, badly shaken at the sight of such great losses having been sustained, would not be able to hold out, especially since it was surrounded on all sides by our cavalry, and any engagement would take place on level and open ground; and this (engagement) was being urged upon him by all sections (of his army). The officers, centurions, and military tribunes flocked around (him), (telling him) not to hesitate in joining battle. (They said) that the minds of the men were totally prepared (for this). On the other hand, (they pointed out) that Afranius' men had shown signs of their fear in a number of ways: that they had not come to the assistance of their (comrades), that they had not come down from the hill, that they could scarcely withstand our cavalry charges, and that, having gathered their standards, they were crowded together in one place, neither keeping their ranks nor (guarding) their standards. But, if he should fear the disadvantage of the ground, yet (the opportunity) would be given (him) of fighting with Afranius in some other place, for he could not remain (there) without water.
Chapter 72. Caesar had come to hope that he could end the affair without a battle and without any wounds to his men, because he had cut off his enemies' corn supply. Why should he lose any of his men, even in a successful battle? Why should he expose his men to be wounded, when they deserved so well of him? - especially since it was no less the (function) of a general to conquer by stratagem as by the sword. Also he was moved with compassion for those citizens whom he saw must be slain; (and) he preferred to gain his object with these (men) safe and unharmed. This plan of Caesar's was not approved of by the majority (of his men); indeed they openly said to one another that, since such an opportunity of victory was being squandered, they would not be prepared to fight, even if Caesar wished (them to). (However,) he persevered in his resolution, and withdrew a short distance from that site, in order to reduce his adversaries' anxiety. Petreius and Afranius, the opportunity having been presented (to them), retired to their camp. Caesar, having posted guards in the mountains, and all access to the Ebro having been cut off, built his camp as close as he could to the enemy camp.
Chapter 73. On the following day, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed that they had lost the prospect of (securing) a corn-supply and of (access) to the River Ebro, deliberated concerning the other courses of action (open to them). There was one route (they could take), if they were prepared to return to Ilerda, (and) another, if they should make for Tarraco. While they were considering these (possibilities), the news was brought (to them) that their watering parties were being harried by our cavalry. When they learned of this situation, they posted several detachments of cavalry and auxiliary cohorts (on the roads) and stationed (them) between legionary cohorts, and they began to construct a rampart from their camp to the water, so that they could collect their water within the fortifications, and without fear and without guards. Petreius and Afranius divided this task between each other, and went in person some distance (from the camp) in order to ensure the completion of the work.
Chapter 74. Having obtained, by their departure (i.e. that of Afranius and Petreius), an unrestricted opportunity to fraternise (with our men), their soldiers came out in large numbers, and each one looked for whichever acquaintance or fellow-townsman he had in our camp, and called (him) over. Firstly, they all gave their thanks to all (of our men), because they had spared them on the previous day, when they were (so) terrified; (and they said) that they were alive through their kindness. Then, they asked about the trustworthiness of our general, and whether they could safely entrust themselves (to him), and they lamented that they had not done (so) from the beginning, and that they had engaged in battle with their close connections and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conversations, they sought a guarantee from our general concerning the lives of Petreius and Afranius, lest they might appear to have committed some crime against them or to have betrayed their (generals). When such assurances were given, they promised to transfer their standards, and they sent centurions of the front rank (as) envoys to Caesar (to talk) about peace. Meanwhile, some (of them) brought their (acquaintances) into their camp to entertain (them), (while) others are led away by their (friends), so that one camp now seemed to to have been formed from the two (of them); and several military tribunes and centurions came to Caesar and commended themselves to him (i.e. they offered him their services). The same thing was done by the Spanish chieftains, whom the (enemy generals) had summoned, and (who) were being kept with them in the camp in the position of hostages. They sought their acquaintances and guest-friends, through whom each one might have access to Caesar for the purpose of commendation. Even Afranius' youthful son tried to negotiate with Caesar through his legate (Publius) Sulpicius (Rufus) concerning his own and his father's life. All (places) were full of joy and thanksgiving, both (that) of those who had avoided such great perils (i.e. the Pompeian army) and (that) of those who seemed to have accomplished so great an achievement without bloodshed (i.e. Caesar's army), and, in the judgment of all, Caesar was reaping the great reward of his earlier leniency, and his decision was approved of by everyone.
Chapter 75. When these events were reported to him, Afranius quitted the task he was engaged upon, and returned to the camp, prepared, so it seemed, that, whatever misfortune should befall, he would bear it with a calmly and with a good grace. But Petreius did not abandon his (resolve). He armed his domestic retinue; with them, and his bodyguard of targeteers, and a few barbarian horsemen, dependants of his, whom he kept (near him) for the sake of his own protection, he unexpectedly rushed to the rampart, interrupted the soldiers' conversations, (and) drove our (men) from the camp and put to death (those) whom he captured. The rest came together, and, alarmed by the sudden danger, they wrapped their left-arms in their cloaks and drew their swords, and in this way defended themselves against the targeteers and the horsemen, relying on the proximity of their camp, and (then) they withdrew to the camp, and (there) they were protected by those cohorts which were on guard at the gates.
Chapter 76. Having done these things, Petreius went around the maniples and called the soldiers by name, and he begged (them) not to hand himself or their absent commander Pompey over to their adversaries to be punished. A crowd quickly formed at his headquarters. He demanded that they should all swear that they would not desert or betray their army and their generals, nor adopt any plan separately from the others. He, himself, was the first to swear to these words; (and) he compelled Afranius to swear the same oath; the military tribunes and the centurions followed suit; the soldiers, turned out in centuries, swore the same. Anyone, in whose quarters there was (one of) Caesar's soldiers, they ordered (him) to produce (him): (those) that were produced, they put to death publicly in the general's tent. But the majority (of those) whom they had entertained, they concealed and led out at night over the rampart. So, the fear engendered by the generals, the cruelty of their punishment, (and) the fresh sanctity of an oath removed any hope of surrender for the present, and changed the minds of the soldiers and returned the situation to the former state of war.
Chapter 77. Caesar ordered that the soldiers of his opponents who had come into his camp during the period of fraternisation should be sought for and sent back. But, of the number of military tribunes and centurions, several remained with him of their own free will. He afterwards held these (men) in high esteem; he restored the centurions to their former rank, (and conferred) tribunician status on the Roman knights.
Chapter 78. Afranius' men were finding it hard to forage, (and) were obtaining water with difficulty. Their legionaries had a sufficient supply of corn, because they had been ordered to bring twenty-two days' worth of corn from Ilerda; (but) the targeteers and the auxiliaries (had) none, for their opportunities to procure (any) were scarce, and their bodies (were) not accustomed to bearing any burdens. And so a great number of them came over to Caesar every day. Their situation was facing such difficulties. But, of the two proposed plans, it seemed more expedient to return to Ilerda, because they had left a little corn there. (And once) there, they trusted that they could consider another plan. Tarraco was further away; (and) in this distance they realised that their circumstances could encounter a greater number of misfortunes. This decision having met with approval, they set out from their camp. His cavalry having been sent ahead to harass and retard the rear of their column, Caesar himself followed closely with his legions. Not a moment passed, but their rearguard was engaged in battle with our cavalry.
Chapter 79. The nature of the fighting was as follows. Cohorts without baggage brought up the rear of their column, and several (of them) made a stand on the level ground. If there was a mountain to be climbed, the very nature of the place readily warded off any danger, because from their higher position those who had gone ahead protected from above those who were ascending; when a valley or a place with an incline was before (them), and those who had gone ahead could not provide any assistance to the tardy, then their (enemy's) cavalry threw their missiles at their backs from the higher ground, (and) then their situation was (one of) great danger. The only thing left (to them) was that, when they were approaching a place of this kind, they should order the legionary standards to come to a halt, and drive back our cavalry with a great charge, and that, when it had withdrawn, they should suddenly all rush out at full speed and descend into the valleys, and so cross (them) again and halt on the higher ground. For they were so far away (from deriving) any assistance from their own cavalry, of which they had a considerable number, that they were obliged to receive them, daunted (as they were) from their previous battles, into the midst of their column, and voluntarily to protect them; nor could anyone quit their (line of) march without being intercepted by Caesar's cavalry.
Chapter 80. While the fighting took place in this manner, they advanced slowly and gradually, and they halted frequently to be of assistance to their own (men), as then happened on this occasion. For, after advancing for four miles, while being vigorously harassed by our cavalry, they occupied a high hill, and there they constructed a camp with a single front facing the enemy, and they did not remove the baggage from their pack animals. When they noticed that Caesar's camp (had been) pitched and his tents erected, and that his cavalrymen (had been) sent out to forage, they suddenly rushed out at about the sixth hour (i.e. noon) on the same day, and, with the hope of our being delayed by the departure of our cavalry, they began to march. Having perceived this action (of theirs), Caesar followed them closely with the legions that had been resting, (but) left a few cohorts to guard the baggage; he ordered the foraging (parties) and the horsemen to be recalled and to follow at the tenth hour (i.e. 4 p.m). The cavalry swiftly resumed their daily duties on the march. They charged so fiercely at the rear of their column that they almost fled, and several of their soldiers, and a number of their centurions also, were killed. Caesar's force was hard on their heels and threatened their entire (army).
10. The Pompeians capitulate (Chapters 81-87).
Chapter 81. But, then, since no opportunity had been given (them) to look for a suitable place for a camp or to go forward, they were obliged to halt and pitch camp some distance away from any water and on ground (which was) unfavourable by nature. But, for reasons which have been explained above, Caesar did not provoke a battle. And from that day (on) he did not allow any tents to be erected, so that (his men) might all be the more ready to go in pursuit, whether they tried to break out at night or during the day. Observing the defects of their camp, the (enemy) (spent) the whole night extending their fortifications and exchanging (one) camp for (another) camp. From dawn on the following day they did the same (thing) and consumed the whole day on this task. But the more they proceeded with this work and enlarged their camp, the further away they were from water, and the remedy for the existing evil was provided by other evils. On the first night no one went out from the camp to fetch water; on the following day, leaving a guard in the camp. they led out all of their troops to (look for) water, (but) no one was sent out to forage. Caesar preferred that they should be weakened by hardships and submit to the inevitable surrender rather than to determine the issue by battle. Yet, he sought to hem them in with a rampart and a trench, so that he might check any of their sudden sallies as effectively as possible; (for) he thought that they would be forced to come down to this. The(enemy) ordered all their baggage cattle to be slaughtered, induced both by the lack of fodder and so that they might be the more ready to march.
Chapter 82. Two days were spent on these tasks and their planning. By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's work had already been completed. In order to obstruct the remaining fortification works, the (enemy leaders) led out their legions at a given signal at around the ninth hour (i.e. 3 p.m.) and formed (them) up in line of battle just outside the camp. Caesar recalled his legionaries from their work, (then) ordered his cavalry to assemble, and formed a battle-line; for to be seen to have shirked a battle contrary to the expectation and opinion of all his soldiers would have brought considerable loss (to his reputation). But for the same reasons, which are known, he was persuaded from wishing to engage, and all the more too, because, even if his adversaries were put to flight, the shortness of the space would not much help to achieve a decisive victory. For the (one) camp was not more than two miles away from the (other) camp. The two battle-lines occupied two thirds of this space; the remaining third was left for the soldiers' charges and attacks. If battle were joined, the proximity of the camp would give the defeated a speedy (source of) refuge in flight. For this reason he (i.e. Caesar) resolved to resist any attacks and not (to be) the first to go into battle.
Chapter 83. Afranius' (first) two battle-lines consisted of five legions; auxiliary cohorts formed a third line in reserve; Caesar's (army was drawn up) in three (lines); but four cohorts from (each of) his five legions formed the first line, and three each, and then again three others from each one of his legions, followed (as) reserves; the archers and slingers were kept together in the centre of the battle-line, (and) the cavalry covered the flanks. The battle-lines having been drawn up in such a (manner), each side seemed to adhere to its plan: Caesar not to join battle unless compelled (to do so), his (enemy) to obstruct Caesar's works. The stalemate, however, was prolonged, until sunset; then, both sides dispersed to their camp. The next day, Caesar arranged to finish the fortifications (he had) begun; the (enemy) tried to ford the River Sicoris, if it were possible to cross (it). As soon as he noticed this activity, Caesar sent some light-armed German (troops) and a party of horsemen across the river and stationed plenty of sentries on its banks.
Chapter 84. At length, having been kept short of everything, now (being) without fodder for the pack animals they had kept for four days, (and) with a shortage of water, firewood and corn, they sought a conference, and this, if it could be arranged, at some distance from the soldiers. When the latter (request) was rejected by Caesar, but a public conference was granted, if they were willing, Afranius' son was offered in the position of a hostage to Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius (then) spoke: (he said) that there should be no ill-will against themselves (i.e. himself and Petreius) or their soldiers, because they had wished to keep faith with regard to their commander Gnaeus Pompey. But now they had discharged their duty sufficiently, and had borne enough suffering by enduring the want of every necessity. But now, penned in almost like wild beasts, they were being prevented from (procuring) water, they were being prevented from moving on, and they could not endure either the bodily pain or the mental disgrace. And so they they acknowledged themselves vanquished; and they begged and entreated that, if there was any room left for mercy, they should not be forced to receive the ultimate punishment. He put forward this (plea) in as humble and submissive a (manner) as possible.
Chapter 85. To these (words) Caesar replied (as follows): that, of all (of us), no one has less right to such expressions of complaint and self-pity (than you). For everyone else had excelled in their duties; he, himself, in that he had been reluctant to engage in battle even on advantageous terms and at a favourable place and time, so that all (things pertaining) to peace should be unimpaired; his army, in that they had preserved and protected (those) whom they had in their power, despite the injuries (which they had) received and the slaying of their (comrades); and even the soldiers of their army, in that they had, on their own initiative, put in motion (talks) about concluding peace, by which action they thought to secure the lives of all their (comrades). So the parts played by all sections had agreed on compassion, (but) their leaders shrank from peace; they had no regard for the conventions of a conference or a truce, and those innocent men, who had been deceived by (the holding of) a conference, they put to death most cruelly. So it happened to them, as is generally wont to happen to men of excessive obstinacy and arrogance, that they have had recourse to the very (thing), and (indeed) to beg for it most earnestly, which they had spurned shortly beforehand. Nor, due to their humiliation or any present advantages (of his), would he demand any terms by which his resources might be increased; but (only) that they would disband those armies which they had now been maintaining against him for (so) many years. For, for no other reason (than this) had six legions been sent to Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many powerful fleets provided and generals experienced in military affairs sent (there). That none of these (measures had been) adopted to keep Spain at peace, nor for the benefit of the province, which, because of the length of the peace, did not require any such assistance. That all these (things) had been designed against him sometime ago, so that the same (person) (i.e. Pompey) should preside over the affairs of the City from its gates and have possession of two most warlike provinces for so many years in his absence; that the rights of magistrates had been altered to his disadvantage, so that they should not be sent to the provinces from the praetorship and the consulate, as (had) always (happened before), but they should be appointed and chosen by a faction. that, to his disadvantage, the plea of age (now) counted for nothing, but that (those who had) proved themselves in earlier wars should be recalled to the command of armies; that, with regard to him alone, (the rule was) not observed that had always been granted to every general, that, after a war had been successfully waged, they should return home and disband their army either with some (mark of) honour or, at least, without disgrace. That he had, however, borne all of these (things) with patience, and that he would submit (to them still); nor did he now intend to take their army away from them and keep (it) himself, (something) which would not, however, be difficult for him (to do), but (only) so that they should not have it to be able to employ against him. Therefore, as he had said (before), let them quit the provinces and disband their army; if this were done, he would harm no one. This was his one and final condition for peace.
Chapter 86. But it was very pleasing and delightful to the soldiers, as could be seen from their own signs (of joy), that those who had been expecting some just penalty, should obtain the reward of a discharge unsolicited. For, when a debate occurred about the place and the timing of their dismissal, they all began to indicate, both by word and gestures from the rampart where they stood, (that is) that they should be discharged immediately, nor, even if every pledge were given, could they be sure (it would happen), if it were deferred to another date. When there had been a discussion in a few words on both sides, the decision came down to this, that those who had a dwelling or a property in Spain should be discharged at once, (and) the rest at the River Var (i.e. the south-east boundary of Gallia Transalpina); a guarantee was given by Caesar that no harm should be inflicted upon them, nor should anyone be compelled to take the military oath against his will.
Chapter 87. Caesar promised that he would provide (them) with corn from that time until they came to the River Var. He added also that whatever any of them had lost during the war, (and) which was (now) in the hands of his own men, would be restored to those who had lost (them); he paid money to his soldiers for those things, after a fair evaluation had been made. Whatever disputes the soldiers afterwards had among themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar for judgment. When their pay was demanded by the legions, and a mutiny almost occurred, Petreius and Afranius asserted that the time for this had not yet come; Caesar was asked to investigate, and both sides were satisfied with what he decided in this (case). About a third part of their army having been dismissed in two days, he ordered two of his own legions to go ahead, and the others to follow close behind, so that they could build camps at a distance not far from each other, and he put his legate Quintus Fufius Calenus in charge of this business. At his order, they marched from Spain to the River Var, and there the remaining part of their army was disbanded.
