Introduction:
Book II of the " De Bello Civili" is the last of the books actually written by Caesar (i.e. "De Bello Gallico" I - VII and "De Bello Civili I - III) to be translated by Sabidius. It is also perhaps the least read of all these books. Why should this be? Perhaps, because it is the one in which Caesar's fortunes are least successful. Much of the first half of the Book is taken up by the frustratingly protracted siege of Massilia, and, although the eventual fall of this port is followed by Caesar's success in winning the submission of Further Spain without the need for any fighting, the second part of the Book, i.e. Chapters 23-44, covers in some considerable detail the doomed campaign of Gaius Scribonius Curio in North Africa, where, after some initial successes, Curio is defeated and killed near Utica by a Pompeian army led by Attius Varus, heavily reinforced by the Numidian king Juba, one of Caesar's arch-enemies. Since the rationale for Caesar's 'Commentaries' is generally considered to involve propaganda, one does wonder why Caesar should have invested so much time and effort in writing of this sole example of a Caesarian campaign that ends in total disaster. The likely answer would seem to lie in Caesar's very high regard for Curio, who, if he had survived this African debacle, would probably have remained his senior and most trusted subordinate. He emphasises Curio's heroic death, when he refuses to seek his own salvation in flight and asserts that he could never look Caesar in the face again, having lost the army to which he had been entrusted: "ita proelians interficitur" - 'and so he died fighting' (see Chapter 42). Perhaps Caesar also felt some subsequent guilt about Curio's tragic death, in that he had given such great responsibilities to a man, who, although he was a great orator and politician, was of limited military experience, and that the army he commanded was much less experienced and reliable than the one he was leading himself. Perhaps in the end though, there is some propaganda value even in reading of Curio's defeat, in that it emphasises that Caesar's armies never lost a campaign when he himself was leading them, and indeed it surely makes his great victory over the Pompeians and Juba at Thapsus in 46 seem all the more remarkable.
1. The Siege of Massilia (Chapters 1-16).
Chapter 1. While these (things) were happening in Spain, his legate Gaius Trebonius, who had been left behind to (conduct) the siege of Massilia (i.e. Marseilles), began to bring up against the town a mound, penthouses and siege towers in two places. One (of these) was near to the harbour and dockyards, (and) the other by the gate, through which there was access (to the road) from Gaul and Spain, (and) to that (stretch of) sea which lay close to the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed by the sea on almost three sides of the town; it is the remaining fourth (side) which provides access to the land. As part of this space (is) that which belongs to the citadel, the nature of the place, fortified (as it is) by a very deep valley, ensures that any siege (will be) a long and difficult (one). In order to accomplish these works, Gaius Trebonius summoned a great multitude of men and beasts of burden from the whole of the province, and ordered wicker hurdles and timber to be collected. These things having been provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in height.
Chapter 2. But so great a stock of all the things required for war had been (laid up) in the town sometime ago, and such a great quantity of war engines, that no penthouses (i.e. screens) woven of wickerwork could withstand their force. For poles, twelve feet (high, were) tipped with metal-points, and these, fired from enormous catapults, crashed into the ground through four layers of wickerwork. So, the arcades (i.e. protective galleries) were covered over with timbers, a foot (thick), joined to one another, and, due to this, (the material for) the mound was carried from hand to hand. A 'tortoise' (i.e. a long, tunnel-like shed) went in front in order to level the ground, (and it was) also made of very strong timber intertwined with everything by which they could be defended from firebrands and stones thrown (by the enemy). But the size of the task, the height of the wall and the towers, (and) the large number of war engines, retarded all their efforts. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the town by the Albici (i.e. a tribe living in the hills to the north-east of Massilia), and fire was thrown at our mound and siege towers. Our men easily repelled these (attacks), and, in addition to inflicting heavy losses on those who had made the sally, they drove (them) back into the town.
Chapter 3. In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius had been sent by Gnaeus Pompeius (Magnus) with a fleet of sixteen ships, a few of which had bronze (beaks), to the assistance of Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus) and the Massiliotes, and had sailed through the Sicilian straits without the knowledge, and against the expectation, of (Gaius Scribonius) Curio, and, after his ships had been put in to land at Messana, and a flight of the leaders and local council had occurred on account of their sudden panic, he carried off a ship from their dockyards. When this had been attached to the rest of his ships, he resumed his journey towards Massilia, and, having sent a small boat secretly ahead, he informed Domitius and the Massiliotes of his approach, and urged them strongly to engage (Decimus Junius) Brutus' fleet once more, as soon as his reinforcements had been added.
Chapter 4. After their earlier setback, the Massiliotes had brought the same number of old ships out of their dockyards (as they had previously lost), and had repaired and refitted (them) with great industry - and a great supply of oarsmen and pilots was available (to them) - and they had added some fishing boats and had covered (them) over (with decking), so that their oarsmen might be safe from the flight of missiles; (and) these they filled up with archers and catapults. When their fleet had been equipped in such a manner, they climbed aboard the ships, encouraged by the prayers and tears of all the old men, family matrons (and) maidens (to) come to the aid of their state at this dire moment, (and) with no less courage and confidence than (they had shown when) they had fought before. For it is a common defect of our nature that in unfamiliar and unknown circumstances we tend to be over-confident or excessively afraid; (and) so it happened on this occasion. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius filled the community with great optimism and enthusiasm. When they got a suitable wind, they left harbour and went to (join) Nasidius at Taurois, which is a fortress belonging to the Massiliotes, and there they prepared their ships for action, and strengthened their resolve to fight once more. The right wing was assigned to the Massiliotes, and the left to Nasidius.
Chapter 5. Brutus hurried to the same (place) with an increased number of ships. For to those which had been built by Caesar at Arelate (i.e. the modern Arles), six (ships) captured from the Massiliotes were added. These he had repaired and fitted out with all necessities. Accordingly, having encouraged his (men) to despise a vanquished (people) whom they had conquered (when they were) at full strength, he advanced against them full of optimism and ardour. From Gaius Trebonius' camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the city, (and see) how all the young men who had remained in the town, and all those of more advanced age, together with their wives and children, were stretching their hands up to heaven from the public squares and watch-towers or from the wall, or were going into the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating themselves before their statues, were imploring the gods for victory. Nor was there a single one out of all (of them) but that he thought that the fate of all his fortunes depended on the outcome of that day. For the pick of the young men and the most eminent of every age (group), having been summoned and entreated, climbed aboard ship, so that, if anything adverse happened, they might see that nothing would be left to them to attempt; (and,) if they were to conquer, they might ensure the safety of the city, either by their domestic resources or by external assistance.
Chapter 6. When battle was joined, nothing was lacking to the Massiliotes with regard to their courage. But, mindful of their instructions, which they had received from their (friends) shortly before, they fought with such spirit, as they thought they would not have another opportunity to try (the fortunes of battle), and they believed that those to whom danger to life would occur in battle would not precede for so very long the fate of the remaining citizens, who, if their city were taken, would have to suffer the same fortune of war. Our ships having gradually dispersed, room was given both to the skill of their helmsmen and the manoevrability of their ships, and, if ever our (men), having gained an opportunity by casting iron hooks, had tied up a ship, they came from all directions to the assistance of their (ships) that were in trouble. Nor, indeed, after the Albici had joined (them), were they lacking in hand-to-hand fighting, nor were they much inferior to our (men) in valour. At the same time, a great shower of darts, thrown from a distance from their smaller ships unexpectedly inflicted several wounds on our (men), off-guard and hampered (by other duties, as they were). And two of their three-decked ships having sighted the ship of Decimus Brutus, which could be easily recognised by its flag, rushed up against it from both sides. But Brutus, having foreseen their design, extricated his ship with such speed that it got clear (of them) just in time. Sailing as rapidly (as they were), thy struck each other so heavily that they were both severely damaged by the collision, (and) indeed the beak of one (of them) was broken off and the whole (ship) was on the verge of foundering. This event having been observed, the ships of Brutus' fleet that were nearest to that spot made an attack on them, and sank (them) both.
Chapter 7. But Nasidius' ships were not of any use, and quickly withdrew from the battle. For neither the sight of their homeland, nor the injunctions of their kinsmen, were compelling them to enter (a situation) of extreme risk to their lives. And so, of the number of their ships not one was lost; of the fleet of the Massiliotes five (ships) were sunk, four taken, (and) one escaped with those of Nasidius; all of these made their way to Further Spain. But, when one of the remaining ships, which had been sent on ahead to convey the news of this (event), came near to the city, a whole multitude (of people) rushed out to discover (what had happened), and, when they learned of the outcome, such grief took hold (of them), that the city seemed to have been captured by the enemy at the same moment. Yet, despite this, the Massiliotes began to make other arrangements for the defence of their city.
Chapter 8. It was observed by the legionaries who were engaged on the right-hand part of the (siege-)works that they could have considerable protection from the frequent sallies of the enemy, if they should build a tower there close to the wall as a stronghold and place of refuge. To begin with, they built a small low (structure) to (guard) against sudden incursions. Into this thy retired; from it they defended themselves, if any rather large force attacked (them); (and) from it they sallied forth to repel and pursue the enemy. It extended thirty feet in every direction, while the thickness of its walls (was) five feet. But later, as experience is the master of all things, man's ingenuity was applied, and it was found that it could be of great use, if it were raised to the height of a tower. This was achieved in the following way.
Chapter 9. When the height of the tower reached the (level of) a storey, they laid the flooring against the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered by the outer structure of the walls, so that nothing should stick out to which the enemy's firebrands might cling. In addition, they built up this timber-work with small bricks as high as the roofs of the penthouses and screens allowed, and on top of that place they laid two joists across, not far from the outer walls, by which they supported that wooden framework which was going (to be) a covering for the tower, and on top of these joists they laid beams across at right angles, and held these down with planks. They made these beams rather longer and more prominent than the ends of the walls were, so that they could stick out in front of (the place) where the roof was, in order to ward off and repel blows, while they were constructing the walls inside this wooden frame; and they covered the top of that wooden framework with bricks and clay, so that none of the enemy's fire could damage (it), and they laid pads of rags on top of (it), lest any missiles hurled by ballistas might break through the flooring, or rocks (fired) from catapults might smash the brickwork.
Moreover, they made three mats, four feet broad, out of anchor cables (to fit) along the length of the walls of the tower, and they fastened these so that they were hanging down around the tower from the projecting (ends of) the beams on the three sides that were facing the enemy; they had learned from experience in other places that this (was) the one type of covering that could not be penetrated by any dart or ballistic engine. But, when that part of the tower which had been completed was shielded and protected from all of the enemy's missiles, they removed the penthouses to other (parts of) the (siege-)works; they began to suspend and raise the roof of the tower from the first storey entirely by leverage. When they had raised (it) as far as the lowering of the mats permitted, hidden and secured within these coverings (as they were), they built up the walls with bricks, and freed space for themselves to build by further leverage again. When it seemed (to be) the time for a second storey, they laid joists such as (they had) at first, protected by external brickwork, and from the flooring they raised up the roof and the matting once more. So, securely, and without any injury or danger, they raised (it) six storeys high, and, in (the course of) building, left apertures in those places where it seemed appropriate for a ballista to discharge (missiles).
Chapter 10. When they were confident that from this tower they could protect the (siege-)works that were (taking place) nearby, they began to build a covered gallery, sixty feet long, (made) of timber two feet square, which they could extend from their brick tower to the enemy's tower and wall. The structure of this gallery was as follows. First, two beams of equal length were placed on the ground at a distance of four feet between them, and small (wooden) pillars five feet high were firmly fixed on these. They connected these one to another by cross-beams (forming) a slight gable, on which joists, which they had set aside for the sake of covering the gallery, were placed. Above this they put joists two feet square, and these they fastened with iron plates and nails. At the top of the roof of the gallery and (on) the uppermost beams, they fixed posts extending four inches square which held the bricks which were piled up on top of the shed. So, when (the roof) had been gabled and properly constructed, so that the timbers had been laid on the cross-beams, the gallery was covered with bricks and clay, so it should be secure from the firebrands which might be thrown from the wall. Over the bricks hides were spread, so that water let loose from pipes could not dissolve the bricks. Moreover, the hides were again covered over with pads of rags, so they should not be destroyed by fire and stones. Under the protection of penthouses, they completed this work to that tower of ours, and suddenly, and with the enemy off guard, they moved (it) right up to the enemy's tower, so that it was (even) connected to their building.
Chapter 11. Alarmed at this sudden calamity, the townsmen pushed forward with levers rocks (which were) as large as they could (manage), and, casting (them) from the wall, they rolled (them) down on to the gallery. The strength of the timber withstood the impact, and whatever fell (on it) slid off due to the gallery's sloping roof. When they saw this, they changed their plan; they set fire to barrels filled with firewood and pitch, and rolled these down from the wall on to the gallery. They rolled and fell off, and, as they fell down at the sides, they were removed from the works by long poles and forks. Meanwhile, inside the gallery our soldiers, (using) crowbars, were breaking up the lowest (row of) rocks in the enemy's tower, on which its foundations depended. The gallery was defended by missiles (thrown) from ballistas by our (men) from the brick tower; the enemy were driven away from the wall and its turrets; nor was any free opportunity given (to them) of defending their wall. Now, when several stones from that part of the wall which was beneath the tower were withdrawn, part of the tower suddenly fell toppling down, (and) the remaining part began to slope forward in consequence; when the enemy, alarmed at (the thought of) their city being sacked, rushed out of the gate in unison, unarmed and with fillets (on their heads), they stretched forth their hands in supplication to our officers and army.
Chapter 12. When this new development occurred, the whole operation of the war came to a standstill, and the soldiers turning away from battle, eagerly rushed out to hear and find out (what was going on). When the enemy came up to our officers and army, they all of them fell prostrate at their feet, and begged (them) to await Caesar's arrival. (They said) that their city (was) taken, our works completed, (and) their tower undermined; and so they were giving up its defence. (They said) that no obstacle could arise that (would prevent them) from being instantly sacked when he arrived, unless they were to carry out his orders at his behest. They pointed out that, if the tower were to collapse completely, our soldiers could not be stopped from bursting into the city in the hope of booty and sacking the city. These and several other (arguments) of the same kind were delivered with much piteousness and lamentation.
Chapter 13.
The officers, moved by these (appeals), withdrew their men from the (siege(-works) and ceased the assault; they left sentries at the works. Some sort of truce was effected, and Caesar's arrival was awaited. No missile was launched from the wall and none by our (men); as if the issue had been completed, they all relaxed their care and attentiveness. For Caesar had strictly instructed Trebonius in dispatches not to allow the town to be stormed by force, lest the soldiers, deeply aroused both by their resentment of the revolt and the contempt (that had been shown) to them, and their protracted labour, might kill all the adult men. They were threatening that they would do (just) this, and, at that time, they were (only) restrained from breaking into the town with difficulty, and they bitterly resented this situation, because it seemed (to them) that they had been prevented by Trebonius from taking over the town.
Chapter 14.
But the enemy, (being) without honour, were seeking a time and an opportunity for fraud and treachery, and, after some days had passed, and our (men) had become listless and absent-minded, all of a sudden at midday, when some of our men were absent (and) others had devoted themselves to rest from their long labours on the very (siege-)works themselves, while all their arms had been put away and covered up, they burst out of the gates, and, (assisted) by a strong following wind, set fire to the (siege-)works. The wind spread it in such a manner that, at a single moment, the siege-wall, the penthouses, the tortoise, the tower (and) the missile-engines caught fire, and all these (things) were consumed before it could be determined how it had happened. Our (men), alarmed by this unexpected misfortune, seized hold of what arms they could (find), and some (of them) rushed out of the camp. An attack was made by them on the enemy, but they were prevented from pursuing (them) as they fled by arrows and missiles (fired) from the wall. The (enemy) retired close to their wall, and there they freely set alight to the gallery, and the brick tower. So, the work of many months was destroyed in a moment of time by the enemy's perfidy and the strength of the storm-wind. The Massiliotes tried the same (thing) the next day. Having obtained another such storm-wind, they fought with greater confidence, and brought a large quantity of firebrands (with them) in a sally against the other tower and siege-wall. But, just as our (men) had given up all (thoughts of) a contest on the previous occasion, so (now), warned by the events of the day before, they had made every preparation for a defence. And so, after many had been killed, they drove the rest back into the town without having achieved their purpose.
Chapter 15.
Trebonius began to rearrange and repair what had been lost with much greater enthusiasm on the part of his men. For, when they realised that their hard work and preparations had utterly gone up in smoke, they were stung by the thought that their valour had been held up to ridicule through the crime of a truce being violated, and, because there was nowhere from which (the materials needed to build) a siege-wall could, in any way, be collected, as all the timbers for miles around within the territories of the Massiliotes had been cut down and carried off, they began to construct a siege-wall of a new and unheard of kind, (made) from two walls of brick, six feet in thickness, and with a floor between these walls of a height almost equal to the old siege-wall which had been piled up out of timber. Wherever the space between the walls or the weakness of the timber appeared to require (it), pillars were inserted and cross-beams were laid in order to provide support, and the (space) which was floored was covered over with wickerwork hurdles (and) the hurdles were plastered with mortar. The soldiers, with a roof overhead, protected by a wall on their right and left, and with a screen put down in front (of them), brought up without any danger whatever they needed for the (building) work. The business proceeded quickly; the loss of their protracted labour was soon restored by the adroitness and fortitude of the soldiers. Gateways were left in the wall at places which seemed suitable for the purpose of (making) sallies.
Chapter 16.
When the enemy had seen that those (works), which they had hoped could not be restored for a long and tedious period of time, had been so far repaired by the work and labour of a few days, that there was no scope for treachery or sallies, and that absolutely no means were left (to them) by which it would be possible to injure our men with missiles or the siege(-works) with fire, and they realised that all of the city to which there was access by land could be surrounded in the same way by a wall and towers, so that there would not be room (for them) to stand on their own fortifications, since a wall seemed to have been built on top of their walls and missiles could be hurled by hand, and that the use of their catapults, on which they had placed great hopes, was at an end, due to the narrow space (between the lines), and they were aware that, if given the chance of fighting from the wall and towers on equal (terms), they could not match our (men) in valour, they had recourse to the same terms of surrender.
2. Spain - the surrender of Varro (Chapters 17-22).
Chapter 17.
In Further Spain, Marcus (Terentius) Varro, when he heard at the start (of the disturbances) of the events which were taking place in Italy, (and) being doubtful of Pompeius' chances of success, spoke of Caesar in very amicable terms: (he said) that he had previously been appointed as legate by Gnaeus Pompeius, and that he was bound in honour to hold (this post); indeed, (while) his ties of friendship with Caesar were no less strong, he was not unaware of what were the duties of a legate who held an office in trust, what his own strengths were, and the extent of the good will of the whole province towards Caesar. He said such (things) in all his conversations, and did not attach himself to any party. But, afterwards, when he learned that Caesar had been held up at Massilia, that the forces of (Marcus) Petreius had been joined with the army of (Lucius) Afranius, that a considerable (number of) auxiliaries had combined with (them) and that there were great hopes and expectations (of more), and that the whole Hither Province was united in its allegiance, and he received (reports of) what had afterwards occurred concerning (Caesar's) difficulties over the corn supply at Ilerda, and Afranius described these (things) to him more fully and in an exaggerated form, he too began to move in step with fortune.
Chapter 18.
He (i.e. Varro) held levies throughout the province, and he brought his two legions up to full strength and added about thirty auxiliary cohorts. He collected a large quantity of corn, to send to the Massiliotes, and also to Afranius and Petreius. He ordered the inhabitants of Gades (i.e. the modern Cadiz) to build ten warships, and arranged for several (more) to be built at Hispalis (i.e. the modern Seville) in addition. He transferred all the money and all the ornaments from the temple of Hercules into the town of Gades; he sent six cohorts there from the province as a garrison, and he placed the town of Gades under the command of Gaius Gallonius, a Roman knight and a friend of Domitius, who had come there because he had been sent by Domitius to take care of an inherited estate; all the weapons, (both) private and public, he deposited into Gallonius' house. He, himself, held public meetings (where he was) heavily critical of Caesar. He frequently announced from his official platform that Caesar had fought (several) unsuccessful battles, (and) that a great number of his soldiers had gone over from him to Afranius; (he said) that he had learned of these (things) from reliable messengers, (and) on good authority. By means of these reports, he (so) alarmed the Roman citizens of his province that he compelled (them) to promise him for the conduct of his government two hundred and thirty thousand sesterces, and twenty thousand pounds of silver, and a hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat. Those city-states which he thought friendly to Caesar, on them he imposed heavier burdens and placed garrisons there (i.e. they then had to bear the cost of billeting these troops), and brought prosecutions against private (individuals) who were alleged to have spoken words and made speeches against the republic; their property he publicly auctioned. He forced the whole province to swear an oath of allegiance to himself and Pompeius. On learning of the events which were taking place in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. Now his plan of war was this, to go to Gades with his two legions, (and) to keep all his ships and corn there; for he had learned that the whole province was in favour of Caesar's party. He thought that the war could be prolonged without difficulty on an island, if he were provided with corn and shipping.
Caesar, although he was being called back to Italy for many important reasons, yet he had decided to leave no part of the war in Spain behind (him), as he knew of the great (number of) benefits (conferred) by Pompeius on the Hither Province and the great (number of) clients (that he had there)
Chapter 19.
So, having sent two legions into Further Spain with Quintus Cassius, the tribune of the people (n.b. it was most unusual for a tribune to be employed in a military capacity during his year of office), he himself proceeded (there) with six hundred cavalry by forced marches, and sent ahead (of him) a proclamation (specifying) the day on which he wished the magistrates and chief men of all the city-states to meet him at Corduba (i.e. a town on the river Baetis, now the Guadalquivir, which was the capital of Further Spain; the modern Cordova). This edict having been published throughout the province, there was no state that did not send a part of its senate to Corduba at the appointed time, (and there was) no Roman citizen of any repute but that he came there on that day. At the same time, the assembly of Corduba closed its gates to Varro of its own accord, and stationed guards and watchmen in their towers and (on) their wall, (and) kept with them two cohorts, which were called the colonials (i.e. they had been levied in Roman colonies), since they had come there by chance, to guard the town. During the same period, after three cohorts had been installed in the town's citadel as a garrison by Varro, the inhabitants of Carmo (i.e. the modern Carmona, a town in Further Spain, about thirteen miles from Hispalis), by far the strongest city-state in the whole province, ejected these cohorts on their own initiative, and shut their gates.
Chapter 20.
Indeed, for this reason, Varro was all the more anxious to to make haste to march to Gades with his legions as soon as possible, lest he should be cut off on his march or sea-crossing; so great and so supportive towards Caesar was the goodwill of the province discovered to be. When he had proceeded a little further, a dispatch from Gades was delivered to him, (saying that) as soon as they had learned of Caesar's edict, the leading citizens of Gades had agreed with the tribunes of the cohorts, which were in the garrison there, to expel Gallonius from the town, and to retain the city and the island (i.e. at that time Gades was still separated from the mainland by a small channel) for Caesar. This course of action having been agreed, they warned Gallonius to leave of his own accord while he could (still do so) safely. When Varro, alarmed by these events, altered his route and sent (word) ahead that he would be coming to Italica (i.e. a town on the northern bank of the River Baetis, just to the north of Hispalis) he was informed by its inhabitants that their gates had been closed against (him). So then, having been barred from every route, he sent (word) to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the legion to whoever he should designate. He (i.e. Caesar) sent Sextus (Julius) Caesar (i.e. Julius Caesar's first cousin once removed) to him and ordered that it should be handed over to him. Having handed over his legion, Varro came to (see) Caesar at Corduba. Having given him a faithful account of his public (monies), he gave up the money that was in his possession and indicated the whereabouts of the corn and shipping that he had.
Chapter 21.
Holding a public meeting at Corduba, Caesar gave thanks to everyone, group by group: the Roman citizens because they had diligently taken the town under their own control, the Spaniards because they had driven out the garrison, and the people of Gades because they had thwarted the efforts of his adversaries and had asserted their right to liberty, (and) the military tribunes and centurions, who had come there to provide a garrison, because they had courageously supported those peoples' decisions. He remitted to the Roman citizens the money which they had publicly promised to Varro; he restored their property to those whom he learned had suffered the punishment (of confiscation) for speaking out too freely. He bestowed certain rewards on (both) communities and individuals, and filled the minds of the rest with good hopes for the future, and, after spending two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades; he ordered that the money and the treasures which had been taken from the temple of Hercules to a private dwelling should be restored to the temple. He put Quintus Cassius in charge of the province (i.e. Further Spain); he assigned four legions to him. He himself arrived with the ships, which Marcus Varro (had built) and which the Gaditani had built on Varro's orders, at Tarraco (i.e. the modern Tarragona, a port on the north-east coast of Spain) in a few days. There deputations from almost the whole of the Hither Province were awaiting Caesar's arrival. Having bestowed honours on certain city states in the same way, both to individuals and to groups, he left Tarraco and came by land to Narbo (i.e. the modern Narbonne), and from there to Massilia. There he learned that a law (had been) passed concerning (the appointment of) a dictator, and that he had been appointed dictator by the praetor Marcus (Aemilius) Lepidus (i.e. the future triumvir).
3. Massilia capitulates (Chapter 22).
Chapter 22.
The Massiliotes had been worn out by all kinds of misfortunes: they had suffered an extreme shortage in their supply of corn, they had twice been defeated in a naval battle, they had been routed in their frequent sallies, they had been struck down by a severe pestilence, the result of the long siege and the change in their diet - for they were subsisting on stale millet and rotten barley, (stocks of) which they had stored in a public warehouse for just such an emergency - , a tower had collapsed, a large section of their wall had been undermined, (and) they had despaired of any assistance from the provinces and their armies, which they had learned had come under Caesar's control; (so) they had decided to surrender in earnest. However, a few days before, Lucius Domitius, having learned of the Massiliotes' intentions, had got together three ships, two of which he had assigned to his associates, (and) one he had embarked upon himself, (and) he set sail as soon as he got stormy weather. Ships, which were keeping watch near the harbour in accordance with daily routine on the orders of Brutus, observed him, and, raising their anchors, began to pursue (him). His own single ship sailed away from them and persisted in flight, and with the help of the storm disappeared from sight, (but the other) two, alarmed at meeting our ships, returned to harbour. The Massiliotes brought their weapons and catapults out of the town, as they had been ordered, took their ships and out of the harbour and the dockyards, (and) handed over the money from their treasury. After these (things) had been done, Caesar, sparing them more on account of the name and the age of the city rather than on account of its services to himself, left two legions there as a garrison, (and) sent the rest to Italy; he himself set out for the City.
4. Africa - Curio's campaign (Chapters 23-36).
Chapter 23.
At the same time, Gaius (Scribonius) Curio (i.e. tribune of the people 50), after sailing to Africa from Sicily, and already scorning from the outset the forces of Publius Attius Varus (i.e. praetor in 53), transported two of the four legions which he had received from Caesar and five hundred cavalry, and, having spent two days and three nights on the voyage, he came in to land at the place which is called Anquillaria. This place is twenty-two miles from Clupea (i.e. a port on the north coast of Africa) and has fairly good anchorage in summer and is enclosed between two projecting promontories. Lucius (Julius) Caesar, the son (i.e. Julius Caesar's third cousin once removed, and the son of Lucius Julius Caesar, consul in 64; he was also first cousin of Marcus Antonius, tribune of the people 49), had been awaiting his arrival off Clupea with ten warships, which ships, having been beached at Utica (i.e. the principal town of Roman North Africa) after the war with the pirates (i.e. Pompeius' campaign in 67), Publius Attius had repaired and fitted out for use in this war, but, alarmed at the large number of our ships, he fled from the sea, and, having run aground his own decked trireme on the nearest shore and having left (it there) on the beach, he fled for refuge to Hadrumetum (i.e. a town on the east coast of Tunisia) by land. Gaius Considius Longus (i.e. praetor perhaps in 52) guarded this town with a garrison of one legion (i.e. on behalf of Pompeius). After his flight, the rest of Caesar's (i.e. Lucius Caesar's) ships retired to Hadrumetum. The quaestor Marcius Rufus pursued him (i.e. Lucius Caesar) with twelve ships, which Curio had brought (with him) from Sicily as an escort for the transport ships, and, when he saw the ship (that had been) abandoned on the shore, he hauled it off with a towrope; he himself returned to Gaius Curio with his fleet.
Chapter 24.
Curio sent Marcius ahead to Utica with his ships. He himself set out with his army at the same time and, after advancing on the march for two days, he came to the river Bagradas (i.e. the principal river of Roman North Africa). There he left his lieutenant Gaius Caninius Rebilus with the legions; he himself went forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre Castra Cornelia (i.e. the site of the camp of Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus in his campaign against Hannibal in 202), because that place was thought highly suitable for a camp. Now it is a straight ridge jutting out into the sea, very steep and rugged on both sides, but yet with a slightly more gentle slope on the side which faces Utica. By the direct route it is little more than a mile from Utica. But on this route there is a spring, over which the sea flows for some distance, and this ground is extensively flooded; if anyone would wish to avoid it, he (must) reach the town by a six mile detour.
Chapter 25.
While exploring this place, Curio caught sight of Varius' camp adjoining the town wall at a gate which is called Belica (i.e. the War-gate), well fortified by the nature of its location, on one side by the town of Utica itself, (and) on the other by a theatre, which lies in front of the town, access to the camp (being rendered) difficult and narrow by the very substantial foundations of that structure. At the same time, he observed the many (things) being transported and driven from every quarter along the very full roads, which were being conveyed from the countryside to the town in alarm at the sudden disturbance. He sent his cavalry after them, to despoil (them) and treat (them) like booty; and at the same time six hundred Numidian cavalry and four hundred infantry, which king Juba had sent to Utica a few days before for the sake of reinforcements, were sent by Varus as an escort for these things. There was a paternal (bond of) friendship between him (i.e. Juba) and Pompeius, and a feud (between him) and Curio, because (the latter as) tribune of the people had proposed a law, by which measure Juba's kingdom would have become the property of the (Roman) people. The cavalry joined battle with each other; but the Numidians could not withstand our charge, but, after about a hundred and twenty (of them) had been killed, the rest withdrew to their camp near the town. Meanwhile, on the arrival of his warships, Curio ordered that a proclamation should be issued to the merchant ships which were lying off Utica, around two hundred in number, that he would consider as enemies (any) who did not take their vessels across to Castra Cornelia at once. As soon as this proclamation had been made, they instantly raised their anchors and left Utica and crossed over to (the place) where they had been commanded (to go). This circumstance furnished the army with supplies of everything.
Chapter 26.
These things having been done, Curio returned to his camp by the Bagradas and was hailed 'imperator' by the acclamation of the whole army, and on the following day he led his army to Utica and pitched camp near the town. While the work on the camp had not yet been completed, the cavalrymen on guard reported that large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry sent by the king were on their way to Utica; at the same time a great cloud of dust was seen, and, in a short time, the front of the column was in sight. Surprised by this new development, Curio sent out the cavalry to receive and retard the initial onset; he himself quickly withdrew the legions from their work and drew up a battle-line. The cavalry joined battle, and before the legions could be deployed and take up their position, the king's entire forces, because they had been marching in a disorderly fashion and without any apprehension, were encircled and thrown into confusion, and they took to flight, but (while) almost all of their cavalry (were) unharmed because they retreated quickly along the shore into the town, a large number of their infantry were killed.
Chapter 27.
On the following night two Marsian centurions from Curio's camp deserted to Attius Varus with twenty-two of their fellow-soldiers. Whether they were expressing to him the view that they really had or were just gratifying his ears - for we readily believe the things that we want (to hear), and we hope that others feel what we feel ourselves - at any rate they assured (him) that the minds of the whole army were alienated from Curio, and that there was a very great need (for him) to come face to face with their army and that he should give (them) a chance of talking (with him). Convinced by this opinion, Varus led his legions out of their camp early the next day. Curio did the same, and each drew up his forces with one small valley coming between (them).
Chapter 28.
There was in Varus' army (one) Sextus Quintilus Varus, who it has been mentioned above, had been at Corfinium, After his release by Caesar, he had come to Africa, and Curio had brought across those legions, which Caesar had taken over at Corfinium, in such a way that the ranks and companies were still the same, although a few centurions had been changed. Taking this (as) a reason to address (them), Quintilius began to go around Curio's lines and beseech the soldiers not to lose (all) recollection of their first (military) oath which they had sworn to Domitius and to himself (as) quaestor, not to bear arms against those who had experienced the same fortune and endured the same (hardships) in a siege (as they had), nor fight for those, by whom they had been insultingly called deserters. To this he added a few (words) in the hope of inducement, (concerning) what they should expect from his own liberality, if they were to follow him and Attius. After this speech had been delivered, no response of any kind was made from Curio's army, and the two (generals) took their forces back (to camp).
Chapter 29.
Then a great fear came upon the minds of everyone in Curio's camp; this was rapidly intensified by the men's various remarks. When this had spread from one author to several (persons) and was passed from one to another, there seemed to be many authors of this view. (It was) a civil war; (they were) a type of men, to whom it was permitted to act freely and to follow whichever (party) they wished; these (were) legions, which (but) a short time before had been among their adversaries; for the manner in which it was offered had even affected Caesar's generosity; the townships were even joined together (by men) from different regions, for they came from the Marsi and the Paeligni, as they had been in tents (as) fellow-soldiers on the previous night; several of the soldiers' conversations were full of rather painful (stories); uncertainty was poorly received, (and) several (of these stories) were invented by those who wished to appear more zealous. (N.B. Because of the corruption of the Latin text it is impossible to translate this chapter with any degree of confidence.)
Chapter 30.
For these reasons, he (i.e. Curio) convoked a council (of war) and began to deliberate on the whole situation. (Some) were of the opinion that they should vote to attempt an attack upon Varus' camp by all (possible) means, because they thought that, with the minds of the men in this (sort of) mood, idleness was the greatest danger. Finally, they said it was better to try the fortunes of war through courage in battle than to be abandoned and betrayed by their own (men) and to have to endure the gravest punishment. There were (those) who thought they should withdraw to Castra Cornelia in the third watch (i.e. during the small hours), so that, after a longer interval of time had intervened, the minds of the men might be healed, (and,) at the same time, if anything untoward should befall (them), a safer and easier retreat might be granted (to them) through the large number of their ships.
Chapter 31.
Curio rejected both of their counsels and said that one proposal was lacking in spirit, and that the other showed an excess of it; the latter were contemplating some kind of disgraceful flight, and the former thought that they should fight in an unfavourable position. "For with what assurance," he said, "can we rely on it being possible for a camp to be stormed (that is) fortified both by works and by the nature of its position? Indeed, what do we gain if we withdraw from an attack on the camp after we have received great losses? As if it is not the case that a successful campaign earns the good-will of an army towards its commanders and failure its hatred! But what would a change of camp amount to other than an ignominious flight and a giving up of all hope and the alienation of the army? For those with a sense of honour ought not to suspect that they are not trusted enough, nor should the rebellious know that they are feared, because our fear would enhance the licentiousness of the latter and diminish the zeal of the former. But if," says he, "we have now had these (reports) investigated, in which (rumours) of disaffection within the army are spoken of, (rumours) which I certainly believe to be false or, at at any rate less (serious) than they are made out (to be), how much better it would be for these (rumours) to be covered up and concealed, (rather) than that they should be confirmed by our (conduct). Should not the troubles of the army be kept hidden like wounds of the body, so as not to increase the hopes of our enemies? But (some) also add that we should set out in the middle of the night, by which means, I suppose, they should have greater scope to attempt to commit misdemeanours. For behaviour of such a kind is (usually) held in check either by (a sense of) shame or by fear, which feelings the night is very much inclined to block. Therefore, I am neither so reckless that I should give my opinion that we should attack their camp without any hope (of success), nor so timid as to lack (all) hope, and I do think that everything should first be tried, and I am, to a great extent, certain that I shall form the (same) judgment as you concerning this matter."
Chapter 32.
Having dismissed the council, he (i.e. Curio) summoned an assembly of his troops. He reminded (them) how Caesar had made use of their zeal at Corfinium, so that, through their good-will and example, he had won over a great part of Italy to his (cause). "For," he said. "all the townships subsequently followed you and your actions, and (it was) not without (good) reason (that) Caesar thought so very well of you, and his enemies (felt) so very harshly (towards you). For Pompeius, although defeated in no battle, departed from Italy because he had become unsettled by the precedent (established) by your conduct; Caesar has entrusted me, whom he considered his dearest (friend), (and) the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which the City and Italy cannot be protected, to your good keeping. But there are (some) who are encouraging you to desert from us. For what is more desirable to them than to betray us, and, at the same time, to involve you in a heinous crime? Or what worse (fate) could they conceive for you than that you should betray those who believe that they owe everything to you, (and) fall into the power of those who think that they have been ruined through you? But have you not heard of the things Caesar has achieved in Spain, that he has routed two armies, conquered two generals, (and) recovered two provinces, (and) that (all) these (things) have been done within forty days of the time when Caesar had come into sight of his opponents? Can (those) who were not able to withstand (him), (when they were) unharmed, resist (him now that they are) ruined? Are you (who) followed Caesar, when victory was uncertain, really going to follow the loser now that the fortune of war has been decided, (and) when you ought to be reaping the rewards of your services? For they say that they (were) deserted and betrayed by you, and they make mention of your former oath. But (did) you (desert) Lucius Domitius, or did Domitius desert you? Did he not forsake (you, when you were) prepared to endure extreme hardship? Did he not seek his own safety by secretly running away from you? Were you not betrayed by him and preserved through Caesar's generosity? How, indeed, could he hold you to your oath, when he had thrown down his symbols of office and laid aside his command, and had, himself, come into the power of another as a private citizen and a captive? A new obligation is left (to your conscience), by which you should neglect that oath by which you are bound, and have regard for the one which was invalidated by your general's surrender and by the loss of his civil rights. But, I suppose, if you approve of Caesar, you take offence at me. I am not going to boast of my services to you, which are still less than my inclination and your expectation; but yet soldiers have always sought the rewards of their labours at the outcome of a war, and what it is going to be, not even you can doubt. Why, indeed, should I omit my own diligence, or my (good) fortune with regard to how far our affairs have as yet progressed? Do you regret that I transported the army safe and sound with not a single ship being lost? That, on my arrival, I routed the enemy's fleet at the first encounter? That twice in two days I defeated (them) in a cavalry battle? That I took two hundred of the enemy's merchant ships out of the harbour and the bay, and forced them (to join us) here, so that they could not receive the help of supplies either by land or in ships? You are rejecting such (good) fortune and such leaders, (and) you are following (those responsible for) the debacle at Corfinium, the flight from Italy, and the surrender of the Spanish (provinces), (all of these) precedents for the war in Africa! I, for my part, wished that I should be called a soldier of Caesar; you hailed me with the name of 'imperator'. If you regret this, restore my name to me, lest you should seem to have given (me) the honour as an insult."
Chapter 33.
The soldiers, upset by this speech, frequently interrupted (him), even as he was speaking, as they seemed to be bearing the suspicion of disloyalty with great anguish, and, indeed, as he was leaving the meeting they all urged (him) to be of a strong mind, and not to hesitate to join battle and put their loyalty and courage to the test. Since the inclination and the view of (them) all had been changed by this action, Curio decided with the consent of his (men) that, whenever the opportunity was first offered (to him), he would entrust (the issue) to battle, and, on the following day, he led (his men) out and arranged (them) in battle order in the same place where he had stationed them on the preceding days. Nor indeed did Attius Varus hesitate to lead out his forces, whether the situation was offered (to him) of suborning our soldiers or of engaging in a favourable position, lest he should lose the opportunity (of doing so).
Chapter 34.
There was, as has been mentioned above (i.e. in Ch. 27), a valley between the two battle-lines, not so deep but difficult and steep to climb. Each side was waiting (to see) whether the forces of their adversaries would attempt to cross it, so that they might join battle in a more favourable position. At the same time, on the left wing, the whole of Publius Attius' cavalry and a good many light-armed troops, (that were) intermingled with them, were perceived when they descended into the valley. Curio sent the cavalry and two cohorts of the Marrucini (i.e. a tribe of central Italy) to (meet) them; the enemy's cavalry failed to withstand their first onset, but spurred on their horses and fled back to their own (lines); abandoned by those who had charged along with them, the light-armed troops were surrounded and slain by our (men). The whole of Varus' army turned around in that direction, and saw their (men) fleeing and being cut down. Then Rebilus, Caesar's lieutenant, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily, because he was aware that he had great experience in military matters, said, "You see the enemy (are) terrified, Curio; why do you hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity provided by this moment?" He (i.e. Curio) said only that his men should should keep in mind those (things) they had professed to him on the previous day, (and then) he ordered them to follow him and charged ahead in front of (them) all. The valley was (so) difficult to climb that those in front could not easily clamber up unless they were supported from below by their (comrades). But the minds of Attius' soldiers were so preoccupied by their fear and with the flight and slaughter of their (comrades) that they had no thought at all of any resistance, and (indeed) they believed that they had all been surrounded already by our cavalry. And so, before a (single dart) could be thrown or any of our (men) could come near them, all of Varus' army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.
Chapter 35.
During this flight, a certain Fabius, a Paelignian (soldier) from the lowest ranks of Curio's army, while pursuing the head of the retreating column, began searching for Varus and calling (him) by name in a loud voice (in such a manner) that he appeared to be one of his own soldiers and to be wishing to speak (to him) and to warn (him) of something. When, after he had been called several times, he stopped and looked at (him), and asked (him) who he was and what he wanted, he aimed a blow at his bare shoulder with his sword, and came very close to killing Varus; but he avoided the danger by raising his shield to (block) the attempted (blow). Fabius was (then) surrounded by the nearby soldiers and cut down. The gates of the camp were thronged and the passageway blocked by the numerous crowd of fleeing (troops), and more (of them) perished in that place without a wound (i.e. they were crushed to death) than in battle or in the retreat, nor were they very far from being expelled from the camp, and several (of them) hurried straight on in the same direction into the town (i.e. Utica). But, when the nature of the ground and the fortifications of the camp prevented their access, then, because Curio's men had marched out (prepared) for battle, they were lacking those pieces of equipment which were necessary for an assault on a camp. So, Curio led his men back to camp with all his (men) except Fabius, while, of the number of the enemy, about six hundred were killed and a thousand wounded; on Curio's departure, all of these, and many (others) in addition, on the pretence of being wounded, withdrew from the camp into the town on account of their fear. Having observed this situation and being aware of his army's terror, Varus left a trumpeter in the camp and a few tents for the sake of appearances, and led his army back into the town in silence during the third watch (i.e. the small hours of the morning).
Chapter 36.
On the following day, Curio began to besiege Utica and to surround it with a rampart. The populace in the town was unaccustomed to war, due to a long period of peace. On account of certain favours of Caesar towards them, the inhabitants of Utica were very well disposed to him; their community (of Roman citizens) was composed of different elements, (and) there was considerable anxiety on account of the earlier battles. And so they all began to speak openly now of surrender, and they urged Publius Attius not to seek to jeopardise the fortunes of all (of them) through his own obstinacy. While these matters were under discussion, messengers, sent ahead by king Juba, arrived to say that he was on his way with large forces and to encourage (them) to guard and defend their city. This news gave fresh strength to their most anxious minds.
5. Curio's last stand (Chapters 37-44).
Chapter 37.
The same information was reported to Curio, but for sometime he could not give (it) credence; (for) he had such great confidence in his own affairs. And at this time, Caesar's successes in Spain were brought to Africa by messengers and dispatches. (He was) elated by all these reports, and did not think that the king would try anything against him. But, when he learned from a reliable authority that his forces were less than twenty-five miles away from Utica, he abandoned the siege-works and withdrew to Castra Cornelia. Here he began to lay up corn, to fortify the camp, and to gather timber, and he immediately sent (orders) to Sicily that the two legions and the rest of the cavalry should be sent to him. His camp was highly suitable for conducting a campaign, from the nature and strength of the site, from its proximity to the sea, and from the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had already been gathered from the neighbouring salt-pits. There could be no lack of timber, due to the large amount of trees, nor corn, of which the fields were very full. And so, with the consent of all his (men), Curio prepared to await the rest of his forces and to prolong the war.
Chapter 38.
These arrangements having been decided and his plans approved, he heard from some deserters from the town that Juba had remained in his kingdom, having been recalled by a border war and troubles with the people of Leptis (i.e. Leptis Minor, a town on the east coast of the province of Africa, between Hadrumetum and Thapsus), and that his commander Saburra, (who had been) sent with a rather small force, was approaching Utica. Rashly believing these informants, he altered his plans and resolved to settle the issue in battle. His youth, his courageous spirit, the outcome of earlier situations, and his confidence in waging war successfully greatly helped to approve this decision. Induced by these factors, he sent all his cavalry at the beginning of the night to the enemy's camp by the river Bagradas. Saburra, of whom he had heard before, was its commander, but the king was following on with all his forces, and had halted at a distance of six miles from Saburra. The cavalry (that had been) sent accomplished the journey at night, and made an attack upon their naive and unsuspecting enemy. For the Numidians, in accordance with some barbarian custom, had encamped here and there without any formation. They fell upon them, dispersed (as they were) and heavy with sleep, and killed a great number of them; many fled in panic. After this had happened, the cavalry returned to Curio and brought back some captives to him.
Chapter 39.
Curio had set out with all of his forces at the third watch (i.e. in the small hours of the morning), having left five cohorts to guard the camp. When he had advanced six miles, he met the cavalry (and) learned of their successful action; he asked the prisoners who was in command of the camp at the Bagradas; they replied (that it was) Saburra. In his eagerness to complete the march, he omitted to ask any other (questions), and, looking back at the nearest ranks, he said, "Don't you see, men, that the prisoners' answer is in line with (the information provided by) the deserters? That the king is not there, (and) that the force he sent out was a small (one), which was not able to be a match for a few cavalrymen? Hasten then to (win) spoils and renown, so that we may now begin to think of your rewards and of the thanks we should give (you)." What the cavalry had achieved was significant in itself, especially when their small number was compared with so great a multitude of the Numidians. However, these (events) were related by themselves in an exaggerated manner, as men are naturally inclined to sing their own praises. Besides, many spoils were displayed and the captured cavalrymen were brought forward, so it seemed that, whatever time intervened, all this would delay their victory. So, the zeal of his soldiers did not fail the hopes of Curio. He ordered the cavalry to follow him, and hastened his march, so that he could attack (them), while they were (still) panic-stricken from their flight. But they (i.e. the cavalry), exhausted by their long all-night journey, could not keep up, and came to a halt, some in one place, some in another. (But), not even this occurrence impaired Curio in his expectations.
Chapter 40.
When Juba was informed by Saburra of the nocturnal battle, he sent Saburra two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalrymen, whom he had been accustomed to keep around him as his (personal body-)guard, and that part of his infantry on which he most greatly relied; he himself followed more slowly with the rest of his forces and sixty elephants. Suspecting that Curio, having sent his cavalry ahead, would (soon) be present himself, Saburra drew up his forces of cavalry and infantry, and ordered them to give way gradually and fall back under the pretence of fear, and that he would give (them) such orders as he felt the situation required. Curio, his view of the present situation being added to his earlier confidence, thought that the enemy were in retreat, and brought his forces down from the higher ground on to the plain.
Chapter 41.
When he had advanced a fairly long way from this place, (about) sixteen miles in distance, and his army was by that time worn out by their exertions, he halted. Saburra gave his (men) the signal, and formed his battle-line and began going around the ranks and encouraging (them). But (keeping) his infantry at a distance, he used (them) only for show, (and) sent his cavalry into battle. Curio was not found wanting in this situation (i.e. he rose to the occasion), and encouraged his (men) to repose all their confidence in their courage. Nor did his soldiers, though weary, nor his cavalry, though few (in number) and exhausted by their labour, lack any zeal and valour for the fighting; but they were (only) two hundred in number, (as) the rest had stopped on the journey. Wherever they charged, they forced the enemy to give ground, but they could not pursue (them) very far as they fled, nor spur their horses on too forcefully. Now the enemy's cavalry began to outflank our battle-line on both wings and to trample down those in our rear. When any of our cohorts ran forward from the battle-line, the Numidians, fresh (as they were), would escape our charge due to their speed, and (then) surround our men as they were seeking to return again to the ranks, and cut (them) off from the battle-line. So it did not seem safe either to remain in their position and keep their ranks, or to charge forward and take a chance. The enemy's forces were frequently increased (in number) by reinforcements sent by the king; the strength began to fail our (men) due to their fatigue, (and,) at the same time, those who had received wounds could neither leave the battle-line nor be taken to a place of safety, because the whole line was surrounded and held back by the enemy's cavalry. Despairing of their own safety, as men are wont to do in the last moment of their lives, they either lamented their own death, or, if fortune should save any (of them) from this peril, they commended their parents (to them). Everything was full of fear and grief.
Chapter 42.
When Curio realised that neither his exhortations nor his pleas were being heeded at all by his terrified (men), he thought that there was one hope of safety left (to them) in their wretched circumstances, and he ordered (them) as a body to take the nearby hills and to convey the standards there. (But) some cavalry, sent by Saburra also, took them first. Then indeed did our (men) fall into a state of the utmost despair, and some were killed by their cavalry as they tried to escape, and others fell to the ground unharmed. His cavalry commander, Gnaeus Domitius, surrounding Curio with a few horsemen, urged (him) to seek safety in flight and make his way to the camp, and he promised that he would not desert him. But Curio declared that, having lost the army which he had accepted when (it was) committed to his charge by Caesar, he would never appear again in his sight, and so he died fighting. Very few of the cavalrymen got away from the battle, but those at the tail of the column, whom we have stated (i.e. see Ch. 39) had stopped for the sake of refreshing their horses, having perceived the rout of the whole army, retired to their camp in safety. The infantrymen were all killed to a man.
Chapter 43.
Having heard of these events, the quaestor Marcius Rufus, (who had been) left behind in the camp by Curio, exhorted his (men) not to lose heart. They begged and entreated that they should be taken back to Sicily in their ships. (This) he promised (to do), and he ordered the ships' masters to bring the boats in to land on the shore by early evening. But so great was the general terror that some said that Juba's forces were present, some that Varus was hard on their heels with his legions, although none of these things had happened at all, (and) others suspected that the enemy's fleet was about to swoop swiftly down on (them). And so, amid the general terror, each (man) sought to consult his own (interests). (Those) who were on board ship were hastening to set sail. Their flight spurred on the masters of the transport vessels; a few skiffs assembled to (do) their duty and (obey) their orders. But on the crowded shores the struggle (to determine) who out of this vast number should be most able to embark was so great that several (vessels) were sunk by the weight of the multitude, (and) the rest were deterred from coming too close by the fear of this.
Chapter 44.
As a result of these things, it happened that (only) a few soldiers and fathers of families, who prevailed either through (personal) influence or compassion, or (who) could swim to the ships, were taken on board and reached Sicily in safety. The rest of the troops sent some centurions to Varus at night as a group of delegates and surrendered themselves to him. The next day Juba caught sight of their cohorts of soldiers in front of the town, and, claiming (them) to be his booty, he ordered a great number of them to be killed and sent back a chosen few to his kingdom, (and,) although Varus protested that his good faith had been broken by him, he did not dare to resist. He, himself, (i.e. Juba) rode into the town on horseback, attended by several senators, among which number were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, (and) in a few days decided and gave instructions as to what he wanted done in Utica, and then after a few days more he returned to his kingdom with all his forces.
